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



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CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

LECTURES AND PAPERS ON

PHILOSOPHY,

CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE,

BIBLICAL ELUCIDATION.

THIRD SERIES.

EDITED BY

CHARLES F. DEEMS, LL.D.,

PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

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CONTENTS.

INSTITUTE LECTURES AND PAPERS.

IS PRAYER REASONABLE ?	I
Noah K. Davis, LL.D.	
CAPITAL AND LABOR,	20
Rt. Rev. Samuel S. Harris, D.D., LL.D.	
THE VICARIOUS PRINCIPLE IN THE UNIVERSE,	38
A. H. Bradford, D.D.	
ANNIVERSARY ADDRESS,	81
Charles F. Deems, D.D., LL.D.	
PRIMEVAL MAN,	97
George D. Armstrong, D.D.	
ETHICS AND RELIGION,	122
Rev. William DeW. Hyde.	
KANT AND LOTZE : 1785-1885,	161
Henry M. MacCracken, D.D.	
THE RELATION OF TRUTH AND TIME,	181
John B. Drury, D.D.	
CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM,	194
Richard Wheatley, D.D.	
THE FAMILY IN THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY,	213
Rev. Samuel W. Dike.	
MUSIC AS REVELATION OF GOD AND OF THE FUTURE,	241
T. T. Munger, D.D.	
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ITS RELATION TO ETHICS,	262
George B. Newcomb, Ph.D.	
THE RELEASE OF FAITH,	286
Addison Ballard, D.D.	
THE WITNESS OF THE CONSCIENCE TO GOD,	302
Rev. Henry Ammi Dows, A.M.	
THE RELATIONS OF ART AND MORALITY,	321
Washington Gladden, D.D.	
THE REASON WHY SOME HONEST AND THOUGHTFUL MEN	
REJECT CHRISTIANITY,	345
James G. Roberts, D.D.	

THE FULNESS OF TIME,	356
Thomas A. Hoyt, D.D.	
THE BIBLE FOR MOHAMMEDANS,	373
Rev. James F. Riggs.	
WHICH NATURE SURVIVES?	401
Rev. James R. Day, D.D.	
THEN AND NOW; OR, THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NINETEENTH,	416
Ransom Bethune Welch, D.D., LL.D.	
THE WILL AS A FACTOR IN SCIENCE,	428
William Tucker, D.D.	
JESUS CHRIST AS THE REPRESENTATIVE HUMAN REDEEM- ER IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE,	433
Rev. Samuel W. Duffield.	

OTHER ARTICLES.

THE JOSEPH HENRY TABLET UNVEILING,	53
THE CREED OF EIGHTEEN CENTURIES,	121
James Anthony Froude.	
✓ FAITH IN RELIGION <i>versus</i> FAITH IN SUPERSTITIONS,	137
Lord Lytton.	
✓ THE EVIDENCES OF CHRIST'S LIFE, DEATH AND RESUR- RECTION,	193
Dr. Arnold, of Rugby.	
THE YOUNG INFIDEL WITH "A LEGAL (!) MIND,"	285
Dr. J. M. Buckley.	
✓ REPROACHING CHRISTIANITY FOR THE BLUNDERS OF ITS ENEMIES,	344
Bishop Coxe.	
THE PRAYER OF MODERN POSITIVISTS,	372
Dr. Lyman Abbott.	
THE INSTITUTE WORK,	69, 138, 235, 314, 398, 470
MEMORABILIA,	57, 395, 469
ABOUT BOOKS,	65, 158, 237, 315, 399, 471
NOTATA,	60, 152
OUR LETTER BOOK,	54, 151

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

JULY-AUGUST, 1885.

IS PRAYER REASONABLE?

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Richfield Springs, August 26th, 1884.]

BY NOAH K. DAVIS, LL.D.,

Professor in the University of Virginia.

HARD questions about prayer never occur to a little child, or trouble those who have become as little children. They never prevent any one from uttering a cry for relief in the hour of peril. Why is this? Perhaps "*le cœur a des raisons que la raison ne connaît point.*" Perhaps prayer is natural, as natural and therefore as universal as religion, "in whose realm," says Hegel, "all the enigmas of the world are solved, all contradictions of our deeper thought fall away, all sorrows of our heart are silenced, all doubting questions exhale in the ether of contemplation and hope."

But we who speculate, we in whose spirit there is much guile, we have our heads full of questions, and, sore vexed, how are we straitened until they be solved! "With the heart I am a Christian, with the understanding a heathen," said Jacobi; and though the Holy Scripture abound in promises of prayer-answer, still we entangle ourselves with the old question by night: How can these things be? And so we turn out of the Way, over the stile into By-Path-Meadow, and wander in the dim Debatable Ground, hard by Doubting Castle, kept by Giant Despair. We

are met by one Vain-Confidence who tells us we are in the right way with such bare assertions as these:

"The custom of prayer is simply evidence of man's weakness and needs, and of the childish views he once entertained of the world and of God. As far as the needs remain, science will supply them under intelligent human effort, and as the light of law advances, the illusions of the old spiritual world, and prayer among them, will vanish like ghosts at dawn. We must outgrow the use of prayer as we do other limitations of childhood—gradually, and by the aid of truer conceptions, ideals, and habits. The practice will cease in direct proportion as the laws of nature become known, and people come to rely on them instead of on petitions to alter them. Pseudo-conceptions of this character, and their fundamental illusions, are, however, ancient, venerable and hereditary. Immense capital—material, mental, social, spiritual—is invested in them. The law of evolution, therefore, leads us to expect that, instead of any sudden change, there will necessarily arise an immense expenditure of ingenuity to make these pseudo-conceptions appear credible, and that a very considerable amount of indignation will be visited upon those who may oppose them."

Let us not, however, expend either ingenuity or indignation here, for we read that "Vain-Confidence, not seeing the way before him, fell into a deep pit (which was purposely made there by the prince of those grounds to catch vainglorious fools withal), and was dashed to pieces with his fall." Let us rather ask with Hopeful: Where are we now? and address ourselves to return to the Way. We shall find it hard, no doubt, for, as the dreamer tells us in a parenthesis, "it is easier going out of the Way when we are in, than going in when we are out."

I.

Before trying to formulate our difficulties, let us consider two obvious conditions, without which there can be no such thing as prayer.

The first is free-will, implying, of course, duality, or the substantial existence and activity of mind as distinguished from matter and its forces. If will be bound, prayer cannot be, and those who still hold it possible are surely under a delusion. The babbled prayer of an automaton, that is, of a being whose every

act is determined without alternative, is an empty form only. If I be an automaton, my prayer is something wrung from me by a rigorous necessity; my action is no more than the thrust of a piston impelled by invisible steam, and I am strictly at par with the hydraulic praying-machine of the East. If I be not free, I cannot pray; for, indeed, then there is no I; selfhood has vanished, and that which has been called "the masterful Ego" is only the pitiful slave of nature.*

But if will be free, self remains, and I am I. Living in the midst of nature, I am merged in an ocean of necessity. In my own physical, and largely in my mental constitution, I am subject to necessity. Yet one element segregates me, I can choose. In this liberty it becomes possible to ask or to refrain from asking. Unless there were power to refrain, asking would not be asking. Hence, if free, not only I am I, but since I can refrain from asking, I can truly ask, can truly pray. Whether it be reasonable or unreasonable to do so is a further question.

We are here concerned with prayer to God, and the second condition of such prayer is the existence of a personal God. Prayer implies a relation between free persons whose accord or conflict is conceivable, and unless such persons be, it cannot be. Liberty and personality are here stated as conditions, and we offer no proof of either, because our argument is for those only who already admit the reality of both. We have no word here for the avowed atheist, either of the old nihilist school of Hume, or of the new positivist school of Comte which offers us Humanity for worship. We have no word for the agnostic with his newly discovered Unknowable, into which he tries to rub a little unction by spelling it with a capital letter.† We have nothing to say to the pantheist who in deifying Nature materializes both God and

* "Science," it is said, "has reversed every important early belief of mankind, beginning with astronomy, and ending with the theory of the *ego* or selfhood." Then science has committed suicide. There is no knowledge nor device, unless I am myself, and free to devise.

† This Unknowable is a wonderful thing. A something known to be, to be not a negation but a positive reality, to be ever present, to be an Energy, infinite, and eternal, and from which all things proceed, and yet with all this not merely unknown, but Unknowable! It would seem that if we only know it to be unknowable it is so far knowable.

man. Nor have we now to do with the pure theist who refines the conception of the Deity to a pallid abstraction, and tries to soar in a vacuum. With all these prayer is logically and practically absurd; for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek after Him.

Our words are for those only who reverently believe in the existence of a personal God. Personality implies intelligence and freedom in action. An imperfect person, as a man, is a being conscious of obligation. A perfect person is a being conscious of holiness. The conception of God is that of a perfectly harmonious personality infinitated. The unperverted Name carries with it a whole theology—"a Supreme Being, the Creator, Upholder, Governor, and Sovereign Lord of all, self-dependent, and the only being that is such; Eternal, and the only Eternal; all-sufficient, all-blessed, and ever-blessed; the Supreme Good; omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent, ineffably one; absolutely perfect; sovereign over His own actions, though always according to the eternal rule of right which is Himself; yet in the works of creation, conservation, government, retribution, making Himself, as it were, the minister and servant of all; taking an interest and having a sympathy in matters of time and space, and imposing on rational beings, in whose hearts He has written the moral law, the duty of worship and service."*

It is the custom of those who would be wise above what is written to denounce this grand conception as being only a subjective fancy, a mere creature of imagination, an *εἶδός* or idol as truly as if hewn from wood or stone, and they point to its anthropomorphism as proof. But whatever there be of anthropomorphism in this view need not trouble us. The conception that we hold to be true to the objective reality involves no element in common with man other than what belongs to personality. Without this no conception whatever of Deity is possible; for an impersonal God is a contradiction. Again, by the constitutional limitation of our faculties we are restricted to such a conception. A rhetorical representation of Deity indulges in sensuous images, but in pure speculation the conception is

* Abbreviated from Cardinal Newman's "Idea of a University," p. 63, 3d edition.

rigidly reduced as far as the necessities of thought permit. We flee the despotism of the eye, and represent an invisible being. We shake off the last fetters of sense, and represent a pure spirit. This is our highest reach, and yet, as a projection of human consciousness, it too is anthropomorphic. Now has it truly been shown that "the anthropomorphic conception of God is a false one, and without the slightest scientific warrant"?* No one looks to physical science for such warrant; but what says moral science? Does philosophy or any moral science confirm the view of Mansel who, dominated by Kant, held the scriptural anthropomorphism to be an accommodation, and that the reality lies beyond the limits of religious thought?† Rather does not the profoundest philosophy warrant the dogma that the Deity truly and really is what He is represented to be in and by human consciousness under the light of revelation? Let us not think that thereby He is dragged down from heaven to earth, but rather that man is lifted from earth toward heaven, recognizing in himself, in his own personality, a faint but true image created in the likeness of God. Let us not think that God is manlike, but that man is godlike.

II.

Believing in freedom and in God, is prayer reasonable? We are not now inquiring into its efficacy, but simply whether there be anything in its nature, or in our relations to the divine being, or in the limitations which He has Himself imposed upon His own will, which precludes or restricts prayer. Is it reasonable to ask God to cause or to avert an event? Now events are of two kinds, human events or those in which man's agency is concerned,

* "The hypothesis of a personal or anthropomorphic God is invoked in vain. It has no weight with pure Theists, Agnostics, Pantheists, or Atheists. All these classes of thinkers unite in showing that the anthropomorphic conception of God is a false one, and without the slightest scientific warrant; that it is a dogma of theology which cannot be conceived, much less understood, but which must be 'received by faith' as a 'mystery', if it be received at all. When mysteries of this kind meet the law of correlation, they pass at once beyond the domain of science into that Limbo of Vanity, or of poetry and fancy, known in science as Fable and Myth."

† And so Schleiermacher: "Whatever affirmations are made with reference to the Deity must be either negative or figurative and anthropomorphic."

as a battle, and natural events or such as occur without his agency, as an eclipse.* Of these in their order.

It is easily conceivable that the divine Spirit may cause a human event. My free conduct, my most secret thought, impresses Him, at least so far that He knows it. Surely, then, it must be that He may in turn impress me, and influence my thoughts. This is not at all inspiration in the theological sense, but is none the less a movement of spirit upon kindred spirit.* Man may thus be brought to see, to know, to feel, what would otherwise be unknown and unfelt, and thus be influenced in action. Evidently God may by such means determine human events.

In a manner quite analogous men influence each other to action, by affection, by persuasion, by reasoning, by threatening, and thus bring about events which otherwise would not occur. What man may do with man, *a fortiori* may God do with man. The difference is chiefly in this, that the communication of man with man is mediate, through some channel of sense, and therefore easily recognized, whereas the communication between the spirit of God and that of man is immediate, and therefore not so easily recognized. I do not believe in the direct influence of soul on soul; but I do believe that we are nearer to God than to each other.

The influence of spirit on spirit is obviously beyond the realm of natural law. The causation which induces human action is not that physical causation which determines natural events, but a moral causation, which, however, in extreme cases, is hardly less certain. There is, then, no question here about interference with natural law. But does not such influence interfere with human freedom? If the Deity, prompted by prayer, or merely by His own intent, directs or thwarts human conduct by means of subjective unrecognized influences, is not freedom so far secretly violated? "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; He turneth it whithersoever He

* As to events in which brutes are concerned, I know not. If they have free will, their actions are to be classed with human events; if not, then with natural events.

* Conscience has sometimes been interpreted, by its etymology, as "a knowing together" with God.

will." Then is the king a free man, and personally responsible for his ruling?

The analogy helps here. Human minds influence and even powerfully determine each other, but no one ever supposes that there is in this a coercion of will. Indeed it is not possible for one man to interfere with the subjective choice, with the original freedom of another. Now God can, no doubt, absolutely master the man, but will He do so? He has, in making us free, bestowed the greatest dignity upon us, has formed us in His own likeness, and He cannot without violating His own decree, without trespass upon His own self-imposed limitation, without a breach of moral order, withdraw the gift even momentarily. We are, therefore, as secure from His interfering with our freedom, as we are from the interference of our fellows. In His Scriptures He pleads, He reasons, He threatens; and by like influences in the secret closet of the soul He brings our will into free harmony with His, and this without any breach of natural or supernatural, of physical or of moral order.

It is worthy of remark that by far the largest proportion of prayers make request for events conditioned on human action. The psalm before battle calling on the God of Sabaoth for victory, the fasting and humiliation that cries out for the blessing of peace; the prayer for all in civil authority, for the clergy and people; the prayer for all sorts and conditions of men, for the holy Church universal, for all who profess and call themselves Christians, for all who are in any ways afflicted in mind, body or estate—all these are petitions whose ends may be reached by influences on the minds of men. The litany of the Roman and of the Anglican Church throughout is limited to such requests. The Lord's Prayer has no wider extent. Prayers for the sick may be answered, not by rebuking the disease, which would be a miracle, but, if remedy be within human reach, by guiding or enlightening the physician. Prayers against pestilence or shipwreck are not exceptions, for those involved may be brought so to act as to escape. Finally, prayers for personal guidance into temporal good, and for all spiritual blessings, for pardon, purification, salvation, growth in grace and wisdom—all, all these are reasonable as seeking closer communion with God, and deeper

subjection to the Father of our spirits, who is not far from any one of us, for in Him we live, and move, and have our being, for we are also His offspring.

III.

Beside the moral order there is a natural order which the Creator has established in the universe. The specific difference is that in moral order there are alternatives and it is violable, whereas in natural order there is no alternative and it is inviolable. In the one moral law, in the other natural law, reigns. In the one is will and freedom, in the other causation and necessity. Human events, since they involve alternatives and choice in action, belong to the moral order. Natural events, occurring under the natural order, are now to be considered. Is it reasonable to ask God to cause a natural event, one in which human agency is not concerned, as an eclipse?

The propositions, that every event is caused, and that like causes always produce like effects, are self-evident. By the universal consensus of experts they are axiomatic truths, truths which are invariable, to which no exception is possible, or even conceivable. An immediate consequence of them is that every effect is necessitated, strictly determined to be what it is by its cause. Also it is self-evident that in quantitative relation no cause is less than adequate to its effect; that none is more than adequate is now held to be intuitively true. Hence there is no loss, all that is in the cause reappearing in the effect. These inflexible principles lie at the root of physical science; they are its essential conditions. Physicists investigate the relations of natural phenomena, and by virtue of these principles rise inductively from particular facts to universal truth or natural law. They are the base of the grand scientific conception of nature—a system of forces whose algebraic sum is constant, so balanced that if all the kinetic energies in existence, amid all their interchanges of kind, their fluctuations in total quantity, were bearing incessantly on a single point, it would remain stationary. This is an expression of the doctrine of the correlation or transmutation of force, and the conservation of energy. The calm, unmoved and immovable centre enthroned amid the never-ceasing tempestuous

whirl of events may fitly represent the steadfast, inviolable necessity which reigns in nature. Such is the established order, the *kosmos*, in which no alternative ever exists, where all procedure is strictly determined, fixed, and eternally inviolable and unalterable.

A physical law or law of nature is merely a statement, formulated in general terms, of a uniformity in nature determined by causation. To say that God governs nature by or according to laws means only that He wills certain uniform sequences. There is no command and obedience, but only the plan of a creator and conservator. All natural tendencies conform to His will, and their ends fulfil His purpose. In His perfection, His will and purpose must be unchangeable ; and this is an additional reason for profound faith in the constancy and sufficiency of nature. The order of natural events is ordained of the Father of lights, with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning. The uniformity of nature is the fidelity of God.

To ask for a change in this fixed order would be to ask for a miracle. What is a miracle ? An innovation of will upon natural order, subjecting it to variation or exception. M. Renan founds his "*Vie de Jesus*" on the postulate that a miracle is impossible, and many savans think with him. But why impossible ? Not to conception, for the notion of causative will combining with physical cause does not contradict, but is in strict accord with, our intuitions of causation. Not to the power of the Almighty, of course. But would not a miracle show Him to be changeable, unfaithful and self-contradictory, and so must be denied ? Not necessarily, for extraordinary purpose requires extraordinary means. We believe that the Deity purposed from all eternity to accredit, in due time, by an invincible demonstration, Himself and His messengers to mankind ; that innovations upon natural order were the most effective way to accomplish this subordinate end ; that in the fulness of time such manifest exceptions to natural order were made ; and that, the special purpose having long since been accomplished, miracles have ceased. The Duke of Argyll represents miracles, though supernatural, as under the reign of law, under a higher law dominating both realms. In accord with this view, we might

figure two lines intersecting in the plane of order, the moral overriding the natural. But we would rather figure two right lines parallel, the one broken by sin, the other by miracle, yet both holding their course and meeting in the vanishing point of ultimate purpose.

There are many devout persons who believe that the providences of to-day are innovations upon natural order, the divine will overruling causation, and that prayer for such miraculous interposition is not infrequently granted. They should remember that the order of nature is a manifestation of God's will, and that its constancy is His fidelity. Shall believers have less confidence in His faithfulness than unbelievers? Physics upholds His immutability; shall theology proclaim Him variable? God has limited Himself in fixing the constitution of nature so that He cannot without violence and inconsistency interpose to grant a petition for a natural event that otherwise would not occur. It is not possible for Him to invert His own decrees. There are even in the moral sphere impossibilities. The most solemn prayer on record began: *If it be possible.* Much more are there impossibilities in the natural sphere.

Strauss in his "*Leben Jesu*" calls nature a stamping-mill which relentlessly crushes all beneath it. We reject the pessimism of the trope, believing the general order of nature to be truly beneficent. Yet nature does take and make its rigid way with no yielding or stepping aside; not with cruelty, but without mercy or remorse. It is built of indurated iron, and its ponderous wheels roll steadily and ruthlessly on. Man, with his intelligence and freedom, may step aside and save himself; and more, he may turn to account the mighty, unvarying march of events. But woe to him if he stands in the way. No prayer avails. Nature cannot, God will not, hear.

These considerations force upon us the conviction that prayer for any alteration of natural order is so unreasonable as to be absurd; and indeed, if offered intelligently, it is impious. Shall we ask God to be unfaithful to Himself, and to mankind in whom He has implanted unwavering trust in the constancy of nature? Should He consent to reorder the stars of the sky, to invert the planetary courses, to forbid an eclipse, to hasten or restrain the

sun in his seasons, the heavens would no longer declare His glory, but His shame. That the earthquake, the ocean tides, the cyclone, the gentle breeze and the fruitful shower are equally under the dominion of physical law, no one doubts, though they are as yet beyond our calculus. Any interruption of these would be an equal dishonor. But He cannot deny Himself, He will not disgrace the throne of His glory. Hence we do not believe that the prayer of all Christendom may induce Him who appointed them to modify in any tittle their coming or going, their day or their power. We do not say that the Omnipotent cannot, but that the Immutable will not.

IV.

In the hope of maintaining the preconceived doctrine that all prayer is reasonable, and as unlimited as the potency of the Deity, many hypotheses have been framed by those to whom the foregoing conclusion is distasteful. Among the most important of these hypotheses are the following:

1. It has been supposed that the Creator, when endowing matter with forces admitting in themselves no alternative, reserved to Himself alternatives, and so without self-contradiction, without any trespass upon self-imposed limitations, He can vary, or adjust the order of events. But if so, then natural science is baseless, all forecast is uncertain, our intuitions are delusions, our Maker a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie. Again, it is impossible to reconcile the supposition with the omniscience, omnipotence, and perfection of the Deity. "For if the order of nature be but the order of continuous manifestations of His power, it is invariable, because it must be perfect, for it is the action of a perfect being who knew all things for all time, and had infinite power to execute all that He knew or wished. To suppose such a being to alter the order of the world would be to admit that it was not perfectly conceived and ordered in the first place, and that its Maker failed for want of knowledge or power to make it complete. A perfect and invariable God cannot also be imperfect and variable."

2. It has been supposed that a prayer is a link in the chain of moral sequences which necessarily precede an event, through or

by means of which it is brought to pass; so that, should the prayer be omitted, the sequences would occur in a different order, and determine a different event. This removes the difficulty somewhat out of reach, perhaps, but not out of sight. It is unsatisfactory, because it assumes that moral sequences are of the nature of physical cause and effect, which cannot be proved;* it asserts the answer to be merely a resultant, the orderly consequence of a law governing moral sequences, which contradicts its immediateness; it regards prayer as something other than what it seems and claims to be, hence as untrue, reducing it to theatrical formality.

3. Another supposition is that the prayer was foreknown and foreordained as a part of the world-order, and therefore will as certainly occur as the subsequent event, its answer. But this is inconsistent with the postulate of human liberty, and would likewise reduce the prayer to a senseless form, and the man to a mantis.† The modified supposition that certain events are preordained to be born as twins, so that when our prayer comes forth its fulfilment follows, is a revival, in a special case, of

* When Professor Drummond calls upon us to recognize "Natural Law in the Spiritual World" we hesitate. He eloquently maintains that the same laws—laws not merely analogous, but the same—are continued from the natural into the spiritual world. This seems to us an extravagance arising to some extent from a confusion of the several distinct meanings of the word law, and in general from a reasoning from metaphor to fact and *vice versa*, which is *fallacia figura dictionis*. He constantly mistakes slender analogy for identity. For example, in his doctrine of biogenesis he declares the natural law, that life can be originated only by life (quoting Harvey as saying, *Omne vivum ex vivo*, whereas I believe he said *ex ovo*), to be a law of the spiritual world also, to be the universal law of regeneration. As matter cannot become living of itself, but only through contact with matter already living, so the mind of man cannot become spiritual of itself, but only by the influence of the Divine Spirit. This might pass as a piece of rhetoric, but when we are told that it is not a figure of speech, but a literal statement of fact, that it is scientific truth, we must object that the laws in the two cases are only analogous, not identical, and that they can only rhetorically replace each other. In this doctrine of the identity of natural and supernatural law we find no solution, but a duplication of our difficulties. If it can be demonstrated that moral necessity is only another name for causal necessity, then we may abandon all prayer as a delusion.

† We are surprised to find, in a defence of prayer, the following: "Law is just as fixed in the realm of mind or spirit as in the realm of matter. The laws by which mind is developed are just as immutable as the laws by which the oak is unfolded

Cartesian occasionalism, a doctrine long since dismissed from philosophy and from theology. It cannot escape the fatal objections that such fulfilment implies an alternative in physical order, and that the answer is not truly from God, but from nature.

4. In the supposition that the prayer was merely foreknown, and its answer provided for in the original ordering of coming events, we have an approved form of the doctrine of special providence. This has much the appearance of a device to escape difficulty. Evidently natural order is thereby supposed, in some respects, to some extent, to be conditioned on, or determined by, the wish and will of imperfect beings, blind in ignorance and folly. This cannot be allowed. The supposition introduces difficulties more and greater than it removes. We hold nevertheless to the doctrine of general providence in nature, that all providences are from eternity, and come to pass in the chain of causation. In this view a thunderbolt arresting a murderous attack is no more "an immediate act of God" than the rising of the sun.*

5. The following more plausible hypothesis requires fuller statement. There is in man a cause or force, free in that he can apply it or not as he may choose. By skilfully combining this with natural forces, that is, by moving things from place to place and by this only, he is able to attain his ends. Thus many things occur which in nature alone, or without the intervention of this force, would never occur at all. Observe that herein no

from the acorn; the laws by which we think are as rigid and fixed as those which regulate the rivers in their flow or the clouds which sweep across the sky. If on account of the fixedness of law it is absurd to pray for rain, it is for the same reason equally absurd to pray that the divine spirit may illuminate our minds and guide our thoughts."

*In the discussion which followed the lecture the very pertinent question was asked whether the example of Elijah was not cited (James v., 17) with the intent to encourage us, or at least in such a manner as to encourage us, to pray for rain. The answer is that apparently the citation is made merely to support the preceding general proposition: "The supplication of a righteous man availeth much in its working." The argument seems to run thus: The prayer of Elijah, a righteous man, was answered by a great miracle; it availed very much. Therefore in general it is reasonable to expect much in answer to prayer. The process is *a fortiori*, *a maiore ad minus*. In this view it does not seem to encourage prayer specifically for rain.

law of nature is violated, broken, infringed, or turned awry, which, confessedly, is beyond human power. Man subdues nature, says Bacon, only by obeying her (*Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur*). Observe also that no man knows how he does such things. I move my arm, how I know not, but I know that I move it.

Now why may not a personal God, whose intelligence and freedom are unlimited, do likewise? Would He restrict Himself more narrowly than His creatures? He that formed the eye, shall He not see? Why may He not combine His own original force with natural causes, and thus determine a result that otherwise, by natural causes alone, would not occur? Surely He may choose to interpose or not, and we need not think that any law of nature is thereby broken, or suspended, or altered, or overruled. God's presence in nature as a free force is no more inconsistent with the tenets of modern science than is the presence of the experimenting scientist himself. So, if a man may reasonably ask a friend to help him, or to do for him something beyond his own reach or power, much more may he ask God. He may ask, for example, for an abundant harvest, for protection from the thunderbolt, for the extinction of a conflagration, for the purification from pestilence of the air he breathes. Truly we know not how God may do such things without infringing natural order, but we do know that men, scientists themselves, try to bring about each of these very things in strict subjection to physical law. Why then should it be thought impossible with God?

It has been objected to this view that there is but one perfect order, with the inference that, since God is perfect in wisdom and power, He can work only in one way. The objection appears unsound, for it reduces the divine being, by virtue of His very perfection, to a being of necessity, and this annihilates Him. Is it true that there is only one perfect order? When a thing is perfect there is nothing better, but may there not be another thing equally good? A body by a single impulse passes over the diagonal of a polygon in a given time. The same body under several successive impulses may pass along the sides of the polygon, or along a side and a diagonal, and reach the same

end in the same time. Is there any scientific principle that distinguishes one of these as a perfect, and every other as an imperfect, order? Is it that economy prefers the single diagonal, when, in fact, the sum of the forces is in every case the same? This is merely an illustration, but it suggests the possibility of many a perfect order to the same end, among which there may be choice. We believe there is an established order in nature, but, perhaps, some other would be equally perfect.

It seems, however, that there are objections to the hypothesis which cannot be so easily set aside. We clearly distinguish between the artificial and the natural, between man's work and the work of nature. But if the Author of nature takes part to-day in bringing about special events, there is no means of distinguishing between His special working and the work of nature. Consequently there would be for us no fixed order in nature, no strict and invariable uniformities, no established and inviolable natural law, and all natural science, all practical confidence in natural order, would be at an end. Moreover, the hypothesis assumes an insufficiency in natural law to the purposes of the law-maker, a need to be supplemented from time to time, which is inadmissible. It is based on the erroneous notion that the Deity, having created matter and force, then stepped aside, and is now a looker-on, watching and superintending natural evolution, ready to interpose, and actually interposing, to readjust, or overrule, or counteract for special purposes, thus representing Him as correcting and contradicting Himself. Whereas, God is in every natural process, not as the superintending, but as the ever-present determining power; by which we do not mean the physical force itself, but that which makes force constant in its efficacy, just as His ever-present sustaining power makes substance constant in its being.

None of the foregoing hypotheses being satisfactory, we are constrained to adhere to the conclusion that prayer for an extraordinary natural event is strictly unreasonable, and indeed a presumptuous offence in any but the ignorant. If any devout person be shocked and repelled by this stern result of our inquiry, let him consider that the faith of those who ask and receive not,

because they ask amiss, would be in less danger, if they clearly recognized and carefully observed the reasonable limits of prayer; and so a doctrine which at first seems enervating, may prove to be such as is good to the use of edifying. Let it also be considered that intelligent believers never in fact ask for an alteration of what they recognize to be the ordinary and established course of nature. Who prays that an eclipse may be averted? The times of ignorance God winked at, but to-day who dare offer such petition? Who would ask for an extra transit of Venus, for a waxing of the waning moon, for a flow of the ebbing tide? Believing the complex causes of weather-change to be as rigidly determined and determining under physical law as are those of an eclipse or of the tides, we dare not ask for any other determination. Once more let it be considered that a petition really for an end often takes in expression the form of a petition for the means. We do not ask for a fruitful season for its own sake, but for the sake of what it would bring. This form is not to be rigorously condemned; we know not what we should pray for as we ought, and prayers of righteous intent are interpreted for us by the Spirit. Still let us guard even the form. "We may, without offence, intimate in our prayers the end we wish to attain; but it is not for us, poor mortals, to point out to an all-seeing Providence the precise manner in which our petitions are to be accomplished."* We may, amid the inevitable disasters of a natural convulsion, cry out for relief, aye, even for blessing. Truly nature is a stamping-mill, but it crushes to get out gold. We may not ask that the crushing cease, but we may ask for the gold.

V.

While, therefore, we would insist upon a close observance by all praying people of the profound distinction between natural order and moral order, and on a strict limitation of their petitions to events in the moral order, we now face about for a moment, and insist with equal positive emphasis that physical scientists, as such, should limit their investigations to events belonging to the natural order. Physical science can take cognizance of

* Scott, in "Castle Dangerous," p. 92.

human affairs only in so far as they are subject to causation, in the strict sense of the term, and so come under the category of natural events. The great body of eminent physicists, many of whom are devout Christian men, constantly and carefully observe this necessary limitation. Darwin himself said, in a posthumous letter: "Science has nothing to do with Christianity; only it should make us careful about our proofs." A wise saying. This clear recognition of their distinct spheres makes the cry of conflict between science and religion a sheer absurdity. There are, however, some physicists who overstep the bounds, and would apply the principles of natural order to moral order. By way of illustration we will cite a notable case, though familiar, and already sufficiently discussed.

We refer to the famous prayer-gauge devised in 1872 by Professor Tyndall and Sir Henry Thompson. Holding all prayer to be unreasonable, they proposed to test its efficacy by subjecting God to an experiment. The device took the form of what is known in the *Logic of Induction* as the Double Method of Agreement and Difference; but it had the form only. The Method is applicable only to the natural order, and authorizes conclusions only in cases of strictly physical causation. That these physicists should propose to apply it under distinctly foreign conditions, to a case involving free-will, to the moral order, was, if not mere frivolous mockery, a gross logical blunder, for which a school-boy should be whipped, and they themselves heartily ashamed.* In the natural order, in a case of physical causation, the Method named would furnish a crucial test; but in the case proposed it was crucial only in that it was devised to crucify the

* They cannot cover their shame by citing the case of Elijah on Carmel. His was not one of the Inductive Methods, but a special, or rather a particular, method of Divine appointment; it was not at all a case of physical causation, but of free condescension.

It has been said that the proposed test, though rejected at the time by the Christian world, was nevertheless applied on a grand scale in 1881, when the fervent prayers of millions ascended for months, day and night, for the life of our languishing President, yet could not cause the change of a single pus-cell in his deadly wound. On this it is sufficient to remark that the case is essentially unlike the proposed test; that these prayers, being offered on the supposition that remedy was within reach of human skill, were reasonable; and, finally, that they were offered in entire submission to the will of God. It has never been held that prayer is a causal force.

Lord afresh, and put Him to an open shame. It did not have even the poor merit of originality; I say poor, for originality in error is easy enough. The same test was proposed nearly twenty centuries ago, on the pinnacle of the Temple.

We must not be misunderstood here. We proudly profess the most enthusiastic faith in the methods and processes of modern physical science, and the profoundest and most unquestioning admiration for its wonderful and beneficent results. But we would stop short of intoxication and bewilderment, and cling fast to sound logic and common sense. Physical science has bounds it must not trespass. With the cry *ne sutor ultra crepidam*, we forbid it to rush into the recesses of human and divine nature. It is grandly solving the mysteries of the material universe, but from the mysteries of the spiritual universe, involving new conditions and modes of being, *Procul O! procul este profani*.

VI.

A few words must close this discussion, already, perhaps, too long. It should be noted that prayer within the moral order is not only reasonable, but seems in an important sense to be a part of that order. The law is: Ask and ye shall receive. Asking is a condition such that without it we have no assurance. To this law of the moral order even the Son was subjected by the Father. We find it in the decree at the dawn of redemption: Ask of Me, etc. (Ps. ii.). During the work of redemption the law was strictly obeyed. Witness the amazing high-priestly prayer after the Supper (Jno. xvii.). And it is still observed (Rom. viii., 34). The law is also for us. Many bounties, indeed, we receive without asking, but should one omit to ask, saying, I shall nevertheless receive, he thereby makes a break in moral order. The complete harmony between the moral and the natural order renders it proper to offer prayer for a natural event when it is expected to occur in the fixed process of nature. It seems quite as reasonable to pray for the orderly occurrence of a natural event, as to give thanks for one that has already so occurred. And so in everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving we should let our requests be made known unto God.

The entire and indeed necessary harmony which exists be-

tween the two orders becomes quite evident when we consider that each is an expression of God's will; the moral order, of His will commanding, the natural order, of His will determining. And this brings to light a dominating principle in prayer that narrows its scope more closely. The essence of all prayer is in the words: Thy will be done. This is its substance and its sum. The vow in response to the decree of redemption was: Lo, I come to do Thy will, O God. From Gethsemane we hear the cry: Not My will but Thine be done. Here, then, an impassable boundary is set for prayer. Within it are all human needs, all sinless desires. Every special petition must be not merely in subordination to the principle, but an emanation from it; not merely in accord, but in unison with it, otherwise it is nullified by it. We are forbidden alike by reason and by revelation to ask for a change or any modification of the divine plan either in the material or in the spiritual world. We are permitted to ask for anything that is in unison with our Father's will. That the will of God may be perfected, whatever that will may be, however unknown in its means and ends, however counter to our longings, to our apparent welfare—this must be the fundamental desire of every praying heart, and not only fundamental, but the all-informing, the all-absorbing desire. Our requests may be excursive, but faith leads them back to this centre, where they concur and close. It is not merely the submission of our will to that of God. The man whose life is hid with Christ in God, has no will apart from, or deviating from God's will. Though still free, his will is raised to coincide with God's. Thus exalted his prayers express his own will only in so far as they express God's will; all else he disavows. Hence it is our profoundest concern to be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual understanding. We must strive to attain that angelic ecstasy wherein our desires are attuned into perfect harmony with the purposes of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will. We must find it—

"Sweet to lie passive in His hands,
And know no will but His."

CAPITAL AND LABOR.

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WHAT has come to be called, in economic literature, the Labor Question, has not attained in this country to the importance that belongs to it in Europe; nor does it sustain the same relation to civil society. An intelligent discussion of it, therefore, before an audience more or less familiar with the course of European thought in regard to industrial problems, should begin by discriminating the conditions which distinguish our social and economic state from that of the older world. There the issue between capital and labor has been so reached and defined that the trial of it by force is an impending danger. At any moment such a conflict may be precipitated as would involve the fabric of society in confusion and disaster. In England, France and Germany there is an organized proletariat, with a definite programme and active propaganda, the object of which, more or less thinly disguised, is to overthrow the existing order of civil society, and institute a new and radically different order in its place. In this country, on the other hand, we have, properly speaking, no proletariat at all, or at least no permanent and organized class of wage-workers. The conditions which have called such a class into existence in Europe, and have favored its persistence as a class, are almost wholly lacking here. Yet, partly because large numbers of European workingmen have been transferred by emigration to these shores, who do not readily shake off the habits and prejudices of their former condition; partly because the literature of the received political economy emanates in large degree from European sources; and partly because the same subtle political and economic errors that have antagonized capital and labor in

Europe are also at work here, there is a distinct movement in this country toward the formation of a proletariat, and the introduction of the same evils and dangers that vex and menace less favored lands. A school of politicians and economists has sprung up who pander to the imported proletarianism which agrarian agitators are engaged in naturalizing and domesticating here. To this end they are willing to change our institutions, or the spirit of them, in order to meet the views of the coming race of workingmen, and so to welcome dangers that could hardly arise without such mischievous interference. Such dangers, however, have not yet actually arisen, and it is not too late to avert them. It is essential, therefore, that we should distinguish between the Labor Question of Europe, and the Labor Question of the United States. A careful discrimination will indicate the difficulties with which the American economist has properly to deal, and will serve to warn us against the introduction of those which belong essentially to the peculiar conditions of European political and industrial society.

Perhaps a brief reference to the history of the Labor Question in Europe, will most easily bring the proper discrimination before us. There the existing relation between Capital and Labor is of recent date. Using the word labor in the sense of human energy and skill devoted to productive industry for wages; and using the word capital as that portion of the accumulated product of labor which is employed in compensating productive labor, and in distributing production, it may be said that both labor and capital have emerged into prominence as factors of civilization only within the last hundred years. It was not until the Republic of Venice elaborated its system of commercial exchanges and ventures that capital, as such, began to be employed; and it was not till a much later period that wage-laborers appeared as a class in modern civil society. Under all ancient civilizations non-proprietary labor was carried on almost exclusively by slaves. Among all ancient peoples, both classic and barbarian, with the single exception of the Jews, handicraft, especially, was considered so ignoble that it was relegated to the servile classes. In the reconstruction of society which succeeded the irruption of the barbarians the laws of feudal

tenure and service conditioned all kinds of labor. Eventually the guilds and crafts of the Middle Ages organized the interests of handicraft labor in some of the larger cities into the mutual relations of apprentices, journeymen and masters. During all this time, however, there was one incidental characteristic that distinguished all the industrial pursuits of society, and that was that productive labor was carried forward, not for purposes of general commercial exchange, but simply to supply the local demand for each particular product. Thus, for instance, there was a shoemaker to make shoes for the community or neighborhood, just as there was a leech to attend to their diseases, and a parson to minister to their spiritual and moral necessities. Each artisan was a part of the social machinery or system of his locality, and was personally related to all its parts. The same was true of the larger operations of manufacture. The primary object was to supply the local demand. It was only the surplus of woolen cloths, for instance, which the local demand did not at any particular time happen to consume, that was in the category of a commercial product upon the market, in our modern sense of the term. During all this time, moreover, the relation between the laborer and those above him was intimately personal. The old tenure of villenage, with its personal service, was succeeded by relations not less intimate and even more personal in their character. The laborer was related far more closely to the master whose servant he was than he could be to any other laborer. Society, in a word, was divided perpendicularly rather than horizontally, and there was, as yet, no proletariat, no *class* of laborers.

With the introduction of machinery, however, and the manufacture of commodities on a large scale for the supply of the general market, all this was changed. There sprang up a middle class, distinguished by thrift, industry and economy, who began to employ a new agency in industrial enterprises, namely, capital. They segregated the laborers, so to speak, for a new service, calling them away from the old service in which their masters had been their over-lords and protectors. These capitalists recognized no relation to their workingmen but the purely commercial and impersonal one of wages—what Carlyle calls the *nexus* of cash payment. Their only object was to get the

largest amount of work done for the least possible pay. The old checks and limitations supplied by the bonds of paternal and personal interest, had no place in their system. They were a purely economical class who severed between the aristocracy and the peasantry, and they did not take on the sympathies or assume the responsibilities of either. They did not aspire to employ the higher motives and forces that had all along held society together, but left them to be wielded by the upper classes. Here, then, were the conditions of the genesis and growth of the existing proletariat in Europe. A new class arose who began to wield the new economical force called capital in a purely economical and unmoral way, employing the peasant class for wages in productive industry, to create industrial products, not for personal demand or local consumption, but for general distribution as articles of commerce. The characteristics of the new situation may be summarized as follows: 1. The erection, between the aristocracy and the peasantry, of a new class which sustained no personal relations toward the peasantry and recognized no personal and social responsibilities toward them. 2. The severance of the pre-existing bond between the lowest and the highest classes. 3. The transformation of the peasant into a workingman, leaving him in large degree helpless, separated as he was from his old patron and protector, and without political power or status to protect himself. Gradually this middle class gained control of the state as well as of trade and commerce. Then there grew up a condition of affairs without parallel in the history of human wretchedness and degradation. The capitalist class, clothed with newly gained power, unchastened and uncontrolled by the moral and paternal considerations which in large degree did sway the upper classes, and feeling themselves concerned with nothing but the economical forces of industry and trade, began to wield those forces with pitiless eagerness and consummate ability. To them human labor was simply a means of production to be procured as cheaply and used as effectually as possible. With the domestic and personal well-being of their laborers they did not concern themselves, but left the lords and ladies, the clergy and gentry to see to that. The result was that a slavery more

horrible and revolting than any yet seen among men began to reduce the men, women and children of the peasant classes of Christian Europe to a condition of unspeakable wretchedness and degradation. One has but to read the reluctant and well-authenticated statements of English blue-books in order to see that the condition of the African slave in our own land was enviable when compared with the unhappy lot of the English factory-worker in the earlier part of the present century. The accounts of the ghastly, deadly overwork of women and children in the mills and mines, driven by the lash of the over-looker; the story of men crazed by want and worse than want, of women fainting and dying by the loom, and of losing the very semblance of womanhood as they acted the part of draught horses and beasts of burden in the collieries; and of children scourged and dwarfed and often killed by their hard taskmasters, constitute the very darkest page in all modern history. One does not need to look for his facts to the sympathetic writings of Kingsley, and Mrs. Browning and Carlyle. The damning evidence of the horrible evils of that time is to be found in the official reports of English statesmen, and is still seen writ large in the physical and intellectual depravement of large numbers of the English people.

I have pointed out that the middle or capitalist class did not at first consider themselves responsible for the well-being of the laborer. They regarded their relation to him as purely economical, and left his case to be looked after by the hereditary custodians of order and morals, the gentry and clergy. As for themselves, though they were not altogether deficient in moral and spiritual sensibility, they reserved their sympathies for the oppressed of other countries. At last, however, England was aroused to the necessity of doing something to rectify the relations of Capital and Labor. The remedies proposed were mostly mistaken ones, as I shall endeavor to show presently, but they were suggested by the conditions of the case and by prevailing political theories. Of these remedies, some have been put into operation in the enactments of English and other European legislatures; in the various factory acts and labor laws that have made up so much of recent transatlantic legislation.

Others are not yet enacted or put into operation, but are urged with more and more boldness by theorists and reformers, and many of them are so utterly revolutionary and destructive that to hold them is accounted a grave political crime. Yet dangerous as these last are recognized as being, there are multitudes who do hold them, and are willing to go to the death for them. The Nihilist of Russia, the Social Democrat of Germany, the Communist of France, the democratic federationist of England, led by active, cool, determined thinkers, are ready, if opportunity should offer, to attempt the overthrow of European society to-morrow, and to institute anarchy in its stead. Yet, deadly as is the antagonism between the governments of Europe at this moment, and the socialistic movements of which I have just spoken, it may be said that all the measures of a remedial nature yet proposed, either by outlaw agitators or statesmen in power, are essentially socialistic and therefore radically harmful as well as nugatory. They all rest on one elementary fallacy, namely, that the victims of industrial injury or wrong are to be protected, instead of being clothed with the power to protect themselves. Socialism in all its forms is but the outgrowth of the old absolutist principle, that civil government is of divine institution and authority, and that the state is to be looked to, therefore, to play a paternal part toward the people. All socialistic schemes are based on the notion that the state possesses some extraordinary power to reverse or suspend natural law, and that classes have not only powers but rights more extensive and more sacred than those of the individual. They all tend, therefore, to the subordination of the individual and to the enfranchisement of the class; and they all aim theoretically and would operate practically to set aside the rights and destroy the liberty of the individual. We need not be surprised, therefore, at finding as we do that Louis Napoleon was a Socialist, and that Bismarck's political and industrial philosophy is socialistic to the core, and that the policy of the Roman curia continually betrays an ineradicable affinity for Socialism. For all socialistic theories are the outcome of absolutist and despotic theories of government and of the rights of man. They are all born of the same fallacy, and lead to the same result, namely, slavery.

It is evident, then, that our Labor Question is not the same as the Labor Question of Europe. For here we have no middle class on the one hand, and no disfranchised class on the other. The conditions which made the capitalist class insensible to or unconscious of its moral and social responsibilities in Europe have not existed here, and manifestly cannot here exist, since there is here no higher class whose traditional relations to the poor might seem to relieve the mere moneyed man of his obligations toward the less unfortunate. Our workingmen occupy a different position, moreover, from that of the European laborer, since in Europe the laborer is disfranchised, and his only immediate hope seems to lie in revolution, whereas here the laborer has the ballot in his hand, and stands in exactly the same position politically as his employer. Moreover, here we have as yet no stationary classes. The laborer of to-day may be the employer of to-morrow, and the industrious wage-worker is constantly encouraged to look forward to the independence of proprietorship for himself and his children. The relations of Capital and Labor in this country, therefore, cannot be altogether the same as those which prevail in Europe, and it is of the last importance that the difference should be intelligently discriminated. Nevertheless, we have our Labor Question, sufficiently grave, sufficiently difficult, sufficiently burdened with anxiety. The enormous increase of our mining and manufacturing industries; the inevitable tendency of the self-indulgent poor to forsake agricultural pursuits and betake themselves to cities, where, as artisans they are relieved in greater degree than the farmer can be, from the exercise of the difficult virtues of foresight, thrift and self-control; the severance between the owners of productive capital and the laborer, which is brought about by the use of corporations with their official machinery; the thoroughly vicious system of class-legislation which has come into vogue of late, and the fostering by such legislation of class interests and class prejudices—all these conditions combine to widen the breach between the rich and the poor, and to invoke a real antagonism between capital and labor that is likely, if uncorrected, to lead to the gravest consequences in the not distant future. Among the causes of this alienation here enumerated, especial attention should be:

directed to the effect of aggregating capital in the hands and under the control of corporations, as the agency that is working in this country the most complete separation between the owners of money or capital, and the wage-workers upon whose labor the productiveness of capital depends. The enormous development of the industrial use of the corporation as the agent of capital is one of the most portentous signs of our times. Certain it is that, whatever economic advantages the corporation may possess, it does sever between the rich and the poor; it does operate to exempt the stockholder from apparent personal responsibility for the wise and beneficent administration of his money that properly belongs to all ownership; it dissolves the personal bond between the man who pays and the man who works, which is the one vital and efficient bond to hold the industrial classes together; it emancipates the poor from the personal duty which they owe to those upon whose accumulated thrift and "abstinence" they depend; it leaves the rich apparently responsible only for the use of their profits, whereas they ought to feel that they are responsible for the use of their whole wealth; and it leaves the laborer without motive and without opportunity to exercise any higher gift or effort than is required to fulfil the minimum demand of a wage-contract in which no personal considerations have any place. Moreover, the aggregation of large amounts of capital in the hands of corporations, tends inevitably to create monopolies, which stamp out small proprietorships and render it difficult if not impossible for the laborer to rise to the condition of a proprietary workman or to the dignity of an employer of labor. The effect of this must sooner or later be, to create a permanent class of laborers or wage-workers—in other words, a proletariat, a class of the *disinherited*. I need not point out at greater length the results that must accrue from the continued and extended use of corporate agencies in our industrial enterprises. It is sufficiently evident to all thoughtful students of our social and economical system, that it is along the course of this development, if it should be pursued, that our gravest dangers are likely to arise.

In order to arrive at a solution of our Labor Question, it will be necessary to examine briefly such remedies as are commonly

proposed. And first, it must be said, that most of these are essentially socialistic. In this category are to be placed, not only the agrarian and revolutionary plans and purposes of the the avowed and radical socialists, but all methods which call for special or class legislation, or state interference with the fixed and persistent laws of the industrial and commercial world. Of revolutionary socialism of the most dangerous character there is far more than is commonly supposed. Much of its propagandism is confined to the German language, or is carried on in *arbeiter* halls and other meeting-places for workingmen exclusively in town and country. If the true nature and extent of the socialistic movement among such could be understood, I venture to assert that it would excite the gravest alarm and anxiety. Hardly less dangerous, however, is the *dilettanti* socialism of a class of *doctrinaire* political economists, of the kind called in Europe, "Socialists of the Chair." These, actuated by impulses of genuine philanthropy, no doubt, but misled by un-American tendencies and modes of thought, have done and are doing much to create a socialistic literature, and to give a socialistic bias to our current political and economical philosophy. Add to these influences the temptation to demagogism to which our practical politicians are exposed, to appeal to the laboring classes as the readiest means of keeping or securing place and influence, and it is easy to understand the extent and danger of the socialistic tendencies of the day. A candid consideration of them, however, will discover how utterly unsound is the basis on which they all rest, and how utterly irreconcilable they are with the principles of our Government and institutions.

For all such theories proceed out of a radical and fundamental error in politics and philosophy. The old conflict between Realism and Nominalism lies at the basis of the question which is here indicated. Realism has been the philosophical support of despotism. The outcome of Nominalism has been liberty. Our own institutions, our own theory of government, especially, are founded on a nominalistic postulate, that is, upon the autonomy and sacredness of the individual, the person, the man. Despotism relies on the Realistic postulate, that is, upon the autonomy and supreme sacredness of the genus, the society,

the class. The famous principle of Grotius, that civil society is founded on contract between men acting in obedience to and in accordance with the *societatis appetitus* with which each individual is endowed, was the outcome of the nominalistic theory, and it was on this principle that our Government was founded. According to this principle man is greater than any agent that he employs, and governments are made for men and by men, to serve men in those things and those only which are, by common consent, delegated to them. Now the radical error of all socialism in this country is that it abandons this ground and looks to the state, either as the source of an original power greater than that delegated to it by the men who created it; or as having gained in some way by aggregation, the authority to set aside or abrogate individual rights regardless of the consent, express or implied, of the individual. Such a theory is subversive of the principles on which our Government was founded. According to those principles, the state derives its powers wholly from the consent of the governed, and is instituted to conserve and not to destroy the inalienable rights of man. Among those inalienable rights which constitute his dignity and integrity as a man, are the freedom of labor and the security of property. These are his inherent, underived, original rights, which the state does not give, and cannot rightly take away. But all socialism proceeds upon the principle that the state may take these away, or abrogate them if it will; and that it will be well for the state so to do, in the exercise of a tutelary function over society as a whole or over particular classes. In the words of Professor Sumner, they regard the "state as an entity having conscience, power and will sublimated above human limitations, and as constituting a tutelary genius over us all." Therefore they look to the state to do all manner of extraordinary things; to interpose and redistribute wealth according to a plan altogether different from that natural economy which God has instituted; to readjust social and industrial relations in the most artificial and arbitrary way, and to provide a remedy for all manner of social and economic evils. As has been before said, such a theory is at one with the theory upon which all absolutism and despotism rest. And it is perfectly logical that

Socialism should be unfriendly, as it is seen to be, to human liberty and progress. The world has seen no such despotisms as those worked out in theory by Fourier and Proudhon, and in actual fact by the Paris Commune, and in the secret order of the Nihilists. It was no accidental circumstance that made Prince Bismarck and the Socialist Lassalle such friends and mutual admirers. It is no accident that Socialistic literature teems with praises of the good old times of the Middle Ages, and that the only religious body for which it has a good word to say is the Church of Rome.

Time and space will not allow me to urge, as I wish I might, that all class legislation, and all sumptuary and protective legislation are founded on the same radical error, and are therefore socialistic; that they are in so far, at variance with the spirit of our institutions, and must, if followed to their legitimate results, be subversive of them. It remains to urge that they are not only at variance with our traditional and constitutional order, but that they are not competent to provide even the remedy which they promise. For the movements and relations of the industrial and commercial world depend on great, immutable laws which man has not enacted, and which man cannot annul. Like any other natural law, that of gravitation, for instance, they resist or punish any attempt at interference with them by a burden or a blow. Interference, therefore, is costly and disastrous. The best legislation in the industrial and commercial sphere of human activity has long since been enacted by the Supreme Lawgiver; and every interposition by human government is both impertinent and harmful. How unwise and harmful such interferences are when they are proposed or attempted in behalf of labor, there are many to tell us. Perhaps there are not so many to suggest how unwise and harmful one of the interferences may become which the state has made in behalf of capital. I mean in creating corporations for the control and administration of aggregated capital.

No one can question the fact that the creation and employment of corporations have had a vast effect in extending the use and increasing the power of capital. The resulting effect of extending industrial and commercial enterprises of various kinds

has been so obvious that many are disposed to regard the employment of this agency as an unmixed good. One or two broad facts meet us at the outset, however, when we begin to consider the corporation and its uses from the standpoint which we have now reached. The first of these is that the corporation is not a natural but an artificial agency, and that its design is to countervail or avoid the operation of certain great natural laws, which, because they are natural are presumably salutary. It is a natural law that the man who acquires capital shall administer it, his administration of it and his responsibility for such administration, being of the essence of his proprietorship; and that such use of it should cease with his death. In other words, the natural law which operates to prevent the irresponsible use of capital, and the undue accumulation of it, is the law of personal responsibility for what a man has, and that it shall be distributed at his death. Now both of these natural provisions are avoided by the law of corporations. The corporation is a person that does not die. With accumulating resources and accumulating power, it goes on its way defying the law of death which arrests all personal enterprises. And not only in duration but in range, its power is extended far beyond that of any individual, or combination of individuals. The natural law is that a man may wield as much power in the shape of capital as he can gain by industry or inheritance. But here is an artificial person that is allowed to wield the power which a thousand or a hundred thousand men have gained, and to do this for an unlimited time, subject to no risk or chance of death or decrepitude. It is easy to see what an enormous advantage is given to capital as such by such an arrangement as this. And when to this is added the further consideration already alluded to, that this accumulated power is placed in virtually impersonal hands; that the natural proprietors and proper administrators of all this capital are emancipated by this legal device from their proper and personal responsibilities, transferring the administration of their wealth to official agents or over-lookers, it is well seen that capital has been clothed by the state with exceptional privileges and enormous powers which place the mere individual who attempts to compete with it at an immense disadvantage. And among the

evil results which arise from such interference by the state, is the reactionary tendency which it provokes among workingmen to combine against capital, to regard its absentee and irresponsible owners whose agents the corporations are, as their enemies, and to invoke state interposition for their own defence and succor. I am well aware that the question of limiting or abrogating corporations would be beset by peculiar and manifold difficulties. Perhaps no opinion could be advanced that would be less acceptable to the popular mind as yet, than the opinion that is here indicated. Nevertheless I venture to suggest that corporations are a distinctly socialistic device; that they are obnoxious to some, at least, of the objections that are rightly urged against the principles of Fourier, and Proudhon, and Marx and Lassalle; that they are the occasion of combinations and conspiracies on the part of workingmen the danger of which capitalists are not slow to recognize; that they often separate and alienate the rich and poor; that the advantages which they command are balanced in part, at least, by the undoubted tyranny which they exercise, and the discontent and disturbance which they create; and that the industrial and commercial world would as a whole be compensated in part, at least, for their limitation by the resulting encouragement of small proprietorships, the more natural distribution of industrial energy, the larger hope held out to the workingman, and the closer and more personal bond that would be established between the capitalist and the laborer.

It remains for me to indicate, as briefly as may be, the remedial agencies that may be properly invoked to solve existing difficulties and avoid future disaster. These may be classed under two heads—economical and moral. So far as economical agencies are concerned, there is no doubt that the great principle of *laissez faire*, advanced by Adam Smith, is the correct one. Provided the moral and intellectual agencies presently to be indicated, are put into operation, the natural laws of work and wages, of supply and demand, constitute the only legislation necessary for the best adjustment of the relation between capital and labor. This means, of course, a complete application of *laissez faire*; the withdrawal of all state interference both from capital and

labor; the limitation of corporate privileges and powers; the repeal of all sumptuary and protective legislation—so would the natural laws which are actually in force be left free to adjust all the industrial relations which are in the sphere of their action. And such laws are the best possible—entirely adequate to the solution of all difficulties in the best way. For under their operation appropriate rewards and penalties are evenly distributed in a manner most conducive to the general good; and the very hardships which belong to certain conditions are found to be salutary in their influence on human progress and the development of human character. It is well that the condition of the wage-worker should not be one of careless irresponsibility. It is high time that the specious claptrap which has so long been lavished in praise of the workingman and the dignity of his lot, should give place to a more sober and accurate estimate of what labor for wages really means. It means that the man who engages in it has probably not yet exhibited such industry and self-control, such frugality and abstinence, as to save from his lower wants a surplus out of which to minister to his higher needs; and until he shall have achieved sufficient mastery over himself to do this, it is in the nature of things that he should be in a condition of comparative dependence. The case of the afflicted, the unfortunate, the disabled, will fall under the category of moral remedies, which we are presently to consider. For the strong, the able-bodied, there is no better discipline than the operation of those natural economical and industrial laws which God has enacted. Only let the principle of *laissez faire* be thoroughly applied in the economical sphere, leaving all eccentric and exceptional cases to be dealt with by the moral agencies which, in conclusion, are now to engage our attention.

For this proclamation of *laissez faire* must be supplemented by a proposal of moral remedy for such ills as arise out of human obliquity and shortcoming—otherwise it is justly chargeable with both heartlessness and inadequacy. Such moral remedy is proposed by Christianity. It is provided for in an economy which, unlike that of civil society, does not derive its authority from the consent of men, but from the will of God. It is enacted by a Kingdom not of this world, and enforced by considerations

that transcend the interests of time and sense. It is of the essence of this agency that it makes its appeal, through the conscience, to the individual man, and enforces it by sanctions which deal with the individual solely as a moral being, accountable to a supernatural lawgiver. It cannot, therefore, either interfere with the functions of civil society or supply their place—can neither enter into conflict with it nor form an alliance with it. Because civil society rests wholly on human consent, and the Church rests wholly on divine enactment and institution, there cannot rightly be an alliance between them. The point of contact between them, however, is the individual man, who, while he is the subject of civil society, is the object of the divine care. Upon him as a moral and spiritual being Christianity brings its moral and spiritual forces to bear, and in working his elevation and rectification, it operates to rectify all relations that have been disturbed by his obliquity. Among these are the relations that subsist between the rich and the poor, between the capitalist and laboring classes.

It is important to bear in mind that the first effect of Christianity upon the soul that receives it is to individualize it. Men enter, not in ranks or classes, but one by one into the kingdom of God. Its message of love is delivered to the individual soul. It makes a personal appeal to his conscience, to his affection. It delivers to him a personal assurance; it offers him a personal salvation. To this fact is due the wonderful uplifting and emancipating power of Christianity, a power which in early days upheaved and broke in pieces the foundations of Roman imperial power, and still, wherever the Gospel is truly preached and received, disintegrates all the combinations of despotism. The regenerated and believing soul comes to himself. He returns to the liberty of the sons of God. The sense of sonship disenthalls him. He is rescued from the insignificance to which the world's political and social system would reduce him. He is no longer an unconsidered part of a rank or class, but he is a man, a child of God. Not that his relations to others are abrogated or ignored. On the contrary they are strengthened and vitalized. But they are seen to be moral and spiritual, not legal; to arise out of love instead of being imposed by mere enactment; to

proceed from an inner principle, instead of depending upon an arbitrary and external authority. He becomes a better husband, a better father, a better brother, a better son, a better neighbor, a better citizen, because he has realized his individuality and his responsibility as a man.

Now then Christianity comes as the one adequate remedial agency to supplement the natural laws which rule the industrial world, and to alleviate or remove the evils that arise, under the working of those laws, out of human obliquity or shortcoming. Its effect, in the first place, is to individualize the owner of money or capital; to awaken in him a sense of responsibility for the use or administration of his capital as well as for the disposition which he is to make of the profit of it. For stewardship is the Gospel definition of riches, and charity, or love to God and man, is the one law which the Gospel proclaims for the use of it. And this responsibility can in no wise be avoided or transferred to another. No legal device can emancipate the owner of money from the essential obligation which God has placed upon him to use it wisely, beneficently, helpfully. He cannot "buy into a corporation," as the phrase is, and then be responsible merely for his use of his dividends. He is responsible for everything that is done with his money; and if the soulless corporation oppress the hireling or withhold from the laborer his wages, let him know that his soul shall answer for it at the bar of God.

Time does not permit me to dwell longer on the remedial function of Christianity in checking, limiting, controlling, the selfish and unrighteous use of capital. I venture to suggest, however, that the unflinching application of the Gospel principle of stewardship and responsibility to the owners of capital is the one adequate remedy for every evil that capital is justly chargeable with to-day in its relations to labor. And I believe that just in proportion as Christianity reaches and quickens the consciences of the rich they will feel bound to personally administer their own wealth, withdrawing it more and more from corporation management, and embarking in industrial enterprises in which the hand of the man who owns the capital shall deal out wages to the man who works. In that day there shall be

re-established a living bond between capital and labor; the man of means who does nothing will be esteemed the vagabond that he really is, and the place of honor for the rich man to aspire to will be seen to be at the head of his own affairs, as the manager and administrator of his own riches.

Not less salutary should the influence of Christianity be upon the man who works for wages. Its first function should be to individualize him; to make him feel that his duties, his responsibilities, his rights are not to be merged in those of a class, but that they pertain to him as a man, as a child of God. He would be rescued, therefore, from the insignificance and slavery of all socialistic and class combinations. Taught and enabled by the Gospel, he would realize his individuality and responsibility, not as a wage-worker merely but as a man, as a father, as a neighbor, as a citizen. He should see that the fact that he is a wage-worker instead of a wage-payer is a mere incident of his state, not an essential of his character. With proper pride and dignity, therefore, he should refuse to be classified according to this accidental characteristic. And wherever Christianity does its work in the heart of a laboring man, he does so refuse. He sees that it is a degrading servitude to which labor combinations and all kinds of socialistic devices would consign him. He claims the right to pass out of the category of the wage-worker whenever he chooses and can, and in the meantime to love all men and do his duty to all men, whether rich or poor; because all are his brethren, children of one common Father.

I have detained you too long to dwell upon the details of that remedial function which Christianity discharges in moving the rich to help the afflicted with their riches, and in moving the indigent poor to help the rich by their gratitude and affection. Happily this branch of my subject does not need to be elaborated. May I venture to conclude this paper with a practical suggestion to all Christian philanthropists who would engage in this good work of rectifying the disturbed relations of capital and labor? The Christian philanthropist, and especially the Christian pastor and teacher, should follow the genius of Christianity, and deal with men not in ranks or classes but as individuals; not in guilds or associations, but in their families and

homes. The very term workingman should be laid aside. Men should be regarded by him not for what they have nor for what they do, but as souls, all equally precious, all under the same obligation of love to God and man. If the attempt of the socialistic or communistic agitator to create class prejudices and invoke class passions is rightly regarded as mischievous; if the appeal to class interests that is now made by our political parties and demagogues is rightly regarded as both dangerous and discreditable, not less dangerous and mischievous is the effort made constantly by religious men to reach and deal with the laboring men of our cities and centres of industry by wholesale expedients, associations, combinations, and other agencies which tend to obliterate the man's individuality and to make him feel that his rights and his duties as a wage-worker are something different from or greater than his rights and duties as a man. Let all such expedients be abandoned, and let the Churches deal with all men alike, preaching the same Gospel to rich and poor, carrying the same message of consolation or warning to the home of the laborer and of the employer, providing that both shall issue out of the portals of Christian homes in the morning and return to the shelter of Christian homes at night, and Christianity will well discharge its high function as the great conservator of civil society. With this remedial agency constantly and efficiently applied, it will be our wisdom and our safety to leave the movements of trade and industry to the operation of those great laws which God has enacted. When labor is truly free and property known to be secure, and when Christianity shall really become a living power in all the homes of the land, we shall cease to be disturbed by any antagonisms or by any fear of conflict between capital and labor.

THE VICARIOUS PRINCIPLE IN THE UNIVERSE.

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THE purpose of this essay is not a discussion of the doctrine of the Atonement. It will not enter into any extended consideration of the nature of the Atonement. Its primary object is to show that the Atonement was to have been expected, something without which the universe would have been as incomplete as our solar system without the planet Jupiter. A slight contribution toward an understanding of the naturalness and reasonableness of the sacrifice of Christ, it is our desire to present at this time.

The Vicarious Principle in the Universe is the large form in which our subject phrases itself, and I know not how to simplify it.

Does the vicarious principle find expression in all parts of the universe, in all gradations of life? or, is it something which comes into prominence and culminates only in the supreme event of human history, the death of Jesus Christ?

What does the word "vicarious" signify? The common definition is "The position, place, office of one person as assumed by another. Acting or suffering for another." The origin of the word is evident. It is the same in the root as the word "vice" in "Vicegerent," "Viceroy," "Vicar," "Vicar-general," "Vice-President," and the like. It is a word that carries always a face of substitution indicating that one person comes in place, somehow, of another. A Vice-President is one who is to act in certain contingencies as, and for, the President. The Pope is called the Vicar of Christ because supposed to be authorized to fill Christ's place. Any person acts vicariously so far as he comes into the place and assumes the duties, the sufferings, the respon-

sibilities of another. The word is not found in the Bible. It has been adopted, however, to express the central thought of the Bible.

The definition given above seems to confine vicarious relations to persons, but the principle may be as true of an animal as of a man. The horse which is cut loose from the traces for the wolves to feed upon while the master escapes, dies instead of the man. A traveller accompanied by his dog is starving. He must die or kill the dog for food. The death of the dog is the life of the man. The one dies instead of the other. This principle is the condition of all existence. In a note to an admirable article on "Natural Selection and Natural Theology," by Eustace R. Conder, D.D., I find the following: "Another comprehensive and profoundly impressive view of design is presented by the mutual relations of plants and animals. The constitution of the atmosphere is equally indispensable to each order of life; but each draws in from the air that which sustains its own life and is death to the other, and returns that which to itself is useless, or poisonous, but which to the other is the breath of life. The relations of herbivorous and carnivorous animals are another illustration. Yet a writer whom I have before quoted has the hardihood to say that 'if all, or even some, species had been so interrelated as to each other's necessities, organic species might then have been likened to a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalm of praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; each species is for itself, and for itself alone—an outcome of the always and everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life.'" To this Dr. Conder replies, "This reckless assertion is refuted by the flavor of every peach; the chemical composition of every morsel of our daily food; by the labor of every earth-worm ploughing his dark path underground; by the structure of every wheat-plant storing the food on which the labor, commerce, politics, public and family life of nations depend. One person or thing taking the place of another, in some way and for some purpose, prevails everywhere. Even the doctrine of Evolution requires the vicarious principle, the life of the higher rising out of and conditioned upon the death of the lower. According to this doctrine of Evolution there is a scheme of adaptation to circum-

stances, which reaches through all time, from the first appearance of life on our globe, which enlists all the force of the universe, co-ordinates all the conditions of life, bases birth and growth on decay and death, and maintains in stable equilibrium this immense living Whole, every member of which is momentarily undergoing dissolution and reconstruction." (*Contemporary Review*, Sept. 1882, p. 26.)

The meaning and reach of the principle of which we are speaking is now evident. Throughout all that we know of the universe in which we dwell, runs the principle of one taking the place of another to perform its office, to endure its trials, voluntarily or involuntarily to do or be something for another, or for others, without which they could not be what they are or do what they do. The why of the vicarious relationships are among the mysteries. They are facts. There must they be left.

We will consider a few illustrations.

I. There is through all we know of the universe the fact of *vicarious service*. By service I do not mean what is technically called sacrifice, although there may be an element of sacrifice in it. Everywhere the work of one takes the place of the labors of others, and is truly vicarious, unless it should be maintained that there is always a *conscious* delegation of duties where this element is found. Work for another, or instead of another, is recognized as legitimate and universal. There is in it no injustice. The universe is constructed with a place for vicarious service. It is among animals. The eagle gathers food for his mate and the eaglets. The lion brings his prey and drops it for his cubs to feed upon. The tiniest bird recognizes his duty to take the place of his mate as a provider while the eggs are hatching. This is instinct. Yes, but it is a case where instinct leads to the performance of duties which, under other circumstances, would be performed by some one else. It is, therefore, an instance of vicarious service. Some one writing from Constantinople tells a story of sea-gulls. A flock were on the land. One became wounded. The next day the flock, as if by pre-arrangement, started off over the sea of Marmora; but they left behind them their wounded companion and two others to minister to his wants. They brought him food. They waited

by him until his strength should increase. After a day or two had passed the three rose from the ground and started on their flight. They were watched. Soon the wings of the wounded bird failed. Then his companions went under him and carried him, until he was rested. They used their wings instead of his wings. That was repeated until the birds were out of sight. That was vicarious service. It exists among animals. It needs no more than a mention when applied to human life. Parents stand in a vicarious relation to their children. Officers of state occupy the same relation towards their constituents. Every judge, every juror, every legislator, all executive officers perform duties which belong to others, and because we have many duties we delegate part of them to those who can give to them their whole attention. Officers of state are, vicariously, servants. They stand in our places, as our representatives, to do work which we must either do or have done. Vicarious service may be performed and the end of the service accomplished when there is no conscious or voluntary participation in it, by the one helped. I may owe a debt to the bank. That debt may be cancelled by an unknown friend, and it is as really cancelled as if I had paid it myself; but I have no right to compel another to pay my debts or to be my servant.

The universe serves the individual. Its laws and forces bring to him and do for him what he cannot get, or do, for himself. He is sick. All his skill and knowledge of remedies fail. The sunshine and air come to him and make a new man of him. They have done something for him—instead of him.

The following passage from Robertson's sermon on "Caiaphas's View of Vicarious Sacrifice" exactly illustrates vicarious service, but hardly vicarious sacrifice. I will substitute the word service for sacrifice. "Vicarious Service is the law of being. It is a mysterious and fearful thing to observe how all God's universe is built upon this law, how it penetrates and pervades all nature, so that if it were to cease, nature would cease to exist. The mountain-rock must have its surface rusted into putrescence and become dead soil before the herb can grow. The destruction of the mineral is the life of the vegetable. Upon the life of the vegetable world, the myriad forms of higher life

sustain themselves—still the same law. Farther still: have we never pondered over that mystery of nature—the dove struck dumb by the hawk—the deer trembling beneath the stroke of the lion—the winged fish falling into the jaws of the dolphin? It is the same solemn law again."

These words of Robertson find an echo in the lines,

" Life evermore is fed by death,
In earth and sea and sky;
And that a rose may breathe its breath
Something must die."

In this fact of service there may be the action of a will, and there may be only the operation of a law. Service may be voluntary, or involuntary. The principle of vicarious service is universal.

• II. Another fact equally conspicuous is the universality of *vicarious suffering*. This is one of the gloomiest problems that the mind ever fronts. The innocent suffer for the guilty—not merely in behalf of the guilty but instead of the guilty. Suffering which results from effort to help has in it an element of compensation. Suffering which comes simply because one has the misfortune to be related to those who transgress law, and which is entailed by the folly of others without volition of those afflicted, all are powerless to prevent. This is a mystery of mysteries. The members of the race are tied together inextricably. The law of heredity is universal and remorseless. One may have nothing but pleasure. His indulgences are so regulated that they never get control of him. He gets the honey out of them, but his course is such that his child is born with a tendency to evil which is well nigh resistless. The father may eat *sweet* grapes but the children's teeth will be set on edge. The whole history of the doctrine of heredity illustrates the fact of which we are speaking. Æschylus as explicitly as Ezekiel declares that an old transgression sometimes abides to the third generation, as illustrated in the unhappy family of Laius ("Thebes," 742):

" With urgent force the Fury treadeth
To generations three,
Avenging Laius' sin on Laius' race."

Again, in these terrible lines is repeated the recognition of the same fact :

" What hath been, and shall be ever,
That when purple gouts bedash
The guilty ground, then blood doth blood
Demand, and blood for blood shall flow.
Fury to Havoc cries; and Havoc,
The tainted track of blood pursuing,
From age to age works woe."

—*Chocphon*, 398.

A mother dresses her child with short stockings and takes him into the bitter cold on a winter's day. She is closely wrapped in seal-skins. The child is made an invalid for life. The suffering is the child's—the error the mother's. The problem of punishment in government is an exceedingly difficult one to arrange. A man was a defaulter. His punishment was years in state-prison. His wife had committed no sin. Her disgrace came upon her like lightning from a clear sky. It was her misfortune to have such a husband. She suffered because of his crime. She endured what he could not endure. An imbecile Pope and an intriguing Emperor cunningly made two women believe that it was for the good of the Church and the glory of Christ to have the power of Romanism once more dominant in the ancient land of the Aztecs. Pio Nono and Francis Joseph employed Carlotta, daughter of Leopold of Belgium, and Eugenie of France to influence the French Emperor to establish Maximilian in Mexico. The farce was prolonged until it became a tragedy. The French Emperor was more anxious for himself than for Maximilian. He left him to his own resources. The Pope had nothing but words to offer. Juarez rallied the republicans and overthrew the Empire. The Grand Duke who sought to be Emperor was shot. And now for years poor Carlotta has been insane, imagining at one time that her husband is coming to her, and then raving at those who detain him. She is suffering for others. It is not punishment, for the sin was not hers. Guiteau fired a shot. General Garfield's eighty days of agony, the suffering of his wife and family, the anguish of his poor old mother, these all resulted, besides the long trial, with its accompaniments of shame and disgrace. If

the suffering had been punishment it would have fallen on the head of the criminal. Instead of his suffering others suffered, while he flaunted his egotism until it became a stench in the nostrils of the world. These are conspicuous examples. The principle is of wide application. Wherever human hearts beat, suffering marks its bloody pathway. Parents bear the griefs and carry the sorrows of their children, as Christ bears the griefs and carries the sorrows of the world. A young man commits a sin, and, perhaps, half enjoys the publicity. The arrow pierces his mother's heart, and blood flows. Then there is another sphere of which it is difficult to speak because the facts are hard to get at. Husbands' sins wives carry, and walk through long Gethsemanes with agony and bloody sweat that falls inward. The mistakes of youth fall with ruining force upon those who had no part in them, and only happen to be linked to those from whose past they cannot escape. There is no solution of this problem. As days and nights are linked through the year, so are men who do wrong, and the innocent who suffer for their wrong-doing, linked together around the world.

This doctrine of social liability is developed by Æschylus in the case of Amphiaraus, "a discreet, upright, good and pious man, who wished not to seem, but to be good"—a great prophet who foresaw the disastrous issue of the Theban expedition, and forewarned the leaders, but led on by a high sense of honor he went with them, and fell like them. Then says the poet ("Thebes," 601):

"Death's unblest fruit is reaped
By him who sows in Ates' fields. The man
Who, being godly, with ungodly men
And hot-brained sailors mounts the little bark,
He, when the God-detested crew goes down,
Shall with the guilty, guiltless, perish."

Mrs. Browning's awful picture is true to life :

"Breath freezes on my lips to moan;
As one alone, once not alone,
I sit and knock at nature's door,
Heart-bare, heart-hungry, very poor,
Whose desolated days go on."

—*De Profundis.*

If those who did wrong were the only sufferers, the sense of

justice would temper the pain of the sight; but when we remember that probably ten innocent persons suffer for the wrongdoing of every guilty person; when we see that they suffer what according to every law of justice he and he only ought to endure, the problem becomes one of appalling magnitude. Explanation is impossible. All that can be said is that the law of vicarious suffering, like the law of vicarious service, is universal.

III. The universality of suffering has led to the theory, among ignorant people, that suffering was always to be regarded as punishment. Pain of body, calamity in circumstances, anguish of mind have led men to believe that the gods were following with vengeance. This fact leads us to ask whether there is, or has been, or can be in the nature of things, any such thing as *vicarious punishment*? Punishment is simply penalty for the transgression of law. In the nature of things it can fall upon no one but the transgressor. If the blow falls upon another it ceases to be punishment. It may be called by any name which may be given it, but it can be called punishment only after the word has been entirely emptied of its original meaning. Guilt and penalty are never charged upon a person known to be innocent, although in a hundred ways that person may suffer for the guilt of others. Luther asserted this contradiction and, in asserting it, he denied the possibility of an innocent person being punished for the guilty. He declared that Christ became guilty of all the sins of all the thieves, adulterers, murderers who ever lived, and then was punished because He was guilty; but he did not venture to say that being innocent He was punished. In order that I might present an opinion of real value on this subject I addressed a letter to one of the most learned lawyers of New York asking him whether the principle of vicarious punishment, as distinct from vicarious suffering, was, or ever had been, recognized in human law. His answer was as follows :

"Your inquiry as to vicarious punishment admits of a more extended answer than you call for. Under municipal law it has never in a civilized community been recognized except to the extent of making a part suffer for a larger number of guilty, which is analogous to the military punishment of revolted soldiers by decimation; or again, of holding sureties liable for prin-

cipals, which in the case of bail for criminals was formerly subject to a sort of personal penalty, if the principal failed to appear, or should be guilty of any wrong against which the surety undertook to be amenable. This also was analogous to the military usage of taking hostages, who were held liable for any failure of the party giving the hostages to perform what was agreed.

"By the English common law a town was liable for robbery or riot committed within the limits, and all the inhabitants were subject to a tax which might be inflicted arbitrarily upon any number. In this country a like liability formerly existed for a debt of a city, or town, in case of the bankruptcy or refusal to pay by such city or town, but this is obsolete. The Roman law as to the decurions held them liable for the taxes imposed upon a municipality, and this could be enforced by penal infliction."

In no one of the cases mentioned in this letter is punishment for another's crime inflicted on an innocent person. There is suffering because of connection with others. There is punishment because of offences growing out of circumstances connected with the offences, but in no case mentioned in this letter is the innocent allowed to bear the penalty which belongs to another.

The sacrifices of the Jews could hardly be adduced as exceptions to this rule. Among them "no sacrifices secured forgiveness for specific moral offences" (Dale, "Atonement," p. 466). If that is true, evidently the guilt was never borne except in a symbolical way. Fairbairn, in "The Typology of Scripture" (Clark's edition, vol. ii., pp. 317-392, 4th ed.) mentions different classes of sins for which sacrifices were offered. "If a man had knowingly failed to bear testimony in a court of law against men whom he knew to be justly accused of a crime, he was required to confess his sin and bring a lamb or a kid for a sin-offering; or, if he was poor, two turtle-doves, or two young pigeons; or a small quantity of fine flour, and then his sin was to be forgiven." This sin-offering had nothing in it, however, of the nature of substituted punishment. Among the other instances mentioned are those who have sworn an oath of which they were ignorant and which they could not perform, fraud, adultery with a slave, etc.; yet in none of these cases was there substituted punishment.

Dale says: "God forgave only when by the voluntary act of the guilty the victim of injustice no longer suffered for the crime" ("Atonement," p. 469). I cannot speak of this point without referring to its bearing on the death of Jesus Christ. If I understand, none of us ever think of affirming that Christ was punished, but rather that His *sufferings* were substituted for our punishment, which is a very different thing.

Mozely, in his sermon on the Atonement, in speaking of the objections made to the doctrine of the Atonement says: "The point upon which the objector has fixed is the substitution of one man for another to suffer for sin; but he has not taken this point as it is represented and interpreted in the doctrine itself, but barely and nakedly, simply as the principle of vicarious punishment. Thus stated then—that one man can be guilty of the crime, and another punished in his stead; that a criminal can suffer penalty by deputy, and have sentence executed upon him by substitute—this notion of justice is a barbarous and untenable one. It is to be observed that according to this idea of sacrifice for sin, it is not in the least necessary that the sacrifice should be voluntary, because the whole principle of sacrifice is swallowed up in the idea of vicarious punishment; and punishment, vicarious or other, does not require a voluntary sufferer, but only a sufferer. It was this low and degraded idea of sacrifice which had possession of the ancient world for so many ages, and which produced as its natural fruit, human sacrifices, with all the horrible and revolting cruelties attending them. . . . As if, indeed, the Almighty could ever possibly be appeased by a struggling victim, dragged up in horror and agony to be a sacrifice for sin against his will, recoiling at every step from the purpose to which he was devoted." (pp. 165 and 166, "University Sermons.")

The only exceptions then to the rule that vicarious punishments are not recognized are the human sacrifices—which may be typified by the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis, or the bloody rites of the Druids in the oak groves of Mona—a system which is recognized in the universe in the same train with pestilences, superstitions, and excrescences. But here again there were no vicarious punishments whatever; there was only suffering on the

part of those who were unfortunate enough to be chosen as victims of the sacrifice. Dale, in his work on the Atonement (p. 358), says, "If we attempt a theory of the death of Christ on the hypothesis that it corresponded to what would occur in the administration of human justice, if some illustrious man, as conspicuous for his virtue and public services as for his rank, died as a substitute for a number of obscure persons who had been guilty of treason, we are confronted at once by an objection which admits of no reply. Such a substitution could not be admitted. It would be contrary to the principles of justice and in the highest degree injurious to the state." The Grecian king did not suffer half of his son's punishment; he suffered something himself which would express his horror of his son's crime, and vindicate the law as much as if his son had suffered it all. No person can be punished for another. When an innocent man is executed he suffers because of the mistake of the state, but in the nature of things punishment can be inflicted only on the criminal.

IV. In our tracing of the existence and operation of the vicarious principle we have already met facts which it has been hard to catalogue under the heads which have been named. As we rise in the scale of life we find not only service and suffering vicarious in their nature, but we find that they are voluntarily undertaken, and, further, that they are sought at a cost voluntarily given by the one serving or suffering. Here and there are examples of those who can expect nothing in return, at the price of weariness and pain voluntarily serving the lowest. That is sacrifice—vicarious sacrifice, sacrifice which is necessitated by one who is higher assuming the place and entering into the condition of some one for his benefit. Sacrifice implies the giving of something for the privilege of serving. It differs from simple service, therefore, in that it is always service at a cost, for no promised remuneration, and is always voluntary. The higher the order of life the more conspicuous does this fact become. At first there is only instinct, as when the parent bird provides for its young, or the mother suckles her infant. This can hardly be called sacrifice. Neither can the service done by those who are our representatives in the administration of government, for they usually work for pay, and their service may be as selfish as any-

thing else. But by and by the mother sees her son in peril, and she has to choose between her social pleasures and his safety. The struggle may be hard. She decides for her son. That is in a measure an act of sacrifice, though not the highest because it is the result of a love of kindred. Many motives may come in to help her decision that are right, yet still more or less selfish. There is something in advance of that, although in all these there is somewhat that is vicarious.

We come next to the devotion of patriots who die in battle for their country. There is now reached a sublime height of sacrifice. Men who, like Nathan Hale, calmly face the fact that some one must die that the country may live, are not perhaps very many, but, still, they surprise us, here and there, in history. Such a man was the engineer Leeds, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, whose act was one of the grandest ever recorded. I can never recall the picture of that man with his pale face, his mouth fixed, his eyes eager, rushing to his duty and his death in the flames that six hundred people might live, without a thrill of something that is more than admiration. These men, for they are many, all illustrate in its lower forms the principle of vicarious sacrifice. I say in its lower forms, for there is that in the consciousness of a great achievement, or in great danger, which may be rewarded, which is not quite free from the element of selfishness. Hale and Leeds died in vicarious relationships as truly as any men who ever lived; yet the principle has still loftier illustrations.

In a recent biography are the following words: "There they laid him on a rough bed in the hut where he spent the night. Next day he lay undisturbed. He asked a few wandering questions about the country. Nothing occurred to attract notice during the early part of the night, but, at four o'clock in the morning, the boy who lay at his door called in alarm for Susí, fearing that their master was dead. By the candle still burning they saw him, not in bed, but kneeling at the bedside with his head buried in his hands upon the pillow. The sad yet not unexpected truth soon became evident: he had passed away on the farthest of all his journeys, and without a single attendant near him. But he had died in the act of prayer—prayer offered

in that reverential attitude about which he was always so particular." And who was that man? and what was he doing? His name the world knows. All alone he was trying to get the facts which would result in the healing of what he so vividly called "the open sore of the world"—the slave-trade. In the presence of Livingstone dead in equatorial Africa; of such an example as that of John Howard sailing on an infected ship from Constantinople to Venice in order that he might be put into a lazaretto, and thus get some clue to the awful mystery of the plague for the purpose of destroying its power; of Pastor Fleidner and his wife, of Kaiserwerth, taking into their own home two harlots just out of prison to try to save them, few will fail to recognize a principle at work such as has not yet been mentioned in this essay, and yet which is not altogether uncommon

" In this loud, swelling tide of human care and crime."

This is vicarious sacrifice in its highest human manifestation. There have been examples of it in all ages and under all forms of religion. The Spirit of Christ has been at work many times where His name has been unknown. Always as men have become unselfish, as their capacity to love has been enlarged, the tendency to give at cost of labor, of pain, of life, if need be, to uplift and help others, has found freer expression. The natural language of joy is laughter, of sorrow a sigh, of love sacrifice. There can be no sacrifice which is not, according to the love in it, vicarious. If, then, there is a higher than human love, it will show itself in a higher than human sacrifice, and will enter into the conditions and relations of the objects of love.

We are now in the presence of a great truth. According to the perfection of being is the tendency of being to enter into the conditions of those who are beneath, and lowest, for the purpose, at any cost, of uplifting and saving. Then, following all analogies of lower life, we must say—As the heavens are above the earth so is God above man, and so much greater is the tendency of the love of God to enter into vicarious relationships with those who are in misery and sin. That is a magnificent thought of Dr. Bushnell—all "saints and angels in vicarious sacrifice," "the Eternal Father in vicarious sacrifice," "the

Holy Spirit in vicarious sacrifice," and yet Dr. Bushnell only copied it from the New Testament.

The course of our argument is evident. In all created things, in life in all of its gradations, there is seen, dimly at first, but ever growing to clearer manifestation, the vicarious principle. This fact shows that the Incarnation and the sacrificial work of Jesus Christ, instead of being monstrous and without analogy in nature, are the prophecy of all nature, are in harmony with the growth of life and in line with the process of history. With all reverence it may be affirmed that the Incarnation and the work of the Saviour were required to complete the creation.

Thus have been grouped a few facts concerning the vicarious principle in the universe. It is a part of it as the colors of a sunbeam are a part of the sun's rays. There is vicarious service, vicarious suffering, and vicarious sacrifice, honored among men and angels, and by the Deity Himself. Vicarious punishment, so-called, has been practiced only in rude stages of society, and is conceivable only to imperfect and cruel conceptions of the Deity.

It hardly needs a mention of passages to show that Jesus Christ entered into the vicarious condition so as to become the servant of man. He healed diseases; the empty wine-jars blushed with new wine at the magic of His touch; He went about doing good; He washed the disciples' feet, even those of Peter and Judas. By as much as He was divinely perfect He appreciated the urgency of human infirmities; and by so much was His loving heart ever urging His willing hands to loving service, which was vicarious, because it was doing for others what they could not, or would not, do for themselves.

He bore vicariously human suffering. Like some sad sweet strain of ethereal music sounds the prophecy, "He is despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief. . . . Surely He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows. . . . He was wounded for our transgressions; He was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and with His stripes we are healed." The agony and the bloody sweat, the pathos of that bitter cry, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" show the completeness with

which He had identified Himself with man's experiences of sorrow. The world's suffering is an ocean. Jesus Christ sounded its depths.

Jesus Christ gave Himself in vicarious sacrifice for man. "He made Himself of no reputation and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." "He gave His life a ransom for many." "But God commendeth His love to us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us."

Jesus Christ as the representative man, the perfect man, performed the services which all men ought to perform; therefore He *serves* for us, or instead of us.

Jesus Christ bore the sorrows and sins of the world in His body and on His sympathy, and His love was freighted with it, until His heart broke; thus He *suffered* vicariously.

Jesus Christ voluntarily *sacrificed* Himself in entering human relations, and enduring human experiences, and suffering death because of man's sin, that He might save that which was lost.

Our study has brought into clear relief one practical truth. He who would uplift or ennoble humanity can do it only by entering into vicarious relations. Something of himself must be given by him who would do anything worth doing for his brother. The law of sacrifice is the law of life. The principle of the Incarnation, the higher coming down to the lower and entering its circumstances, and submitting to its limitations, is the principle by which all enduring progress and moral regenerations are achieved. The way of individual salvation, and of the world's redemption, must ever be what á Kempis calls "the royal way of the holy cross."

By the humiliation of the Eternal Son of God, by His Incarnation into vicarious relationships on the earth, by His agony and bloody sweat, by His cross and passion, He has honored the eternal law of righteousness, exhibited the awful nature of sin, shown that the vicarious pathway is the pathway of life, and, in a real sense, borne human guilt and sorrow, and secured for man what could be secured in no other way, pardon and peace, because in no other way could man be brought to accept the conditions of pardon and peace. Life out of death, joy out of sorrow, holiness out of wickedness by strength stooping to

weakness, and innocence taking guilt by the hand—this is a law of the universe. Among all on the earth and in spheres of light it is the glory of being to humble itself in service, and suffering, and sacrifice to save being; and the loftier the sphere, and the more glorious the intelligence, the more gladly is the privilege embraced, until, at last, reaching the supreme and ineffable, in effulgence that no eye can endure, in the splendor of infinities and eternities, where light and love are one, we are brought face to face with the throne in the midst of which is, as it were, a Lamb which had been slain.

THE unveiling of a tablet to Joseph Henry, at Princeton, brings to mind one of the greatest thinkers of modern times. *He was a discoverer and inventor because he was a logician.* Too great emphasis cannot be given to this fact. He first reasoned from Ampere's law the principle that the voltaic currents, revolving around the iron core of the electro-magnet, should move in planes at right angles to the axis of that core. He also reasoned that the resultant of a current from two spirals might be counteracted by winding the wire on a second spiral outside the first, but with its spiral angle opposed, so that the effect would be the same as if it revolved in planes at right angles to the axis of the core. He brought his reasoning to the test of experiment, and the result fully established his theory. From this came the telegraph, a result of mental power applied to the problems of natural phenomena. Thinking, logical and persistent, came before his tests. When he tried his experiments he knew what the results would be. The telegraph is a continual protest against the prevalent practice of learning without thinking. The great inventions that have revolutionized the mercantile world are the result of pure thought, applied to facts as old as creation.

OUR LETTER BOOK.

A GIFTED clergyman in Kentucky, who has been a member of the Institute and an active agent in securing subscribers to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, writes thus:

"I find that membership has not advantaged me any more this year than a subscription to the organ, CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, would have done. A member has no immunities over a subscriber unless he lives in New York. Several have spoken to me touching this point. I shall count it a favor to hear from you in reference to this view of the question of membership, before I renew. I shall at least continue to subscribe for CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, as I regard it a most helpful and excellent magazine for students. In case you desire me to solicit subscriptions, I shall do so with pleasure, but in order to succeed in obtaining members, a better inducement than the fact of attending the lectures, which as to place are not available, must be held out."

This is an important question which has come to us from several quarters. We desire to make a perfectly frank answer. He who pays \$5 for membership in the Institute has no advantage so far as we see over him who pays \$2 for subscription to CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, except this, that he becomes a supporter of the Institute which produces and distributes CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. The man who pays \$500 to become a patron of the American Bible Society, has no advantage over him who gives 25 cts. for a copy of the Holy Scriptures, except, that he has had the pleasure of contributing to an institution which makes a copy of the Scriptures possible for 25 cts. Without the American Institute there would be no publication of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT as its organ. The Institute procures the lectures. The Institute gives to the publication of these lectures the prestige of its dignity and the assistance of its own pecuniary means; both these are enhanced by every name added to our list of members. We, therefore, earnestly solicit the name of every man and every woman who feels it important to create a literature on the lines of

the relations of Philosophy and Science with the great truths revealed in Holy Scripture.

OF the Egypt Exploration Fund, Rev. W. C. Winslow, of Boston, writes us in answer to a question or two:

I. What has been done? *The discovery of Pithom* (Exodus i., 11) by Naville is of incomparable value, (1) in attesting the truth of the sacred narrative in the Hebrew ("treasure" or "store" city) and Septuagint ("fortified") versions, and in its local coloring of bricks with or without straw, with stubble, and of the use of mortar (Exodus i., 14). (2) In identifying Rameses II., "the Pharaoh of the oppression," as the builder of Pithom. (3) In disclosing valuable monumental records, especially the "Stone of Pithom," relating to its subsequent history. (4) In identifying the site with Herōopolis and Ero, the Greek and Roman towns. (5) In monumentally showing Succoth to have been the civil name of Pithom, and that Pithom-Succoth was the capital of the district, which was Succoth. (6) In its relation to the geography of the Exodus route and "the land of Goshen." Brugsch and Ebers representing German, Revillout French, Pleyte Dutch opinion, have cordially accepted the site disclosed by Naville as that of Pithom. So have Maspero, Rawlinson, Poole, Miss Edwards, Tomkins, Sayce, and the Americans, J. A. Paine, A. H. Kellogg, and H. C. Trumbull. *The explorations of Sân Tanis* (the biblical Zoan) by Petrie, although in comparative incipency, have proved Avaris, the long-lost capital of the Shepherd Kings (3,500 years ago), to have been there; have disclosed the "colossus of colossi," the most gigantic of all statues known to man (that of Rameses II.), and the wall of the great temple; statues, pylons, sphinxes, tablets, Ptolemaic and other household and sacred relics; articles in glass, bronze, porcelain, alabaster, etc.; silver and gold, and even that rare metal in Egypt, iron. Petrie's thorough work excites the admiration of archæological scholars. *The discovery of the site of Naucratis*, the beautiful Greek emporium before Alexandria, with a world of pottery and objects of art, of great interest to Hellenists, adds so much to true classical geography. "The Geography of the Land of Goshen," to be published, shows Naville's discovery of the site of the ancient town of Goshen and valuable elucidation of the subject treated, especially in its relation to the Exodus. Preceding it will be "Zoan No. I.," by Petrie, now in press for donors to the Fund. Mr. Griffiths, of Oxford, is training under Naville and Petrie for this work in Egypt. The Society hopes to have a scholarship-fund, in order that students may be

prepared to read the texts and do work when the present masters are passed away.

II. What is to be done? The labors of two or three seasons best answer. Rameses (Exodus i., 11) should also be identified; Goshen bounded; a reliable biblical atlas be made; Zoan, the headquarters of Egyptian monarchy as known to Abraham, Joseph and Moses, should be made to tell its secrets; classical sites of value (there is a special fund for Hellenism) should be sought and examined. The Delta, but little explored with pick and spade, where the tides of Egypt and Asia met, is a wonderfully rich and varied field for archæology to enter and possess. Who will give a spade? There is no endowment; voluntary contributions from *the many* must do the work until some person of requisite means and spirit arise to bear a considerable share of the burden of expense. Moreover, the committee and officers all give their services gratuitously in the cause, and the rare economy of Petrie and Naville has elicited strong praise. More than one hundred Christian scholars of eminence in America have contributed to the work, and the words of Bishop Stevens signed by Bishops Huntington, Williams and Burgess, give no uncertain sound: "Every Bible student and every friend of our Christian religion ought to aid, if possible."

THE ANVIL OF GOD'S WORD.

LAST eve I paused beside a blacksmith's door
 And heard the anvil ring the vesper chime;
 Then looking in I saw upon the floor
 Old hammers worn with beating years of time.

"How many anvils have you had," said I,
 "To wear and batter all these hammers so?"
 "Just one," he answered; then with twinkling eye,
 "The anvil wears the hammers out, you know."

And so, I thought, the anvil of God's Word
 For ages sceptic blows have beat upon;
 Yet, though the noise of falling blows was heard,
 The anvil is unworn—the hammers gone.

MEMORABILIA.

THE SUBTERRANEAN HISTORY OF MAN.—Under this title, President Bartlett, of Dartmouth College, contributed a valuable paper to the *North American Review*, July, 1885. We copy the following important passage : “ It is noteworthy how these researches are affecting the old authorities. Herodotus, Manetho, Ctesias, and most early writers suffer greatly by the contact ; Berossus less, though we know him but in fragments. The only ancient historical authority that walks in safety down the centuries by the side of all these unexpected disclosures, and is constantly becoming vindicated from hostile criticism, is the sacred Scriptures. While, in all this vast range of research, very few authenticated facts seem to conflict with those frank narratives, many a new discovery is coming to their confirmation. The old Table of the Nations (Genesis x.) acquires fresh interest and value. A land of Cush (Genesis ii., 13), long remanded to Africa alone, is found in Western Asia. The land of Shinar reappears in old Sumir, with its burnt ‘ bricks for stone ’ and its ‘ pitch for mortar.’ The life and times of Abraham fall into their proper setting, both in Assyria and in Egypt. The marauding monarchs of the East put in an appearance, and Arioch (Eriaku) dwells in Ellasar or Larsa. Belshazzar also, long lost and even denied to history, comes forth from a buried inscription, and Cyrus declares the capture of Bablyon, ‘ without fighting,’ to have been made on just such a riotous feast-day as the Scripture describes. The whole book of Daniel, notwithstanding one or two remaining difficulties, is found to be so suffused with Babylonian life, customs and institutions as to make it entirely impracticable, says Dr. W. H. Ward, to bring down the date, as has been attempted, three hundred years. And whereas the book of Judith is thus revealed a sheer invention, the book of Daniel, on its historic side, stands firmer than ever. In Egypt, where Herodotus is found wanting, Genesis steadily gains new confirmation. Von Bohlen, who assailed its

historic accuracy fifty years ago, was extinguished in the encounter. And so great an authority as Mr. R. S. Poole has not hesitated to assert that the effort to reduce the date of these narratives many hundred years is wholly incompatible with their minute conformity to all the circumstances of the age of the Ramessides, and that the late Egyptian discoveries 'emphatically call for a reconsideration' of that position. The excavation in the earth will undermine the castle in the air."

EGYPTOLOGY.—There is no point, says the *S. S. Times*, where the Bible record and the claim of infidel scientists—not sincere and reverent, but skeptical and scoffing scientists—are at greater variance than as to man's beginning in knowledge and character. The Bible says that man started on a high plane, and gradually declined through sin and the neglect of his privileges. The scoffing student of science says that man started on a level with the brute, and has been gradually making progress from that beginning until now. Whenever a rude stone hatchet, or a bit of primitive pottery has been found in some subterranean cavern, it has been claimed by the doubter of the Bible as a new witness against Genesis. But the believer in the Bible has rested on the Bible story without having his faith cut to pieces by a stone hatchet. From no land has there come better material for the study of the comparative chronology of learning and art than from Egypt. In view of the recent remarkable discoveries there, a Cairo correspondent of the *Nation* has referred to "the growing conviction of Egyptologists [not of Bible defenders, but of Egyptologists, mark you!] that the earliest Egyptian civilization we know of is the highest, and that all that we know of it is its decadence." Why, the Book of Genesis tells us that! "The oldest pyramid is the largest and best built; the oldest temple—that beside the Sphinx at Gizeh—shows masonry since unapproached; the oldest papyrus—though as yet hardly understood—is the wisest; and the tombs and temples of the Theban period are filled with extracts from ancient books not yet found complete." That's it! All that is necessary to bring a scientist to the defence of the Bible story is—science.

THE sceptical Gibbon has a remarkable passage in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," in which he writes like one who almost believed that the threatenings and promises of God do fulfil themselves in history. He is speaking of the Seven Churches of Asia Minor, to which the second and third chapters of Revelations are addressed. He says: "In the loss of Ephesus the Christians deplored the fall of the first angel, the extinction of the first candlestick of the Revelation; the desolation is complete; and the temple of Diana or the Church of Mary will equally elude the search of the curious traveller. The circus and three stately theatres of Laodicæa are now peopled with wolves and foxes; Sardis is reduced to a miserable village; the god of Mahomet without a rival or a son is invoked in the Mosques of Thyatira and Pergamus and the populousness of Smyrna is supported by the foreign trade of the Greeks and Armenians. Philadelphia alone has been saved by prophecy or courage. At a distance from the sea, forgotten by the emperors, encompassed on all sides by the Turks, her valiant citizens defended their religion and freedom above fourscore years and at length capitulated with the proudest Ottomans. Among the Greek colonies and churches of Asia, Philadelphia is still erect—a column in a scene of ruins—a pleasing example that the paths of honor and safety may sometimes be the same."

"THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "is a philosophy of the origination of things." So far is this from being true, it is obvious that the theory of evolution is no philosophy at all, and that its existence depends upon the denial of the "origination" of things. Material things have been created or have existed eternally. If the latter, there has been no "origination;" and if the former, then "evolution" has no foundation, and "development" accounts to philosophy for all the known changes. That not a single case of "evolution" has yet been found to satisfy the intellect of philosophical thinkers, and that science is producing a great variety of illustrations of "development" are facts which, although they do not prove that there has been a creation, go far to strengthen the probability of a creation.

NOTATA.

AND this is the way in which Dr. Parkhurst answers the question "Is Christianity Declining?" in *North American Review*: "A word or two will be in place in regard to church attendance and church membership. Dr. Griffin became pastor of the Park Street Church, Boston, in 1811. So unpopular was it to be seen in attendance upon an evangelical church that, as Dr. Nehemiah Adams relates, gentlemen of culture and standing who ventured into Dr. Griffin's church Sunday evenings, attracted by the reports of his genius and eloquence, went in partial disguise, sitting in obscure corners, with caps drawn over their faces and wrappers turned inside out. That was in Boston less than eighty years ago! I find that in New York City less than sixty years ago a mob prevented the holding of a meeting planned by Dr. Spring and others for promoting the better observance of the Sabbath. In the year 1800 there were in the United States 3,030 evangelical churches; in 1850, 43,072; in 1870, 70,148; and in 1880, 97,090. A gain of 27,000 in ten years, ending in 1880, and this is what the critics have been pleased to call an effete Protestantism! As gleaned from the 'Year-Books' and 'Church Minutes,' the number of communicants in evangelical churches in the United States has been as follows: In 1800, 364,000; in 1850, 3,529,000; in 1870, 6,673,000; and in 1880, 10,065,000. Of course during all this time there was an immense increase in population, but the increase in church membership a good deal more than kept pace with that of population. Taking the whole country through, there was in 1800 one evangelical communicant to every $14\frac{1}{2}$ inhabitants; in 1850, one to every $6\frac{1}{2}$; in 1870, one to every $5\frac{3}{4}$; and in 1880, one to every 5. Even during the period since 1850, in which materialism and rationalism have been subjecting Protestantism to so severe a strain, while the increase in population has been 116 per cent., the increase in communicants of Protestant evangelical churches in the United States has been 185 per cent. The same pro-

nounced drift Christianwards evinces itself if we consider the matter of American colleges and college students. Writing in 1810, Bishop Meade, of Virginia, said, 'I can truly say that in every educated young man in Virginia whom I met I expected to find a skeptic, if not an avowed infidel.' When Dr. Dwight became President of Yale College in 1745, only five of the students were church members. In the early part of Dr. Appleton's presidency of Bowdoin only one student was a professing Christian. In 1830, according to returns obtained from American colleges, twenty-six per cent. of the students were professing Christians; in 1850, thirty-eight per cent.; in 1865, forty-six per cent.; in 1880, according to the Year Book of the Young Men's Christian Association, out of 12,063 students in sixty-five colleges, 6,081, or a little more than half, were professors of religion. An American college is one of the very safest places in which a young man can be put. And it is by such steps as these that the religion of Jesus Christ is undertaking to die out from the respect and affection of our American people! So far from Christianity betraying the first symptoms of exhaustion, there has been no time since the Jordan baptism of Jesus when Christianity has moved with such gigantic strides, and put forth efforts so vigorous and herculean, as during these years of our own century when the disciples of Voltaire and the imitators of Paine have been most agile in their production of obituaries and accumulation of embalming spices."

A CORRESPONDENT of the *Literary World* gives this sketch of the life of Professor Henry Drummond, the author of "Natural Law in the Spiritual World": "Henry Drummond is a native of Sterling, thirty-three years of age. He is the second son of Mr. Henry Drummond, head of the well-known firm of Scottish seedsmen. He is younger brother of the late Peter Drummond, whose name is world-famed as the founder of the Sterling Tract Society. Educated at the high school of his native town, he, in due course, proceeded to Edinburgh University, where he graduated. He did not display great brilliancy as a scholar, but went through the arts and divinity curriculum with credit and success. He early showed a strong predilection

for outdoor life, and seems to have had an instinctive leaning toward scientific investigation, and no opportunity of encouraging his *penchant* was thrown away. In natural history his knowledge of a special and exhaustive character brought its own reward. Six years ago he was appointed to a lectureship in Glasgow Free Church College on 'Natural History and Science,' which gave him renewed and abundant facilities for the pursuit of his favorite study. His attainments, his practical acquaintance with the subject, the luminous form in which he explained facts and theories, attracted the notice of the foremost scientists, and he rapidly became an authority."

Evangelical Christendom says: "Sir William Muir, the new Principal of Edinburgh University (and one of the Vice-Presidents of the Evangelical Alliance), has lost no time in showing how earnest he is in the matter of religion. At an evangelistic meeting for students, held in the Odd Fellows' Hall, Edinburgh, under the Presidency of Professor Simpson, Sir William said that he thought it right to tell them how heartily he sympathized with the great movement going on among them. It would be contrary to all his sympathies and sentiments if he did not feel the deepest interest in that occasion. Religion, he said, ought to be everything with them. It ought to be their first and chief object to secure the one thing needful. They ought to be 'out and out' whatever they were, and they would find that it was not only the best course, but also the safest and wisest. The religion of Jesus Christ imparted a manliness to those who adopted it; it raised their character, because it brought them into true relation with their Maker, with themselves, and with those about them. There was nothing that gave them a greater purpose, nerve, or power than the adoption of the Christian faith and the following it out with full purpose of heart."

IN the *Southern Presbyterian Quarterly* for April is an elaborate review (20 pp.) of the paper of Professor Davis entitled "Am I Free?" which appeared in the November number of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. The writer, Rev. A. R. Cocke, of Lex-

ington, Va., courteously but decidedly dissents from the views of Professor Davis, and with much ability upholds the scheme of necessity. He would, however, change the word to certainty. But as certainty is the consciousness of necessity, does not the variation seem unessential? Professor Davis thinks the attack upon his position unsuccessful. Perhaps so, perhaps not. Somebody's lance is broken. He has assumed a very aggressive attitude, and must look out for himself. We want the light of truth on this dark subject, and shall not be sorry to see our knight unhorsed if it can be fairly done.

PRESIDENT GILMAN, in the conclusion of his annual report of Johns Hopkins University, says: "It is to many persons at a distance a source of regret that the differences of opinion which separate into so many denominations the religious world prevent our assuming any religious name or wearing any ecclesiastical badge; but, on the other hand, it is a source of general satisfaction that here so many of those who are elsewhere separated can be united in the search after truth and in the maintenance of faith. I believe that in the providence of God this foundation is to be most useful in the development of character, and in teaching successive generations of young men to live uprightly. When this University began, the trustees expressed their wish that it should be free from sectarian bias, but should be pervaded by the spirit of enlightened Christianity."

IN the year 1500 A.D., that is, 384 years ago, the population living under Christian governments was about 100,000,000. Now it is considerably over 600,000,000. At this rate of increase, in a very short period the whole world will be controlled by Christian governments; then will evangelization begin in earnest, until "nations are born in a day," and "the kingdoms of this world become the kingdoms of our Lord and of His Christ." Take the United States as an illustration of its progress in converting men. In 1800, the beginning of this century, there were in round numbers, 3,000 churches and 2,600 ministers, with 360,000 members. Now, nearly 100,000 churches, 70,000 ministers, and over 10,500,000 of members. In addition to this the Roman Catholics claim six millions of adherents.

THE infidel colony founded five years ago in Barton county, Missouri, has not been a success. A correspondent of a St. Louis paper, who spent a day and a half in the new town called Liberal, says that the experiment is a failure ; that the town, instead of keeping pace with other towns of the same age, has fallen far behind them, and instead of being the happy, prosperous community it promised to be, is shrivelled, contracted, torn in two by dissensions, and in a condition where only prompt action on behalf of its friends toward a complete reorganization will save it from disintegration.

DR. HOWARD CROSBY deals a keen blow at the critics who would dismember the Pentateuch, assigning Deuteronomy to a period after the Babylonian captivity. "Imagine," he says, "if you can, the Messiah, in selecting the fittest words to meet Satan's assault, taking up a fragment of a forged book, a book which was a stupendous lie, framed by priestcraft."

DR. PETER BERAULT, who published in London, 1680, his book entitled "The Church of Rome Evidently Proved Heretick," has on the title page this quotation: "They are Heretick who know more than the Scripture teacheth" ("Irenæus," Book V., 16, 17).

THE microscope gives us new ideas of space. Suppose we could similarly apply some instrument to a moment of time too small to be measured, what ideas of eternity would be thus given to us ?

THE famous canon, "*Quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus creditum sit*," as the text of Catholic doctrine, was first put forth by Vicentius of Lerins, who, in the fifth century, was a disciple of Chrysostom.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift will probably meet the demands of our readers.]

There are three volumes on our table to which we wish to call special attention, particularly of those of our readers who have not had the advantage of a regular college classical course. They are entitled, severally, "PREPARATORY GREEK COURSE IN ENGLISH," "PREPARATORY LATIN COURSE IN ENGLISH" and "COLLEGE GREEK COURSE IN ENGLISH." They are prepared by Prof. Wm. Cleaver Wilkinson. The design is to enable those who have been kept from school and college training in Latin and Greek to enjoy "an advantage as nearly as possible equivalent" through the medium of the English. There are many parents who were deprived of advantages of regular training in their youth, but whose boys and girls in academies and colleges are studying the Latin and Greek classics. The total ignorance of the parents in regard to the studies of their children must always create a great gulf between them. A father who went into the bank at fourteen or fifteen years of age is now a millionaire. When he hears his boys and their college chums talking over scholastic matters he feels himself at disadvantage, although his brains are superior to those of the young scholars. One hour each evening given to the study of Prof. Wilkinson's books would nearly bridge the chasm between parent and child. Another large class should give these books attentive perusal, namely, professional people. There are thousands of lawyers, physicians, and even clergymen, who have been so long away from college study and so engrossed in professional pursuits that the old Latin and Greek classics have grown dim in their memory. The perusal of these books would be of great advantage to them. Excellent as the idea is, we should certainly not be so emphatic in our recommendation if the work had not been performed in a really scholarly and thorough manner. The books are published by Messrs. Phillips

& Hunt, New York, and may be purchased separately. Price, \$1.25 each.

At the close of the last volume of *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT* we expressed our view of Dr. Pusey's "*COMMENTARY ON THE MINOR PROPHETS*," the first volume of which had then appeared. Messrs. Funk & Wagnalls have produced the second volume, which completes the work and increases our respect for both the learning and devout spirit of this most excellent commentator. We take pleasure in calling the attention of our readers, a second time, to this admirable work. Price, \$3.00 a volume.

The appearance of the Revised Version of the Old Testament must have created considerable interest in questions as to the extent and nature of the changes made in the text. We commend to the attention of our readers "*A COMPANION TO THE REVISED OLD TESTAMENT*," by Talbot W. Chambers. Dr. Chambers is a well known scholar and clergyman, and was one of the American company of revisers, and his excellent book will greatly assist in deepening the sense of the importance of the Old Testament Scripture as well as the value of the new version. Funk & Wagnalls. Price, \$1.00.

The Rev. Joseph Miller, curate of Newbold-on-Avon, is issuing a series of books on the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. The only volume we have seen is on the Ninth Article and is entitled "*HAMARTIALOGY*." It is a remarkably able and learned discussion of the Christian doctrine of sin. One of the most interesting portions is the section which makes an argument for original sin from the Church doctrine and practice of infant baptism. It will interest anti-pædobaptists as much as "churchmen" to see how Mr. Miller manages the literature of this topic. Indeed, his treatment of each topic of the most grave and awful subject of sin is very fresh, able and comprehensive. It is not a popular treatise: it is a book by a scholar for scholars. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co. Price, 3s. 6d.

There may be readers of *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT* who have become interested in Professor Davis, of the University of Virginia, by reason of his striking lectures delivered before the

Institute and published in this periodical, who are not acquainted with his admirable book entitled "THE THEORY OF THOUGHT." It is not a new book. It is a treatise on Deductive Logic, "not elementary as bringing the subject within the grasp of immature minds," a thing the Professor thinks impracticable, but it is elementary in the sense of "beginning at the beginning," so that a reader who has not had previous knowledge of logic may take it up, and when he shall have mastered its contents he will know both the technical details of the science and its established doctrines, and be prepared to study advanced theories. One very obvious and valuable feature of the book is its great number and variety of examples for illustration and *praxis*. The Harpers. Price, \$2.

Dr. James Strong, of Drew Theological Seminary, has prepared an interesting book entitled "IRENICS." It is a series of essays to show the virtual agreement between, I., Science and the Bible; II., Nature and the Supernatural; III., the Divine and the Human in Scripture; IV., The Old and the New Testaments; V., Calvinism and Arminianism; VI., Divine Benevolence and Endless Punishment. The author's reputation for scholarship is guarantee of an able book. It might be *that*, without being interesting. But we think the reader will find his attention arrested and detained through all the papers. It is a popular discussion of abstruse themes. Price, \$1. Phillips & Hunt.

From our boyhood Virgil has been a favorite poet with most of us. We are pleased to announce that a very handsome edition has been published by Messrs. A. S. Barnes & Co. of the first six books of the *Æneid*, with explanatory notes by Edward Searing, A.M., the *Bucolics* and *Georgics*, with explanatory notes by Henry Clark Johnson, A.M., together with a complete vocabulary. It has been the aim of the editor to present in a convenient and attractive volume, with lexicon, notes, and other helps, those portions of Virgil generally required to be read by students. The work bears evidence of great care and painstaking, the map and engravings are fine specimens of artistic workmanship, and the letter-press in accuracy and neatness could hardly be excelled.

"THE VOCALIST" is a very fresh and new book of songs and hymns for use in social assemblies, seminaries and graded schools, compiled by James E. Ryan, who has added an exposition of the system of musical instruction employed in the schools of Brooklyn, N. Y. Many of the works of the great composers are here presented, it is said, for the first time for use in schools. A. S. Barnes & Co., publishers.

In an able article in *The Century*, Mr. Henry W. Grady quoted from a remarkable speech made before the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, in Atlanta, 1878, by Rev. Wm. D. Johnson, D.D., as Fraternal Delegate from the African M. E. Church. This very eloquent address, under the title of "THE WHITE MAN AND THE COLORED MAN AS CHRISTIAN CITIZENS," has been published by its author and any of our readers may enjoy the pleasure of reading it by forwarding fifteen cents to Rev. Dr. Johnson, Marietta, Ga.

James Pott & Co., 12 Astor Place, publish in a very handsome pamphlet, the able and earnest essay by Rev. Ballard S. Dunn, entitled "THE TWIN MONSTERS: and How National Legislation may help to Solve the Mormon Problem, and Restore to Society the Sacramental Character of the Rite of Holy Matrimony." An abstract of this important Paper was read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. It is here put in popular form. Price, 25 cents.

"THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM AND THEIR PRACTICAL VALUE," have been calmly and skilfully examined, and most satisfactorily stated, in a paper read before the Presbyterian Ministers' Association of Chicago, by Rev. A. C. Zenos, Professor in Lake Forest University.

We have received from Ginn, Heath & Co., Boston, two books of such importance that we reserve a more extended notice of them for our next number. The books are: "OUTLINES OF METAPHYSIC"—Dictated portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. "OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION"—Dictated portions of the Lectures of Hermann Lotze. Both these books are translated from the German and edited by Prof. George T. Ladd, of Yale College.

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[CORRECTED TO JULY 1ST, 1885.]

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Any errors in this list will be cheerfully corrected with thanks to those who report them.

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YOUNG, Prof. CHARLES A., LL.D., Princeton, N. J.

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The Institute cherishes the memory of the following members who were with us in the beginning of our work and have since passed away:

1882.

ALLEN, WILLIAM H., President Girard College, Philadelphia, Pa.
GRAHAM, Gen. JAMES LORIMER, New York.
GRAHAM, Mrs. JULIA M., New York.
HALE, EDWARD J., New York.
SMITH, MARSHALL B., D.D., Passaic, N. J.

1883.

COLLINS, Rev. CHARLES TERRY, Cleveland, Ohio.
EWER, FERDINAND C., S.T.D., New York.
LILLY, E. J., Fayetteville, N. C.
MALLET, Gen. EDWARD J., New York.
MARTIN, Prof. BENJAMIN NICHOLAS, New York.
MEANS, ALEX., D.D., LL.D., Oxford, Georgia.
PHELPS, Prof. MOSES STUART, Northampton, Mass.

1884.

COLLISSON, Rev. HENRY M., Chicago, Ill.
HALSTEAD, Gen. N. NORRIS, Newark, N. J.
HORN, G. W., D.D., Colorado Springs, Col.
HUTCHINSON, W. J., New York.
MCHARG, JOHN, New York.

1885.

BRECKENRIDGE, Rev. EDWARD W., Binghamton, N. Y.
CONSTANT, SAMUEL S., New York.
PIERSON, THEODORE F., A.B., East Orange, N. J.
SCOTT, Prof. WILLIAM A., D.D., LL.D., San Francisco, Cal.
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CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1885.

ANNIVERSARY ADDRESS.

[Delivered before the American Institute of Christian
Philosophy, at Asbury Park, N. J., July 23d, 1885.]

BY CHARLES F. DEEMS, D.D., LL.D.,

President of the Institute.

AT the close of the first year of the work of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy it was thought best that the President should deliver an address, somewhat in the nature of a general view of our field and the work which had been done therein. This has been followed through the successive years; but it seems to me that we have reached such a stage of growth that all that is needed in that department for publication may be found in the reports of our secretary and treasurer. I beg to refer to those documents. To adhere to any topic when there is not sufficient matter to justify a discussion, seems to me not a course to be pursued before such a body as this Institute. I am about, therefore, to presume upon the kindness of the Institute in allowing me to substitute for such a review of Christian effort the treatment of topics, in our line of thought, to which I have given some consideration during the past year.

THE CASE OF GALILEO.

The opening address which I had the honor to make at our first Summer School, on the 12th of July, 1881, contained these sentences: "It was not religion which brought Galileo to his humiliating retraction, about which we hear so much declama-

tion; it was 'the Church.' But why should writers of the history of science so frequently conceal the fact that 'the Church' was instigated thereunto, not by religious people, but scientific men—by Galileo's *collaborateurs*? It was the jealousy of the scientists which made use of the bigotry of the churchmen to degrade a rival in science."

The Rev. Mr. Engström, Secretary of the Christian Evidence Society, London, wrote me that while he was reading that passage in the address, one of the lecturers employed by the society entered the office, and in talking about his work said that one of the most difficult things he found to meet was the case of Galileo, continually presented by the opponents of Christianity. I was asked by Mr. Engström to furnish the proof of the statement made in my address. This led me to examine the case and to furnish what seems to be the true story of Galileo. In repeating this story I shall use freely what I contributed, on this subject, to the pages of *The Critic*.

Before feeling quite safe in using this stale story to show that the religious spirit is intolerant of truths established by science, it might be freshened by a little examination of these three points, namely: what did really happen to Galileo; and on whom rests the responsibility; and, what it all proves.

It is not necessary to recite the history of Galileo, the details of which can be found in any good encyclopædia. It is sufficient to recall the facts that he lived in Italy during the last third of the sixteenth century and the first third of the seventeenth, and that he made a number of very important discoveries which tended to form a science of dynamics, and some astronomical discoveries which hastened the general acceptance of the Copernican system. He was a man of extraordinary genius, and would probably have excelled in any department of study. He early ranked with the most skilful professors of music, and that art at one time seemed about to be his calling. But he loved painting, and one of the most distinguished painters of his day confessed that he owed to Galileo's instruction his success as an artist. He was so eloquent that it was expected he would enrich literature. An incident turned his attention to geometry. Then his great genius for mathematics showed itself, and he

began those experiments and publications which have given him his lasting fame. Before he was twenty-five years of age he was Mathematical Lecturer in the University of Pisa. At twenty-seven years of age he was Professor of Mathematics in the University of Padua where he continued for eighteen years in the enjoyment of a competent salary and leisure for scientific pursuits. From this post he was called to a professorship in Florence at a more liberal salary, and was greatly honored. Cardinal Bellarmino, the most learned and influential member of the Sacred College at Rome, was his warm personal friend; a still warmer friend was Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, who, from that same College, ascended the pontifical throne in 1623, with the title Urban VIII. This is the Pope who is reported to have said (to Cardinal Hohenzollern) that the propagation of the heliocentric theory, which necessarily involved the earth's motion, had not been condemned as heretical, nor could be, but could only be considered as rash.

It is to be remembered that Galileo had not only a great grasp of understanding but great brilliancy of imagination and splendor of speech. He treated the dry details of science with such eloquence that his class at Padua grew until the university was compelled to furnish him a hall which would contain two thousand hearers. His lectures were not at all on theological but scientific subjects. He used his fiery eloquence in burning sarcasm on his scientific opponents. Hence his troubles. When he was twenty-five years old he began, and for two years continued, the experiments on which modern dynamical science may be said mainly to rest. There was nothing in those teachings that could be fancied to have any theological bearing; but when scientific opponents saw him from the tower of Pisa giving ocular demonstration of the falsity of the Peripatetic teachings and heard him ridiculing the Aristotelians with his biting rhetoric, those gentlemen of the adverse scientific school conceived a hatred for Galileo which followed him through his long career. They could not answer his arguments, but they could infuse discomfort into his life, and they would have killed him early if he had not had the protection of such churchmen as Bellarmino and Urban VIII.

His first trouble originated in demonstrating the falsity of the theory that "heavy bodies fall with velocities proportional to their weights." Galileo had a talent for exciting the hatred of those whose scientific opinions he opposed. He not only lacked tact, but even ordinary prudence. To the aid of the Aristotelian foes he raised an auxiliary by the manner in which he condemned a certain machine which had been invented by a son of Cosmo. He thus alienated the favor of the archducal court. His troubles, we see, arose from a scientific hypothesis and an opinion of a machine—neither of which could wound religious or even ecclesiastical susceptibilities.

What did his enemies succeed in doing? They watched Galileo with sleepless vigilance. They knew that his enthusiastic maintenance of any theory he held would give them some hold upon him. Already the Copernican theory, as then understood, seemed, alike to the ignorant and the learned, as being contradicted by some passages in the Holy Scriptures as then understood. In certain expositions of the relations of physical science to the Holy Scriptures, he very unwisely strove to propitiate the ecclesiastics who were indifferent to science, and to confound his scientific opponents who were ecclesiastics, by striving to confirm a new scientific theory by passages out of the old Bible. His scientific opponents, always on the alert, seized the pretext. The pulpits thundered. The inquisition was invoked. When the Dominican, Niccola Lorini, denounced Galileo to the congregation of the Holy Office, it seems to have been mainly on the ground that he "spoke with little respect of Aristotle." A systematic persecution was organized and prosecuted. With what result? Galileo had voluntarily appeared before the Sacred College, expecting to convince them of the truth of his teachings. He failed. The proposition that the sun is the centre of the system was declared by the consulting theologians to be "*absurd in philosophy*, and formally heretical, because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture." The proposition that the earth moved around the sun was declared to be "open to the same censure *in philosophy*, and at least erroneous as to faith."*

* "The Roman College was a regular tribunal, scientific as well as theological." (M. Mezieres, of the French Academy, in *Revue des Deux Mondes*.)

Galileo was admonished not to teach the condemned doctrine. He consented. He returned to his home unhurt and, it is said, in good spirits. He had not abjured. There had been no penalty imposed. His enemies had circulated reports involving those two calumnies which Galileo refuted by producing the written certificate of Cardinal Bellarmino that the statements were untrue.

It was five years after this that Galileo visited his friend Maffeo Barberini, who in the interval had reached the papal throne. With the Pope the astronomer had long and friendly interviews. On his return he continued his studies for years. In 1632 he published a book which was received with highest praise all over Europe on account of the ability of its matter and the elegance of its style. It was in the form of a dialogue, in which there were three interlocutors—one a teacher of the new astronomical doctrines, one an intelligent listener, and the third a good-natured but stupid objector. In this last character Galileo made occasion to ridicule his Peripatetic opponents. Perhaps if that had been omitted, no specially adverse notice would have been taken of the book, the publication of which certainly was a violation of Galileo's promise, to conform to the edict of the Sacred College made sixteen years before. But he managed so to incense his *philosophic and scientific* opponents that they lost little time in renewing the attack.

The result was that the book was prohibited. The mind of the Pope was stirred against Galileo, whose course he regarded as ungrateful to himself, seeing that he had shown him such personal consideration. It was *this* more than any theological animus that prompted Urban VIII. to cite Galileo to Rome. Urban *did not reject the heliocentric theory* of astronomy, but he had his susceptibilities *as Pope*, and he regarded the stirring up of strife by Galileo as a personal offence. Well, finally to Rome Galileo went. There seemed to be no cruel urgency. He was cited in October, 1632, but did not go until February, 1633. He was not thrown into prison. He remained two months in the palace of the Tuscan ambassador, who was his warm personal friend, his ardent partisan on the scientific side. After that he was detained eighteen days in the palace of the Inquisition.

Then he returned to the friendly hospitality of the palace of the Tuscan ambassador. The charge was that he had published matter contrary to the edict of the Inquisition in 1616. He defended himself by disavowing *on oath* his belief in the Copernican theory since its condemnation by the Congregation of the Index, and by avowing that his intentions in all his publications were good and such as became a true Catholic. *He even offered to write another dialogue to disprove the Copernican theory.* On the 21st of June he received his sentence, which was, that, being "violently suspected of heresy," he should be liable to incarceration at the pleasure of the tribunal.

Was he incarcerated? No. Did he recite any abjuration while kneeling, and then spring from his knees and stamp the ground and exclaim "*E pur se muove!*"? No; that powerful and affecting little story does not seem to have been invented until Galileo had been dead nearly a century and a half. What punishment was assigned him by the judges? That for the space of three years he should daily repeat the seven penitential psalms!! Was that awful sentence ever executed? No. It was never ratified by the Pope, whose wounded sensibilities seemed to have been so far alleviated that he gave Galileo a picture and settled a pension on his son. Then the astronomer was transferred to the palace of the Archbishop of Sienna, in whose superb garden he promenaded, daily writing cheerful and even jocose letters and notes to his friends. It is not in this way that an old man who had been tortured would jest, says M. Biot, who was convinced that it was not scientific truth but personal animosities which led to Galileo's troubles.

This is the outcome of the affair of Galileo. This is all the enemies of either the Church of Rome or of Christianity have had for the pages of vituperation which they have concocted against religion. This is all that can be shown historically. All the rest is invention. A calm view of this history shows several things. Reared in the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church three hundred years ago, and dying in the faith and communion in which he was brought up—a faith and communion ordinarily supposed to be the least tolerant of free thought and most exacting of submission to authority—Galileo found

space to cultivate exact science and to promulgate new scientific doctrines. He came when the authority of Aristotle, who was a pagan and whose philosophy was empirical, had ruled human thought for more than a thousand years. He came when, in Italy, Rome ruled in all matters, civil, religious, literary, philosophical and social. There was nothing outside the Church, because everything was inside. Every sinner as well as every saint was a Catholic. If any controversy rose on any subject, both opponents were churchmen, whether they were scullions or scholars, cartmen or cardinals.

Galileo had the sagacity to see the truth of the new theory, and the ability to bring the results of profound and vigorous thought to its support. He found churchmen to help him and churchmen to oppose him. If the Roman Catholic Church of his age must be charged with the fact that some of its theologians opposed the new science, it must be credited with the other fact that some of its theologians maintained it. The edict against the works of Copernicus (*"De Revolutionibus Orbium Cælestium"*) and against Galileo (1616) was issued by a college or congregation whose function was merely disciplinary. The Church of Rome is not to be held responsible for that, because, in the first place, it was not confirmed by the reigning Pope (Paul V.), and in the next place it was disapproved by his successor, and finally it was repealed in the following century by the Church under Benedict XIV. The condemnation of Galileo, seventeen years later, was merely a paper signed by seven cardinals and not ratified by the Pope, Urban VIII., who was opposed to the prohibitory decree and seems to have held to the new doctrine. His heat against Galileo arose from pride wounded by ingratitude. It was followed by no personal pains and penalties, when appeased by Galileo's deceitful recantation. It must not be forgotten that Galileo received his tuition as a pupil in the schools of the Church, and that he held places of honor and emolument, as professor and otherwise, in universities of the Church, from which he was never ejected.

Suppose there were an established Church of America in this last quarter of the nineteenth century, and suppose everybody belonged to it, and that among the scholars that belonged to it

there arose a difference on any question—say the question of evolution ; and suppose some of the evolutionists, being narrow and uncharitable Christians, but good American churchmen, should be in position to make some anti-evolutionist, who also was a good churchman although not strictly moral, feel that he could enjoy life more by verbally agreeing to the doctrine of evolution while he went on with his work of overthrowing the doctrine, being helped therein by other churchmen—in such a case, would it not be very unjudicial, to say the least, to lay the narrow and persecuting spirit of the evolutionist at the door of the American Church ? Let us go further and suppose that the authorities of this imagined American Church had always burned any man who advanced a new scientific thought, and burned his wife, his children, his horse, his ox, his ass, and all that was his ; what would that prove ? Simply that this Church had acted in a way contrary to the spirit and teaching of Christ, and that the severest judge of such a Church would be the founder of Christianity.

But no such thing appears in the case of the Church of Rome and Galileo. His life was only another illustration of the general law of inertia which pervades mind as it does matter, showing that any new motion requires force for its initiation and will meet resistance in its progress. Historically the case in hand was not the case of the Church of Rome *versus* Galileo, but was the case of the Aristotelians *versus* a new scientist, in which the defendant was at some cost to defeat the plaintiff, and in which the plaintiff was finally “thrown out of court.”

It may break the unity of this address, but it certainly will increase its variety, to present another topic. It was discussed before the Methodist ministers of the City of New York and would have been redelivered before the Baptist ministers of Philadelphia but for a painful pastoral engagement which detained me in New York. In this case I make free use of matter which was contributed by me to the June number of the *Homiletic Monthly*, 1885, edited by Rev. Dr. Funk. The topic is :

THE USES OF SCIENTIFIC STUDIES TO THE PREACHER.

Before materials are selected it is important to have a clear

idea of what is to be built. Before discussing the value to the preacher of any particular kind of study it seems proper to make for ourselves a clear idea of what the real functions of a Christian preacher are.

Perhaps we shall agree upon this : The office of a preacher is to set before his hearers, in such ways as shall be persuasive of their authoritative truth, the doctrines of the Holy Scriptures, so that those doctrines shall become to his hearers a sure basis of spiritual experience and moral living. In order to do this in a truly manly and efficient way, the preacher must have for himself a profound conviction of the truth and value of those doctrines. That presupposes a knowledge of those doctrines. But knowledge is the persuasion of the truth of any proposition upon proper evidence. The ordinary Christian may be happy and useful in the belief of many a truth which he cannot teach. He may be a blessed disciple without being a useful apostle. But the preacher is sent forth to "disciple all nations." It is not sufficient that he has the conscious experience of being able to see the glory of God shining in the face of Jesus ; but he must be able to turn the eyes of his fellow-men toward that glory, so that they may partake of the splendid vision.

Science is knowledge systematized. Nothing can be claimed as science which is not *known*. Any one smallest fact in the universe can be as well known as any number of the most important truths. But science has no field until there exists an amount of knowledge sufficient to be made into a system. The apostles knew the fact of the resurrection of their Lord, but that most important fact could not make a Christian theology. The earliest man acquired in the first week of his existence the knowledge of several of the most important facts in the stellar universe ; but it was centuries before the world had anything that could be called astronomy. The doctrines of the Christian system are imbedded in the New Testament as the doctrines of geology are imbedded in the rocks.

Men may till the land and sail the waters sufficiently for the ordinary purposes of life without geological or astronomical knowledge in themselves personally ; but no man can teach geology or astronomy without scientific knowledge. The

preacher-teacher must have such knowledge of what is actually taught in the Gospel as will enable him to set forth the grounds of his persuasion of the truth to his fellow-men. It is sufficient that they be religious, but he must be both religious and theological ; and theology is a science.

Moreover, in order to be efficient and largely useful to his people, the preacher must have a conviction that the doctrines of the Gospel which he has learned are superior to all other doctrines as a basis for religious experience and ethical conduct. To secure that, he must make some comparison of those doctrines with the doctrines set forth in other systems. That involves a study of comparative theology. Just in the measure in which a preacher has suspicion that the truth which he preaches is not the paramount and indispensable truth, in that proportion is his earnestness cooled and his power diminished. His influence over his fellow-men shrinks as his earnestness abates, because the most illiterate can appreciate earnestness where they cannot comprehend knowledge. They take it for granted that when a man undertakes to teach what is necessary for eternal salvation, he has himself examined the grounds and felt the power of the doctrines he teaches. But if earnestness be lacking, they jump to the conclusion that they were mistaken ; that the man has not any profound conviction of the paramount value of what he teaches, and that the teaching which is merely perfunctory and professional cannot be of infinite importance.

Now, In an age in which every class of society—men, women and children—are infected with a desire to know more or less of science ; at a time when even workmen actually know more of the science which has a real basis in knowledge, and also of the science which is falsely so called, than was known by professional men a hundred years ago—there will creep up into the study and into the heart of the preacher, who knows no science but theology, the suspicion that there may be in the attainments of other men some knowledge which militates against the doctrines he has been preaching. Such a suspicion will produce a weakness, and may make a blight. To prevent this, to keep his mind in the robust healthfulness of an unbroken con-

viction, the preacher must make excursions in the fields of science which lie outside theology.

This is mentioned first as being first in importance, as being much more important than all knowledge. *The integrity of the preacher's own innermost, profoundest conviction, that what he preaches is unquestionably true, is indispensable.* He may, with this, be useful in turning many to righteousness; without this, all learning, wit and eloquence tell for nothing. They may make the body of preaching, but conviction of truth supplies the soul of preaching.

There may be a vitality which is very feeble. That the preaching may flame with life, the preacher must not only be convinced that there are no truths in any department of knowledge comparable with the truths of the Gospel, but also that no other truths are of any avail for the salvation of men. He cannot remain in perfect security that this is the fact if he make no acquisition of the knowledge which has been attained by others in the several departments of science and philosophy. In this day it is impossible to escape intimations of intellectual activity, if the preacher read at all. These must cause him to feel as if he were continually walking amid ambushes, if he do not know that there are no truths so important as the truths taught in the Gospel; and if he be not prepared, on suitable occasions and in proper ways, to show this to his people, into whose minds there will frequently be injected the suggestion that this is not the fact. If they discover that the pastor has gone over the ground and examined for himself, and still retains his conviction that there is nothing to shake faith in gospel doctrines, as a preacher he will be able to throw the whole weight of his personality on the right side; and that personality will be more weighty by reason of his larger knowledge.

Studies in what are called the natural sciences are also very useful to a preacher, in giving him some knowledge of the correlation of truths. He is liable to become lop-sided, irregular, and fanatical—all ballast and no sails, or all sails and no ballast. There is a power in the proportions of truth. There is much weight imparted to a man when his acquaintances believe that he has a well-balanced mind. Men of that character have done

much more for mankind than all the brilliant geniuses who have surprised the world. But that balance of mind is attained by the habit of regarding the truths in the several departments of knowledge, not simply in themselves, but in their relations to one another. This cannot be gained by the preacher unless he make space for some study in the various departments of science.

The preacher needs not only balance of mind, but also strength of intellect. His intellectual limbs, so to speak, must not only be proportionate, but also strong. He must engage, every day, not only in physical but also in intellectual gymnastics. He does well to have a side-study, something that will develop his mind by a variety of exercises. He must go from the dumb-bells to the parallel bars. Supplemental to the studies necessary for the direct preparation of his sermons, he should have some study which, while not directly connected with the work of the pulpit, has special training power, and which also gives results that can be worked into sermons. This last, however, is an after-consideration. As he is not to be a specialist he should vary here. He has at command philology and archæology and chemistry and geology and astronomy and biology. Here are six departments of science, study in which develops perception, comparison, judgment, ratiocination. He may take a curriculum of six years and be gaining roundness and strength for his pulpit work. If he be a wise man and have intellectual self-control, his hearers will probably not discover which year is given to archæology and which to astronomy; but they *will* perceive that their pastor is growing in power. He will be manifestly gaining strength to grasp the Word of God more firmly, and skill to apply it more effectually.

That the work of the preacher be effective, it is manifest that it must be timely. The preaching that "turned the world upside down" in the Roman Empire would have been utterly out of place and out of power in the Middle Ages. Nay, the preaching of the last century would not take hold of this generation. The preaching which is to-day removing the stone from the sepulchre of dead souls could not have been uttered in the days of the Reformation. It would have been as great an anachron-

ism as the preaching of Tauler and Luther would be in this day, or would have been in the second century. It is to be kept distinctly in mind, that the preacher who discharges his church duties properly can never become a *specialist*, and should not aim at being an *authority* in any department of natural science. Moreover, he is to be regarded as having lost sight of the proprieties if he delivers scientific and philosophical discourses. The preacher is to "preach the Word"; not philosophy, not science, not poetry, not his own pet theories. He is to labor to make men understand the meaning of "the Word." He is to strive to bring home to the understandings and to the hearts of the very men whom he addresses—not of an imaginary audience. There is one Gospel for king and peasant, for philosopher and school-boy—and but one; yet surely no one would endeavor to convert a company of cultivated men by the method he would employ to bring a congregation of semi-civilized persons to a knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus. A preacher should strive to know the environment of his hearers: their mode of living, their employment, their pleasures, the extent of their knowledge, the character of thoughts which engage their minds, the reading which attracts their attention (if they read at all), and the character of the teaching which secures their attention when out of the church. In our age money-making and science, even more than politics, seem to interest the people. The wonderful practical applications of science to the production of material wealth have so arrested the attention of the people that they listen to all who profess to talk even *about* science. That is very natural. It is so in every department. It is the practical application of religion to the lives of men, as seen in daily life, which gives the pulpit of this age any hearers; and this it is which interests listeners, even in the boldest and stupidest and most erroneous talk about religion. If there were no converted people seen during the week there would be no hearers or worshippers in chapel or cathedral on Sunday. The preacher must know what *the world about him* is thinking of, in order to know how to bring the Gospel down upon their consciences with convincing power.

The fascination of science for the popular mind is very man-

ifest. The two books published within the memory of the present writer, in the department of religious literature, which have made the most sudden, profound, and wide impression, have been Chalmers' "Astronomical Lectures" and Drummond's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World." The fact is stated. We need not stop to account for it in the face of the openness of the latter book to current criticism, and the disappearance of the former from current reading. It must remind us, however, how greatly men are interested in science as well as religion. He who in his teaching can make either minister to the other is the most impressive teacher. Devout teachers of science have been able to give their hearers great uplifting by a sudden flash of religious light on the researches in hand. When the late Prof. Agassiz opened the scientific course at Penakese Island with the simple but solemn statement, that before men entered upon any great undertaking they should seek the aid of Almighty God, and added, "Gentlemen, let us pray," and humbly invoked divine guidance, there fell a hush on the assembly such as probably no young man there had ever known in his church at home when the pastor made the usual invitation to prayer. Once, in a large audience, I was listening to a lecture on the sun, by our revered and beloved associate, Prof. Charles A. Young, of Princeton. We were spell-bound as he pushed forward with the rapid but firm tread with which he is accustomed to march through a lecture. He was giving us facts and generalizations therefrom—phenomena and the probable causes of their production. In the preceding lectures he had made no "moral reflections," nor any allusion to the First Cause, so far as I now recollect. All at once a question arose as to the cause of the existence of a certain class of facts, when the professor dropped his eyes and voice and said simply, that he knew of no reasonable way to account for it, except to refer it to the will of the all-wise and all-good Creator. It was just for a moment, and then we were caught up and carried forward. But that moment was thrilling. It seemed to bow every soul before the throne. So, on the other side, when preachers are inculcating a great religious truth taught by revelation in the Bible, it stirs the souls of their hearers when they let suddenly upon that Bible truth the

light of the torch by whose aid men have been accustomed to explore other labyrinths.

The preacher is bound to enrich his preaching by all he can bring from every department of knowledge. How can he keep a sound conscience and neglect all those treasures which modern science is heaping around him? How can he hope to be a good scribe, unless he bring out of the treasury the new things as well as the old, to the service of the truth? One of the greatest blessings conferred by modern science is the abundance of most rich and satisfactory illustrations it is constantly affording of Bible truth, as well as the light it is shedding on the stability of the foundations of Bible evidences.

Above all things, the work of the gospel preacher is to reconcile man to God. The aim of infidel teachers is to keep man unreconciled to God. These latter do their work by making the impression that the results of scientific studies antagonize the Christian faith. Just so long as that thought holds its power over the mind of the hearer, he is irreconcilable and cannot be otherwise. When the ancient call is rung in modern ears, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God," men must have the solemn and profound conviction of the truth that the God of Nature is the God of Grace, and the Creator of material systems of the universe is the Redeemer of mankind. He hath committed unto His ministers "the ministry of reconciliation." They are to make men see that "God is in Christ" personally as He is in the physical universe pervasively, and that He is "in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." Whatever will enable Christian preachers to do this for any one soul will surpass all valuation. Gospel preachers will be recreant if they let the enemy steal the guns God has mounted in that nature which is the symbol of omnipotent wisdom, and turn them against that cross which is the sign of atoning and transforming grace.

Then, for many reasons, for his intellectual recreation, development and strengthening; for the general enrichment of the soil of his mind; for winning the respect and confidence of his hearers; for the keeping of his own conviction robust, and the attention of his congregation fixed; for knowing what his hearers know, and being able to teach them more; for his own

preservation from flatness, staleness, and unprofitableness; for the enrichment of his discourses, that his parishioners may have gain; for learning how to turn nineteenth century eyes up to "consider the heavens" as they may now be considered, and those same eyes down to consider such lilies as grow in the nineteenth century as they never could have grown beneath the eyes of the peasants and priests who attended the Master's ministry; above all, that he may march boldly up to rebels, in the name of the Divine Majesty, and authoritatively demand the grounding of the arms of all intellectual rebellion; that he may meet the responsibilities which the Lord in this age lays upon His ambassadors—responsibilities which were not imposed on Paul, or Chrysostom, or Augustine; that he may finish his course with joy, and his ministry, which he has received of the Lord Jesus, the gospel minister of this age is bound to seize and use all the instrumentalities which this age affords for setting forth the truth as it is in Nature, as the servant of the truth as it is in Jesus.

To examine all questions of history as they bear on the truths which God has revealed because they cannot be discovered by man; to aid in all departments of scientific research; to increase an appreciation of all true science in all departments of society; to assist in the culture of a sound philosophy without which humanity, with all practicable scientific attainments, would be like a child with a lapful of jewels of the value of which he was ignorant, or an idiot who was the possessor of the most complicated and admirable machinery which he did not know how to work—these are among the objects of our Institute. Young as our Institute is, may we not rejoice, without immodesty, in the measure of success we have found? Shall we not patiently persevere in a work which can attract to our side only the most thoughtful or large-hearted people, and must be wrought away from the glare of crowds and apart from the stimulus of applause?

Congratulating the Institute upon what it has done and returning heart-felt thanks for all the help rendered me personally in the discharge of my duties in the Presidency, I commend it to the providence of that God to whom nothing is more precious than truth.

PRIMEVAL MAN.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Key East, N. J., July 29th, 1885.]

BY GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG, D.D., NORFOLK, VIRGINIA.

HOW LONG AGO, AND IN WHAT CONDITION AS TO CIVILIZATION AND RELIGION, DID THE RACE OF MAN BEGIN ITS COURSE IN THE WORLD?

UNTIL very recently the opinion entertained by those who thought upon the subject at all was, that man was created some six or seven thousand years ago, and that he commenced his course as a civilized being, believing in the one only living and true God.

A far greater antiquity has been claimed for him, by some, of late years; and we are told that man, beginning his course as a savage, has gradually raised himself through what are termed the paleolithic, the neolithic, the bronze and the iron ages, each of which lasted for many thousands of years—until he reached the beginnings of our modern civilization. This opinion has been supported with especial zeal by those who adopt the hypothesis of man's evolution from the brute—indeed, it would seem to be a necessary consequence of such an origin for him, even though evolution be regarded but as "a mode of creation." To an examination of the problem thus presented I ask your attention on the present occasion.

Beginning our examination, where all examination of such a subject must begin if we would arrive at the truth, with the present condition of man—we find him in every possible stage of civilization; from the utter savagery of the Digger Indians of North America and the Weddas of Ceylon, to the advanced civilization of the English-speaking nations who dominate the world; and comparing the present condition of nations with what authentic history tells us it was a few centuries ago, we learn that whilst some nations have been steadily advancing in

civilization, others have remained stationary, and others, again, have retrograded. The American Encyclopædia, in its article on Ethnology, written by an evolutionist and an advocate of the great antiquity of man, marks only five of the thirteen great families into which it divides the human race, as advancing in civilization, whilst four are stationary, and the remaining four are retrograding.

An instance of retrogradation is furnished us by the aborigines of our own country. "There are abundant remains"—writes Sir J. Lubbock—"of a very ancient American civilization, which was marked by the construction of great public works, and by the development of an agriculture founded on the maize, which is a cereal indigenous to the continent of America. This civilization was subsequently destroyed, or lost; and then succeeded a period in which man relapsed into partial barbarism." ("Pre-historic Times," p. 234.)

An instance of the extreme degradation of a once highly civilized people we have in the Veddas or Weddas of Ceylon. Of this people Canon Rawlinson tells us, that a careful study of their language proves them to be "the degenerate descendants of the Sanskrit Aryans who conquered India," and he adds, "It is difficult to conceive of a degradation which could be more complete. The Sanskrit Aryans must, by their language and literature, have been at the time of their conquest in a fairly advanced stage of civilization. The Weddas are savages of a type than which it is scarcely possible to conceive anything more debased. Their language is limited to some few hundred vocables; they cannot count beyond two or three; they have of course no idea of letters; they have in a domesticated condition no animal but the dog; they have no arts beyond the power of making bows and arrows, and constructing huts of a very rude kind; they are said to have no idea of God, and scarcely any memory. They with difficulty obtain a subsistence by means of the bow, and are continually dwindling and threaten to become extinct." (Origin of Nations," pp. 6, 7.)

In view of such facts as these—and many more of like character might be cited—the Duke of Argyll writes, "Nothing in the Natural History of man can be more certain than that both

morally, and intellectually, and physically he can, and he often does, sink from a higher to a lower level. This is true of man both collectively and individually—of men, and of societies of men. Some regions of the world are strewn with monuments of civilizations which have passed away. Rude and barbarous tribes stare with wonder on the remains of temples, of which they cannot conceive the purpose, and of cities which are the dens of beasts." ("Primeval Man," p. 156.) And the venerable Professor of Ancient History at Oxford comes to the conclusion that "Savagery and civilization are the two opposite poles of our social condition, states between which men oscillate freely, passing from either to the other with almost equal ease according to the external circumstances wherewith they are surrounded." ("Origin of Nations," p. 8.)

The several ages, as they are called, of stone, bronze, iron, and a higher civilization are not, nor have they ever been, ages in the progress of the human race as a whole; but only in that of particular peoples or nations; peoples in all these stages of progress living, not only at the same time, but often side by side—as did the English colonists, the Red Indians and the Aztecs in this country two centuries ago. Nor does the passage of a people through one of these ages—the stone age, for example—necessarily require thousands of years. Where a savage people are brought into contact with a civilized one, they may pass through all these ages in the course of a generation or two. Such has been the case with the civilized Indians now quietly settled in our "Indian Territory." The stone age, even the "paleolithic" as it is called, is not necessarily associated with antiquity. Nor are these several ages always stages in the progress of a people. They may be stages in a course of degradation; as was the fact with respect to the stone age in which our Red Indians were found living at the first settlement of this country by Europeans. The stone age may mark the last stage in the decadence of a once highly civilized people, as well as the first stage in the advance of a savage people toward civilization.

The assumption, by the advocates of the great antiquity of man, that our existing civilization is a result wrought out by the

human race as a whole, through long ages, the general course being one of advance from utter savagery as its beginning, is irreconcilable with the known facts in the case. The question under examination cannot be settled by any general reasoning upon what is assumed to be the nature of man, and the necessary progress in civilization. Nor can it be settled by a study of the existing condition of the nations of the earth, and their history for the few centuries which authentic history covers. In seeking an answer we must make use of written history, so far as that is available; and when that fails us, we must turn to the "monuments," and traditions, and every trace of himself of every kind which man has left behind him in the distant past. Geology, Anthropology, Archæology, as well as History, traditional, monumental and written, have a right to be heard in the case. This course I purpose following in the present lecture. The discussion of each of these several kinds of testimony will, of necessity, be brief; but not so brief, I hope, as to prevent our reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

I. WHAT CAN GEOLOGY TELL US RESPECTING THE AGE OF PRIMEVAL MAN?

On one point the testimony of Geology is definite and distinct, and that is, that man is "the latest born" of the inhabitants of our earth. From the fauna to which he belongs more than one species has disappeared, but, in so far as is known, not one has been added since he came into being.

From time to time during the last forty years the announcement has been made, that human remains had been found in positions which demonstrated a much greater antiquity for man than had hitherto been allowed; but in every instance, a more careful examination has proved this claim to be unfounded. Among the most noted of these cases are the following, viz.:

(1) "*The fossil man of Gaudaloupe*," for which Nott and Gliddon in their "*Types of Mankind*," published in 1854, claimed a great antiquity. "There were two of these skeletons, which were found imbedded in the solid rock on the north coast of Gaudaloupe in the West Indies. One of these is in the British Museum; the other, in the Royal Cabinet in Paris. A careful study of them has led to the conclusion that they are the remains

of Indians, killed in battle not more than two centuries ago. The rock is a limestone, which is forming daily on that coast, and the skeletons still retain some of their animal matter, and all their phosphate of lime." (Southall's "Recent Origin of Man," pp. 77, 78.)

(2) *The fossil human bones found, as was reported, by Count Pourtales, in the coral reefs of Florida*; and which Professor L. Agassiz calculated to be 10,000 years old; basing his calculations upon what he considered the rate of growth in coral reefs. Respecting this case the *American Naturalist*, Vol. II., p. 434, contains the following statement: "In regard to the alleged discovery of human bones in the coral formation of Florida, which was first published by Prof. Agassiz in Nott and Gliddon's 'Types of Mankind,' and has appeared in other works, including Lyell's 'Antiquity of Man,' we beg to give our readers the following statement in his own words, by Count L. F. Pourtales, the original discoverer of these bones: 'The human jaw and other bones found in Florida by myself in 1848, were not in a coral formation, but in a fresh-water sandstone, on the shore of Lake Monroe, associated with fresh-water shell, of species still living in the lake (*Paludina*, *Ampullaria*, etc.). No date can be assigned to that deposit, at least from present observation.'"

(3) "*The Natchez man*," as it was called—a human pelvis found in the bottom of a ravine cut through the fluvial deposit at Natchez, Mississippi, which Sir Charles Lyell estimated to have an age of 100,000 years. On this case I remark: 1. Prof. C. G. Forshey, who subsequently examined the spot where the bone was found, says: "It was probably not *in situ*, but this loam and the bone too had caved in from some point above and been washed thither. A dozen plantation burial places, and Indian mounds and camps had been exposed above for centuries. The probabilities are a hundred to one that this bone was not of the bluff formation, but of the present era." ("Recent Origin of Man," p. 552.) 2. This conclusion of Lyell's is based upon another conclusion of his, that the delta of the Mississippi has been 100,000 years in forming. Since Lyell's estimate, more accurate observations on the rate of formation of the Mississippi delta have reduced the estimate of its age to 14,200 years, according to

Prof. Hitchcock, or 4,400, according to Majors Humphreys and Abbot, U. S. Engineers, the latest authorities on the subject.

Such are three of the cases in which certain geologists thought, for a time, that they had obtained proof of a great antiquity for man. Time will not permit me to examine all; but the three given above are among the most noted, and they are fair specimens, I think, of the whole class. In view of them all my conclusion is, that whilst Geology distinctly testifies that man is "the latest born" of the living creatures inhabiting our earth, it can tell us nothing definite about the time of his birth—certainly nothing at variance with the idea, that he began his course not more than six or seven thousand years ago.

II. WHAT CAN ANTHROPOLOGY TELL US RESPECTING PRIMEVAL MAN?

At one time it was claimed that certain human skulls which had been discovered, and which from the position in which they were found were regarded as the skulls of paleolithic men—"the Neanderthall skull," for example—demonstrated a great difference between these men and the men of the present day, and so, a much greater antiquity for man than had hitherto been allowed him. A more careful examination has led anthropologists to a different conclusion.

"The most ancient of all known human skulls," writes the Duke of Argyll, "is so ample in its dimensions that it might have contained the brains of a philosopher. So conclusive is this evidence against any change whatever in the specific characters of man since the oldest Human Being yet known was born, that Prof. Huxley pronounces it to be clearly indicated 'that the first traces of the primordial stock whence man has proceeded need no longer be sought, by those who entertain any form of the doctrine of progressive development, in the newest tertiaries'—that is, in the oldest deposit yet known to contain human remains at all. 'But,' he adds, 'they may be looked for in an epoch more distant from the age of those tertiaries than that is from us.'" ("Primeval Man," pp. 73, 74.)

Prof. Pfaff, of the University of Erlangen, the latest authority on this subject I have seen, after giving a tabular statement of the dimensions of a large number of very ancient skulls collected in Great Britain and France, reaches the conclusion:

"We see very clearly from all this that the size of the brain of the oldest populations known to us is not such as to permit us to place them on a lower level than that of the now living inhabitants of the earth." And he subsequently adds that, "The brain of the apes most like man does not amount to quite a third of the brain of the lowest race of men; it is not half the size of the brain of a new-born child. The same gulf which is found to-day between Man and the Ape, goes back with undiminished breadth and depth to the tertiary period." ("The Origin of Man," pp. 41, 51.)

III. WHAT CAN ARCHÆOLOGY TELL US RESPECTING PRIMEVAL MAN?

The evidence furnished by Archæology is of several kinds:

1. *That of the Megalithic Monuments and Tumuli* found in various parts of the world. One of the most celebrated of these Megalithic Monuments is that of Stonehenge, on Salisbury Plains, England. When was this erected? Geoffrey of Monmouth, in his History of Britain, written in the twelfth century—and he is followed in this by all subsequent chroniclers—tells us that Ambrosius, the successor of Vortigern, erected Stonehenge as a monument to three hundred British noblemen treacherously slain by Hengist, about A.D. 462. In confirmation of this date we have the facts that some of the great stones are dressed evidently with iron tools, and that iron arrow-heads and pieces of iron armor, nearly eaten up with rust, have been dug up within its enclosure.

Mr. James Fergusson, F.R.S., who has made this a special subject of study, in his "Rude Stone Monuments," published in 1872, states as his conclusion that the "Cromlechs" of Great Britain and France belong to the first centuries of the Christian era, and further, that "three-fourths of these monuments have yielded sepulchral deposits to the explorer; and, including the *tumuli*, probably nine-tenths have proved to be burial places." For the *tumuli* of North and South America no more ancient date can reasonably be claimed than for those of Europe.

2. *That of the remains of the Lake Dwellings, i. e.,* buildings erected upon piles, which have been discovered in the course of the last thirty years in many of the lakes of Switzerland and adjacent countries. An age of six or seven thousand years has

been claimed for these remains, on the ground of the rude stone implements found in them.

In considering this claim I would ask you to remark the facts:

(1) That mingled with these stone implements, others of bronze and iron occur; together with the remains of the horse, the ox, the goat, the sheep, and the dog, all domesticated animals; and wheat, barley and millet roasted and stored up in jars, precisely as is now done in these same countries; and very recently silver coins, of the eighth and tenth centuries, have been dredged up from the ruins of the lake-dwellings of Lake Paladru, in Southern France. (2) That pile-dwellings are delineated on Trajan's Column at Rome. The date of this column is about A.D. 105, and it was erected to commemorate the conquest of Dacia, the modern Hungary. Such dwellings have been common in many countries in ages past, and are still in use in some; being resorted to for protection from the attacks of enemies—as in Ireland as late as 1562—or to escape the periodic floods to which the country is subject as in Venezuela to-day.

3. *That of the Danish Kjökken-moddings, or shell-mounds.* The great antiquity of these shell-mounds is contended for on the ground of the rude character of the stone implements found in them, metal implements being entirely wanting in many of them, and the presence of the bones of animals now extinct.

Shell-mounds of similar character are found along the coast in many countries. On our own coast they are of frequent occurrence all the way from Nova Scotia to Florida. Those on our own coast are undoubtedly of Indian origin. Knowing the history of the early settlement of our country by Europeans, what would we naturally expect to find true respecting these shell-mounds which the Indians have left behind them? I answer: (1) In the lower strata, or the older mounds, rude stone (paleolithic) implements alone. (2) In the upper strata and the newer mounds, formed after the arrival of European settlers, the same rude stone implements, mingled with copper ornaments and iron hatchets. And this is just what we do find. Is it strange, then, that 2,000 years ago, when the natives of Denmark stood to the civilized Romans in very much the same relation that our Indians

did to civilized Europeans 250 years ago, the same thing should be true of the shell-mounds they left behind them?

The truth is, "The whole argument which has been founded on flint implements," as the Duke of Argyll well says, "is liable to these two fundamental objections: (1) That flint implements are a very uncertain index of civilization even among the tribes who use them; and (2) that they are no index at all of the state of civilization of other tribes who lived at the same time in other portions of the globe. The finding of flint implements, for example, however rude, in England or Denmark or France, affords no evidence whatever of the condition of the Industrial Arts in the same age, upon the banks of the Euphrates or the Nile." ("Primeval Man," p. 184.)

4. *That of the "Bone-Caves" of Europe;* in which the bones of man are found, mingled with those of the cave-bear, the cave-hyena, the mammoth, the woolly elephant, and the reindeer, animals now extinct, or else, no longer inhabitants of the countries in which these caves occur.

If man was the cotemporary of these animals—and the evidence seems to place this beyond reasonable doubt—the question presents itself, how long ago is it that these animals inhabited Central Europe? And when did they cease to exist, if they have disappeared altogether? (1) The cave-bear and cave-hyena, once thought to be extinct species of these animals, and so, very ancient, more careful examination has shown to be identical with those now living. (2) The reindeer, now confined to Northern Europe, Cæsar and Sallust both tell us was common in Gaul (France) and Germany in their day. (3) The remains of the woolly elephant occur in great abundance in Siberia, in some instances with the flesh perfect, and in such a condition as to be eaten by dogs. (4) The remains of the mammoth are found in surface deposits and peat swamps, with the bones retaining a large portion of their animal matter, thus proving their comparatively recent extinction. And in confirmation of this, in the Smithsonian "Contributions to Knowledge," Vol. III., p. 142, we are told that among the North American Indians, there are native legends which indicate a traditional knowledge of more than one extinct animal, among them the

mastodon or mammoth. Now, whether we adopt the supposition of Dr. Southall, that these human bones are those of "the first race which reached Western Europe from Western Asia, and were subsequently pushed further north by the Celts," or not, this much, I think, is certainly true, that there is nothing in the known facts of the case which demands for them an antiquity greater than 4,000 or 5,000 years.

Such is a statement of all that Geology, Anthropology and Archæology can tell us respecting the age and condition of primeval man. It has necessarily been brief; but I have tried to make it a fair statement. To any who may wish to pursue the subject further, I would recommend Dr. James C. Southall's "Recent Origin of Man," a work which contains the most thorough discussion of the whole subject that I have seen. Whilst this testimony of science in its various departments does not settle the age and condition of primeval man, it certainly furnishes no authority for such statements as that of Clodd: "Man was once wild and rough and savage, frightened at his own shadow, and still more frightened at the roar of the thunder, and the quiver of the lightning, which he thought were the clappings of the wings and the flashings of the eyes of the angry Spirit as he came flying from the sun; and that it has taken many thousands of years for man to become as wise and skilful as we now see him." ("Childhood of the World," p. 2.)

IV. TURN WE NOW TO THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORY, WRITTEN AND MONUMENTAL.

The unity of the human race, a question on which there was at one time much difference of opinion, may now be regarded as a settled question. Prof. Huxley writes, "I cannot see any good ground whatever, or even any tenable sort of evidence, for believing that there is more than one species of man." ("Origin of Species," Lect. 5.) And the Duke of Argyll: "On this point, therefore, of the unity of man's origin, those who bow to the authority of the most ancient and the most venerable traditions, and those who accept the most imposing and the most popular of modern scientific theories, are found standing on common ground, and accepting the same result." ("Unity of Nature," p. 399.)

Where did the human race begin its course? On this point, as well as that of the unity of the race, scholars are pretty well agreed. The country known to us in part as Armenia, the elevated region in which the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Indus have their head-waters, is regarded as the cradle of the human race; and this, among other reasons, because the most ancient traditions all point to this as man's starting-point; this is the native country of the cereals which have furnished food for man, the world over; and because it is here, and clustering around this as a centre, we find the oldest nations, the only ones that have a history reaching back into the long past; *e. g.*, the Chinese, the Indians, the Persians, the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Jews, the Phœnicians and the Greeks.

I cannot, of course, within the limits of a single lecture, give you any discussion of the claims to antiquity of these several peoples. Instead thereof I will ask your attention to the conclusions on this subject of Canon Rawlinson, stated at large, with his reasons for them, in his "Seven Great Monarchies," and, in brief, in his later work, "The Origin of Nations." He writes: "Exaggerated chronologies are common to a large number of nations; but critical examination has—at any rate, in all cases but one—demonstrated their fallacy; and the many myriads of years postulated for their past civilization and history by the Babylonians and Assyrians, the Hindoos, the Chinese and others, has been shown to be pure fiction, utterly unworthy of belief, and not even requiring any very elaborate refutation. Cuneiform scholars confidently place the beginning of Babylon about B.C. 2300; of Assyria, about B.C. 1500; of India, about B.C. 1200. Chinese investigators can find nothing solid or substantial in the past of the 'Celestials' earlier than B.C. 781, or at the farthest, B.C. 1154. For Phœnicia the date assigned by the latest English investigator is sixteen or seventeen centuries B.C. . . . A *consensus* of savants and scholars almost unparalleled, limits the past history of civilized man to a date removed from our own time by less than 4,400 years, excepting in a single instance. There remains one country, one civilization, with respect to which the learned are at variance; there being writers of high repute who place the dawn of Egyptian civilization about 2700

B.C., or only four centuries before that of Babylon, while there are others who postulate for it an antiquity exceeding this by about 2,400 years." (*"Origin of Nations,"* pp. 147-149.)

On what is this claim for so great an antiquity for Egyptian civilization based? Not on any direct monumental testimony, although certain writers speak as if it was upon such testimony, at least in part, the claim rested. On this point Rawlinson writes, "Nothing is more certain, nothing more universally admitted by Egyptologists, than the absence from the monuments of any continuous chronology;" and in support of this statement he quotes from the writings of Stuart Pool, Bunsen, Brugsch and Mariette and Lenormant. (*"Origin of Nations,"* p. 152.)

Prof. Owens, the ablest advocate of the great antiquity of Egyptian civilization, rests its claim to acceptance, mainly, on the testimony of Manetho, an Egyptian priest, who lived and wrote B.C. 280-250. Unfortunately for us, the original "*History of Egypt*" by Manetho has been lost; and we have nothing more than fragments of it, preserved in the writings of Eusebius and Sincellus, together with a few quotations by Josephus.

Respecting Manetho's dynasties of Egyptian kings it is worthy of remark—(1) That the earlier dynasties are rejected by all as fabulous. Of this character are his dynasties of the Gods, covering a period of 13,900 years, and those of the Manes and Heroes, covering 5,813 years more; and so the antiquity of Egyptian civilization as given by Manetho is curtailed, by common consent, nearly 20,000 years. (2) The statements of Eusebius and Sincellus, each professing to give Manetho's numbers, often differ as to the length of the same dynasty, admitted to be genuine; in one instance as much as 300 years. (3) Manetho states that Egypt, throughout a large portion of its history, was divided into the three kingdoms of Upper, Middle and Lower Egypt, and there is abundant evidence from other quarters that such was the fact. And if so, it seems fair to conclude that some of his dynasties were cotemporary. As to which and how many of them were cotemporary Egyptologists are not agreed. In view of all these facts it must be admitted that anything like a definite determination of the antiquity of Egyptian civilization on the authority of Manetho's dynasties is out of the question.

Can we, in any way, get light on this perplexing question from the monuments? A peculiarity in the structure of the Great Pyramid, confessedly one of the oldest, if not the very oldest, of Egyptian monuments, is thought by some to give us the date of its erection. This pyramid is admirably oriented, and, of course, one of its sides faces due north. In this north side is the entrance; the long entrance passage being in the exact plane of the meridian—not horizontal—not pointing to the true pole which would require an angle of elevation of 30° , the latitude of the pyramid, but at an angle of $26^{\circ} 27'$, according to the careful determination of Piazzi Smith, Astronomer Royal of Scotland. Col. Howard Vise, who forty-five years ago spent months in the study of this pyramid, was impressed with this peculiarity, and thinking it possible that this passage pointed to what was the pole star at the time of its erection, he communicated this idea to Sir John Herschel, with the request that he would determine for him, whether or not there ever was a pole-star which occupied just the position indicated, and which might have served as a guide to the pyramid builders; and if there was, what star, and when did it occupy that position? As changes in the pole-star are dependent upon the "precession of the equinoxes," and the rate of that precession has been determined, these questions were not difficult to answer. Sir John Herschel determined that the star Alpha Draconis, one of the brightest stars in the northern circum-polar regions, was once pole-star, and occupied the very position indicated at two periods in the past, viz.: B.C. 2123 and B.C. 3400. For reasons which time will not permit me to state here, the first of these dates was accepted by Col. Vise; and for a time, the date of the erection of the Great Pyramid was generally considered settled; and for myself, I must say, I have seen no good reason given for setting aside this settlement. This pyramid, as the quarry-marks upon many of its blocks of stone show, was built during the reign of Cheops; and, according to Manetho's dynasties, not more than two or three centuries could have intervened between Cheops' reign and that of Menes, universally regarded as the founder of the Egyptian monarchy. Thus, in the date of the building of the Great Pyramid, we have Canon Rawlinson's

determination of the antiquity of Egyptian civilization, viz., about B.C. 2600, strikingly confirmed.

The pyramid period falls very early in Egyptian history; and yet, its civilization would seem to have been as perfect as at any later period. Sir G. Wilkinson writes: "The scenes depicted in the tombs of this epoch show that the Egyptians had already the same arts and habits as in after times; and the hieroglyphics in the Great Pyramid prove that writing had been long in use. We see no primitive mode of life in Egypt; no barbarous customs; not even the habit, so slowly abandoned by all people, of wearing arms when not on military service, nor any archaic art." (Rawlinson's "Herodotus," Vol. II., p. 291.) If to all this we add the architectural skill exhibited in fixing the casing-stones of the pyramid, and in polishing the marble linings of the several passages, and more especially the red granite linings of what is called the King's Chamber, we cannot but form a high idea of Egyptian civilization at that period. In view of all these facts M. Renan exclaims, "When we think of this civilization, that it had no known infancy; that this art, of which there remain innumerable monuments, had no archaic period; that the Egypt of Cheops and Cephron is superior, in a sense, to all that followed, *on est pris de vertige*." (Quoted in Smith's "Great Pyramid," Vol. III., p. 371.)

Admitting the truth of all that has been said about the advanced civilization of the pyramid period, and that we cannot, on the authority of authentic history, carry back its date much further than Canon Rawlinson has done, Prof. Owens contends for the addition of some 2,000 years on the ground that "sober experience teaches that arts, language and literature are of slow growth, the result of gradual development; that of all the marvels of this history, the manifestation of the dawn of civilization by such works, agreeably with the conceptions of Canon Rawlinson, would be the greatest. The birth of Pallas from the brain of Jove would be its parallel." (Appendix to the "Origin of Nations," p. 259.) This argument of Professor Owen—and I have given it in his own words—is simply "a begging of the question" at issue. A parallel to the birth of Pallas from the brain of Jove is just what those who hold that the human race

began its course in a civilized condition contend for. As to the civilization of Egypt, they hold that the Egyptians were not autochthones, nor did their civilization dawn in the valley of the Nile. Like the Anglo-Saxon race in our own country, they were immigrants; the off-shoot of a civilized people; and, in their settlement of Egypt, they brought with them the civilization or the country from which they came, as our forefathers did.

This view of matters is confirmed by all we know of the history of their religion. Piazza Smith tells us that, "the pyramids are generally without idolatrous decorations or contents." ("The Great Pyramid," Vol. III., p. 518.) A very remarkable fact is this, when their later-built temples and tombs are more thickly covered with marks of idolatry than those of any other people. M. Renouf writes, "It is incontestably true that the sublimest portions of the Egyptian religion are not the comparatively late result of a process of development, or elimination from the grosser. The sublimest portions are demonstrably ancient, and the last stage of the Egyptian religion, that known to the Greek and Latin writers, was by far the grossest and most corrupt." ("Hibbert Lectures," p. 119.)

V. TRADITIONAL TESTIMONY.

By means of authentic records, written and monumental, we have traced back the history of man about 4,500 years. Beyond this date we have certain traditions, more or less universal, that furnish some light to guide us. To three of these—the three most ancient—I will now ask your attention.

1. *The Tradition respecting "the Confusion of Tongues."* "This story of the Tower of Tongues," writes Lenormant, "was among the most ancient recollections of the Chaldeans, and was one of the national traditions of the Armenians, who had received it from the civilized nations inhabiting the Tigro-Euphrates basin." ("Ancient History of the East," p. 22.)

Berosus gives the tradition in the following form, viz.: "They say that the first inhabitants of the earth, glorying in their own strength and size, and despising the gods, undertook to raise a tower whose top should reach the sky, in the place in which Babylon now stands; but when it approached the heavens, the winds assisted the gods and overthrew the work upon its con-

trivers; and its ruins are said to be still in Babylon; and the gods introduced a diversity of tongues among men, who till that time had all spoken the same language; and a war arose between Chronus and Titan. The place in which they built the tower is now called Babylon, on account of the confusion of tongues, for confusion is by the Hebrews called Babel." (Cory's "Ancient Fragments," p. 34.) This tradition, in its earliest form, has recently been discovered inscribed on one of the Assyrian tablets in the British Museum, and a translation of it is given in "The Records of the Past," Vol. VII., pp. 129-132.

2. *The Tradition of a General Flood.* "The one tradition," writes Lenormet, "which is really universal, among those bearing on the history of primeval man, is that of the Deluge. . . . Of all traditions relative to the deluge, by far the most curious is that of the Chaldeans, made known to the Greeks by Berosus." ("Ancient History of the East," pp. 13, 14.)

This tradition as given by Berosus is as follows, viz : "In the time of Xisuthrus happened a great deluge, the history of which is thus described: The deity Chronus appeared to him in a vision, and warned him that upon the fifteenth day of the month Sivan, there would be a flood by which mankind would be destroyed. He therefore enjoined him to write a history of the beginning, procedure, and course of all things, and to bury it in the city of the Sun at Sippora; and to build a vessel, and take with him into it his friends and relations, and convey on board everything necessary to sustain life, together with all the different animals, both birds and quadrupeds, and to trust himself fearlessly to the deep. Having asked the deity whither he was to sail, he was answered, 'To the gods,' upon which he offered up a prayer for the good of mankind. He then built a vessel five *stadia* in length, and two in breadth. Into this he put everything he had prepared; and last of all, conveyed into it his wife, his children and his friends. After the flood had been upon the earth, and was in time abated, Xisuthrus sent out birds from the vessel, which, not finding any food, nor any place whereupon they might rest their feet, returned to him again. After an interval of some days he sent them forth a second time, and they now returned with their feet tinged with mud. He made a trial a third time

with these birds, but they returned no more, from whence he judged that the surface of the earth had appeared above the waters. He therefore made an opening in the vessel, and upon looking out found that it was stranded upon the side of some mountain, upon which he immediately quitted it with his wife, his daughter, and the pilot. Xisuthrus then paid his adoration to the earth; and having constructed an altar, offered sacrifice to the gods." (Cory's "Ancient Fragments," p. 26.) This tradition in its earliest form, like that of "The Tower of Tongues," has recently been discovered among the Assyrian tablets in the British Museum, and a translation of it is given in "The Records of the Past," Vol. VII., pp. 133-149.

3. *The Tradition of a Golden Age.* "The traditions of almost all nations," writes Canon Rawlinson, "place at the beginning of human history a time of happiness and perfection, 'a golden age,' which has no features of savagery or barbarism, but many of civilization and refinement. In the Zendavesta, the first Aryan king, after reigning for a time in the original *Aryanem vaejo*, removes with his subjects to a secluded spot, where both he and they enjoy uninterrupted happiness. In this place was neither overbearing nor mean-spiritedness, neither stupidity nor violence, neither poverty nor deceit, neither puniness nor deformity, neither huge teeth nor bodies beyond the usual measure. The inhabitants suffered no defilement from the evil spirit. They dwelt amid odoriferous trees and golden pillars; their cattle were the largest, best, and most beautiful on earth; they were themselves a tall and beautiful race; their food was ambrosial and never failed them." ("Origin of Nations," p. 11.)

The Egyptian dynasties, according to Manetho, commenced with a reign of the gods which lasted for 13,900 years, and it would be in violation of all notions of the fit and the proper to think of the gods as reigning over a race of savages. "The Chinese historians tell of an age of innocence, when the whole creation enjoyed a state of happiness; when everything was good; all being perfect in their kind. The Greeks and Romans believed in a golden age under the rule of Saturn; and many of their poets—as for example, Hesiod, Aratus, Ovid, and above all, Virgil, in the first book of his "Georgics"—have turned this poetic

material to admirable account, and defined the gradual decadence of the world, as the silver, the brass, and the iron ages, holding out at the same time the hope that the pristine state of things will one day return." (Chambers' Encyclopædia, art. "Golden Age.")

As already remarked, in the light of authentic history, written and monumental, we can trace back the history of man some 4,500 years; and I now add—under the guidance of tradition we can go back 1,000 or 2,000 years more—and there, we seem to reach his beginning, to come upon Primeval Man as he is starting upon his course; and we find him—not the ignorant, brutal savage, destitute of all religion, which some would have us believe man to have been—but man enjoying his golden age, under the immediate government of the gods, and in happy communion with them; and true science testifies to nothing at variance with this. I may be told, this conclusion is out of harmony with the hypothesis of the evolution of man from the brute. If this be so, all I have to say is, the worse then for the hypothesis of Evolution. At best "an unproved hypothesis," to use the words of Virchow, it cannot be accounted an integral part of true science. True science is built of facts, not fancies.

Thus far we have sought to answer the questions, when and in what condition did the human race begin its course, from sources admitted by all to be worthy of credit. I have purposely said nothing of that wonderful Ancient History preserved for us by the Jews, which claims to have been written more than a thousand years before Manetho or Berosus was born—The Pentateuch, or Five Books of Moses.

VI. THE CLAIMS OF MANETHO, BEROSUS AND MOSES EXAMINED.

The testimony of Moses is studiously ignored by most of those who contend for a great antiquity, and a savage origin for man; and if I should attempt to state their objection to him, just as I believe it lies in their own minds, I would do it in some such words as these: Moses was a priest, and the Pentateuch was written in the interest of the religion which he taught; and priestcraft, whether it presents itself in the form of duties enjoined or lessons taught, is not to be trusted.

"Moses was a priest"—this is not the exact truth; his

brother Aaron was the priest—but let that pass. And who was Berosus? A priest, and he tells us expressly that the substance of his history was derived from the temple records of Babylon. And who was Manetho? A priest, and he, too, professes to derive his information from the temple records and traditions of Egypt. If, then, we accept the testimony of the two priests, Berosus and Manetho, how can we, on the ground of his priestly character, with any show of reason, reject that of Moses? The truth is, in those early ages in the East, as in Great Britain 500 years ago, education was almost entirely confined to the priesthood. Sir Walter Scott is true to history when he makes a leading nobleman of Scotland of that age say:

“ At first in heart it liked me ill,
When the King praised his clerkly skill;
Thanks to St. Botan, son of mine
Save Gawan, ne’er could pen a line.”

It would be just as reasonable to discredit the histories of the Venerable Bede or Lingard, because of the priestly character of their authors, as to discredit the writings of Berosus, or Manetho, or Moses on such ground.

“ Moses wrote in the interests of religion, and the Pentateuch has a religious tone throughout.” True, and the same is true of the writings of Manetho and Berosus. Of Manetho’s writings we have but little besides his “*Dynasties of the Kings of Egypt*,” but this begins with “*The Reign of the Gods*.” Of the religious tone of the writings of Berosus, the traditions which he has preserved for us of “*the Tower of Tongues*” and “*the Flood*,” already quoted, furnish an illustration. The cuneiform inscriptions of the Tigro-Euphrates valley, the only writings of an antiquity approaching that of the Pentateuch, are all profoundly religious in their tone. In proof of this take a brief extract from the celebrated Behistun Inscription, as translated by Oppert: “*And Darius the king says: these are the princes which call themselves mine. By the grace of Ormazd, to me they made subjection, brought tribute to me, what was ordered by me unto them, in the night time as well as in the day time, that they executed. And Darius the king says: in these provinces the man who was my friend, I cherished him, the man who was my enemy I pun-*”

ished him thoroughly. By the grace of Ormazd, in these lands my law was observed; and what was ordered unto them by me, that they executed. And Darius the king says: Ormazd gave to me this kingdom, and Ormazd was my helper until I gained this kingdom, and by the grace of Ormazd I possess this kingdom." ("Records of the Past," Vol. VII., pp. 88, 89.)

In the thoroughly religious tone of their writings, Manetho, Berosus, Moses, and the cuneiform inscriptions are all alike, the only difference being that the religion which appears in Moses' writings is a religion of a confessedly higher type—inasmuch as it recognizes one God only—than the Egyptian animal-worship of Manetho, or the Parseeism of Nineveh or Babylon. Did the Pentateuch lack this religious tone it would be out of harmony with all other writings of the age in which it claims to have been written; and to object to it on this ground simply exposes the ignorance of the objector.

In addition to this, I would ask you to notice the facts: (1) That we have the original work of Moses, in the language in which it was first written (as well as in several ancient translations), preserved with religious care by the Jews; whilst of the writings of Manetho and Berosus, we have but fragments preserved by later writers. (2) That the Pentateuch is, in large part, a record of what took place in Moses' day—is contemporary history—whilst the histories of Manetho and Berosus, who both lived during the third century before Christ, are altogether histories of what must have been to them the long-past. If they had tradition and the temple records to help them, so had Moses tradition, and, as is inferred from a critical examination of his writings by our ablest scholars, certain written documents which had come down to him from an earlier age. Possibly, it is to these documents the Chaldean tradition of the Deluge refers, when it tells us that "the Deity appeared to Xisuthrus (the Noah of Moses) and enjoined him to write a history of the beginning, the procedure, and course of all things," and to take measures for preserving it, for the instruction of after ages. (3) If the writings of Manetho and Berosus are confirmed at many points by the monuments of Egypt and the Tigro-Euphrates valley, so are the writings of Moses. And in one particular—in the greatest

event in the history of Israel which it records, the exodus from Egyptian bondage—the history of Moses is confirmed in a way in which no other ancient history is. In commemoration of that event, and of the means by which the pride of Egypt was broken and Israel set free, a solemn feast was instituted—the Passover which is observed by the Jews to-day, scattered though they be all over the world, and which has been observed by them from the day of its institution: a monument this, standing forth amid the ages, solitary and alone; as lasting as the pyramids, and more certain in its testimony; for, whilst the purpose for which the Great Pyramid was erected is a matter in dispute among the learned; but one interpretation has ever been given to the Passover, the presiding officer at the feast to-day, repeating as he did 3,800 years ago: “It is the sacrifice of the Lord’s Passover, who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when He smote the Egyptians, and delivered our houses.” (Exodus xii., 27.)

In view of such facts as these, I ask, how can we, with any show of reason, accept the writings of Manetho and Berosus as credible, and reject those of Moses? I have said nothing of Moses’ claim to inspiration—nor do I mean, on the present occasion, to advance that claim. I wish to discuss the question before us on grounds admitted by all to be legitimate. All I claim for Moses is, that he shall be treated fairly—treated just as Manetho and Berosus are; and, so treated, I believe his claim to credibility can be more satisfactorily established than that of any other ancient historian whose writings have come down to us—and so, in the words of Lenormant, “they should, in sound criticism, form the basis of all history.” (“Manual of Ancient History,” p. 1.)

VII. TESTIMONY OF THE PENTATEUCH.

Taking the Pentateuch as our guide, at the point at which all other written history fails us, we will be able to trace back the race of man to its beginning. As we start in this attempt, I will ask you to remark, that :

1. At the point at which we start, Moses’ history is in perfect harmony with all other credible histories, in its representation of the then existing state of things. There are great civilized nations dwelling in the Tigro-Euphrates and Nile valleys;

their people living in walled cities, as well as in the open country; and carrying on trade, and making wars one with another; that emigration is going on, and has been going on for years, from the great centres of population, and so, Egypt and Chaldea are surrounded by lesser tribes, who under the influence of their less favorable environments have lost something of the civilization they once possessed; and that a gross idolatry seems to be supplanting the purer worship of one God, which had prevailed, notably in Egypt. And—

2. As we proceed back to the beginning, with Moses' writings in our hands, we gather up, and incorporate into a history which possesses philosophic unity, all the fragments preserved in the most ancient traditions, such as "the Tower of Tongues," "the Deluge," and "the Golden Age." Lenorment writes: "The Pentateuch contains the most ancient tradition as to the first days of the human race, the only one which has not been disfigured by the introduction of fantastic myths of disordered imaginations run wild. The chief features of that tradition, which was originally common to all mankind, and which the special care of Providence has preserved in greater purity among the chosen people than among other races, are preserved, though changed, in countries distant from each other, and whose inhabitants have had no communication for thousands of years. The only clue which can guide us through the labyrinth of these scattered fragments of tradition, is the Bible story." ("Manual of Ancient History," p. 1.)

The condition of Primeval Man is described by Moses in the words, "God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." (Gen. i., 27.) "And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there He put the man whom He had formed. And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food. And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it." (Gen. ii., 8, 9, 15.) "And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowls of the air, and to every beast of the field. And . . . the Lord God . . . brought the woman unto the man. And Adam said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh

of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of man. Therefore shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh." (Gen. ii., 20, 22-24.) "And God blessed them, and God said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." (Gen. i., 28.)

The sketch thus given us of Primeval Man is a sketch in outline only, but it is complete enough to place beyond all reasonable question the fact, that he was no savage, just emerging as to body and mind from the condition of a brute; living in a damp gloomy cave, and feeding upon the raw flesh of such animals as he was able to entrap, or master in open fight. But a being bearing the image of God, cultivating the fruitful earth which, in response to his labor, yielded an abundant return of all that was good for food; possessed of a language copious enough to give names to every living thing; subduing the earth, and having dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowls of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth; and having the marriage relation established in all the sacredness which belongs to it among the most civilized nations of our day, a most significant particular in Moses sketch, when we consider that "one of the most general characteristics of the savage is to despise and degrade the female sex." ("Malthus on Population," Vol. I., p. 39.)

All these things, I may be told, do not constitute civilization, in the accepted signification of that word. An extended knowledge of the useful arts, and the possession of such a settled system of laws and government as enable men to live in great political communities, are essential features of civilization, as the meaning of the word is determined by its etymology. Actual civilization, in this sense, was impossible for man at the commencement of his course—impossible until he had multiplied greatly in the earth—impossible for a century or two. Civilization, in its living germ, is all that can possibly be predicated of Primeval Man; and in the particulars which Moses has given us, we have this civilization in its living germ, and that a civiliza-

tion of a higher type than that of Egypt, with her pyramids and temples built by slaves, working under the lash of their taskmasters; or, that of Rome, with her triumphal arches adorned with sculptures of chained captives, and her Coliseum erected for popular shows of mortal combat between gladiators and wild beasts.

Turning now to what the Pentateuch tells us of the religion of Primeval Man, I must necessarily be brief, and will, therefore, direct your attention to one passage only: "And in process of time it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto the Lord. And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock, and of the fat thereof. And the Lord had respect unto Abel and unto his offering; but unto Cain and his offering He had not respect." (Gen. iv., 3-5.) As throwing light upon the significance of this passage, one of the most learned of the Jews wrote eighteen hundred years ago, "By faith Abel offered unto God a more acceptable sacrifice than Cain." We have here, then, Abel, by bloody sacrifice, which he offered in faith, the representative of what is distinctively styled "evangelical religion;" and Cain, by his offering of the fruit of the ground, the representative of what is distinctively styled "natural religion;" neither of them the religion of the savage, but the two great phases of religious thought and belief common among the highly civilized peoples of to-day.

Canon Rawlinson, in his "Religions of the Ancient World," the most thorough and exhaustive treatise on this subject I know of, states his conclusions in the following words, viz.: "Altogether, the theory to which the facts appear on the whole to point is the existence of a primitive religion, communicated to man from without, whereof monotheism and expiatory sacrifice were parts, and the gradual clouding over of this primitive revelation everywhere, unless it were among the Hebrews. . . . The cloud was darker and thicker in some places than in others. There were, perhaps, races with whom the whole of the past became a *tabula rasa* and all traditional knowledge being lost, religion was evolved afresh out of the inner consciousness. There were others which lost a portion, without losing the whole of their inherited knowledge. There were

others again who lost scarcely anything; but hid up the truth in mystic language and strange symbolism. The only theory which accounts for all the facts, for the unity as well as the diversity of Ancient Religions, is that of a primeval revelation, variously corrupted through the manifold and multiform deterioration of human nature in different races and places." ("Humboldt Library," No. 62, p. 92.)

In view of all the facts of the case, and no important fact bearing upon the question at issue has been intentionally omitted, the conclusion to which we come is, that no sufficient reason, either scientific or historical, has as yet been given for abandoning what has been hitherto the almost universal faith, not of Christian peoples alone, but of the more enlightened heathen also, as manifested in their traditions—*That man was created some six or seven thousand years ago, and that he commenced his course as a civilized being, believing in the one only living and true God*

JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE: The creed of eighteen centuries is not about to fade away like an exhalation, nor are the new lights of science so exhilarating that serious persons can look with comfort to exchanging one for the other. Christianity has abler advocates than its professed defenders, in those many quiet and humble men and women who in the light of it and the strength of it live holy, beautiful, and self-denying lives. The God that answers by fire is the God whom mankind will acknowledge; and so long as the fruits of the spirit continued to be visible in charity, in self-sacrifice, in those graces which raise human creatures above themselves and invest them with the beauty of holiness which only religion confers, thoughtful persons will remain convinced that with them in some form or other is the secret of truth.

ETHICS AND RELIGION.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Key East, N. J., July 31st, 1885.]

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PRESIDENT WASHBURN, of Robert College, Constantinople, tells of a wealthy banker, a member of the Greek Church, who brought his son to the college with this request: "I want you to teach him your morality but leave him in our religion."

There is probably no parish in the United States that does not have its quota of moral men who make no profession of religion. And the churches are few and fortunate that do not likewise have their professors of religion who make little practice of morality.

The prevalence of this notion that ethics and religion may be set over against each other, together with the fearful injury to religion that must result from the divorce of the two in practical life is sufficient reason why the relation between Ethics and Religion may rightly claim the attention of this Institute of Christian Philosophy. For if philosophy is not itself immediately practical, yet in this intensely practical world it must vindicate its right to be by grappling with the concrete facts and forces of the real world. If she does not touch with her own feet the thorny pathway of human life, she must at least from her ethereal dwelling-place stoop down to illumine the rugged roads wherein the perplexed and weary men and women of the world are struggling forward. If not life itself, she must be the guide to life. And of all the practical concerns of life there are none more important in themselves, and at the same time more intricate and perplexing, than those that concern the conduct of man and his communion with God—or ethics and religion.

Philosophy, true to her mission, has not been slow to real-

ize the problem, and in recent treatises on Ethics, the Philosophy of Religion, and kindred themes, the question of the relation between Ethics and Religion is receiving constantly increased attention. I shall endeavor this morning to recall to your minds the historic development of ethical inquiry, and to point out the intimate and necessary connection with religion into which ethics inevitably develops; and in turn to show that religion must find its basis and its test of truth in the satisfaction it gives to the demand of ethics.

First, let us clearly understand what we mean by our terms. As a definition of ethics I take the formula of F. H. Bradley in his "Ethical Studies": "Ethics is the science of self-realization;" or, as we might say from the practical point of view, ethics is the art of making a man of one's self. As a definition of religion I accept that given by Principal Caird in his "Philosophy of Religion": "Religion is defined as the elevation of the human spirit into union with the Divine." In the same vein is Dorner's definition: "Religion is a living communion with and experience of Him in whom we live and move and have our being, not a mere one-sided relation of man to the divine Being as represented objectively to the mind."

The fact on which I wish to insist is, that Ethics and Religion alike deal directly with the essential life of man. Let this fact once be lost sight of; let ethics be regarded as conformity to a set of external rules or the cultivation of a catalogue of virtues; let religion be treated as "a mere one-sided relation of man to the divine Being as represented objectively to the mind," and our problem of discovering the relation between the two becomes hopeless. It is owing to this external and artificial treatment to which Ethics and Religion alike have been subjected that their kinship has been forgotten, and they have become so much estranged.

With these conceptions of ethics as self-realization, and religion as conscious union with God, clearly in mind, let us take up each term separately for more careful analysis. First: ethics, or the science of self-realization. It may be well to dwell for a moment on the significance of this term self-realization. Many of you are doubtless accustomed to define ethics in different

terms. Yet a moment's reflection will be sufficient to show that this phrase includes within itself whatever is true in each of the common definitions. For instance, ethics has been defined as the science of human actions. What then is a human action but the means through which a man expresses or realizes the self that is in him? Likewise the definitions, "science of conduct," "science of duty" may readily be included within our formula, "the science of self-realization." For what is conduct but the method in which the inner self is brought forth and realized? And what is duty but the way in which this self is bound to give expression and reality to itself? If then, whatever your own preferences may be, you will allow me to use this term as one which excludes no other formula but rather aims to include all within itself, we will briefly review the various theories of ethics, or the various methods in which the human self has sought expression and realization in the outward world.

The various ethical theories fall into three broad classes, distinguished by the three conceptions of self from which they start—the natural self, the social self, and the ideal self. And again, each of these three types of ethical theory may be subdivided into three minor classes according as it views the self with which it starts, abstractly, or subjectively, or objectively. Thus under these nine subdivisions we may include all the types of ethical theory. In passing them in review I shall refer to but one prominent representative of each school.

Our first general division includes those who start with the natural self. And the first subdivision under this general head are those who seek the realization of the natural self in *abstract pleasure*, or the mere physical sensation of the moment. Aristippus, of the Cyrenaic school, is the historic representative of this phase of ethics. It was his aim to shun all responsibilities of government, even to spend most of his time in travel, that he might be as free as possible from responsibility and care. "*Carpe diem*" expresses his theory of morals. Yet he did recognize that the mere pleasure of transitory sensation tended rather to destroy than to realize the self, and he was forced to insist upon "the control of enjoyment in the midst of enjoyment." "Not he who abstains, but he who enjoys without being carried away, is

master of his pleasures." Of his relation to Lais he says, "*ἔχω οὐκ ἔχομαι.*"

In this recognition of the destroying tendency of mere abstract pleasure, and the necessity of regulation, Aristippus prepared the way for his successor, Epicurus.

Epicurus sought self-satisfaction, not in immediate pleasure, but in a permanent condition of happiness for the whole life. He therefore marks the subjective stage in the realization of the natural self. To make my own individual life a happy and harmonious whole is, according to Epicurus, the end and aim of virtue. In his endeavor to realize this happy whole of life, Epicurus is forced to recognize forces and facts outside himself, and to respect physiological and social laws. Intemperance, churlishness, licentiousness defeat this supreme effort to be happy, and therefore such virtues as temperance, friendship and chastity must be practiced. In recognizing and respecting these physical and moral facts of the constitution of nature and society Epicurus is moving on toward the position of Aristotle, who, though chronologically his predecessor by fifty years, yet logically represents the progress and completion of the ethics of Epicurus.

These forces and facts of the natural and social constitution of man and of society, which Epicurus ran against in his pursuit of pleasure, Aristotle took up as a part of the nature of man himself. The self to be realized, according to Aristotle, is not the self of Epicurus, susceptible merely to sensuous delight. It is rather a rational self whose realization is to be found in these very facts and experiences of social, intellectual and political life. The natural self of man is not the sensuous nature of the brute, but that rational nature which is peculiar to himself as man. And though to Aristotle the problem of ethics is still the harmonious adjustment of the natural self to outward facts and forces, avoiding on both sides destructive extremes, still he includes the whole realm of rational pursuits within the limits of legitimate self-realization. The rule of life to him, or at all events, if the authenticity of Books V.-VII. be denied, the logical outcome of the line of thought in which he stood is to act according to right reason—"*κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.*"

Thus, as the outcome of this line of ethical inquiry, starting simply with the natural self and seeking merely the realization of our own nature, are we brought face to face with a Reason and a Righteousness, not of our own making or our own choosing, to which we must yield in order to realize the nature of the self within.

A second method of ethics, developed by the more practical genius of the English race, starts with the social self, in recognition of the fact that I am one of many similar selves, and must realize myself through some relationship to them. In this school we likewise may trace three separate forms—the abstract, the subjective and the objective.

First, as the representative of abstract society stands Hobbes. He taught that the individual self must be realized through immediate and unquestioning submission to authority. Without attempting to ground the authority of the King in reason or in right, he simply appeals to the empirical fact that the King has might, and therefore the individual must obey him.

Hobbes indeed referred this might of the King to the necessity human nature felt in its original state of warfare, of having some one force which should hold in check all others. This thought was taken up by Locke, popularized by Rousseau, and gave rise to the second or subjective stage of social ethics. According to Locke, the individual abates something of his pretensions as an individual, in order that through conceding a little he may gain tranquillity and freedom in the realization of his remaining self. Society then is a social compact, the end of which, however, is not society but the individual self. Society is a means to the individual self, which is the end. Man's relation to society is purely subjective and selfish. The purely selfish and animal character of the scheme was at once pointed out by critics on all sides. Malebranche, with special clearness, pointed out the fundamental insufficiency of this scheme : "*Les hommes, disent-ils, se sont fait des lois pour leur mutuelle conservation. C'est sur l'amour-propre qu'ils les ont fondées. Ils sont convenus entre eux, et par là ils se sont obligés ; car celui qui manque à la convention se trouvant plus faible que le reste des contractants, il se trouve parmi des ennemis qui satisfont à*

leur amour-propre en le punissant. Ainsi, par amour-propre, il doit observer les lois du pays où il vit ; non parce qu'elles sont justes en elles-mêmes, car delà l'eau, disent-ils, on en observe de toutes contraires ; mais parce qu'en s'y soumettant, on n'a rien à craindre de ceux qui sont les plus forts. Selon eux, tout est naturellement permis à tous les hommes. Chaque particulier a droit à tout ; et si je cède de mon droit, c'est que la force des concurrents m'y oblige. Ainsi, l'amour-propre est la règle de mes actions. Ma loi c'est une puissance étrangère ; et si j'étais le plus fort, je rentrerais naturellement dans tous mes droits."

It is out of the manifest incompleteness of this subjective relation of the individual to the many selves of society that modern utilitarianism took its rise, of which John Stuart Mill may be regarded as the chief exponent. Utilitarianism includes within the self that is to be realized, not the mere individual animal self, but the social, sympathetic, human self. And therefore "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" becomes the legitimate form of self-realization even for the individual, simply because the individual by virtue of his human nature includes within himself an organic relation to all his fellows. "The firm foundation of utilitarian ethics," says Mr. Mill, "is the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures."

"Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto."

Thus, following out the aim to realize the self as one among many, the logic of ethics compels us to recognize a bond of fraternity with all mankind.

Furthermore, though reluctant to admit it, there is manifest in the advocates of this view an advance upon mere natural pleasure as the means through which both the single self and the many selves shall be realized. Mr. Mill, in introducing quality instead of mere quantity as the standard of pleasure, has brought in an element distinct from mere pleasure itself. In recognizing that the satisfaction found in sympathy and generosity, and even in self-sacrifice, is higher and better and more desirable than the satisfaction of animal appetite and passion, he is brought face to face with a Supreme Good. For relative measurements imply an absolute standard. Likewise, in referring the question of the relative desirability of pleasures to the

decision of competent judges, he obviously admits that there is some recognized law or standard in conformity with which these "competent judges" are to render their verdict.

With more candor, yet not without the same inability to see all that is involved in it, does George Eliot declare that consistent utilitarianism must transcend the narrow limits of hedonism: "It is only a poor sort of happiness, my Lillo, that could ever come by caring very much about our own narrow pleasures. We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by having wide thoughts and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as for ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."

Thus by a consistent development of the ethics involved in our relation to our fellow-men are we driven to recognize a Good which is visible to the pure intuition of the soul; a Good which so far transcends all consideration of pleasure and pain that we cannot classify it with either.

Still a third method of ethics starts with the ideal self as the self to be realized. For the chief representatives of this school we must turn to Germany. In this general class we also find three subdivisions or stages of advance—the abstract, the subjective, and the objective.

The champion of abstract Idealism is Kant. The ideal self I am to realize dwells apart in a sphere peculiar to itself, and has no kinship either with my own sensuous nature or with the external sensible world. "Act from a maxim worthy of being made a universal law" is the categorical imperative of pure reason; and the hypothetical precepts drawn from individual happiness or physical environment are to be excluded from the sphere of pure morality.

Kant thus sought to realize the ideal self of reason at the expense of the natural and individual self altogether. The more the natural self was thwarted and humiliated, the more perfect was the realization of the ideal self. And natural disgust and disinclination was made almost an essential feature of his ascetic virtue.

As a corrective to this one-sided abstractness of Kant came the subjective idealism of Fichte. According to Fichte, the ideal is not merely above me, but in me. The ideal of Reason is my own proper self. And my problem is through freedom to realize this rational self in outward conduct. Assert thy freedom; continuously fulfil thy vocation; act out the Divine Idea that thy conscience reveals within thee, are therefore from this point of view the ultimate ethical maxims.

The insufficiency of subjective idealism as a theory of ethics may be most readily shown by referring to the complaint against Fichte himself made by Solger, his colleague at Berlin: "Fichte makes our very existence bitter by his mode of acting—not only by his paradoxical whims and real absurdities, but by his obstinacy and egotism. Continuously to overawe by declaring, 'Not I as an individual say or desire this, but the Idea which speaks and acts through me,' is certainly a fine mode of speech, in which I willingly recognize true and honest zeal. But when he proceeds in all matters, the greatest or the least, from the axiom that the Idea has selected but one organ—viz., Herr Fichte himself—it does appear to me that individuality becomes simple despotism."

In his later works Fichte transcended this purely subjective individualism, and included within his theory the maxim that "Each individual shall recognize God as He is outwardly manifested to him in the conduct of all other men." Yet it was reserved for Hegel to work out to its full extent the Ethics of Objective Idealism, which teaches that "The final and crowning stage of the development of the individual consciousness is, that in which the finite spirit by thought or reason apprehends the organic plan of existence, knows with clearness the intimate nature of the relations which unite him and all other finite spirits in one community of free intelligences, with a common aim and purpose, and thus subjectively realizes the supreme synthesis of thought." According to Hegel, Ethics culminates in Institutions. The self is realized in and through union with the objective life of the Universal Will as expressed in the family, the community, the state and the world-history. The self finds its realization in the not-self, or rather the other self—the universal self—of which

the actual world-order is the expression and embodiment. These institutions and the Rational Will that has its expression in them are the Ethical Substance in which the individual must live, move and have his being.

Thus do each of the three general methods of ethics converge toward a common centre, whether the individual representatives of the systems are conscious of the tendency or not. The natural self in the pursuit of pleasure and happiness, can avoid contradiction and defeat only by submission to "right reason" as its guide and stay. The single one of many selves seeking "to be in unity with fellow-creatures" is forced to acknowledge a bond of kinship above and beyond all considerations of individual self-interest; and to find its highest type of excellence in the fulfilment of that spiritual relationship. The ideal self likewise is found ultimately to rest on a Universal Will whose image and expression is manifested in the domestic, social and civil relations of the human race. Start where you will, the effort to realize self involves a Rational and Righteous Supreme Being in union with whose expressed wisdom, constituted relationships and instituted righteousness the finite self finds its only adequate realization.

Ethics therefore leads up to Religion. As was the Mosaic law to ancient Israel, so is the principle of ethics to the men of to-day a schoolmaster, a pedagogue, literally a child-leader to bring them to the Christ. Ethics, if consistent to its fundamental aim to make the most of self, cannot stop short of religion. In every stage, inasmuch as the self must ever depend on rationally given material for the means of its realization and expression, Ethics is blindly and unconsciously religious. The self cannot go out at all except it lean on some staff, weaker or stouter, which a creative and guiding Spirit places in its hand. Either abstractly, as a *datum* immediately given, whether in the form of pleasure, might, or law; or subjectively, as an experience inwardly felt, whether as happiness, security, or freedom; or objectively, as right reason; or human brotherhood or organic human society, Ethics in all its various forms and methods is inevitably tending toward a union of the finite self with that good, right rational, universal One in whose image the finite self is created.

That the self shall be conscious of this universal Being with whom it is united Ethics does not insure. The child may be in the physical world a long while before apprehending that the world is a sphere. Yet his feet are none the less securely planted on the surface of this sphere because he is aware of only the small and seemingly flat surface within the range of his immediate vision. So the merely moral man is relatively a blind man. Planted as he is upon a narrower or wider section of the sphere of rational righteousness, he yet fails to recognize more of that sphere than his own untrained senses enable him to see and touch. Ethics, therefore, is fragmentary and unconscious religion; as religion is ethics, complete and conscious of the Object in and through whom its completeness and realization is attained.

Ethics, to realize complete personality, is forced to include relationship to the Absolute. Religion is conscious union with God. The higher forms of Ethics, as we have seen, in proportion as they widen and deepen their conception of the object through which the self is to gain its realization, approximate the attitude of religion. Religion in turn may be tested by its ability to satisfy the problem of Ethics. That form of religion which perfectly satisfies the ethical impulse toward self-realization—that form and that alone can claim to be the ultimate and absolute religion. An exhaustive analysis of the various forms in which religion has appeared would reveal as many, if not more, species and varieties than we have traced in our review of the leading phases of Ethics. Three general classes, however, may be said to include the more essential phases of religion. And these three classes may be described as the abstract, the subjective, and the objective; and in a general way designated as Deism, Pantheism, and Christian Theism. Deism gains its conception of God by abstracting from the forces of Nature and the instincts and passions of Humanity their most impressive features, and hypostatizing the attributes thus obtained. It existed as an undercurrent throughout the entire history of Judaism; breaking forth at last in Pharisaism as its crowning achievement. With or without the accompaniment of idols by which to make sensible the abstraction, it has been the religion of the formal

understanding everywhere. It has crept into the Christian Church itself; notably in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and to-day thousands of churches, and it is to be feared pulpits too, in every Christian land are sick and dying from its baneful influence transmitted by heredity from preceding generations. Wherever God is set forth under any forms of natural or human finitude; wherever He is confined to a scheme of operations; wherever His conduct is laid down by arbitrary rule, and temporal and spatial limitations are placed upon the outgo of His pure and holy love, I care not what may be the verbal disguise, or the theological banner—there Deism reigns triumphant and supreme. One single qualification is all we have a warrant to ascribe to the activity of God. He cannot tolerate, He must resist and overthrow sin. For sin is the contradiction of Himself. With this single exception, on which revelation and reason insist with equal clearness, whoever except by recognized license of figurative speech, whoever attributes to God any finite limitation whatsoever falls into the fatal fallacy of Deism. Whatever is unlimited and infinite—goodness, grace, mercy, compassion, love—all that may be attributed to Him consistently with the Theistic standpoint. "The Lord, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty"—this is at once the Scriptural and the Philosophical conception of God. A Being perfect in the outgo of spiritual affection wherever such outgo of love would not be self-contradiction, is the idea of God which Jesus taught us to express in the name—Father. A Being limited only by the nature of His own perfections is the Philosophical conception of a personal God. And the substitution in place of this conception, of attributes, or qualities, or modes of action gained by abstraction from finite forces or finite beings is the mark of Deism.

If now Deism be in essence the abstraction and Deification of forces and qualities drawn from impersonal and finite sources; if it therefore sets up as its object something less than Absolute Personality, it is obviously unfit to satisfy the ethical impulse. Such a God stands over against me as a limit. In yielding to

Him I must submit to a force alien to myself. His will and His action must present themselves as something different from my freest will, and highest action. He is finite like myself; and finite cannot unite with finite. The opposition is hopeless. Conscious union is impossible. For only in the Infinite can I find the complete and perfect realization of myself. Only with the Perfect One can I perfectly unite. To yield to One in whom remains a trace of finitude is to make His limitations my own. It is to abandon as hopeless the problem of complete self-realization. It is to acknowledge that the ethical impulse can never be truly and completely satisfied.

Just here we meet the practical difficulty mentioned at the outset. Why are so many of the best moral men in every community outside the Churches? Much no doubt must be attributed to the real fact our fathers indicated by the doctrine of "total depravity." There is a tendency in men to cling to the self that is at the time dominant; an unwillingness to die and be born again, even when it is clearly recognized that this process is the essential condition of retaining any true life whatever. Yet, after all due allowance has been made for this original and fundamental sin, the fact remains that multitudes of men who would not hesitate for an instant to do the thing they feel to be right; who are eagerly asking the question, "What shall I do to be perfect?" refuse to unite with the Church, and confess the God whom the Church proclaims. Is not the reason to be found in the fact that intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, the God who is practically presented to their minds by much of the teaching of the pulpit, the atmosphere of the social meeting, and the tone of pious conversation represents the Deistic rather than the Theistic conception? Is it not a fact that profession of religion often presents itself to the minds of such men as a real limitation and check on what is most truly personal within them? It ought not so to be. And yet the philosophical truth that Deism in its very essence denies the ethical impulse its perfect realization, may have more to do than we think with the fact that multitudes of good moral men in our day stand aloof from a Christianity that has not altogether and in all quarters freed itself from an inherited tendency to Deistic modes of thought.

The second form of religion to which I refer, the subjective, is Pantheism. It is the exact opposite of Deism, and often arises in the attempt to remedy the deficiencies of the Deistic mode of thought. Instead of placing God over against the free personality of man by abstraction, Pantheism asserts that God is in us and we in Him in such a sense that there is no God that is not man as well, and no man that is not God.

"What are we all but a mood,
A single mood in the life
Of the Spirit in whom we exist,
Who alone is all things in One?"

Pantheism sacrifices individuality and responsibility in man and eliminates moral distinctions from its idea of God. It denies the opportunity of free outgo to human personality, because it sets forth no ideal sphere into which the soul may develop. The ideal is the actual: and that which is, is right. Pantheism is therefore inadequate to meet the demands of the ethical instinct. The lover of beauty will find Pantheism beautiful. The lover of pleasure will find Pantheism pleasant. The lover of speculation will find Pantheism a magnificent speculative theory. But the soul earnest in the endeavor after ethical completeness, will not find in Pantheism the realization of his highest self, in union with the ideal of his being. If a cold and abstract Deism chills and baffles the ethical impulse, an easy-going and subjective Pantheism lulls and stifles it. Deism is a train so far from us that we cannot catch it. Pantheism comes so near that it runs over us.

Thirdly and lastly we have the objective method of religion which gives us Christian Theism. Not by abstraction of force, or vengeance, or immensity, or numerical unity from the world without; not by deification of the actual consciousness I have within me; but by the faith that that to which my moral nature points as the complement and presupposition of my personality is objectively real. Nor is this faith the mere projection of my hope; it is met and confirmed by a positive revelation in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is a person, and the perfect person. In Him the human is in perfect union with the Divine. In Him Ethics is completed in the union of religion. He can ask, "Which of you convinceth Me of sin?" because He can affirm, "The

Father and I are one." He has no self that is not merged in God. "I do nothing of Myself;" "I can of Mine own self do nothing;" "I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent Me." By virtue of this union with the Father He has what from the ethical point of view we have termed complete self-realization; what in His own religious language He terms "eternal life." "For as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself." This life of Christ is shared by every man who makes Christ his Lord and Master, and who accepts His perfect obedience to the Father as his principle of life. To one thus united to God in Christ there can be no circumstance wherein he cannot give perfect expression to his inmost self. For the will of God is universal good. The Christ-life consists in perfect doing of that will. To every sphere of human life, private, domestic, social, industrial, political, that will applies. In each and all it is capable of realization. The Christian man, therefore, whose ultimate and only object is the Father's will, finds union with God possible always and everywhere. "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed."

Christianity, therefore, in setting before the individual self a perfect Person, solves the problem of Ethics. The Christian is the man whose individual and private self is swallowed up in devotion to One to whom he gladly yields himself as servant and friend in every act and relation of life. It is the identification of the finite will with the will of God revealed through Christ. Christianity accomplishes what Ethics is ever reaching after. The ethical man is ever widening his life as he identifies himself with broader and more personal objects. The member of a family is more a man than the hermit. The active citizen more fully realizes his human nature than the recluse. But the man who in faithful following of Christ is united to the Eternal Will of God, is personally complete. The goal is reached. And though he may still at times lose sight of the One in whom he lives; though his defeats be frequent and his falls many, yet he is in his inmost and real self eternally united to the Infinite. To be sure he must still progress; yet, as it has been said, "Religious progress is not progress toward but within the sphere of the

infinite." "It is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me." The self, as an individual, private self, is dead; and yet lives and finds its realization forevermore, "hid with Christ in God." Even sin and guilt cannot destroy this life; for the pathway of penitence and the gateway of Divine Grace are ever open for the wanderer's return. Nor can the weakness of the flesh thwart its realization; for prayer can triumphantly secure the union of the soul with God, when the coarser means of human assertion and effort are unavailing. "As many as receive Christ as their Lord, to them gives He power to become Sons of God," participants in the infinite Divine life.

In conclusion I will briefly indicate the practical bearings of this discussion. Religion must have some fulcrum to work from in order to move mankind. We must have a "*ποῦ στῶ*." This to early Christianity was furnished by the stern ethics of the Mosaic law. The weight of moral responsibility bore heavily upon the minds of men. Under its pressure men were seeking relief. The young men were already pondering the question, "What shall I do to be perfect?" And as Jesus said, when that question is asked, the distance to the kingdom of heaven is not far.

Ethics is the propædæutics to religion. The thorough preaching of profound ethics is the only thing that can do for us in our day what the Jewish law did for the Jews, and what Stoicism did for the Gentiles in the days of early Christianity. "Study theology; preach ethics," is the wholesome advice the president of Union Theological Seminary gives to his students. When that advice shall be universally heeded by the pulpit at large, a genuine revival of healthy, vigorous religion cannot be long delayed. In the meantime the miserable and pitiful attempts to rear a religious life on transitory excitement, or an elaborate ritual, or schemes of divinity, or dread of future punishment, will each have their brief day and seeming success, and then cease to be. Ethics alone gives the solid groundwork needed; for it is the science of that self-realization of man of which the union with God given in religion is the consummation.

Ethics puts the question, and gives partial solutions to that problem to which the Christian religion is the complete and final

answer. Ethics develops that impulse in man which Christ came to gratify. Ethics urges the man to fulness of life. Christ came "that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." To create a demand is often quite as essential as to furnish a supply. Profound and thorough ethical teaching which shall make men see and feel the narrowness and insufficiency of the natural life in itself; and the death and destruction of the spiritual man to which the merely natural life inevitably tends—this is the discipline by which alone we can create a demand for the Way, and the Truth, and the Life which the Gospel of Christ is so amply able to supply. Force men to realize themselves, and you drive them ultimately to union with God in Jesus Christ. For without God no man can attain true manhood.

Not alone the original corruption of the race at the dawn of history; not alone the disaster that awaits the sinner at its far-off close, but the loss and destruction and ruin and decay that are going on now and always within the soul of every man who is not losing the narrow, selfish life of nature to find the universal and eternal life in union with humanity and God; this, as Jesus taught us, is the everlasting destruction from which ethical religion offers the only and all-sufficient deliverance. "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled."

LORD LYTTON: The man who has no faith in religion is often the man who has faith in a nightmare. Julius Cæsar publicly denounced a belief in hereafter, and rejected the idea of a soul and a deity, yet muttered a charm when he entered a chariot, and did not cross the Rubicon until he had consulted the omens. Lord Herbert, of Cherbourg, writes a book against revelation, asks a sign from heaven to tell him if his book is approved by his Maker. The man who cannot believe in the miracles performed by the Saviour, gravely tells us of a miracle vouchsafed to himself.

THE SUMMER SCHOOLS OF 1885.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE Institute has held two Summer Schools during the year—a seaside school at Asbury Park and Key East, N. J., and a mountain school at Richfield Springs, N. Y.

THE SEASIDE SUMMER SCHOOL.

The *Seventh Summer School* opened in Educational Hall, *Asbury Park*, on Tuesday, July 21st, at 11 A.M. The President, the Rev. Dr. Deems read a passage of Scripture, and led in prayer. The regular paper of the day was by John B. Drury, D.D., of Ghent, N. Y. His subject was "The Relation of Truth and Time."

After the lecture, at the request of the Secretary, Mr. Marion J. Verdery, of Augusta, Ga., was appointed Assistant Secretary. Adam Wallace, D.D., of Ocean Grove, John C. Clyde, D.D., of Bloomsbury, and the Secretary were appointed a committee to revise the By-Laws. Prof. Ransom B. Welch, of Auburn Theological Seminary, Prof. Edward J. Hamilton, of Clinton, N. Y., and Rev. James F. Riggs, of Bergen Point, N. J., were appointed a Committee to nominate officers at the Annual Meeting.

In the afternoon the paper of the morning was discussed by Messrs. Riggs, Conger and Mingins, Drs. Clyde and Drury, and Profs. Welch and Hamilton.

On Wednesday, July 22d, the devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. David Laughlin, of Manalapan, N. J.

The paper of the day was by Rev. James F. Riggs, of Bergen Point, N. J., on "The Difficulties to be Met in the Work of Translating the Scriptures into the Language of the Mohammedans; particularly as Exemplified in Translating Them into Turkish."

In the afternoon the paper was discussed by Drs. Drury, Clyde and Welch, Prof. Newcomb and others.

The *Fourth Anniversary Meeting* of the Institute was held on Thursday morning, July 23d, in Educational Hall. Prof. Ransom B. Welch, D.D., of Auburn, was in the chair. Scripture was read and prayer offered by Rev. William H. Ballagh, Pastor of the Reformed Church at Asbury Park. The Annual Address was by the President. It appears in this number.

The hour for the Annual Meeting of the Institute having arrived, the President announced the death of General Grant, which had occurred that day, and that it seemed to him that the passing into eternity of a personage whose sufferings had aroused the sympathy of the nation, a personage destined to be historic, was an event which should receive notice from the Institute of Christian Philosophy.

George D. Armstrong, D.D., of Norfolk, Va., then moved that in honor of the memory of General Grant, ex-President of the United States, the annual meeting of the Institute be adjourned until three o'clock P.M. to-morrow.

Dr. Armstrong proceeded to say: "During the protracted sufferings which have preceded the death of General Grant, his case has awakened the deepest sympathy at the South, and the event which has just been announced will be sincerely mourned there as here. We accounted him an enemy in time of war, but always an honorable enemy—and when peace came there was no more earnest advocate of pacification than he. It is characteristic of the good man to remember nothing but the good of the dead; and one reason why God has made this a law of our being is, I believe, that good men may the more readily recognize each other in heaven, when all that is evil in the nature of the redeemed shall have been eliminated; the man of our memory being thus made more like the reality with which we meet in the better world."

Professor Welch, of Auburn Theological Seminary, said: "I rise to second the resolution offered by Rev. Dr. Armstrong, of Virginia. The despatch from Mount McGregor, just received, challenges our sad and reverent attention. This day a great American hero has fallen. It seems to me fitting that, *The American Institute of Christian Philosophy*, at this its anniversary meeting, pause in its ordinary work, that we may render

our tribute of respect to his memory. It is especially fitting that this resolution has been proposed by one of the representative scholars and divines of Virginia. We of New Jersey and New York and the other States represented here, to-day, welcome this motion from a citizen of that old and honored commonwealth. This, we believe, is an indication of the American feeling everywhere entertained toward our dead hero. As the sad news of his death to-day is flashed across the country, the people north and south and east and west will, with common accord, lament our national loss, and offer grateful tribute to his memory. Our national banner, borne aloft with patriotic loyalty by the blue and the gray on the fourth day of this July, will, on this twenty-third day of July, droop at half-mast, in every State throughout our whole Union and on every ship that floats our starry flag. Generous as he was brave; true to the last as in every way he was tried; patient in sickness as well as in public service; self-poised in danger and in duty, in war and in peace; an honest and simple citizen in the midst of his unparalleled successes and honors in war and in peace, at home and abroad; serenely trustful in God for himself and his country, we honor this our dead hero, as the foremost American soldier and citizen of our time. Emerging from the great conflict in behalf of the American Union, he expressed not the ambition of a conqueror but the loyalty of a citizen, in these noble words which will never be forgotten—'Let us have peace.' And heaven has graciously permitted him to see his kindly precept fulfilled as a prophecy. Let our great nation in the enjoyment of union and peace, honor and bless his memory. And may the American Union, perpetuated in peace, in prosperity and in righteousness, remain the lasting monument of his fame."

Rev. Dr. Clyde, of Bloomsbury, N. J., spoke of the personal loss he felt in the death of his old commander. His mind naturally reverted to the scenes of 1863, when, as a boy-soldier and deputy provost-marshal, he saw him at Columbus, Ky., the head of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and base of supplies for the campaign against Vicksburg. He spoke of the part he took in forwarding provisions by river to feed the General's army when his line of communications by rail was cut by the enemy;

and also of the part he took in the rejoicings over the capture of the last stronghold on the river, on July 4th of that year.

President Deems said that after the proceedings had begun, there had entered the hall a gentleman who was a member of the Institute, who had been an officer in the Confederate army, and who had officiated at the funeral of General Grant's venerable mother. He called upon Rev. Dr. Howard Henderson, of Jersey City, who said: "I heartily concur in the resolution. In many ways Gen. Grant has shown his magnanimity. When I came to Simpson M. E. Church, Jersey City, I found Mrs. Hannah Grant, the mother, and two of General Grant's sisters, a nephew and a niece, members of my congregation. Soon afterward the mother of General Grant suddenly died. I proposed to surrender my pastoral prerogative to Dr. J. P. Newman, knowing the intimate relation he sustained to General Grant. He knew my antecedents as an officer in the Confederate Army, but this was no bar to his recognition of the propriety of his mother's pastor presiding at the funeral. In this he showed his respect for discipline—a characteristic of a great soldier. He said he desired that I should have full charge of the services, and should make the remarks, but that it would be agreeable to his feelings if I would invite Dr. Newman to take some part in the obsequies. I asked Dr. N. to make the prayer and he very modestly acceded to the request. Nothing was dearer to the great chieftain than his mother. His freedom from all military prejudice, in this sacred matter, is a wholesome lesson to the nation, and greatly endears his memory to my heart. The Republic is in mourning. The South twining its orange blossoms with the cypress wreaths of the North, to lay in common tribute on his pulseless breast, is the grandest offering that the Muse of History will record. General Grant was as largely endowed with generosity as with military skill and personal courage. It is a real gratification for me to be able to recite an incident so pregnant with meaning, and I will, so long as I live, be a hearty witness to the mercy and merits of the grand man who is able in death to bring a united country to mourn at his bier and to weep at his tomb. The resolution proposed by Virginia, elicits, from a soldier of the South, a cordial ratification. On a nation's rain of tears I discern

a covenant bow betokening that a deluge of fratricidal blood will never again sweep over our land. The prayer of the conquering hero for a permanent national peace has been answered. The dove comes fluttering back to the ark of political security, bearing in its gentle beak the olive-branch, while the clearing-up shower is scarfed with a rainbow which,

“ ‘ Like the wing of the Deity calmly unfurl’d,
Bends from the cloud to encircle the world.’ ”

On Friday, the fourth day of the School, the devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. William D. W. Hyde, President of Bowdoin College.

The regular paper of the day was by Prof. Ransom B. Welch, D.D., of Auburn Theological Seminary, whose subject was, “Then and Now; or, The Fourteenth Century and the Nineteenth.”

After the lecture, Rev. Dr. John C. Clyde, of the Committee on By-Laws, reported the By-Laws with the amendments that would be presented to the Institute for their action, in the afternoon.

The adjourned *Annual Meeting* was held in the afternoon, the President being in the chair. Scripture was read and prayer offered by Rev. Dr. Gallaudet, Rector of St. Anne’s, New York. In the absence of the Treasurer, his report was read by the Secretary, it having been examined and reported correct by Messrs. A. B. Conger and O. O. Schimmel, the Auditing Committee appointed by the Trustees. It was as follows:

TREASURER’S ANNUAL REPORT.

W. O. McDOWELL, TREASURER, *in account with* AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

1885.		RECEIPTS.	
June 30th.			
For Life Membership (from June 30th, 1884).....			\$100 00
Annual Dues “ “ “			1,199 10
1884.			
From Donations, July 21st, Mrs. Linnard.....		\$50 00	
July 21st, Anonymous.....		10 25	
September, Anonymous.....		2 00	
October 17th, O. O. Schimmel.....		8 40	
December 2d, O. O. Schimmel.....		50 00	

THE SUMMER SCHOOLS.

143

December 24th, Mrs. C. H. McCormick.	100 00	
1885.		
January 19th, Through Bishop H. C. Potter.....	100 00	
January 19th, F. B. Newcombe.....	50 00	
Rev. Mackay-Smith.....	10 00	
April 9th, Mrs. C. Vanderbilt.....	10 00	
June 11th, Church of the Strangers.....	10 00	
June 30th, Henry P. Smith.....	25 00	425 65
From Collections, At Lecture by Ram Chandra Bose in Church of the Strangers, \$27.44 (less \$25 credited to his Membership).....	2 44	
1884.		
August 28th, Richfield Springs.....	72 53	
1885.		
January 19th, In St. Thomas' Church...	67 79	
April 9th, In Church of the Strangers...	9 31	152 07
1884.		
For Summer Schools, July 21st, Sea-side Assembly, Key-East.....	250 00	
August 20th, Richfield Springs.....	400 00	650 00
		\$2,526 82
EXPENDITURES.		
Summer Schools, Key-East.....	\$265 25	
Richfield Springs.....	397 54	\$662 79
Printing, Stationery and Postage.....		138 16
Publishing and Donating CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.....		906 59
Expenses (attending) Annual Sermon.....		91 95
Paid Note (given last year).....		106 58
Painting Sign and Petty Items.....		8 22
Clerical Services.....		383 78
		\$2,475 89
Balance on hand.....		50 93

The Secretary reported as follows:

SECRETARY'S ANNUAL REPORT.

I. *The Treasurer's Report* shows that there have been received from all sources \$2,526.82. Of this, life-membership and annual dues amounted to \$1,299.10, leaving from donations and collections \$1,227.72. Of these donations \$650 were given for the expenses of Summer Schools. Other sums, varying from \$1 to \$100, were given mostly by personal friends; and collections during the year amounted to \$152.07. The balance is \$50.93.

The fifty dollars belong to a former lecturer, who will draw it from the treasury as soon as he hands his manuscript to the Secretary. The available balance in the treasury, therefore, is 93 cents. Of the expenses mentioned, the largest sum expended for any one object was \$960.59, for publishing and distributing CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. By *distributing* is meant the sending of the journal to members of the Institute, Colleges, Seminaries, and other institutions; especially last year in sending about five hundred copies of one number to India. This was paid for by special donations.

II. *Membership*. There are two classes of members, *Life* and *Annual*. Those who give \$50 or more for the general expenses are *life* members. \$100 or more contributed to the Endowment Fund, make an *Endowment* Member, also for *Life*. There is no initiation fee; \$5 a year constitute an annual member. There are 8 *endowment* members, 45 *life*, 390 *annual*; 443 in all. At first, Membership dated from the time of joining the Institute; but it was soon found necessary to date it in every case either from January or July. As July is the beginning of the fiscal year, and the first number of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT is issued in that month, it is hoped that all memberships may soon be made to begin at that time.

III. *Two Summer Schools* were held last year; one of five lectures at Key East, New Jersey, from July 15th to 19th; and one at Richfield Springs, New York, August 20th-28th, at which eight addresses were delivered. There have been nine *Monthly Meetings* at the Institute's rooms, in New York. By "Institute's Rooms" is meant the Lecture-room of the Church of the Strangers, the use of which the Trustees have granted to the Institute from its beginning free of all expense, and including heating, lighting and other comforts. For this, I believe, no vote of thanks has ever been tendered that body. Such beneficence seems so natural to that church and its pastor that people forget to thank them for its exercise. And here the Secretary might add that the officers of the Institute serve without salary. The condition of accepting office in this body is the duty of contributing freely and frequently. At the monthly meetings lectures have been read, which have afterwards appeared in CHRIS-

TIAN THOUGHT. These lectures are given without expense to the Institute. It is hoped that the time will soon come when some honorarium, even though small, shall be returned for these valuable contributions.

IV. Endowment. The Institute can never take the position to which its objects and its work entitle it, until it has an income of at least \$600 independent of membership fees and donations. It needs a *local habitation* as well as a *name*. To secure this there must be a fund of \$10,000. A beginning of this has already been made. The treasurer of this fund reported on the 21st of June last, that the securities held by him are worth about \$1,000. The interest of this cannot be used until the whole fund amounts to \$10,000.

But the Institute cannot wait for the **ENDOWMENT**; nor should it depend at all upon donations and contributions. It deserves the support of the Christians of America. If those who are already members were prompt and regular in the payment of dues, much time and trouble would be saved the officers; and if the number of members were doubled, the good accomplished would be many times greater.

We are, however, not discouraged. The Victoria Institute, whom we are proud to call our mother, was organized in May, 1866, with 93 members. In June, 1871, it had 203.

Our Institute was organized in July, 1881, with 13 members; it now has 443. The English society, now nineteen years old, has 996 members. We will hope for a like success. Like Paul at the Market of Appius and the Three Taverns, we meet friends, thank God, and take courage.

The Committee on By-Laws reported the following, which were adopted:

BY-LAWS.

ARTICLE I.

NAME.

This Society shall be known as **THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY**: The act of incorporation, together with the prospectus setting forth its objects, etc., adopted July 21st, 1881, shall be its Constitution.

ARTICLE II.

MEETINGS.

SEC. 1. The Institute shall hold regular monthly meetings at such times and places as the Executive Committee shall direct.

SEC. 2. The President shall preside at all the meetings, or in his absence, or at his call, some Vice-President; and in their absence, the members of the Institute present shall select from among themselves a President *pro tempore*.

SEC. 3. The following shall be the order of proceeding at the monthly meeting:

1. Reading Holy Scripture and Prayer.
2. Reading the Minutes of the latest preceding meeting.
3. Report of Special Committees.
4. New Business.
5. Announcements.
6. Reading of the Paper appointed for the evening.

SEC. 4. Upon the arrival of the hour appointed for any paper which has been announced, its reading shall take place, and the unfinished items of business shall follow the reading.

ARTICLE III.

OFFICERS.

SEC. 1. The Officers shall be a President, a Vice-President for every State in which there are members, a Secretary and a Treasurer.

There shall also be five Trustees, and an Executive Committee consisting of the President, the Secretary, the Treasurer, and such other gentlemen as may be named by the President.

SEC. 2. The Officers and Trustees shall be elected by the members from among the members, said election being by ballot, at the annual meeting.

SEC. 3. Any vacancy occurring in any office shall be filled, until the next annual meeting, by the Executive Committee.

SEC. 4. Gentlemen not residents of the United States may be chosen Honorary Vice-Presidents by the Institute.

ARTICLE IV.

The duties of the several officers shall be such as ordinarily

pertain to the offices of President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer.

The Treasurer shall render his accounts to the Board of Trustees, who shall audit and report the same to the Institute, as often as they may deem advisable. It shall be their duty to present the annual report of the Treasurer to the Institute at its annual meeting. The Trustees shall have charge of all questions involving finance. The Executive Committee shall have charge of all questions relating to papers to be read, and lectures to be delivered before the Institute in any of its Schools, and at any of its meetings, and all other business not otherwise assigned; and three members shall constitute a quorum.

ARTICLE V.

Any one of these By-Laws may be rescinded or amended by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Institute assembled under notice to act upon the proposed changes.

The report of the Committee on Nominations was presented and accepted. After which a ballot was cast, and the following persons elected as officers:

President: Charles F. Deems, D.D., LL.D. *Vice-Presidents:* John Bascom, D.D., LL.D., Wisconsin; Hon. Kemp P. Battle, LL.D., North Carolina; Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, Delaware; W. C. Cattell, D.D., LL.D., Pennsylvania; Rev. Bishop Cheney, Illinois; Rt. Rev. Bishop Green, Mississippi; R. D. Hitchcock, D.D., LL.D., New York; Mark Hopkins, D.D., LL.D., Massachusetts; Rev. Bishop Hurst, Iowa; Rt. Rev. Bishop Bedell, Ohio; Gen. G. W. Custis Lee, Virginia; Rev. Bishop McTyeire, Tennessee; P. H. Mell, D.D., LL.D., Georgia; Francis L. Patton, D.D., LL.D., New Jersey; Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D., Connecticut; Alexander Winchell, LL.D., Michigan. *Trustees:* Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Mr. William O. McDowell, Dr. Sylvester Willard, Gen. Clinton B. Fisk, Mr. Owen O. Schimmel. *Secretary:* Mr. Charles M. Davis. *Treasurer:* Mr. W. O. McDowell.

The Annual Meeting then adjourned to meet at Richfield Springs, on the call of the President.

On Saturday, July 25th, at the fifth day of the School, the devotional exercises were led by Rev. Wm. L. Ledwith, of Philadelphia. The regular paper of the day was by Prof. George B. Newcomb, of the College of the City of New York. His subject was, "Economic Science in its Relation to Ethics."

In the afternoon Prof. Welch was called to the chair. Rev. Drs. Drury and Clyde, President Hyde, Hon. A. B. Conger and others took part in the discussion.

On Monday, July 27th, Prof. Welch presided at the sixth meeting of the School. The devotional exercises were led by Dr. Clyde. The paper of the day was by Rev. Samuel W. Dike, of Royalton, Vt., whose subject was, "The Family in the History of Christianity."

In the afternoon the subject was discussed by Messrs. Armstrong, Newcomb, Hamilton, Duffield, Hyde, Welch, Drury and Conger.

On Tuesday, July 28th, the devotional exercises were by Rev. George Mingsins, of New York. The paper of the day was by Rev. Samuel W. Duffield, of Bloomfield, N. J. His subject was, "Jesus Christ, the Representative Human Redeemer, in the Light of Modern Science."

Rev. Drs. Clyde and Rankin, Profs. Welch and Hamilton, Rev. E. M. Deems, Hon. Mr. Conger, and others took part in the discussion in the afternoon.

The School on the *Eighth Day* was held in the Seaside Assembly Room at Key East, Wednesday, July 29th; the President in the chair. Devotional exercises by Rev. T. Max Hart, of Lancaster, Pa. The regular paper of the day was by George D. Armstrong, D.D., of Norfolk, Va., whose subject was, "Primeval Man." In the afternoon the subject was discussed by Rev. Mr. Dike, Prof. Welch, Washington Gladden, D.D., Rev. Mr. Hungerford and others.

Thursday, July 30th, reading of Scripture and prayer by Rev. Mr. Cressy, of Boston. The paper of the day was by Rev. Edward Hungerford, of Adams, Mass.; his subject was, "Science among the Arabians from the Time of Mohammed to the Fall of the Moors in Spain." Remarks and questions in the afternoon by Prof. Welch, Dr. Armstrong, Dr. Deems and Mr. Riggs.

Friday, July 31st, Rev. Alexander McKelvey, of Jersey City, conducted the devotional exercises. Rev. Wm. De Witt Hyde, President of Bowdoin College, read a paper entitled, "Ethics and Religion." Messrs. Hungerford, Welch, Armstrong, McKelvey, Gladden, Dike, Conger and Hamilton discussed the subject in the afternoon.

On Saturday, August 1st, the eleventh and last day of the Seaside School, the devotional exercises were led by J. E. Rankin, D.D., of Orange, N. J. The regular paper of the day was by Washington Gladden, D.D., of Columbus, Ohio. His theme was "The Relation of Art to Morality." The School adjourned immediately after the lecture, without discussion of the subject, in order to allow members to take trains for home.

THE MOUNTAIN SUMMER SCHOOL.

The course of six lectures began Thursday morning, August 20th, in the Presbyterian Church. The devotional exercises were led by Prof. Wm. Henry Green, of the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J. The regular paper of the day was by Rev. Dr. Charles F. Deems, whose subject was, "A Defence of the Superstitions of Science."

In the afternoon, among those who joined in the discussion were Rev. Dr. Rankin, of Richfield Springs, Vice-Chancellor MacCracken, Messrs. Miller of Pottsville, Pa., Pike of Clayville, Traver of Junius, and Prof. Ballard, of Lafayette College.

The devotional exercises on the second day were led by Rev. J. L. Humphreys, pastor of the M. E. Church in Richfield Springs. The paper of the day was by Henry A. Buttz, D.D., President of Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J. His subject was, "The Evidential Force of Paul's Beliefs." Among those who discussed the subject in the afternoon were Rev. Messrs. Williams, Granger and Sheard, Prof. Ballard and Vice-Chancellor MacCracken.

On Saturday, August 22d, the third day of the school, Rev. Hiram Hutchins, of the Bedford Avenue Baptist Church, Brooklyn, read a passage of Scripture and led in prayer. Prof. Addison Ballard, of Lafayette College, Easton, Pa., read a paper entitled, "The Gospel a Divorce from the Law."

The *conversazione* in the afternoon was conducted by Messrs. Davis, Pike, Granger, Rev. Drs. Rankin, McCook, Deems and Burchard.

On Monday, August 24th, the devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. G. R. Pike, of Clayville, N. Y. Rev. Henry C. McCook, D.D., of Philadelphia, read a paper on "Natural Indications of Personal Immortality," which was discussed in the afternoon by Messrs. T. C. Henry, of Philadelphia, Drs. Deems, Van Horn and Rankin, Prof. Ballard and Vice-Chancellor MacCracken.

The devotional exercises on the fifth day, August 25th, were led by Rev. Dr. E. Kempshall, of Elizabeth, N. J. The regular paper of the day was by Rev. Theodore T. Munger, D.D., of North Adams, Mass., whose subject was, "Music a Revelation." Among the debaters in the afternoon were Dr. Deems, Dr. Rankin, Vice-Chancellor MacCracken, and Mr. Hinckley.

In the evening the Annual Meeting adjourned from Asbury Park, July 24th, was held according to call of the President. The reports of Secretary and Treasurer were read, and the President gave an account of the origin and history of the Institute. Remarks were made by Gouverneur M. Smith, M.D., of New York, Rev. Dr. Humphrey, recently returned from India, Prof. Ballard, and others.

On the sixth and last day of the School, the devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. Mr. Gray. The regular paper of the day was by Henry M. MacCracken, D.D., Vice-Chancellor of the University of the City of New York. His subject was, "Kant, 1785: Lotze, 1885. A Centennial Comparison." This was discussed by Drs. Munger, Ballard and Dunscomb. Dr. Deems then purported to read a chapter from an anonymous religious novel bearing on the subject under discussion. This "Chapter" was discussed by Rev. Drs. Munger, Rankin and Ballard. After which the closing devotional exercises were led by the President, and the Eighth Summer of the Institute was closed, the members and attendants lingering for parting salutations.

OUR LETTER BOOK.

THE Institute of Christian Philosophy has frequent appeals for copies of its publication, CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, for circulation in the East where it will assist missionaries. Here are samples of such letters. The writer is a Wesleyan Minister:

"Ceylon, Caltura, June 11th, 1885.—Dear Sir: I am by the help of the Lord trying to do what I can in the way of spreading literature in defence of the Truth against the attempts of Atheists, Theosophists and others who get out and circulate all sorts of Infidel pamphlets and papers, such as the *Banner of Light* from America, and the *Social Reformer*, *Secular Review*, etc., etc., and Bradlaugh's, Besant's and Ingersoll's productions. I have very little help and sympathy, and am greatly crippled for means, being very poor; but still I do what I can and I know the Lord does not expect more. So much to serve as a self-introduction. I now write, though a stranger, having just seen a notice in the *Canadian Methodist Magazine* of your paper, the CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. If not possible to send it only for the postage, may I ask whether you can kindly send it at half-price from the number for July, 1885, that I may lay it on the table of my Free Reading Room, which I have established at my own expense for the benefit of young men and others? With Christian salutations, yours in the Lord, J. A. Spaar."

This also has reached us as we go to press: "Constantinople, Turkey, August 27th, 1885.—This is the second time that I receive the CHRISTIAN THOUGHT, for which I feel very grateful to you. It is the most valuable magazine for the present age I ever knew. I wish I could pay for it. But as you know, we ministers here in Turkey being not rich cannot pay for such magazines, though we like to read it from one end to the other. Thus far you sent me the CHRISTIAN THOUGHT to Talas Cesarea; but I left Talas Cesarea, and now I am the pastor at Vlonga Church in Constantinople. If you continue to send me the CHRISTIAN THOUGHT to the following address, I can have it and be very much obliged to you. Rev. G. H. Filian," etc.

Showing this to a few friends has brought \$22.38 for foreign distribution. Mr. Spaar has been supplied. The Institute could use at once \$100 judiciously for Mission stations. Donors may direct the publications sent to any missionary station.

RT. REV. BISHOP BEDELL writes to Secretary Davis: "Diocese of Ohio, Gambier, August 8th, 1885.—My dear friend: The position [Vice President] offered me by the American Institute of Christian Philosophy is accepted with pleasure. CHRISTIAN THOUGHT is doing large service in the cause of truth. Only last night I was reading with much enjoyment the instructive article by Dr. Davis on Prayer. Yours truly, G. T. Bedell."

REV. WM. C. WINSLOW, of Boston, writes: "Your association is *unique* and *peerless* in important respects. My whole heart is in its cause and for its work. Why I give so much time to the explorations in Egypt is because every disclosure there bearing evidence is for the truth of God's Word as given by Moses. Therefore please enroll me on your lists."

REV. DR. VINCENT, of Chautauqua: "I noticed a number yesterday which charmed me greatly. Please send magazine with bill." [Afterward he became a member.]

NOTATA.

AMONG the El Fayoum manuscripts which are in the keeping of Prof. Karabacek of Vienna, and which he is classifying, has been found a fragment of Thucydides (chap. 91, sec. 3; chap. 92, sec. 1-6, with *scholia* and interlinear comments) which gives us a manuscript of that classic earlier by about 700 years than anything by Thucydides hitherto known among scholars. This El Fayoum fragment is dated in the third century, the most ancient manuscript of anything by Thucydides, hitherto known to us, dating no further back than the eleventh century. And yet, strangely, there has been little skepticism among scholars in regard to our classic treasures, the doubts, questionings, and criticisms having been reserved for the New Testament writings. Will it not be at least modest for scholars to show us autograph writings of Cicero, Virgil, Horace and Sallust, of Demosthenes, Plato and Thucydides, before making a demand for the autograph productions of Matthew, Luke, John and Paul?

THE *New York Mail and Express* of a recent date gives the following a place on its editorial page: "One of the

most serious and notable of the admirable after-dinner speeches that made Mr. Lowell so famous in England has only lately been published. It was called out by some allusions to the Christian religion made in the tone of genteel skepticism quite common among the literary men of England. Mr. Lowell took occasion to remind those enemies of the religion which is at the very heart of all there is good in our civilization, 'that whatever the defects and imperfections may attach to a few points of the doctrinal system of Calvin—the bulk of which was simply what all Christians believe—it will be found that Calvinism, or any other ism which claims an open Bible and proclaims a crucified and risen Christ, is infinitely preferable to any form of polite and polished skepticism, which gathers as its votaries the degenerate sons of heroic ancestors, who, having been trained in a society and educated in schools, the foundations of which were laid by men of faith and piety, now turn and kick down the ladder by which they have climbed up, and persuade men to live without God and leave them to die without hope.' 'The worst kind of religion,' continued Mr. Lowell, 'is no religion at all; and these men, living in ease and luxury, indulging themselves in the amusement of going without religion, may be thankful that they live in lands where the Gospel they neglect has tamed the beastliness and ferocity of the men who, but for Christianity, might long ago have eaten their carcasses like the South Sea Islanders, or cut off their heads and tanned their hides like the monsters of the French Revolution. When the microscopic search of skepticism, which had hunted the heavens and sounded the seas to disprove the existence of a Creator, has turned its attention to human society, and has found a place on this planet ten miles square where a decent man can live in decency, comfort, and security, supporting and educating his children unspoiled and unpolluted; a place where age is revered, infancy respected, womanhood honored, and human life held in due regard—when skeptics can find such a place ten miles square on this globe, where the Gospel of Christ has not gone and cleared the way and laid the foundations and made decency and security possible, it will then be in order for the skeptical *literati* to move thither, and then ventilate their views. But so long as these very men are

dependent upon the religion which they discard for every privilege they enjoy, they may well hesitate a little before they seek to rob the Christian of his hope and humanity of its faith in that Saviour who alone has given to man that hope of life eternal which makes life tolerable and society possible and robs death of its terrors and the grave of its gloom."

A WRITER in an English journal commits himself as follows: "Man, diminutive man, who, if he walked on all fours, would be no bigger than a silly sheep, and who only partially disguises his native smallness by his acquired habit of walking erect on what ought to be his hind legs," etc. Now, there is nothing new in this comparison. We frequently hear the limbs of man compared to the four legs of animals, and evolutionists seem generally to accept the notion that we are nothing more than quadrupeds set up erect. But it does not seem to have been observed by these persons that our limbs have an exactly reverse construction from that of quadrupeds. Our legs have the knee-joint like that of the fore leg of animals, and hence, if they ever were hind legs, that which was originally a backward bend had to be brought round to a forward bend, and a joint developed. Evolution can easily explain how the joint, in course of time, might come, but it is not easy to see how evolution could bring the joint into a reverse action. It is the same way with our arms, commonly assumed to have been originally fore legs, but which are constructed on the model of hind legs. We thus see that man had not merely to acquire the habit of walking erect, but must have been compelled, in his transformation from a quadruped to a biped, either to have reconstructed his limbs, or by some hocus pocus caused them to change places.

AT the Oxford University's own paper-mill—which is situated at Wolvercote, near Oxford—375 tons of rags were consumed in making 250 tons of paper for the Revised Version of the Old Testament. It would go round the world in a strip of six inches wide, or say, if the pages were laid open one after another, it would go round the world. The sheets piled in reams as they leave the mill would make a column ten times the

height of St. Paul's, or folded into books before binding, at least one hundred times the height. The copies, which are being prepared by the Oxford University Press alone, would, if piled flat one upon another, make a column more than fourteen miles high, or 370 times the height of the Monument. If piled end on end they would reach seventy-four miles high, or 1,943 times the height of the Monument. It is hardly possible to give an idea of the number of goats and sheep whose skins have been required for binding the copies, but it has been calculated that 1,560 goat skins have been used in binding the copies which will be presented by the American Committee of Revision on the 21st. A special Act of Congress has been passed to admit these copies into the United States free of duty.

IT is a remarkable fact that Sir Isaac Newton, in his work on the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation, said that if they were true it would be necessary that a new mode of travelling should be invented. He said that the knowledge of mankind would be so increased before a certain date, or time terminated—namely, one thousand two hundred and sixty years—that they would be able to travel at the rate of fifty miles an hour. Voltaire got hold of this, and true to the spirit of scepticism of all ages, said: "Now, look at the mighty mind of Newton, who discovered gravitation; when he became an old man, and got into his dotage, he began to study the book called the Bible, and it seems in order to credit its fabulous nonsense we must believe that the knowledge of mankind will be so increased that we shall be able to travel at the rate of fifty miles an hour. The poor dotard." The self-complacency of the philosophic infidel made his friends laugh, but if he should get into a railway-train, even a sceptic to-day would have to say, "Newton was a wise philosopher, Voltaire a poor old dotard."—*Chris. Oracle*.

PROF. MAX MÜLLER makes the following strong point against Mr. Darwin's "Theory of Evolution." He insists that *Philology* points out the real specific difference between man and the lower animals. It erects a barrier which has never been passed. He says: "I cannot follow Mr. Darwin, because I hold

that this question is not to be decided in an anatomical theatre only. There is, to my mind, one difficulty which Mr. Darwin has not sufficiently appreciated, and which I certainly do not feel able to remove. There is, between the whole animal kingdom on the one side and man, even in his lowest state, on the other, a barrier which no animal has ever crossed, and that barrier is—*language*. By no effort of the understanding, by no stretch of imagination, can I explain to myself how language could have grown out of any thing which animals possess, even if we granted them millions of years for that purpose."

THAT very ancient man, the great-grandfather of the pre-adamite man, the man who existed before there were any preparations for him on this planet, put in an appearance recently in Mexico. This kind of man is continually meeting with rebuffs in the modern world, and the Mexican representative fares no better than his predecessors on the stage of modern science. Prof. J. S. Newberry, of Columbia College, writes to the *Tribune* that "the facts reported have in themselves very little geological or archæological significance"—the facts, that is to say, about this primeval Mexican. The deposit in which the venerable person was found, Prof. Newberry concludes, after examining the facts as reported, "has no geological position or age, and is an altogether superficial accumulation," and that "no facts have yet been brought to light which prove that this deposit was not made within a thousand years."

IN London the cause of "Liberal Theology" has suffered a serious reverse. Mr. Voysey, formerly of the Church of England, and Mr. Conway, an American, have been its chief representatives. But both Mr. Voysey and Mr. Conway have publicly confessed in their pulpits the hopeless collapse of the Theistic cause. Mr. Conway has been obliged to leave London, and Mr. Voysey's church is reduced to support its expenses by appropriating its building fund. About a dozen years ago Mr. Conway wrote exultantly that the Theistic Church "is to be the next great home of human hearts and thoughts." Neither Mr. Conway's nor Mr. Voysey's church had spiritual energy enough to start a Sunday-school.

THE "Japanese Friends of the Bible" is the title of a society which numbers 1,800 members, each of whom is pledged "to read a portion of the Scriptures daily." The title in Japanese is, "Nippon Seisho Notomo." In Japan English is fast becoming what French is in England—an accomplishment of the educated. What may we not hope from this daily study of the Word?

THE editor of the Japanese paper, *Yigi Gbimbo*, with his whole family, having embraced Christianity, has issued a manifesto calling on the Japanese people to do the same, on the ground of their being already Europeanized in every other respect.

THE King of New Zealand has recently made a visit to England, and while there pledged himself at a public meeting to exert his influence in the work of spreading the Gospel among his people.

M. SAINT-CLAIRE DEVILLE, who made real contributions to science before his death, July, 1881, is said to have declared the whole theoretical tendency of modern chemistry, the atomic theory not excepted, to be a superfluous speculation.

CHRISTIANITY is protected in Madagascar. The best authorities place the number of Protestants there at 350,000, and Roman Catholics 35,000. Education is compulsory. One district alone makes a return of 100,000 pupils in the schools.

. . . . We get no good,
 By being ungenerous even to a book,
 And calculating profits—so much help,
 By so much reading. It is rather when
 We gloriously forget ourselves and plunge
 Soul-forward, headlong, into a book's profound,
 Impassioned for its beauty and salt of truth—
 'Tis then we get the right good from a book.

—Mrs. Browning.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift will probably meet the demands of our readers.]

Hermann Lotze, the soundest and profoundest of recent German metaphysicians, has wonderfully influenced thought in Europe by his lectures delivered in Göttingen and Berlin. And now his stimulating thoughts are to have a direct influence on philosophy in America. Americans are indebted to Prof. Ladd, of Yale College, for an excellent translation of two of Lotze's works, viz.: "OUTLINES OF METAPHYSIC" and "OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION." As we cannot here give these two small but weighty volumes anything like an adequate review, we must content ourselves by simply indicating their contents. Lotze treats of metaphysic in his "Outlines" under three principal divisions, viz.: Ontology, Cosmology and Phenomenology. Under Ontology, in five chapters he treats of the significance of being, the content of the existent, the conception of reality, change, causes and effects. Under Cosmology he treats of space, time and motion; matter; the coherency of natural events. Under Phenomenology he deals with the subjectivity of cognition and the objectivity of cognition, bringing his whole work to a close by a summary and conclusion. This work should be read first in order to appreciate "The Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion." This latter work deals in a broad, strong, clear and suggestive way with the cardinal subjects of the faith of Christendom. In its one hundred and forty-three pages Lotze touches with a masterly hand on the proofs for the existence of God, more precise determinations of the Absolute, the metaphysical attributes of God, the personality of the Absolute, the conception of creation, preservation, government, the conception of the world-aim, religion and morality, dogmas and confessions. However much one may disagree with some of Lotze's views and conclusions, one can scarcely be master of the philosophy of our day without studying his system. Boston: Ginn, Heath & Co.

"EARTH'S EARLIEST AGES; and their Connection with Modern Spiritualism and Theology," is the title of a volume published by Messrs. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. The author states his position, in advance, to be the acceptance of the first chapter of Genesis, equally with those which follow, as in its primary meaning plain history, a literal statement of facts, and not either tradition or allegory; and that care must there-

fore be taken to reach the exact sense of the Hebrew text. The book is ingenious and earnest. The author is learned and devout. He sets forth that the Holy Scriptures teach an original creation "out of nothing" of the cosmos—chaos being a pagan poetic error; that in the interval between the first and second verses of Genesis there was time for all geological formations; the *tohu* and *boh* do not describe the original state of the earth at creation, but was a "confusion" and "emptiness" (absence of population), caused by a preadamite destruction produced by sin among preadamite men; that there have been three irruptions of Satanic influence in historic times, namely, in the days of Noah, at the time of Christ, and in our age, the real phenomena of spiritualism being indications thereof. Like all books worth reading this work has a number of things which will call out the dissent of thoughtful readers, but is not a book to be neglected. We wish the spirit which pervades it were common among scientists and theologians.

Dr. J. B. Mattison has written and G. P. Putnam's Sons publish (\$1) "THE TREATMENT OF THE OPIUM ADDICTION." The author is a member of the American Association for the Cure of Inebriates, and of the New York Neurological Society, and has had a wide opportunity of studying the disease the treatment of which he discusses in this volume, which is mainly the substance of a paper presented to the American Association for the Cure of Inebriates, at its annual meeting last year, and details a method of treatment original with the writer, and practised by him for several years with increasing satisfaction and success. Clergymen as well as physicians are having their attention called to the increase of this fearful habit and the havoc it is making in families. Let young people and men under pressure of business and bereavement be warned against the insidious and baleful habit of opium addiction, which in some aspects seems worse than alcoholism.

Rev. R. Heber Newton, under the title "PHILISTINISM," has issued a series of the sermons he had preached in review of certain forms of Modern Criticism. They were specially addressed to the young men of his congregation. They are timely and earnest. We should not adopt his methods of expression, but we believe that even with what seem to us to be their faults, the reading of these discourses will do much good to many young men not otherwise reached. The seven sermons which point to the invulnerability of the fundamental faiths of religion under the attacks of modern Philistinism are really valuable. It would be a favor to put this volume into the hands of any young man

who had been touched and tainted by Ingersollism. G. P. Putnam's Sons. Price, 50 cents.

Messrs. Charles Scribner's Sons publish in excellent style the Address delivered at Princeton College, June 16th, 1885, presenting the memorial tablet of Professor Henry. It is entitled "JOSEPH HENRY AND THE MAGNETIC TELEGRAPH." A fitting tribute is paid to the grand scientist and noble Christian, and a succinct and valuable history is given of the steps taken toward a result which has very markedly modified our modern civilization. President McCosh did well in taking measures to have "so comprehensive a paper circulated in our day," and in expressing a hope that it would be "handed down to posterity."

"THE PROTESTANT FAITH, OR SALVATION BY BELIEF," is an essay upon the errors of Protestantism, by Dwight Hinckley Olmstead. No real Protestant can protest against a protest against himself or against the form of belief which he has adopted. On the contrary, every true Protestant welcomes every acute and fair criticism however searching. It is well enough to see ourselves as others see us, and Mr. Olmstead is one of the "others." G. P. Putman's Sons. Price, \$1.

"THE ERRORS OF EVOLUTION," by Robert Patterson, published by H. L. Hastings, Boston (75 cents), should be put into the hands of all persons who are at all interested in this subject and have not the means of making a thorough examination of the questions involved, by going through the great amount of literature recently called into existence by the discussion of evolutionary hypotheses. It should be in all libraries and reading circles. Our young people will find it as interesting as a novel.

Messrs. A. S. Barnes & Co. publish "THE CHILD'S HEALTH PRIMER." It was written for primary classes, with special reference to the effects of alcoholic drinks, stimulants, and narcotics upon the human system. It is judiciously prepared and well illustrated. It should be in every Sunday-school library. Price, 85 cents.

A very brilliant and earnest address on "CHURCH BENEVOLENCE," by Howard Henderson, D.D., is a remarkably forceful presentation of the duty of liberality in the extension of the Gospel. We recommend its circulation by all pastors, and the reading of certain passages from our pulpits. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Price, 25 cents.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1885.

KANT AND LOTZE: 1785-1885.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Richfield Springs, August 26th, 1885.]

BY HENRY M. MACCRACKEN, D.D.,

Vice-Chancellor of the University of the City of New York.

THE American Institute of Christian Philosophy can with consistence mark the Centenary of the Ethics of Kant. No one of us, perhaps, believes, with a certain ancient school, that the essence of things is number, but we *all* are Pythagoreans in admitting *some* numbers as fit symbols. We refuse to go with extremists of that school in saying that the number five is identical with righteousness, but we are all agreed that the number one hundred fitly stands for commemoration. As soon as last year was found to be the bi-centenary of Berkeley, we as students of Philosophy accepted the fitness of its celebration. And now, since it is brought to our knowledge that just one hundred years have elapsed since Immanuel Kant first uttered his "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals," we all will approve of remembering at this meeting that familiar epoch in Christian Philosophy. My subject is "Kant's Ethics, 1785; Lotze's Ethics, 1885; A Centennial Comparison." I have joined with the hundred-year oldness of Kant a recent publication, one indeed that has appeared in its English form only the last month—whose author, Herrman Lotze, died but the other day after a service as a lecturer at Leipsic, his own University, from his twenty-first year to his twenty-seventh,

and as Professor of Metaphysics at Göttingen from his twenty-seventh year till the close of his career. A scribe instructed in the kingdom of God bringeth forth out of his treasures things new and old. The old has perhaps been viewed often and by the same who are invited to view it to-day. The sun in the sky has been viewed often by us; but if it can be viewed once more by the side of a new object, even if only a new bright cloud, it is well again to look at the sun and at the cloud as well. I do not name Kant a sun and Lotze a bright cloud by this parable. I wish that every one compare and call by his own name the Ethics of these two North German minds. I confine myself to attempting some slight commemoration of Kant as a master in morals by impressing, mainly by the use of comparison, a few of his great thoughts more thoroughly upon our minds. In order to hasten to the Ethics of Kant, I shall give but few words to his outward life. This is not the centenary of the beginning of his life, but of the beginning of his volumes upon the Principles of Morals, which was not till he was sixty-one years old. He had lived the first twenty-one years of his life in the university town of Königsberg. His father, a saddler, had sent him to the university every morning from home, and received him home every night. Königsberg was for this reason the best possible university for the future master of morals, because he was never beyond the shelter of the best school of applied morals, namely, the Christian home. The father lived just long enough to see his son through his student life. His living so long was the greater boon, because the mother had died when her son was but thirteen, but yet was old enough to remember and testify of her: "She planted and fostered the first germ of good in me. She opened my heart to the impression of nature. She awoke and enlarged my thoughts, and her teaching has always had an enduring and wholesome influence on my life." Ending his student life and losing his father, Kant was from twenty-one to thirty-one, or about ten years, a teacher in private families in various places in Eastern Prussia. Then he was back in Königsberg fifteen years as lecturer and author, but without fixed office or means of livelihood. Not till he was forty-six did he enter his work as Professor of Metaphysics, in which he was to con-

tinue thirty-four years, or until fourscore. Not until he had entered upon his professorship did he begin the line of effort upon which his fame now rests. After eleven years as professor he published at fifty-seven his "Critique of Pure Reason"; at sixty-one his "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals." He had therefore, from his entrance upon manhood at twenty-one, spent no less than forty years in comparative silence before he uttered what he, with new meaning to the phrase, called "The Moral Law."

What men thought of him very soon was shown by Schiller saying, "A new light is lighted for men," or John Paul Richter writing to a friend, "For heaven's sake buy two books—Kant's 'Foundation to a Metaphysic of Ethics' (that is the publication of 1785), and Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason.' Kant is no mere light of the world, but a whole dazzling solar system at once."

What foremost men thought after a generation passed away appears in these words of William von Humboldt: "Kant undertook and completed the greatest work for which the Philosophic Reason has to thank any man. He proved and sifted the whole of philosophic procedure in a way that led him to encounter the philosophies of all kinds and nations. He carried, in the true sense of the word, philosophy back into the human bosom. Every attribute of the great thinker he possessed in the fullest measure" (1830).

What men of English tongue have thought respecting Kant is indicated by De Quincey's words: "By the number of books written directly for or against himself, to say nothing of those which he has indirectly modified, there is no philosophical writer whatever, if we except Aristotle, who can pretend to approach Kant in the extent of the influence which he has exercised over the minds of men."

John Stuart Mill, rejecting as he did Kant's foundation views in Ethics, declares Kant "has become one of the turning-points in the history of Philosophy." Calderwood says: "In the literature of Moral Philosophy there is certainly nothing more important than the contributions which Kant has made to ethical science."

Schwegler's "History of Philosophy" says: "Kant is the great

renovater of Philosophy." Ueberweg, so cautious in opinion, writes, "Kant opened up a new path. The later developments in Philosophy were, in a certain sense, modified renewals of earlier systems under the influence, and in fact on the ground of Kantism."

Finally, since no end of testimonies might be given, Lotze, whom I present to-day for comparison, indicates his view of the importance of Kant when in his "Metaphysic" he makes direct reference to Kant oftener than to any other save Herbart, whose successor, as it happened, he was in the chair of Metaphysics at Göttingen. He refers to Kant one-third oftener than even to Aristotle.

Kant asks, "How do we arrive at the consciousness of the Moral Law?" He means by Moral Law "propositions containing rules which may be grounds of determining the will. They are either subjective and are called maxims when the rule is considered as of force only in reference to the thinking subject himself, or they are objective and are called Laws when reason pronounces the rule to have an ethical virtue of obliging all reasonable beings."

Will and Reason are to be understood as follows: "The Will is cogitated as a faculty to determine itself to act conformably to the representation of given laws, and such a power can be met with in reasonable agents only." As to Reason: "Man finds himself endowed with a function by which he distinguishes himself from all other objects, nay, even from himself in so far as he is affectable through the sensory; and this function or power is Reason. This as pure self-activity transcends in excellence even the faculty of understanding, for though this is likewise self-activity and does not, like the sensory, contain mere representations which result from its reaction when impressed by things, yet it begets no conceptions excepting only such as serve to regulate and order the sensory and so to combine them in the identity of self-consciousness, without which union and combination of perceptibles the intellect could furnish no thought; whereas Reason in supplying the ideas shows so original and high a power of pure spontaneity that it passes altogether beyond the field of the sensory."

With these definitions of Moral Law, of Reason and of Will, we are ready for the answer to the question, "How do we arrive at the Consciousness of the Moral Law?" Kant says, "We are conscious of a practical law *a priori* as we are conscious of theoretic ones, by attending to the necessity with which Reason obtrudes them upon the mind."

The following is by way of illustration: "Even the Holy one of the Gospels must first be compared with an ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize Him as such; and so He says of Himself, 'Why call ye Me, whom ye see, good? None is good (the model of good) but God only whom ye do not see.' But whence have we the conception of God as the Supreme good? Simply from the idea of moral perfection which reason frames *a priori*." (F. P. M. M., 31.)

I turn now to Lotze and hear him say, "The whole of our knowledge certainly does not originate from external experience which is mediated for us by the senses. There are also inner states which are available for the acquisition of truth."

"These are the ethical feelings which, without being deducible from mere experience, necessitate the attempt to conceive of a construction of the world in which this fact of the moral obligation of the will to a definite form of action finds an intelligible and rational place."

"An interpretation of moral commands which insists upon endeavoring to find in ethical precepts nothing but prudential maxims acquired by experience, is arbitrary. He who prefers this interpretation overlooks the fact that we all of us none the less set over against the conduct which conforms to these maxims of experience another of an altogether different sort as being the only one of value." "It will not be possible to gainsay those who are conscious of this inner experience." Further: "It must be acknowledged that the conscience is not, prior to all experience, a coherent revelation of the commands to which our future conduct ought to conform; the rather is it like our capacity for cognition."

"Conscience is first induced, by considering cases that are quite definite, to pass particular judgments of approval or disapproval upon actions which are brought before it."

Such general conceptions, as the Good, the Holy, or the Just, express nothing whatever but the peculiar character of the impression which definite kinds of conduct will make upon our feelings as soon as we shall become acquainted with them.

There is here substantial coincidence in the two masters, holding that knowledge of right and wrong is not of mere experience but is *a priori*.

Closely connected with the position of Kant that to Moral Law there is a source *a priori* is his maintenance of the *Freedom of the Will*.

"Freedom and an imperative practical law reciprocally point to one another."

"Freedom is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative reason of which we know the possibility *a priori* (without, however, understanding it) because it is the condition of the moral law which we know."

"Morality first reveals to man his inward freedom. No one could have hazarded the introduction of such an idea [as that of freedom of the will] into Science had not the Moral Law obtruded and flung it before the Mind.

"Had not the Moral Law been previously distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom, although it be not contradictory.

"All men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come such judgments upon actions, as being such as ought to have been done, although they have not been done. However, this freedom is not a conception of experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains even though experience shows the contrary of what on supposition of freedom are conceived as its necessary consequences. The claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is altogether independent on merely subjectively determined causes which together constitute what belongs to sensation only, and which consequently come under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering himself in this way as an intelligence, places himself thereby in a different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind, when on the one hand he

thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will and consequently with causality, and when on the other he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also) and affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold good, at the same time. That he must conceive and think of himself in this twofold way rests as to the first on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses, and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an intelligence—that is, as independent on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason."

It is thus in the book of one hundred years ago that Kant puts forth most boldly his speculation that man exists in two worlds: the "sensible," in which he finds himself subject to laws of nature—the "intelligible," in which he has to do with laws that are not dependent on nature.

This speculation accomplishes nothing perhaps that is not equally achieved by the position that man is above the natural or physical world in so far as he is endowed with causality, as Kant himself says "Intelligence endowed with will is causality," in other words that Mind is above Matter.

Kant agrees that the will has an indwelling, surpassing power. The will is not controlled by the understanding. It can so indulge impulses as to hinder the activity of the understanding. Yet it is not controlled by impulses or dispositions. It can so direct intelligence and attention as to quell the overbearing strength of motives.

Compare now the words of Lotze on Free Will.

"Religious sentiment has always insisted—at the outset very obscurely although rigorously—that something new also must happen in the world—something that is not a mere consequence of what has gone before—and that there must exist in individual spirits just this capacity to initiate a new series of events, and therefore in brief a freedom of acting or primarily of willing, by which they separate themselves from the Universal Substance in a still more decided manner than by their mere 'Being for self' as relatively independent beings."

"There is no reason why perfectly new beginnings of a subsequent origin that have no foundation in what is prior, should not also show themselves within the course of things, but after they have once taken their place in the coherent system of things actual, they bring after them those consequences which belong to them in their present combination with the rest of the world, according to general laws."

"It is self-evident that every such new beginning, and therefore every decision of a free will, must be inexplicable with respect to the way in which it comes to pass—for to explain means nothing more than to show that a definite event is the result of its antecedents in accordance with general rules."

Lotze does justice to Necessitarianism when he says, "That decided form of Determinism which makes all the action of animate beings proceed according to general laws from their inner spiritual states, with the same necessity as physical effects do from their blind causes is, in itself considered, perfectly clear and free from contradiction."

There is only one fact which can bring us at all to the thought that the case stands otherwise with human conduct than with such effects—and that is the feeling of penitence and self-condemnation."

"The conception of 'an Ought' and of an obligation has the most indubitable and incontrovertible significance." We demand this formal freedom because we regard it as the *conditio sine qua non* for the fulfilment of ethical commands whose obligatory majesty we consider to be the most absolute certainty, and one that needs no derivation from any other source whatever. We find in penitence and self-condemnation "the immediate assurance of the possibility that the choice whose failure is now repented of, might have been reached even sooner than it was."

"Acceptance or rejection of freedom will ultimately be a matter of decision and not the result of a theoretical demonstration. It is only on the assumption that we do not hold the speculative difficulties which we encounter to be insuperable, and that we therefore believe in the freedom of spiritual beings, that there is any further interest in discussing the conception of a Government of the world."

"It is found that freedom itself, in order that it may even be thought of as being what it aims at being, postulates a very widely extended, although not an exclusive, prevalence of the law of causation. For a free decision can never come to actual conduct unless there is a system of things, relations, and events which infallibly cohere according to general laws. Consequently the principle of Freedom includes the other principle of *Determinism*. The question comes as to the means that determine the intensity with which the freely originated will either overcomes the states of passion that struggle against it, or else yields to them. A decisive judgment upon this question it is hardly possible to find."

"We come upon new difficulties still when freedom is considered in connection with the mechanism of our psychical life, into which it must necessarily enter, if it is to be effective at all." "For every decision of the free will finds in our minds certain states, partly ideas, partly feelings, partly effects, which it must either change, or must guard against impending changes. Now since these changes are all without doubt connected together according to general laws and therefore fall under the conception of a mechanism, the will, in order to be able to achieve aught in this region, would be obliged each time to transform itself into a definite power of definite magnitude, which is just sufficient to produce the required effect in accordance with the laws of this mechanism." "That is to say, every act of the will must have some degree of effective intensity." We are therefore "compelled to demand that a perfect freedom determine not merely the direction which the will is to take but also the energy with which it projects itself in this direction. If therefore our good will has at any time been too weak to withstand our passions, this is no excuse for us, but an accusation against us."

It will at once be recognized by the foregoing that Lotze has added much to Kant. Indeed his discussion upon the points here named is to us by far the most suggestive portion of his entire discourse upon *Morals*. Yet he controverts seriously no position of the older master.

There now comes a question upon which we shall see greater

divergence than we have found on the foregoing. It is, what may be the ground for the will determining itself?

Kant asks: "But what sort of a law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification?"

Kant has before this laid down that all imperatives which are expressed by the word "ought" indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by an obligation.

As he says in one place: "Imperatives are formulæ to express the relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being."

"The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws." The "ought" makes this conception needful. The objective ground of self-determination is the *end*.

Suppose that there were "something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth," something "an end in itself." "Man, and in general any rational being, exists as an end in itself."

This principle that humanity, and generally every rational nature, is an end in itself is not borrowed from experience, *firstly*, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever; *secondly*, because it presents humanity, not as that which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end, but as objective which must constitute the supreme limiting condition—let our subjective ends be what they will.

From this principle there rises the imperative, "So act that humanity both in thine own person and that of others be used as an end in itself and never as a mere mean."

This implies the truth that only that act of the self-determining will is good, that can never, if applied to the universe of irrational beings, be turned to evil. If it were one which would contradict and destroy itself if thus applied, it would be evil. Therefore there may be laid down the law: "Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law." This is given elsewhere in slightly differing form.

More than one eminent critic of Kant misses the meaning of

this law. Dr. Francis Bowen says, "This precept assumes that my duty is made known to me only through my previous knowledge how all intelligent beings ought to act, if they were precisely under the same circumstances. How did I acquire this previous knowledge? How is it easier for me to know what all mankind ought to do than to recognize what is my own particular duty?"

Dr. Bowen has first misstated Kant's Law. He says, it may be briefly and simply expressed thus: "Act always as you would wish every intelligent being to act if he were in your place."

But that is not it. It is not, act according to a maxim which you *would wish* but which thou *canst* will to become a universal law.

Kant's test does not at all have regard to the injury or benefit to persons that a certain course of conduct would effect, but rather to the way in which the course of conduct would affect the law itself. For example—a man acts on the maxim, "Tell lies when you see gain to yourself in lying." Now apply the test—will it to become a universal law—what is the result? Plainly to destroy all distinction between telling truth and telling lies. So it destroys lying, and destroys the man's own maxim. Therefore thou canst not will that maxim to be a universal law. It is logically an impossibility.

The truth is, Kant's Categorical Imperative is begotten of Logic only. Hence it is efficient. But it is efficient like a net—it will not allow some transgressions to escape detection, but it presents no obstacle to others. Kant if in undue bondage to anything, was so to Logic. An American writer adduced Schopenhauer as pointing out that most of the errors and superfluities of his systems have arisen from this morbid passion for system and pure Logic. His categorical imperative is sound and efficient. But Dr. Bowen is not the only one who has not rightly looked at it.

Mr. Mill's criticism on Kant's formula is that when we speak of a maxim being fit to be a universal law, it is obvious that some test of fitness is required, and that Kant, in fact, tests the maxims by their consequences.

On this Thomas Kingswell Abbott remarks, "The whole

gist of Kant's argument is that the only test of this fitness is logical possibility. This is the one thing expressed in the formula." As to testing maxims by consequences, he does so in the same sense in which Euclid in indirect demonstrations tests a hypothesis by its consequences, and in no other, that is, by the logical consequences. Abbott further remarks that "the categorical imperative is far from being sufficiently clear as a test of the morality of actions."

It seems to me like the demon of Socrates that forbade him a great many actions which he thought of doing but which, he himself said, never enjoined any conduct.

Let us see how Kant arrives at the content or matter of obligation. He says "every action has its end." "To have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the agent." Amongst ends there must also be some which are at the same time duties, else the knowledge of "ought" were of none effect. "What," Kant asks, "are the ends which are also duties?" They are our own Perfection, the Happiness of others. He looks at a complete humanity as meaning perfection and happiness.

"One's own happiness is no doubt an end that all men have by virtue of the impulse of their own nature—but this end cannot without contradiction be regarded as a duty. What a man of himself mentally wills does not come under the notion of duty. It is therefore a contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own happiness with all his power."

It is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another my end, and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it. For it is just in this that the perfection of another man as a person consists, namely, that he is able of himself to set before him his own end according to his own notion of duty; and it is a contradiction to make it a duty for me that I should do something which no other but himself can do. Under the duty of making one's own perfection an end, Kant declares: First, it is his duty to labor to raise himself out of the rudeness of his nature, out of his animal nature, more and more to humanity.

These utterances are in Kant's latest discourses on Ethics only three years before his death.

Lotze's criticism on Kant's categorical imperative must

now be given. He fairly describes it as assuming that "Moral conduct has no regard whatever to pay to consequences: that it should not at all be defined by means of an object, but that its specific nature and value consist simply in a formal construction. This formula (namely, so act that the maxims of thy conduct be adapted for universal legislation) presupposes a work of theoretic interpretation by which in every case the definite maxim in accordance with which the resolution is to be apprehended has first to be discovered."

Justly is it asserted by Lotze that Kant is obscure upon the discovery of the particular definite maxim. Further, Lotze holds that according to Kant, "There is no maxim of any sort which could not be set up as a universal law." "For example, the maxim that every man take his own is just as well adapted for such a generalization as the other maxim that every man be left his own." The first of course leads to open disorder and unhappiness, the other alone to order and happiness. But before any distinction can be made, "it is conceded as a matter of course that all conduct must be directed towards the production of some form of good and its enjoyment."

Lotze concludes as to Kant's position that "all talk of absolutely obligatory forms of conduct which should have no reference at all to the resulting consequences is perhaps very nobly meant, but is a formal service that arises from a complete misunderstanding."

Lotze accepts Final Cause: "No ethics can avoid having regard to a purpose that is final and in itself of absolute value." What is this final purpose which is in itself of absolute value? He answers: "Real and substantial Good exists only in the pleasure of some sensitive spirit, and would vanish with the world of spirits completely from the realm of actuality."

"It is impossible to understand what is to constitute the value of any action if its results are not able to produce some good somewhere in the world, or to increase the sum of already existing good."

What is to be understood by pleasure?

Lotze says: "General and abstract pleasure which might possibly be set up as a goal for conduct, does not exist."

"We can leave," he briefly says, "the different values of pleasure also to be immediately revealed to us by the voice of conscience." He inquires into the content of this immediate revelation.

Remember that he has defined "conscience" as first considering cases that are quite definite, and then passing judgments of approval or disapproval upon actions which are brought before it. "It is only by reflective comparison of these particular judgments that there is formed from them those general ethical precepts which it is customary to designate as the immediate voice of conscience."

He affirms that there are "simple modes of conduct that are productive of the finer and spiritual pleasure of an unconditioned approbation."

He restricts the term "conduct" "to those cases in which an idea of different possible modes of conduct—further, an idea of their different value, and finally a decision between them, have preceded."

"All conduct must either alter some state or states of a being or a thing or else protect it against threatening alteration.

"There is such a thing as moral judgment of conduct only upon the assumption that this conduct leads to pleasure or pain." "But to this conscience joins the further truth that it is not the effort after our own, but only that for the production of another's felicity, which is ethically meritorious, and accordingly that the idea of benevolence must give us the sole supreme principle of all moral conduct."

It is difficult to see on what ground Lotze rules out from consideration "the many forms of enjoyment which have been made possible by our organization and its reciprocal action with the external world."

It is equally difficult to see why, "the effort after our own felicity" is "not ethically meritorious," provided it be not exalted above effort for the felicity of our neighbor.

In a word, Lotze, in giving his sole supreme principle, leaves out, as it seems to me, what we owe ourselves—what we would owe if alone in the earth. Kant arrived at the proposition that we should seek not only others' happiness, but our own perfec-

tion as duties that were also ends—because having such propositions presented, they bore the test, in that they could be willed to be laws universal.

Lotze arrives at the proposition that we should seek others' happiness as the supreme principle, because we know that it is such.

As to "moral ideas that of themselves excite unconditioned approbation," we are accurately limited to "Benevolence" alone. We cannot include such ideas as justice or retribution. We know that Benevolence is supreme, because it is a simpler mode of conduct that is "productive of the finer and spiritual pleasure of an unconditioned approbation."

True he says elsewhere (P. R., 117), it is not meant "that the direct effort after happiness, and that too after one's own happiness, should be the ethically praiseworthy motive of our action. On this point our conscience gives us sufficient instruction. Since it interprets this endeavor as in itself considered indifferent and merely natural, but on the contrary interprets as ethically laudable only the endeavor to secure the happiness of others."

Thus the great mass of the endeavors of life which are referred to in the phrase of Christ "as thyself" are not according to Lotze ethically laudable.

The conclusion that we are forced to reach as to Lotze's effort to give us the supreme test of conduct is, that like Kant's effort of a century ago, it gives but a partial and insufficient result. Kant, as far as he led us, laid down propositions that hold. They do not content us. The way still remains open to further propositions in Ethics which, when rightly stated and explained, will win as general acceptance as did some of the propositions of Kant as soon as these were plainly stated to the thinking world.

Yet Lotze has advanced beyond Kant, in that he has grounded theology on broader foundations than the thinker of the last century.

Kant affirms, "There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity on the grounds of speculative reason." First, the ontological, which he holds cannot enlarge our cognition of

God any more than the merchant may augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash account. And Lotze agrees that "Logically, this attempt at proof (namely, the ontological argument) is not valid."

Second is the cosmological, which argues that if something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist. Consequently there exists an absolutely necessary being. Of this Kant declares it is illusive and inadequate.

Lotze follows him, saying, "From that which is conditioned by something else external to it, it is certainly possible to ascend to the Unconditioned." But "it is entirely incorrect to persist in designating such an Unconditioned as is sought for by the predicate *necessary*." Also, "it is altogether an arbitrary leap to assume that this Unconditioned must be one." Further, "We get no insight as to how a single unconditioned being would be able to condition anything else."

The third line of argument Kant and Lotze agree in calling the *Physico-theological*. This begins from determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and rises according to the laws of causality from it to the Highest Cause existing apart from the world.

Kant agrees that "This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the reason of humanity." "It would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed." Yet he concludes, "The physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being."

Lotze agrees as regards the teleological part of this argument that "this course of thought has utterly failed as an argument for the existence of God." "That Intelligence of which we cannot be wholly rid, admits just as well of being apprehended as a property adhering immanently to all things," "or as a multiplicity of spiritual beings or demons." The teleological argument is wrecked by the fact that it is "unable to prove empirically the world's conformity to an end." Lotze nevertheless builds up a physico-theological argument. "All the elements of the world, without exception, act upon one another, no matter

whether adapted to an end or not." "From the fact of the reciprocal action of individual things," we arrive at the conclusion of the "necessary unity of the absolute." "The reciprocal influence of two things, a and b , is impossible, so long as both were conceived of as entirely self-sufficient, and in such sort independent of each other that the former might exist and be what it is, even though the latter had no existence."

"We derive, moreover, from Metaphysic the further conviction that all middle forms which are interpolated between a and b , such as 'force,' are either essentially inconceivable ideas, or at any rate do not at all explain the action. Finally, we derive the conviction that the aforesaid inconceivableness can be removed only by the negation of the independence of individual things. A and b cannot be absolutely different beings, but only modifications of one and the same being, M , the Truly Existent, and which has indeed assumed different forms in all these different things, but still remains one and the same individual, M . What this one Being or Absolute is, remains at first completely indeterminate. Furthermore, in designating things as modifications of the absolute, it is to be acknowledged that such an expression contains no explanation whatever of the precise sort of unity which obtains between things and the absolute, or the sort of dependence in which things stand with reference to the Absolute." Next he argues that we must find "the Spirit alone as truly existent and all else as its predicate."

"We can never reach the point where it would be for us a matter of course that a mode of the motion of these masses, however wondrously intricate, would now have to cease to remain such, and would be necessitated to transmute itself into quite a different process of sensation and feeling." Since "a substance that is merely real and acts blindly does not suffice for explaining the world, we find herein one of the motives that lead us to the opposite attempt—to the pure Spiritualism, which undertakes to comprehend the Spirit alone as truly existent, and all else as its product."

He further argues, "*Perfect personality* is reconcilable only with the conception of one Infinite Being. In Perfect Personality all the predicated absoluteness, oneness, unchangeableness,

omnipresence, omnipotence, and eternal duration are found valid, and in that only." The argument to this result I leave with this mere mention.

Yet it is in morals that Lotze as well as Kant finds the truth of God impressed upon the mind. The æsthetic and ethical feelings not being deducible from mere experience, necessitate the attempt to conceive a creator who is the Intrinsically Good.

"If there is no speculative argument for religious conviction, still there must be a motive for holding fast this conviction." "The only element common to men to which an appeal may be made for the confirmation of religion consists in those utterances of the conscience that primarily only say what ought to be and yet permit an indirect inference from this as to what *is*."

Kant finds that the "necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law," is "the realization of the *summum bonum*." But for this there must be perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law, in other words, "holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence." "It can only be found in a progress *in finitum* towards that perfect accordance. This is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul." Further, "Happiness is a second element of the *summum bonum*." The *summum bonum* "we ought to endeavor to promote. Therefore it must be possible."

"Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also postulated."

"A Supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character—the supreme cause of nature which must be presupposed as a condition of the *summum bonum*—is a being which is the cause of nature by intelligence and will, consequently its author, that is, God.

"It is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the transcendent region above my

horizon. I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my own existence. . . . The moral law reveals to me a life independent on animality and even on the whole sensible world, at least so far as may be inferred from the destination assigned to my existence by this law, a destination not restricted to conditions and limits of this life, but reaching into the infinite."

A certain translator and critic of Kant tells us that he must confess that it is impossible for him to read the passages in which the principle of immortality is inculcated without the consciousness of a Mephistophelic smile (on the part of Kant, that is) lurking somewhere between the lines. "Of course," he adds, "it is open to any one to call this an illusion, and yet the fact of such an effect being produced (upon Mr. Belfort Bax, that is) would seem to indicate a lack of sincerity, though possibly an unconscious one."

By similar logic, the fact of the impression being produced upon Judas that Christ was not sincerely benevolent in accepting the woman's ointment would seem to indicate a lack of genuine benevolence on the part of Christ. This is Mr. Bax's logic.

"Granted," he says, "that Kant conceived morality to be impossible apart from the doctrines of theism and immortality, did he believe himself or expect others to believe in the objective validity of a proposition merely because the interest of morality rendered its truth desirable?" He misstates here Kant's plain doctrine, which is that the moral law is the one fact that must be believed—not in the interest of anything, but of necessity, as that I believe I exist myself, and that as it must be believed, so immortality and God, of like necessity, are forced upon belief.

The Mephistophelic smile of Kant and his unconsciousness at the same time of any insincerity, which Mr. Bax describes, cohere just as well as Mr. Bax's theory of Kant's belief and that belief itself.

On this centennial anniversary of the Ethics of the great master, we place the surer foundations of reality in the world of morals above the world of the senses.

So long as Kant is read, however much men may grow skep-

tical, they will doubt that matter is as soon as that mind is—they will doubt that time is, sooner than that God is.

Kant was the great pioneer. He hewed away stumps which, had they remained to be used as foundation-blocks of Ethics and Theology, had proven in the end to be insufficient and rotten supports. He did not himself lay clear and strong all the foundations for belief in God, belief in God's Word and work, or for rules whereby we may live right, but he laid no false foundations. So far as one hundred years show firm foundations, they are laid upon the ground which was cleared up by Kant.

Kant, in hewing away obstacles, struck and marred more than was needful, but the true was not destroyed by his strokes. The building sites for truth seem more and more open for Kant having lived and taught.

Kant, it is said, won his most intimate friend, one who afterwards heard and criticised every word of the "Critique" before it was published, by a conversation upon American Independence, in which Kant, by his maintenance of American rights, first offended and then converted his neighbor.

Kant's best friend to-day is the Christian community, which at first regarded itself as attacked by him, but was not seriously attacked or endangered by him in the essentials of its life and belief. While the anti-Christian community, which once boasted that Kant relieved them of the bonds of theology, to-day labors in vain to be relieved of the theses in *Morals and Religion* maintained by the logic of Immanuel Kant.

DR. DEEMS: Matter possesses figure because matter has bounds. The bounds of any matter are the lines made by the ending of that particular matter in all directions. Finiteness and bounds are inseparable: therefore that which is infinite must be figureless. Wherefore the infiniteness of God precludes the idea of figure from the idea of God.

THE RELATION OF TRUTH AND TIME.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Asbury Park, N. J., July 21st, 1885.]

BY JOHN B. DRURY, D.D., GHENT, N. Y.

WHEN Pilate asked of Him "who was born and came into the world to the end that He might bear witness unto the truth," "What is truth?" he expressed the world's despair of the possibility of gaining its possession. Some men to-day are ready to re-echo the ancient agnostic's despairing cry, but the vast majority, I take it, believe in the existence of truth, in its discoverability and certainty. They believe that He who is alone omniscient, and hence the absolute possessor of truth, does not intend us to always grope in error, or abide in uncertainty, and has consequently put it in our power to discover and settle truth. That He wishes us to come to this heritage is conspicuous in the giving of His revelation, in furnishing therein the evidence of its existence, and the clew and guide unto its discovery. But the diversity in the interpretation of this revelation, to say nothing of the disagreement of men in other domains of truth, proves that revelation itself, and Christ the living guide unto truth, were intended to encourage in the search and assure success, rather than terminate the pursuit.

As long as men live on the earth they are to be truth-seekers, and however great the acquisitions of truth, there will ever be in this inheritance much land yet to be possessed.

In the seeking after truth some test by which its certainty can be assured is of first importance. Without attempting a philosophical inquiry as to the different *criteria* proposed or used, I would raise the question whether, after all, time is not the chief and ultimate test of truth. Whether it be or not the one great conclusive and final touchstone whereby truth is to be tried, it is plain that there is an intimate and necessary relation between truth and time, and into this relation I wish to make some inquiries.

That there is such a relation distinctly appears as we trace the history of men's struggles after settled truth, and inquire what has been the influence of time on its discovery and establishment. Truth is light, and it would seem as if it would from its very nature make its way swiftly and irresistibly, but it needs no argument to prove that it does not. Time has ever been required for its determination and establishment; but with sufficient time it has always prevailed.

This is a strong ground of confidence and hopefulness to whomsoever the cause of truth is dear. The thought is well voiced in the pregnant words of inspiration—"He that believeth doth not make haste."

He who has faith in the sure and ultimate triumph of truth feels no discouragement and manifests no impatience at the slow progress of the cause in which he is engaged. He has no anxiety as to the result. He is content calmly and confidently to abide the verdict of the ages. If he really believes, his faith will show itself by leading him to do his part, and then leave to time the manifestation and the triumph of the truth.

By virtue of his faith he is sure that however falsehood may masquerade in its borrowed garb, time will tear off the disguise and let the truth be seen.

Thus at all events has God wrought. He has eternity to draw upon—infinity of time is the sphere in which He acts, and hence He never makes haste. He is content that time should be His vindicator, under the seeming inequalities and inconsistencies that may appear in the progress of His purposes, and in the little part we see of His government.

We have only to rightly study the revelation He has given us to see how entirely this is His method.

The purpose to save a fallen world is carried out through more than four thousand years, in only a more and more wide and pervasive extension of human depravity—a deeper and wider apostasy from truth and righteousness.

Even among the chosen race, inhabiting the narrow territory hemmed in by the Jordan and the sea, by mountains and deserts, —among the people named with His name and preserved to be the custodians of His truth and worship, after this long lapse of

time, barely a remnant could be found faithful witnesses to Him and the religion of holiness. Not until this long period is ended does He send forth His Son, the promised seed of the woman, the looked-for conqueror of Satan, the effectual bringer-in of hope and salvation to fallen men. "The fulness of time" to God only meant, after more than forty centuries. The world's hope, in His plans and purposes, only comes when the failures of succeeding generations, of successive philosophies, religions and kingdoms, have plunged the world into the night of despair. It is "the latter days," "the last times" of the Scriptures, the dispensation since Christ, that alone furnishes the key that unlocks the mysteries of God's governing during the weary years through which the world was preparing for its Saviour. He who was "the truth, the way and the life," waited the fit time for His revealing—and it was long in coming.

So also has it been in respect to the success of His undertaking. The full coming of His kingdom, His complete triumph over His enemies, the entire reclamation of the earth from the curse of sin yet tarries. Though nearly two thousand years have passed, and His kingdom has been an ever-increasing one, it is yet only leaven hidden in the lump—a seed growing secretly—a power before which more remains to be conquered than has been conquered. Thus slowly have the purposes of God ripened. So little has the mighty and rightful Sovereign made haste, that many are led to ask, "Where, O Christian, is thy God?" "Can it be that Jehovah is on the throne of the universe?"

All along the track of history, yea, now, the enemy has not only boasted of triumphs, but has seemingly had them. A world opposed to God, a race not liking to retain the knowledge of Him, has not easily given up its false gods and false worships, its God-denying and God-dethroning philosophies; yea, the adversary has shown in many ways all along the ages that he is the god of this world. The very truth has been perverted, the Church of Christ itself corrupted; every advance in knowledge, in science, art and civilization, has been claimed as the enemy's.

The whole progress of Christ's kingdom has had to be by way of redemption. Not men's souls only, but men's arts, and skill, and knowledge have had to be redeemed from the service

of sin and Satan, unto the service and honor of Christ. The fact that in the progress of time they have been and are so redeemed and rescued, that however often and much the first fruits have been Satan's, the harvest has ever been Christ's, is proof that only time is needed to make His triumph complete. The final consummation is delayed because, for His own wise reasons, God wills that the cause of truth shall alone be established through the slow but sure co-operation of truth's firm ally—time.

This course of divine government as shown in human history, strongly suggests that time is a natural and even necessary factor in the determining and establishing of truth. That God thus works, that He limits thus of His own choice His power, and makes time the vindicator of His righteousness, assures us that something in the nature of things, and especially in the nature of man, makes such a course wisest and best. Were it our purpose to make a study of the divine government, and the relation of truth and time from the divine side, we might pursue much further the line of inquiry opened up by the fact that God's days are time-cycles—olams—periods reaching forth unto eternity. But sufficient has been said to suggest an intimate and natural connection between truth and time, and to make it proper for us to ask why and how truth is so dependent on time. The answer, I doubt not, is to be found in the very nature of man. The constitution of his mind, particularly as moulded and influenced by his moral nature, is doubtless the occasion of God's taking so much time for the working out of His purposes. We are bidden, therefore, to look in this direction for the reason that time is necessary for the discovery and establishment of truth. The connection of truth and time, as we have practically to do with it, largely rests upon a peculiarity of man's faculty of reason. There is a factor in the logical sequence of which text-books and teachers of logic take altogether too little heed. And this factor is just the one that alone explains this relation of truth and time. The glory of our humanity is this faculty of reason, the ability from two premises to draw a conclusion. The ideal man has this faculty in perfection. Were all men perfect, from the same premises every one would draw the same conclusion. But it is a universal experience that they do not. Now,

conceding that this diversity of conclusion frequently comes from undefined premises—from that “undistributed middle” about which students of logic are so much concerned, yet this does not, I believe, account by itself for all the difference of conclusions which men draw from them. There is a still further factor to be weighed, a more potent one than any other in affecting the conclusion. This is each man’s personality, as the outcome of hereditary character and education. Each man is what he is through influences largely exterior to himself and beyond his control. His mental and spiritual character, as well as the individuality of his body, is the outcome of generations that have gone before. His lot in life, his daily surroundings, his associations in the home, the school and the world, all mould and influence him. Each new idea, thought and purpose is super-imposed on, and is more or less modified by what has been learned, believed and held before, so that no two individuals are entirely alike in mental constitution, any more than in body. Thus it happens from precisely the same facts, premises and postulates very widely different conclusions may be and are drawn. From this source have sprung the honest differences among men on subjects of most vital and general interest in religion, philosophy and politics. Hence have arisen sects, schools and parties earnestly and often violently contending one against the other. And until this aberration of the faculty of reason is allowed for and corrected they will continue to arise and prevail. From the very constitution of our natures it consequently follows that the conclusion of any one individual is always clouded with doubt. There is always a possibility and probability that his personality—his biases and prejudices, his ignorance and his obstinacy—may have affected his judgment. Now this source of uncertainty and doubt, growing as it does out of personality, is not and cannot be recognized by the person himself: it is unconscious error. It is like color-blindness. It can only be discovered and corrected by comparison with the experience and observation of others. Hence truth is only gained among men by successive approximations. The final absolute truth is reached, as we are constituted, in much the same way as the result in some mathematical processes, by continu-

ally narrowing the range of possible error. Hence truth's need of time for its establishing.

The one right conclusion, the truth, is only found by a process of comparison, a testing of one man's conclusion by another's, one generation's opinions by succeeding ones, the ideas of men born and educated in one condition or age by those of a different, and so the truth is more and more closely approximated unto, until it is finally reached. And for this time is necessary.

We thus see that truth from the very nature of man requires time for its discovery and establishment.

Conversely, it can be affirmed, that time will and does expose error and establish truth. Men may and do, under the bias of natural constitution and education, fail to discover the necessary and right conclusion of their premises. Through a whole generation or even a longer period men may be deceived as to the necessary and true deduction, but time will reveal the mistake and correct the error, and finally the true conclusion will be drawn. In other words, time never fails to reveal and establish the truth.

It is an axiom in logic that the conclusion is always in the premises; in other words, from two premises in a logical formula one, and only one, true conclusion can be drawn. The right conclusion is consequently from the first present and unchangeable—it is only not seen, or seen distorted. As one perverting medium after another is removed, it stands forth in more and more unmistakable outlines, recognized and acknowledged as the necessary conclusion. By this process accepted inferences and conclusions of one age have repeatedly been discovered to be erroneous in the next; systems and propositions accepted as leading to certain results, have experimentally been found to involve widely different ones; the ruling ideas of one generation have been found in the next to need modification, if not rejection; and only thus does the world move on toward its final heritage of clear, defined and absolute truth.

No age, however, but what leaves behind it some legacy of worth, and thus the world grows richer from the accumulating wealth of truth which flows from time's refining crucible. The world possesses more ascertained and settled truth to-day than

ever before, and this is so because time has been doing all along the ages its testing work.

I present a few illustrations, which may serve also as corroborations, of the working of these principles, selected from various departments of human thought and experience.

The first I will take from the common experience of the preacher. We who are ministers are continually presenting to men the Gospel offer. It is in its nature a conclusive syllogism. We proclaim that all men are sinners and in need of a Saviour. We further proclaim that Jesus Christ is alone able and willing to save sinners. These premises contain and necessitate the conclusion that all men should accept the Saviour and secure the salvation He alone can give. Multitudes of Gospel hearers who accept the premises, yet resist and evade the conclusion. They do it through the blinding influence of corrupt and depraved hearts. Nearly every hearer, for a longer or shorter period, acts thus illogically. Some persist in their blindness even to the end of life. But to every one the truth will some time become clear. Happy those who, taught and enlightened by the Spirit, discover the mistake while yet a possibility of rectifying it remains. At the judgment, if not before, the full truth and the greatness of the error will be felt. In every portraiture we have of this day of days, there is no attempt at excuse on the part of the unbelieving. They are, as consciously inexcusable, either speechless, or they call on the mountains and the rocks to fall on them and cover them.

Another example I draw from the domain of philosophy. It is a case where, in the interest of truth, time reveals an undetected error.

As a consequence of the new trend given to philosophical thought by the revolutionizing works of Francis Bacon, John Locke, near the close of the seventeenth century, formulated a system of philosophy, in which experience was made the single source of knowledge. In his great work "On the Human Understanding," he represented the mind as a sheet of white paper and all its contents as received directly or indirectly through the senses. His ideas were generally accepted and his became the prevalent philosophy. The logical consequences were for a time

unrecognized. Locke himself saw not that he was laying the foundation for the entire negation of the Spiritual. This was only clearly discerned when David Hume, a half-century later, showed the logical results. His famous syllogism against miracles, and his argument for religious skepticism were found unanswerable on the premises furnished by the accepted philosophy, closing as it did every avenue of knowledge except that through the senses. Time has indeed left us a heritage of truth from the sensational school of philosophy, but less than and different from what its founders expected.

Something similar has taken place in the school of philosophy which gave the completest answer to the error of Locke and the skeptical arguments of Hume, and which had its origin in the profound and original intellect of Emmanuel Kant. Discerning there must be more in the mind than Locke allowed, Kant and his school, applying a more exhaustive analysis, found in man necessary forms of thought behind and formulative of experience; and in what Kant termed the reason, a faculty for the cognition of ideas otherwise unknowable. Valuable as this contribution to philosophy has been, undetected by him and only long subsequently made apparent, were present in his system postulates, the logical outcome of which have been destructive of the very objects which led his devout and religious mind to the study of philosophy and formulation of his system. In making the intuitional faculty, reason, the final arbiter of truth, he laid the logical foundation for that Pantheistical Idealism and Rationalistic criticism, which have so disastrously affected faith and religion in the land where he taught; while in our own day we see Herbert Spencer, in the interest of a skeptical materialism, basing his banishment of theology from among the sciences, and remanding God to the domain of the unknowable, on Kant's postulate of the relativity of knowledge, as developed by Hamilton and Mansell in the supposed interest of religion.

The lesson from all which is, that time alone will show the true effect of whatever contribution to thought any one man or age may make. Only through its agency will the possible latent element of error become manifest.

If we turn to the natural sciences, whose progress has been

so rapid and whose fascination for their students is so engrossing that they come to regard all else unworthy the name of science, we find the same process of sifting and settling going on—time here as elsewhere doing its legitimate work. The theories and working hypotheses of one generation have been not only modified, but frequently revolutionized in the next. The controversies as to the igneous or aqueous agencies in geology, of the phlogistic and atomic theories in chemistry, of one or two fluids among electricians, have become obsolete. Later investigations and wider observation have in these, as in many other instances, demonstrated the partiality of a theory, or superseded rival ones by a fresh and fuller generalization. Time must test and give its verdict before even the most plausible hypothesis may be accepted as the truth. No one man, and scarcely one age, can decide as to the influence and effect of what is put forth by them. A new discovery, a formulated law is viewed in connection with ideas, conceptions and beliefs already present and potential through educational influences, and time is necessary to disentangle, isolate and properly proportion the new contribution to established facts and ascertained truths. This is well illustrated in the difficulty we find in adjusting our nomenclature and ideas acquired when light, heat and electricity were known as the imponderables, to the now demonstrated fact that they are not matter at all, but only different modes of motion. Every new discovery in science has had claimed for it, both by advocates and opponents, consequences which time has shown to be neither so harmful as some have feared or others hoped. Frequently a residuum of truth has remained—a valuable contribution to human knowledge—but its relation to other truth, its amount and bearing, have been widely different from what was claimed at first. This is destined, I doubt not, to be the fate of that theory, at present being tested, which is so intimately associated with the name of Charles Darwin. It is yet too soon, perhaps, for a final verdict, but already time has demonstrated the unsoundness of some of its claims, and exhibited, in the character and tendencies of the dominant school of Darwinists, that its logical consequences were not at all, or only imperfectly, estimated by its sincere and reverent propounder. The outcome

promises to be, a valuable formulation of one of nature's laws—of one method of the Great Architect's working—and at the same time, a considerable limiting of the supposed range and power of Natural Selection, and a vast lowering of the claims so confidently made of its creative potency.

In politics we see continually, in individual cases, how hard it is for men to grow away from opinions and principles once established—yea, how in men of honest convictions each event and new emergency is beheld and judged in the light of previous views and opinions. We have in this the true philosophy of political parties. Yet in politics, as elsewhere, principles work out their logical results, though not always the ones declared and purposed by the advocates of the measures that embody them. The course of history shows nothing more clearly than the fact that radical changes have had for their causes, measures frequently remote in time, and often intended to subserve widely different purposes. The causes that have made England what she is, are to be sought long antecedent to the present form of her constitution, and in events many of which were the outcome of personal aims and ambitions. No student of the hidden springs of history can doubt that France is to-day the Republic she is, largely because in the social upheaval of the Revolution, the law of primogeniture was abolished, and the partition and transfer of land made easy.

In our own country the war of the Rebellion and the overthrow of slavery were the logical outcome of principles as old as the nation, and principles whose logical sequence was denied and combatted by multitudes of intelligent and conscientious men.

We now for a moment turn to ecclesiastical history for illustrations of our principle. We find an essential peculiarity of the Papal Church to be, the attribution of saving potency to the acts of sacerdotal persons, and to ceremonies. This is a direct inheritance from Jewish and pagan influences. The same high-churchly tendency has manifested itself in some of our Protestant communions. Wherever found, it is the direct consequence of a partial reformation—the logical sequence of expressions and ideas of the Mother Church, retained, because regarded as indifferent or harmless.

In the English Church there has for long been a trend toward Rome hard to withstand, and it is not to be doubted that a chief cause of it has been, the presence in the Prayer Book of expressions and directions that imply that the ministry is a priesthood, the Lord's table an altar, the communion a sacrifice, and that there is a magical power to save and to sanctify in churchly acts and services.

A somewhat similar High-Churchism has manifested itself in some branches of the Lutheran Church, particularly in Germany. And there, it can scarcely be doubted, it has grown from the fact that the great Reformer modified, rather than reformed, the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation. Luther's doctrine of consubstantiation—of the real presence of the body of Christ in, with and under the elements—left open the door for the re-entrance of sacerdotalism—which is confidence in the magical power of a rite to save, the effect of which is to convert religion into churchly observances rather than godly deeds—into a ceremony rather than a life.

We may here remark that the radicals in politics, in philosophy and religion are almost always the logical party, and antagonize their generations by being in advance of the majority to perceive the logical sequence. Were it not that the logical sequence when correctly drawn is as frequently the demonstration of an error as the unveiling of a truth, the radicals would be always in the right—which, it goes without saying, they are not.

A conspicuous instance—and one of many, where an individual sees not at first the results of his own views and positions, but discerns them only as years roll on—is furnished by Strauss. Only in his old age did he see the true consequences of his mythical hypothesis. In all his earlier writings he deluded himself with the idea that he was a defender and not a destroyer of the faith.

Reverting once again to the progress of Christ's kingdom—so conspicuous an example of how slowly, and yet certainly, truth wins its triumphs—we ask you to note that the Reformation of the sixteenth century, with its tremendous consequences not only in purifying and freeing the Church, but in liberalizing,

humanizing and elevating civilization and society—consequences which have made Protestantism the synonym of progress in thought, discovery and invention—this wondrous Reformation was but the logical and necessary result of Christ's preaching and dying. It was only the coming forth from the crysalis of the thing of life and beauty which had been hidden from sight and entombed in the swathings of an anti-Christian civilization and an opposing social force. The Reformation then begun, the quickening of churchly and spiritual life then inaugurated, has gone on ever since, is still progressing and will not cease until the kingdom of our Immanuel shall be universal, and time, having done its work, shall be no more.

In conclusion, I would briefly note some inferences which seem to follow from what we have advanced. A firm grasping of the intimate and necessary relation of truth and time, a persuasion that time is the proper and ultimate test of truth, ought to and will induce,

First—Enlarged charity of judgment and action toward those from whom we differ in opinion. It will preserve us alike from dogmatism and intolerance. It will make us distrustful of our own infallibility, patient under the contradiction of our opinions, tolerant toward opposers, and content, in the calm assurance that only truth can endure the test of time, to leave to that reliable touchstone the settling of every controversy.

It will lead *Secondly*—To more confident resting on revealed truth as, within its sphere, the surest anticipation of the final outcome of the world's seeking after truth. The Bible has stood the test of succeeding centuries and generations—has proved itself the Word of God in its universal adaptability to men's needs, and in its increasing acceptance and influence despite every assault; and he who accepts its teachings and, enlightened by the Spirit, grasps the measure of truth it unfolds, has the firmest ground to rest upon, in believing himself the possessor of some portion, and that the most essential, of absolute truth—of truth that time will only confirm and establish, and which will endure even to eternity.

It follows, further and *Thirdly*—That the ages of the past have given us, as the result of their inquiries, some fixed and

certain truth. That which, therefore, comes to us commended by the assent of succeeding generations, which has been proved and tested and not found wanting, may be accepted with great confidence as truth destined to endure. It is well for us to recognize that there are some substantial truths, heirlooms from the past, on which the present may build with some degree of confidence. Embalmed in laws and institutions, in creeds and formularies and hymns, they commend themselves, by their survival of every change and the endurance of every test, as the winnowed grain from whose sowing the world's final harvest of truth is to be gathered.

It follows, further and *lastly*, that each age has its work to do in discovering and settling the truth. Along with our heritage of truth from the past comes an admixture of error, which it becomes us to do our part in seeking out and eliminating. By just so far as our inheritance of truth is great, and our knowledge increased, is the obligation on us to be faithful and fearless in doing this important work. There is no need for us to tremble as to the final issue. Truth is as eternal as God its author. However searching be the queries of friends or foes, the truth will stand, and when the end shall come its triumph will be found complete. Happy the man who in his day and place can do something to hasten this ultimate result.

DR. ARNOLD, OF RUGBY: The evidence of our Lord's life and death, and resurrection may be, and often has been shown to be satisfactory; it is good according to the common rules for distinguishing good evidence from bad. Thousands and tens of thousands of persons have gone through it piece by piece as carefully as ever judge summed up on a most important cause. I have myself done it many times over, not to persuade others, but to satisfy myself. I have been used for many years to study the history of other times, and to examine and weigh the evidence of those who have written about them, and *I know of no one fact in the history of mankind which is proved by better and fuller evidence of every sort, to the understanding of a fair inquirer, than the great sign which God hath given us, that Christ died and rose again from the dead.*

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM.

[A Paper read before the American Institute of Christian
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CHRISTIAN Socialism is the system of Society deducible from the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ and His apostles. It postulates the unity of the human race, and the solidarity of its interests. It regards each individual as vitally and organically related to all the rest. Just as in the physical organism there are plastidules, cells, muscular tissues, and osseous structure correlated in the construction of each of the minor members; just as these minor members are correlated in the construction of the larger members, and all the larger members themselves in the constitution of the entire body; so is it with the members of the human race. The monogamous family is the social unit. Families are correlated in clans and villages; these again in larger political organizations, which merge into national commonwealths that are but the larger members of the entire body of mankind. For the welfare and happiness of the whole body the Deity is deeply and wisely concerned. For the whole Christ died; to the whole the Holy Spirit is given; for the whole the Scriptures were written, and that ministry, whose aim it is to present every man perfect in Christ Jesus, established.

Nothing is more painfully apparent than the fact that there is sickness, disorganization, and pain in human society—in every part of the great whole. Even in the United States, which is one of the members most highly favored, there is complaint of the oppression of labor by capital—that “the rich are growing richer, and the poor poorer.” Without pausing to show the falsity of the latter statement, it must be acknowledged that there is much of overreaching, injustice, and cruelty chargeable to capital or wealth; and much of ignorance, improvidence, and

vice to labor or poverty. All classes are tainted by selfishness and corruption.

Error and wickedness are positive and persistent forces, operative in all ranks of society, and everywhere confront Christianity in the application of the true theory of society to humanity under its existing conditions. It must also be acknowledged that the light of divine truth, and the warmth of holy love, and the power of divine grace, working in and through men, and especially through the visible Church, are forces as positive and persistent as those of moral evil. The world is a battle-field. Irreconcilable spiritual forces contend for the mastery, and on the varying issues of the conflict depend the happiness or misery of mankind.

Every large city presents extremes of wealth and poverty. Part of the rich regard poverty as the fruit of idleness, improvidence, and vice; and part of the poor revile the rich as speculators, robbers, and oppressors. The latter "believe in no God but Mammon; no devil but the absence of gold; no damnation but that of being poor, and no hell but that of an empty stomach." All are conscious that society is not in harmony with its environment. How to promote and complete that harmony is the subject of much anxious thought, of many books, of innumerable newspaper articles. Every thinker has his theory. None fully agrees with another. From the times of Plato, Sir Thomas More, and Dr. Johnson to those of Fourier, Proudhon, Owen, Marx, and writers of the present day, each writer differs more or less from all the rest. Nordhoff's book on the "Communitistic Societies of America" shows how various the art, or applied science of society, of these theorists is. Each of them is as really a failure as the celebrated Brook Farm experiment. Is there no way out of the woods? Are the congestion and the cachexia, the inflammation and the paralysis, the frenzy and the groaning to continue for ever? Not if humanity will take the prescriptions and submit to the treatment of the Great Physician.

Socialist, Communist, Anarchist, Nihilist, each declares his profound conviction that labor does not receive its due share of the proceeds of associated industry; that social wretchedness is the result of this iniquity; that revolutionary meas-

ures are necessary to equitable distribution. Are they right? If so, is there no other method of relief than one which involves destruction of property, disruption of the social system, and wholesale murder? Must the family burn down the mansion because the roof leaks?

Very many considerations are involved in the reconciliation of the human family with its environment. Each member is like, and yet unlike, to all the rest. Each has what all have, and each has what no one of the rest has. Equality and inequality distinguish the whole. All have the right, under ordinary conditions, to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. All, as related to God through Christ, have the right to deliverance from the moral corruption of nature; from the love, practice, and consequences of sin; to the communication and indwelling of the Holy Spirit; to the blessedness of participation in the divine nature, and to ideal everlasting life. The only limitation to the enjoyment of these rights is, that which bounds the rights of the person and of society.

But these are the only equalities known or possible to men. In all other respects they are unequal. It is well they are so. Even the prairie with its wealth of flowers and grasses becomes unendurably monotonous. Were its only flora that of the grasses, and each spikelet of same or even similar size, it would be maddening. Every sane man prefers the various vegetation of the Central Park to such an earth-covering. No human individual is alike, in all particulars, to any one of his fellows. This is obvious enough in respect of his bodily organization. It is no less true of his intellectual and passional constitution, and of his æsthetic temperament. Some are born to lead, others to follow; some to command, others to obey; some to devise, others to execute. Not every man can be one of the great captains of industrial art. Stephensons, Roeblings, Bigelows are scarce as Grants, Wolseleys, or Skobelevs. True, the great captain of industrial art is as powerless without the assistance of less highly gifted men as is the field-marshal without the co-operation of officers and privates; but the fact nevertheless remains that he only may be fitted for leadership, and they only for more or less distinguished subordination. Between the pay and emoluments

of the military general and those of the private soldier there is great discrepancy. Just about as striking is the difference between the income of the great captain of industrial art and that of the ordinary operative. The latter concedes that there should be a difference, but complains because the difference is so great. He admits that without the genius, foresight, energy, and practical wisdom of the leader his own resources and those of his associates would be comparatively unproductive; but he also contends that without their co-operation the endowments of the leader would be almost equally barren of beneficent results. If the hand cannot say to the head: "I have no need of thee," neither can the head say to the hands: "I have no need of you." Mutual dependence is the law of normal being. He therefore claims an authoritative voice in the distribution of the wealth created by their joint endeavors.

Just at this stage of the discussion, illustrations drawn from real life render great service by making the issues between brain and hand, labor and capital, more distinct and intelligible. New England furnishes many such illustrations. New York and Pennsylvania, to say nothing of other States, are almost equally affluent of examples. Among the many eminent sons of New England who have perforce ceased from activities in the busy haunts of men within the past decade, is Erastus Brigham Bigelow, the inventor of the automatic Jacquard power-loom, and the political economist to whom the nation is largely indebted for its protective tariff policy. At Clinton, Mass., on the basis of his inventions, Mr. Bigelow organized the Clinton Company for the manufacture of coach-lace; the Clinton Wire-cloth Company for the manufacture of wire-cloth; the Lancaster Mills for the manufacture of gingham, and the Bigelow Carpet Company for the manufacture of Brussels and Wilton carpets. All these companies were successful. All the looms used by them have some devices in common, but in construction are very unlike. His was the first triumphant attempt to adapt the power-loom to carpet weaving. Subsequent modifications adapted it to the production of almost all kinds of textile fabrics. The highest style of inventive mathematical genius alone could construct such singular instruments of industrial art.

The multiplicity of their parts and movements; their seeming complexity, yet perfect order; the regularity, rapidity, and exactness of their operations; the all but intelligent action of the seemingly self-moving, self-controlling mechanism, and the finished and beautiful work which it creates and spreads before the eye, sufficiently attest this truth.

What portion of the wealth created by such extraordinary abilities ought equitably to be apportioned to the possessor? This is a difficult question to answer. A very general reply would be: "Enough to enable him to be true to the instincts and aspirations of his own nature, when stripped of all selfish tendencies." A response so indefinite would not satisfy the demands of industrial life. The law of demand and supply, which is as unrelenting in its operation as the law of gravitation, justifies the position that he was entitled to all he could obtain, on the assumption that men will not knowingly pay more for any thing than what they believe it to be worth to them. Crossley & Sons, of Halifax, England, in 1851 purchased with a good round sum all Bigelow's patent rights in the United Kingdom, placed his looms in their immense carpet factory, and thenceforward, for a series of years, supplied more carpets to the domiciles and public institutions of their own and other countries, including the United States, than any other firm. They profited by the purchase, and in that profit the operatives of Halifax enjoyed no small share.

Subsequently Mr. Bigelow organized the manufacturing corporations just mentioned, at Clinton, Mass. On what precise terms they were established is not necessary to state. The usual method is for capitalists to put their money, and the patentee his inventions and abilities, into such enterprises. A capital stock of a million dollars would probably consist of \$500,000 contributed in cash by capitalists, and of a similar sum in the form of the inventor's rights and energies. Such an arrangement involves the virtual payment to him of \$250,000. Whether such sum be too much or too little is matter for the judgment of the investing share-holders, and for their judgment exclusively. The Golden Rule of doing to others as we would have others do to us, were the relative conditions reversed, and the law

of beneficent self-love ought to enter into the determination. A company like the one imagined is the representative of thousands. They begin operations, give employment to hundreds of thousands, supply domestic and foreign markets, and while lowering prices increase profits by the superior cheapness of production. Dividends to the stockholders, after the payment of salaries and wages, are made from accumulated profits. In one sense all payments for value received are dividends from profits. The capitalist or share-holder grows richer: so does the operative. The first may waste his surplus in riotous living, or in other ways: so may the second. The first may fund his in the purchase of bonds and stocks, or in the acquisition of real estate, or both: the second may do the same, or may prefer the lower interest and higher safety of the savings bank. The principles of Christian Socialism recommend some degree of preparation for future contingencies.

The process thus indicated rarely continues without friction, heat, and complaint. Capital, centred in self, wishes to reduce wages, that it may further gratify the lust of the eye, the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life. Labor, no less self-centred, and with similar instincts, resists the demand, and clamors for increase. Or, it may be that capital is equitable and wise, and labor unjust and foolish, or the conditions may be the reverse. In any case lock-outs or strikes result from the antagonism of inherently evil forces, or from the conflict of the evil with the good. Idleness, dissipation, vice, crime, waste, poverty, suffering follow, until temporary accommodation is compelled by desperate necessity. In the United States the outcry is frequent that labor does not receive a due share of the profits of associated industrial art. The farmer complains of his inability to earn more than subsistence, because the railroad corporations tax the transportation of his products at rates not in agreement with the costs and risks of service, but estimated solely by what the traffic will bear. The Socialists, under the guidance of foreign-born demagogues—and yet with no small amount of honesty and intended fairness—insist that in the distribution of profits labor is oppressed and defrauded by capital, and therefore brand capitalists as speculators, robbers, and even murderers.

To them, as to Proudhon, all private property is robbery, and as stolen goods may righteously be wrested by force from thieves, so violence is justifiable in the redress of injuries perpetrated under the forms of law. So madly does this delirium rage that the more violent are not willing to admit, what all reasonable complainants cheerfully concede, that the directive brain, or capitalist, ought to accumulate a fortune sufficiently large to bridge over the chasms of commercial depression, to continue operations at temporary loss, and to resume them with hopeful energy when demand once more is equal to, or exceeds, supply. They cannot, or will not, see that the fortune of the employer, like the savings of the employee, constitutes insurance of supply in time of need.

The reasonable allow what the unreasonable deny, but affirm that the insurance fund of the capitalist is too large, and that of the laborer too small. Nor are they satisfied with the compensative humanities of capital. The capitalist, like the Congregationalist Crossleys of Halifax, or the Congregationalist Fairbankses of St. Johnsbury, and many others, may furnish the best educational facilities for their children; erect free libraries, museums and galleries of art; establish and endow hospitals, asylums, and alms-houses; provide dispensaries; lay out and maintain public parks, baths, and places of recreation; construct churches, and support ministers of the Gospel, whose services are free to all; but to all this many laborers object. While honoring the principle of beneficence, they distrust the motives of the benefactor, and allege that they ought to be enabled to do these things for themselves through more equitable diffusion of profits. The rich philanthropist is often puzzled and disgusted by what seems to be the callous ingratitude or perverse ugliness of the classes he tries to raise to higher, nobler planes of life. The sulking beneficiary is not wholly ungrateful. His perverseness springs from thwarted desire to manage the whole of what he regards as his own affairs; it is the protest, in his estimation, of fully developed manhood against the dependence of undeveloped youth. What a chaotic weltering sea of desires, aspirations, good and bad passions is here! Is wreck, ruin, despair to be perpetually incident to it;

or is there any oil that may be thrown on the troubled waters—any means of calming the tempest and bringing smoothness, brightness and blessing to the ocean of human life? The science of Christian Socialism, drawn from the Sermon on the Mount, and from the writings of apostle and evangelist, answers all queries. The great laws of justice, equity, and love that it enjoins, applied to social arrangements, will—provided the members of society be willing and obedient—banish the evil, introduce the good, and completely harmonize humanity with its environment. Who is to determine the application of these laws, the capitalist or the laborer, or both? Both. Sometimes the employer, with the tacit consent of the employed, undertakes the application. Thus, one of the most successful wholesale merchants of New York, while doing a yearly business of several million dollars, was wont to distribute several thousands, at the end of every twelve months, among the most deserving men in his establishment. This method was somewhat arbitrary, and rarely succeeded in commanding the full approval of all the beneficiaries. His estimate of merit naturally differed from that of some of them. The proprietors of the great Pillsbury flouring mill at Minneapolis, in 1854, distributed \$25,000 among the workmen, as a fair share of the profits of the business, in addition to their wages. Other corporations pursue the same policy. Strikes, conflicts between labor and capital, and kindred difficulties are said to be unknown in these establishments. A second method, in use with other corporations and individual employers, is that of distributing one-half, or a certain proportion of the annual profits, as may be mutually agreed upon, among the operatives in proportion to their earnings. A third scheme is that described by John Stuart Mill* as having been adopted by Messrs. Briggs, of the Whitwood and Methley Collieries, near Normanton in Yorkshire, England. Their proposal was to work these collieries by a company, themselves holding two-thirds of the capital stock, and in the allotment of the remaining third, to give the preference to the "officials and operatives employed in the concern." They further proposed

* Principles of Political Economy, Book iv., Chap. vii., § 5.

to the share-holders that whenever the annual profit should exceed 10 per cent., one-half the excess should be divided among the work-people and employés, whether share-holders or not, in proportion to their earnings during the year. The expectation of the just and generous projectors of this mode of appropriation that its adoption would "add so great an element of success to the undertaking as to increase rather than diminish the dividend to the share-holders," has, we understand, been realized. The admission of operatives as shareholders in the great scale-works of the Fairbanks Company at St. Johnsbury, and in the carpet works of the Crossleys at Halifax, has certainly been followed by beneficial results.

The remuneration of working men by percentages of profit added to stipulated wages is not a new thing in the arrangements between capital and labor. It has prevailed in the American ships trading to China, in the whaling vessels of New England, in the mining districts of Cornwall, and among the tradesmen and manufacturers of Paris; and everywhere with the effect of uniting the interests of the workmen with those of the masters. The yearly division of profits has been and is a mutual bond of security. It is too much to expect of humanity to anticipate only ease, harmony, and profit from such agreements. The evils inherent in human nature are too deeply rooted and too widely spread to warrant the hope of more than great melioration of the chronic condition of dissatisfaction and unfairness.

All these differing plans for adjusting the claims of capital and labor are simply steps in the right direction. All more or less recognize the manhood of the workmen, their right to a voice in the regulation of all that concerns them collectively, and in the distribution of the wealth they have assisted to create, and this on the basis of equity, and not of the necessity peculiar to the law of supply and demand.

Co-operative associations are the most promising modern development of Christian Socialism in the department of industrial art. Even the Socialists of Paris, when they inscribe "Jesus Christ, the first Socialist" under the portraits of the Redeemer that adorn their club-rooms, acknowledge that in Him and in

His Gospel lies the great hope of humanity. In His teachings alone are the true principles of perfect society to be found. The application of them is with men, and is of very slow growth. The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers is not only the most successful of co-operative corporations, but has embodied more of the spirit of Christianity than any other by its admission of women to membership, and its vigilant guardianship of their interests. Honesty, sobriety, intellectual and moral culture, and temporal prosperity are the legitimate fruits of their enterprise. Sense of security, independence, social sympathy, and practical intelligence characterize them. Each theoretically and virtually labors for all, and all for each. Yet even in this society the old leaven of selfishness manifests its presence in the employment of hired laborers without any interest in the profits.

Christian teaching reflects the true nature of things when it affirms that duty and privilege, right and felicity, equity and profit imply each other, and are inseparable as light from the sun or gravitation from matter. Believing most heartily in the eternal truth of that doctrine, we are prepared to look for the time when in some way or other, "both private capitalists and associations will gradually find it necessary to make the entire body of laborers participants in profits. Eventually, and perhaps in a less remote future than may be supposed, we may, through the co-operative principle, see our way to a change in society which would combine the freedom and independence of the individual with the moral, intellectual, and economical advantages of aggregate production; and which, without violence or spoliation, or even any sudden disturbance of existing habits and expectations, would realize, at least in the industrial department, the best aspirations of the democratic spirit, by putting an end to the division of society into the industrious and the idle, and effacing all social distinctions but those fairly earned by personal services and exertions."*

When the nearest approximations to this ideal social condition have been made, it has been felt that disturbing forces

*J. S. Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*, Book iv., Chap. vii., § 7.

outside the domestic relation of capital and labor have come in and made trouble. For example, it has been found that associated industrial art in the United States cannot compete for the supply of the market with that of other countries, and keep up the standard of living to which the artisans and directors are accustomed or aspire. Labor is dearer, less educated, less efficient. Some raw materials of manufacture are not so abundant and cheap. Distances and costs of transit are greater. Attempts at competition, therefore, end in failure. Resort is had to high tariff for the protection of native industry. This is the expedient adopted by Germany, the United States, and other countries to ensure success. Consumers are legally obliged to pay more for their goods than they would under a system of free trade, that domestic manufactures may flourish, and the awards to industry of brain and muscle be more satisfactory. With this end in view, and aware of the damage wrought by fluctuating imposts, the late E. B. Bigelow devoted himself to the study of the tariff history of Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States, etc., and deduced from his tabulated statistics, statements of results and comparison of prices, the law of imposts that must be imposed to make American manufactures remunerative. Senator Morrill advocated his plans, Congress adopted and clothed them with the sanction of law, and under that law the country entered upon a period of unprecedented prosperity.

But the effect on the people of foreign countries was not equally agreeable. Their fabrics were hindered from entrance into American markets, even while dire necessity compelled the purchase of American products of field, forest, mines, and waters. Readjustment to new conditions involved suffering and complaint. The prices of labor were depressed and the sum of comfort in artisan homes seriously lessened. Such legislation will scarcely abide the application of the Golden Rule. It fails, in large measure, to recognize the unity of the race and the solidarity of human interests. That others would have done the same in our circumstances is nothing to the point. What is best for the whole is, in the long run, the best for each part. While we are not to love our neighbor better than ourselves, we

are to love him as ourselves. Such charity always credits with good intentions, and hopes for change of policy when rightfulness and propriety are demonstrated.

Protectionists justify a high tariff: (1) Because it provides the readiest means of meeting governmental expenses, interest on public debt, reduction and extinction of the principal. People dislike and evade direct taxation, but submit cheerfully when taxation assumes indirect forms. (2) Because it opens a field for all kinds of human endowments and aptitudes. All cannot be farmers, herdsmen, mechanics, manufacturers, merchants, or professional men. Failures in life are the ordinary consequences of misapplied powers. Any condition of society that does not afford congenial employment for all classes of individuals is discontented and unprosperous. Ireland is wretched and rebellious because so largely and necessarily agricultural. Social content and progress are correlated with sufficient openings for diversified tastes and powers. (3) Because it develops native sources of wealth in field, forest, flood, and mine. (4) Because it creates a home market for agricultural products and raw materials of manufacture. (5) Because it makes us independent of other nations in time of war.

These reasons are plausible; to many they are convincing. Not a few protectionists are utterly conscientious. But even they see that some of these reasons are losing foundation in fact. Half our national debt is paid; the remaining half will soon be liquidated. What then? Is the high tariff to be continued? Debts have been paid and enormous wealth accumulated, but other peoples have suffered. Vast numbers of laborers and vast masses of capital have been transferred to this country. The transfer has relieved the tension there, but still the people suffer. What is to be done with surplus revenue? Is it to be expended in works of public improvement, in schools, in payment of State taxes, or how? These are questions that must be met.

Is the system of taxing the many for the benefit of the few—for this is what protection really means—to be continued, or is it to give place to a broader system which acknowledges what Christian Socialism teaches—that humanity is a whole, and the interests of a part are the interests of all. Direct taxation

in proportion to what a citizen owns is the fairest and most equitable way of raising revenue for all purposes, and disposes of the first argument in favor of protection. The facility with which people pass from congested districts or countries to other sections where their resources are in demand answers the second. The fact that we can be supplied with raw materials for manufacture more cheaply from other countries shows that the time for drawing upon purely American sources of wealth has not arrived. They are reserves waiting upon the exhaustion of other reservoirs. If the home market for agricultural products presents fewer requisitions, that of foreign countries will present more, and the maritime genius of our people gain wider scope for gratification. As self-love is the strongest safeguard against the folly and wickedness of war, free trade will make that safeguard almost if not altogether impregnable, by ministering most effectually to the self-love of all, and demonstrating that by war much may be lost and little or nothing gained.

The laws of Christian Socialism punish the vice of indolence by the provision that he who will not work when he may and can, shall not eat; suppress vice and crime, self-protectively and mercifully, because injurious to wrong-doers; equitably divide the proceeds of associated industry; allow fullest play for natural endowments; supply the needs of the dependent classes by causing the strong to bear the infirmities of the weak, and applying the redundancy of the many to the deficiencies of the few, and thus hasten the accommodation of humanity to the conditions of existence. But the application of these laws will be resisted in the future as in the past, but with less and less intensity of opposition. Suffering and complaint will attend the antagonism. In the arrangements of Divine Providence, which we can no more alter than we can change the laws of motion, there is no progress save through the conflict of opposites. Through "much tribulation" God's saints enter into His Kingdom. The Captain of our salvation was made "perfect through sufferings." But while this is true, it is also certain that the intelligent, persistent application of the principles and laws of Christian Socialism will not fail of reward. "He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come

again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him." (Psalm cxxvi., 6.)

The President (Rev. Dr. Deems) thanked Rev. Dr. Wheatley for his interesting paper, and invited discussion.

HOWARD HENDERSON, D.D., after complimenting the paper which had been read as very timely and appropriate to the work of the Institute, said:

Christian Socialism is the adjustment, on gospel principles, of the equities of society. It substitutes for the barbaric ethics,

" He shall take who has the power,
And he shall keep who can,"

the Golden Rule. Christian economics look on men as brothers having family rights to be respected, instead of as "hands" to be counted and called by numbers. The tendency of modern inventions, instituting a division of labor to secure expert skill and thus cheapen manufactured products, is to the sinking of personal identity into a machine force. The management of large concerns is calculated to make "the bosses" comprehensive men, while the mechanic specialist becomes narrow and dwarfed. Put a man to adjusting the heads on pins, and keep him at it for twenty years, and he will become a pin-head. Sharing in the profits of his skilled labor would lead him to the development of a broader brain, for it would become his interest to acquaint himself with the varied details of the business. Coparcenary co-operation is enlarging to the intelligence and aim of labor. Success should be measured by the achievements of a man in his chosen business, and not be confined to professions and mastership in the mechanic arts. Labor is always a curse when it is enslaving and tends to the minifying of the faculties. There is no such thing as the dignity of labor, but there is of the *dignity of the laborer*. A man must "think himself a thought of God" and not a mere machine for the moulding of matter. When Garowski, the noble Pole, exiled from his native land, vainly sought for work befitting the employment of his higher faculties, and finally engaged to serve as a day laborer, he was told by some learned friends that he would degrade himself.

His eye flashed as his soul kindled with a heroic disdain at the suggestion, and in broken but firm accents he replied, "I cannot be degraded; I am Garowski!" He knew what spirit dwelt within him, decorated with the insignia of conscious royalty of character, and rightly felt that no outward circumstances and no humble employment could debase him in his own esteem. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." His *reputation* might suffer in the esteem of those who measure men by their wages, but *character*, weighed in the balances of his consciousness of capacity and integrity, could not lower his estimate of himself. The Golden Calf, when pedestalled, may find worshippers, turn a stock market into a shrine, and a herd of brokers into a congregation of idolaters, but the precious image cannot become a self-conscious divinity. Socrates was born a satyr, but so transformed his features by reason and religion, that at length a god looked through them and illumined the Phædon. A greater than Socrates said: "I am among you as one that serveth." On the lower levels of life He humbly washed His disciples' feet, and chose His home among the lowly. On the table-lands of His higher nature He transfigured His body, until it became diaphanous, and shone, as a cathedral window, with sacred images. Labor, rightly pursued, can be made a sacrament, and turn a work-shop into a sanctuary. When workmen send their wages down the sink of a saloon, all the labor they can do is stripped of its dignity. Self-respecting laborers should find no difficulty in securing the respect of employers. But when the despotism of capital and monopoly refuses to recognize men, save as money-making machinery, and all human sympathy and the equities of praise and compensation are withheld, because necessity cracks the whip of masterhood, it is no wonder that souls revolt when brain and brawn are yoked to the car of covetous tyranny. Sooner or later white slavery will cry for emancipation, and shout, as butchery and the brand become avenging divinities—"Sic semper tyrannis!" Wealth must be generous for its own protection, else hearts, hungering for sympathy, will become fiery furies, and an avenging Nemesis will pursue on the track of fugitive oppression. Riches, banking on human necessities, has reason to dread the silent argument that wane and waste

women and starving and shivering children make to men who must slave life's golden opportunities away to "make buckle and tongue meet," and to fight the wolf that barks for blood at the door of work-worn stint and wretchedness. When Socialists convene in parks to swill hundreds of kegs of beer, under crimson banners inscribed, "Bread or blood," thoughtful men will fail to hear the voice of entreaty. This is taking the children's meat and giving it to dogs. Wanton idleness has no argument to which thrift and capital will not turn a deaf ear and bolt the heart of pity. When workmen sink their identity in a "trade's union," the personal plea of manhood is stifled. He is the worst of slaves who has to ask a conventicle of fellows to legislate for him and say when and for what he will work. No taskmaster can be so cruel as a "union" holding the personal will in the thrall of its caprice. When men's wages are high enough to enable them to "strike" and revengefully murder time in conventional idleness, and destroy the instruments of industry, they earn too much. A man must be willing to starve rather than be guilty of dawdling at his tasks, or living at the will of others a life of enforced idleness.

When workingmen surrender personal liberty to an organization that proscribes the industry and skill they might employ, individuality is sunk in the demands of an impersonal mass. In such a case "a man's foes shall be of his own household." If an artisan is afraid to work with a will because of a caitiff fear of the workmen in the same shop, in what respect does he differ from a galley slave bound to his oar, or a Chinese coolie waiting on the nod and beck of a proscriptive or prohibitory company? "Boycotting" is labor converted into brigandage. If the Irish would ever secure "home-rule," or national independence, the enfranchised sons of Erin in this land of the free must prove themselves worthy of liberty. The ignorant can be governed by the bayonet and billy, but only an intelligent and virtuous people can govern themselves. Virtuous nations govern the world, and educated men govern nations. The voice of the people is the voice of God only when the people are godlike. The ballot is no more the palladium of freedom, when corruptly cast or coerced, than stage lightning and sheet-iron thunder are

the executors of the will of God. If the ballot-box be the "urn of fate," corruption will put it on the grave of Liberty, rather than in the Pantheon of Freedom. The elective franchise makes the man clothed with it a sovereign. What should be the mental and moral fitness of the king-voter? Patriotic and *Pat-riotic* are not one and the same thing. A shillalah is not a sceptre, nor a paving-stone a ballot. Riotic Irishmen here, means a distrust of "home-rule" in the Emerald Isle. That was as bitter a piece of satire as it was a fine stroke of humor, when, after the Wyoming massacre, the Chinese ambassador, being asked what he would do if recalled, replied, "If I am to remain in the diplomatic service, I will ask to be sent to Ireland as the only country in which the Irish have no influence." The hope of laborers is in the principles and precedents legislated and practised by the Carpenter of Nazareth, and not in Nihilism, Socialism, Communism and Sand-lot-ism—with atheism, or priestcraft for a foundation. All such godless theories of equality are built upon quicksands that cannot bear up the overlaying superstructure of modern civilization. To break the Gospel's promise of "good will toward men" is to shatter the corner-stones of progress, and overturn the pillared supports of labor. The Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of men mutually complement each other. The perfect globe of Christian Socialism will only round the globe of recognized human rights when these two hemispheres come together, belted with an equator of love. "Lords of the loom," "merchant princes," "bonanza kings" must learn that they, too, have a Master in heaven, in whose hands the balances of justice hang square. Labor will share in the fruits of capital when the divine equities possess the souls of those who, as faithful stewards, handle the money of God, and mete out the compensations of toil. The reign of righteousness will ring out "the cursed lust of gold" by ringing in "the Christ that is *to be*." The poor have the Gospel not only preached *to* them, but *for* them. Christian society, when organized on a pure gospel basis, will effect all the readjustments possible to political economy. Selfish wealth, heartless toward labor, carries with it a sorer penalty than suffering, on account of short wages, will ever entail on the workman who earns the bread he eats, and that rest for wearied

limbs which makes his bed soft, and yields him to the fairy realm of pleasant dreams. "Better is a little with righteousness, than great revenues without right." St. Paul lifted service out of the marshes of meanness and gave a sunny aspect toward it by turning a side of it Godward: "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh; not with eye-service as man-pleasers; but in singleness of heart, fearing God; and whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto man."

The man who works for Christ's sake, no matter what his task may be, nor how callous his employer to his wants and woes, is in equal rank with titled honor of the bluest blood. Denied the approving smile or sympathizing tear of his employer he looks upward where the light rules and feels that a divine benediction falls upon his patient fidelity. The service that thinks of nothing but "the boodle," and is as Godless as selfish, will balk at the first hill, and shake off the yoke the moment the bows begin to blister.

VICE-CHANCELLOR MACCRACKEN, of New York University, said that he found great pleasure in listening to the paper of the evening. Its theme was of peculiar importance at this time. Its statement of facts was suggestive. Its spirit was admirable. He was not quite satisfied with the definition of Christian Socialism. [Here followed a discussion of the definition, which is omitted, since it was intimated that a fuller definition would be given in the paper as published.] The speaker continued:

If I have not mistaken Dr. Wheatley's words, he confounds the provinces of justice, equity and love. He brings before us a merchant of New York who, at the end of a year, distributed thousands among the most deserving men in the establishment. Similarly he presents the proprietor of the Pillsbury mill in Minneapolis as scattering twenty-five thousand dollars among his workmen as a fair share of the profits of the business. Dr. Wheatley tells us that this is in order to obey the great law of justice, equity and love. Evidently he is using equity here, not in the juridical sense, and hence it becomes merely a synonym for justice. The law of justice and love, then, according to Dr. Wheatley, commands these employers to make a dividend accord-

ing to the profits of their concern to all their employees. Certainly if these employers promised their employees a share of their profits, then justice commanded them to pay the same. Love had nothing to do with it. On the other hand, if they did not promise such a share, then justice required them to pay only the wages promised. The province of love is to supplement justice. The mistake of grounding, as Dr. Wheatley does, upon justice what must be based upon benevolence is the mistake made by certain employees some time since who, when they came for a settlement, received every man a penny and murmured against their employer, who answered, "Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a penny? Take that thine is, and go thy way." I believe heartily that political economy and social science should not be confined to the so-called economic laws, but should comprehend the facts of ethics and the obligations of the loftier impulses. But let us not confound the sphere of justice in the relation of employer and employee with that of love. I deny that justice commands me, because I double my income this year over last, say from literary work, and that because the work of the cook in my house has been better, giving me better digestion and strength, to double this cook's wages. Yet benevolence may well lead me to make the cook a handsome Christmas present. Her wages must, in justice, be regulated upon other principles than love, and these principles, known as "economic," are part of the laws of God, written in the constitution of men and of things.

The views of the lecturer upon the tariff were open to criticism in that they asserted that its effect upon prices of articles protected was inevitably to enhance them. James Park, of Pittsburgh, who is generally credited with a leading part in the establishment of the steel manufacture in this country, used to say to me that protection made steel cheaper and kept steel cheaper than it would have been with free trade. The imposition of high tariff, low tariff, or no tariff, is eminently a thing to be settled, not by general rules, but by the circumstances of a nation, which vary from generation to generation. This, I understand, is also the view which the lecture approves.

THE FAMILY IN THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Asbury Park, N. J., July 27th, 1885.]

BY REV. SAMUEL W. DIKE, ROYALTON, VT.

RECENT methods of research have thrown so much new light upon the nature of ancient institutions, and have brought so many intimations of the early origin of those present customs and social forms which have been regarded as almost wholly modern, that the finality of our former conclusions on many of these subjects is greatly distrusted. We are coming to understand, to take a conspicuous example, that the most modern forms of political institutions as they are seen in our own country, are not altogether the new things we have imagined them to be. We have learned that they are the slow growth and the long-ripening fruit of a process that has been going on from the earliest periods of human society. The customary lines of history, it is now well known, cannot adequately explain American political institutions. For it has been found that the latest of political systems is largely the product of the very earliest of political ideas subjected to a constant social fermentation, change and recombination—all working towards more or less definite ends.

The Family affords another instance of the new subjects which are coming into prominence under present methods of study. Within twenty-five years two classes of students have given us the results of their investigations in a field that has much to do with the Family. Of the first class Sir Henry S. Maine is the most eminent representative. His application of the historical method to the study of legal institutions has already yielded much valuable knowledge in regard to the Family. The second class is represented by such names as Bachofen, Morgan, McLennan and Spencer, who have turned to the study of the origin and growth of social institutions the

methods of the evolutionary school. It is hardly too much to say that, within the period covered by the names in these two classes of writers, the entire problem concerning the origin, nature, development and final form of the Family in society has become a new one of momentous importance. And this fact is sure to lead to a repetition of the old story, in fresh and possibly more difficult form, of the conflict between the friends of science and those of the Christian religion which once raged over Astronomy and Geology. The Church will be called upon to give up or change its traditionary opinions, or else find better supports for them than it has hitherto used.

Yet certain other perils are far more to be feared. Modern industrialism, which primarily seeks an individual laborer and subjects him to influences that either ignore or antagonize the Family; Mormon polygamy coming, be it remembered, with Bible in hand; that materialism that gravitates towards lust; the theories and methods of individualism which are pressing earnest and sincere men and women of the times—as they call themselves—to demand an interpretation of the idea and offices of the Family foreign to long-accepted views—these are some of the forces that will join in the attack upon the Family. They will make the most of the new scientific materials to which I have alluded and of any weak places in the Christian line of defence. For these reasons, therefore, and for others that need not be named here, the future work of the Church in behalf of the Family must inevitably be a grave task of great magnitude. It becomes the Church to study her own ground with the utmost care.

One of the subjects that I have long thought needs to be thoroughly understood in order that the Christian Church may be ready for its practical work is that concerning *the place of the Family in the history of Christianity*. And it is my chief regret on the present occasion that circumstances beyond my control have compelled me to give up my first plan of treatment and be content with a sketch of one or two points in the historical relation of the Family and Christianity, which may, it seems to me, need careful re-examination, adding thereto some considerations on the practical bearing of its results. I do not venture to teach you philosophy. I cannot claim to bring before you the

results of a scientific investigation. All I can do is to lay before you the things I have chanced to see, and to state the questions they have put into my own mind and, as I suspect, into the thought of others. Instead of a lecture, I try to make an interrogation point.

I. The first thing to which I would direct attention is that of the need of a reinvestigation of the actual relation of *early Christianity* and the *Family* to each other. The popular opinion on this subject is expressed in the common remark that the Family owes everything to the Christian religion—a remark in which the expression is generally taken almost literally. And even if we turn to the more familiar accounts we may chance to take up of the condition of the civilized world at the time of the introduction of Christianity, we shall find abundant illustrations of this fact. The contrast between the condition of morals in the Roman empire before Christianity affected them and the purer morality of the early Christians has been shown many times. Nor can any one doubt the immense service Christianity rendered society in the interests of a pure home life. Probably the civilized world has never seen before or since such deep and general depravity in domestic life as that was which confronted the Apostles and their followers. The researches of scholars have entirely justified the terrible indictment which the Apostle drew in the Epistle to the Romans. This and the other epistles of the New Testament, and the Christian literature of the first centuries of our era, also exhibit evidences of the marvellous reformation which Christianity wrought in the character of domestic morals. Perhaps no one thing in the entire range of primitive Christian achievement is more remarkable. All this, I find, is conceded by nearly every intelligent student of those times.

But this popular impression goes farther, and here it demands our special attention. It is based on the practical assumption or the direct assertion that not only the domestic character, but the domestic constitution itself underwent a complete change at the hands of early Christianity. According to this view, although Greece and Rome once had something like the Family of which the book of Genesis gives us glimpses in still earlier times, and which the Hebrew race partially preserved until the

coming of Christ, it is very commonly assumed that certain words of the New Testament were the seed out of which nearly the entire domestic growth of the Christian era sprang. It has been said repeatedly that the few words of Jesus recorded in the Gospels on the subject of marriage and divorce have wrought greater social changes than any other ever uttered; that He thus turned human thought and life back to the original constitution of the Family, which had been more or less faithfully preserved in the Mosiac system; and that an utterly corrupt society has in this way been recovered to the true idea and to that purer practice which, in spite of all imperfection, is the glory of Christendom.

Now I do not question the substantial truth of this picture of the early Christian transformation of the character of the Family. The debt of the Family to Christianity is an immense one. But I do wish to say that the statement to which I refer tacitly conveys more than we have a right to make it without further proof. The particular defect of it is that it leaves the impression—on the popular mind at least—that the work of Christianity upon the Family was constitutional to the degree that it amounted to a creation *de novo*, and that therefore there is little to be drawn from other than Christian sources on the subject that is worthy our serious attention. And at this time I wish to call attention to the possibility, and even probability, that this theory may assume that there was a completeness in the early Christian conception of the Family, and in its early Christian development, which a more careful examination of the facts may not support.

Let us look a moment at the Family of the early Church. If there is any one thing true beyond a doubt in regard to the method of the founder of Christianity and of that of His immediate followers, it is that He did not propose to begin His work with the founding of political institutions or to enter directly and immediately upon the reconstruction of any of those social institutions that lay outside the religious societies that must necessarily be formed. But, on the other hand, it is clear enough at the present period in the Christian era that the kingdom of God means ultimately the organization of all society on Christian

principles, or, to put the same thing in another form, the ultimate recovery of society to its normal, that is, to its natural and divinely intended order. This is true unless those are in the right who think the ultimate triumph of Christianity will come about through an overthrow of the entire social order of the present. But that a new social system was not an object of immediate care with the first Christians is, as I have just said, an undoubted fact. The constant and most positive insistence that His kingdom was not of this world, the more than utter indifference to political affairs and methods which they exhibited, and their pressure of motives drawn from strictly spiritual sources and urged in simply moral ways, clearly show the attitude of the Christians of the first centuries. It is one of the singular features of early Christianity that a system which was intended to change existing institutions more radically and do more to bring new institutions into being and to mould all the forms of social life more than any other, if not all other systems put together, should have so little to do in its beginning with their constitutional forms. The recorded words of Christ say remarkably little concerning the forms of either the Church or the Family or the State. In each of these instances, a few comprehensive principles for use in questions of individual duty is about all we have. The nature of even the Family is only indirectly set forth. The form of it given in the Gospels seems little more than embryonic.

The moral necessity for this course has been universally perceived. Men have seen the wisdom of the method that took the early disciples away from all political and social entanglements, and fixed their attention on spiritual aims and spiritual methods. But what I may be allowed to call the sociological necessity for it has not been as widely understood. It has often wholly escaped notice. Yet just here lies an important truth and one that is of the utmost consequence to our subject. For those who are familiar with the manner in which the earlier groups of society were formed, tell us that the processes which we see going on to-day in India are probably good examples of the way in which the germs of political and other societies have been constantly formed from the very first. One man, to illustrate, possessed with

ambition or under a conviction of some sort, generally religious, separates from his community and gathers around him those he can pick off from other groups one by one; or occasionally, and in earlier times especially, he secures an entire household. Then in course of time follow the institutions and order of a new society, whose unique or common features depend much on the originality and power of their underlying principles. We see much the same thing going on in our own times and country in the formation of religious sects—Christian and unchristian. Mormonism may be noted as a striking illustration of the essential repetition of this process. Its resemblance to the general course of social development from its earliest beginnings in making its individual converts, down through its construction of a domestic system to serve its religion, to its ultimate presentation of all the essentials of a great political organism only waiting the opportunity of successful promise to become such in avowed form and fact, becomes very evident when we turn to its study with the comparative method. Some of the Christian sects of our own day are further illustrations of this method of social growth. In their earlier stages these have been—both from a moral and a social necessity—protesting and separating systems. Each one has at first turned from old institutions to some supposed or real elementary principle or principles, from organic or social relations with other men to the individual and to the individualistic conception of ethical relations. Differentiating principles have almost inevitably taken precedence, and co-ordinating ideas have waited upon them. So powerfully have the former of these operated that the adherents to the new ideas have generally been forced into the formation of new religious bodies in spite of their early intentions to the contrary. By as much as the new society, of whatever kind it chanced to be, has been widely and radically different from the old order, by so much have the protesting, the separating, the individualizing principles had the greater influence as a practical working force. And by so much also has it been difficult for those most deeply imbued with the spirit and traditions of the formative period in any social system or polity, to rise to the demands of the co-ordinating and constructive work of its later stages. Except in rare instances this

latter work has been left to the different minds of a more catholic type and period. Very rarely have the two types been found together in the men of the early stage.

It would seem, however, to be one of the great characteristics of the founder of Christianity that He held both principles in firm proportion in His own thought. That marvellous conception of the kingdom of God, or of a universal society of absolute completeness, was matched with the equally wonderful apprehension of the true means of bringing it to pass through the withdrawal of its early members from all attempts at its immediate formal establishment. The permeation of society with the constructive principles of the Gospel is not less remarkable than the means taken to accomplish the object for which they were put there. And it is here that the force of the suggestion of the need of a careful re-examination concerning the place of the Family in early Christianity will be felt. For the peculiar form of reverence which Christians have been taught to cherish for the teachings of the New Testament, may be found to have urged on a natural disposition to assume that Christ gave more at the time, in the way of exact precept and definite form, than a better understanding of His language and method will permit us to believe to have been the case. If the early Christians generally took it for granted that Christ gave them nothing in regard to political institutions, modern scholarship sees in the Gospels the essentials of all that is fundamental and best in them. The profound attention recently given to the early sources of modern political institutions and the influence of their practical development have made the attitude of the Bible towards them far clearer. We now know something more than we did of what the Bible aims, and what it does not aim, to teach on the subject. But in respect of the Family the case differs at some important points. Political status and political duties were made for the early Christians by circumstances with which they had little to do. Public affairs could be readily avoided. It was the rule to conform as far as possible to existing laws. But with domestic life things were in several respects different, though in some similar. Especially were they different in that the domestic constitution was more within their own control. Though they might not at-

tempt to fashion the political institutions about them, they could and did do much to shape their own domestic life. Marriage and divorce, chastity and similar concerns of the Family, were far more within their own control and under their own authoritative rules. And this privilege was exercised in practical ways. But at precisely this point they show the influence of the great Christian methods which I have noted. The early Christians did not assume to build social institutions, but gave themselves to the work of winning individuals from their old allegiances, though it often involved separation from their former social environment, to an allegiance to God that was personal and which should first of all instill Christian principles into the minds of individual men and women.

Accordingly, the early disciples of the new faith did not trouble themselves much about the idea of the state and citizenship as a political theory, but were chiefly anxious to meet specific duties under existing governments. The government *de facto* was always with them the government *de jure*. And although, as I have said, they felt far more liberty in respect to the Family, yet the true constitution of it did not occupy their thought so much as the question how to live in its relations as they found them. The specific relations of marriage, of divorce, of chastity, and of parents and children were uppermost in their minds. For these were their practical, every-day questions. Consequently, where the early converts had been first Jews or Jewish proselytes, the Family of the Mosaic law and of Jewish tradition was the principal material of their domestic framework. And the words of Christ seemed to sanction this course. But if their origin had been directly Gentile, then the Family of the Roman world did more to supply the material form which was to be moulded towards the Christian ideal. And then here, where the idea of contract as the formula of marriage—a form which had come into wide use in the empire—prevailed, the great stress of the Christian instruction would be naturally laid on the sacredness and permanency of this contract, and in teaching fidelity and purity within the relation without much attention to its peculiar nature, just as we see it done at the present time in similar circumstances. But wherever the older ideas of a *status*

still held their ground, as they undoubtedly did among some people and in some regions, especially in the country districts that lay remote from large cities and the great highways, Christianity must have eagerly held the higher vantage ground and gladly lodged its principles in the better soil.

Now, if these explanations be sustained, then we can see that we miss the mark if we look to the Scriptures and other early Christian documents for a full and completely wrought out Christian form of the Family. The development of such an idea and its formulation in a positive institution were foreign to the main trend of early Christian thought. And we are also now prepared to perceive the serious limitation to the statement that the Family owes everything to Christianity. We may freely acknowledge a great debt while we question the accuracy of the common statement of its amount and form. For in order to complete its representation, we must take into the account the profound and extensive work which the Family itself did for Christianity. As sin did not obliterate the human soul nor extinguish the faculties it corrupted, so it was with the Family. The main work of the Gospel was not properly creative, but regenerative. In other words, it was a work of recovery in the restoration of the essential Family that lay buried under the hideous corruption of the times. Or to use another comparison, just as the philosophic thought of Greece has in one form or another supplied the warp, or something like it, of Christian theology and philosophy, from which the Christian thinking of the West has always been unable to rid itself, so it has been in good degree with the Family in the Christendom of the Western world. The great social elements of the Aryans entered into the work which the early Church did in behalf of the Family. They made up a large part of its warp. It could hardly have been otherwise. For the first institution in the order of social development, and the last wholly to give way in the decline of society from a high civilization, is the Family. I say the last *wholly* to give way. Because, though decay of the Family precedes and compels political decline, yet probably long after political institutions are generally corrupt, and even after their overthrow and after the Family itself is widely decayed and frequently entirely rotten,

there must still remain in such communities many families which, though scattered and isolated from each other, and thereby put beyond the power of effective political co-ordination, are still available for those religious uses which precede the reconstruction of society. And we are to remember still another thing. It is that even when the Family had lost its positive character and its constitution was sadly broken or deranged, it was still frequently capable of response to the call of the Christian faith, and under this new appeal of religion many a member, like the bones in the vision of the prophet, moved towards its old mate.

While, then, early Christianity undoubtedly brought the spirit and principles of the Gospel, and even its underlying law, to act powerfully in the task of restoring the true domestic order, Aryan institutions probably supplied a good part of the material and form of the restored household of the early centuries. Christ gave the disciples the elements of truth concerning it and the leading principles of reorganization, but they and their successors were left to work out the perfected Family by an historical process. Both the environment of Judaic society and of the Græco-Roman world entered effectively into the result. In this way the debt of the Family and Christianity became mutual. Only a careful re-study of this field in the light of modern research and in use of the methods applied to the study of social institutions can disclose the amount due to each. And when this study is made, I should not be surprised if we learned that the preparation for the Gospel that was made by the domestic institutions of the Roman world should take high place in our regard as we estimate the preparatory mission of ancient civilization.

This brings us to another part of the field where a re-study of the historic relations of the Family and Christianity may do good. It is,

II. *The development of the Family from the times of the Apostles and Fathers to the present.* The sketch here may be made more briefly, for some of the considerations already set forth apply to the latter period with corresponding force.

To recur to an influence already noted—the disposition of early Christianity to make its work individual at the expense of the social—and trace it farther down. The tendency thereby

formed perpetuated itself. It naturally grew and external conditions helped on its growth. The way of looking at their work as the plucking of brands, one by one, from the general burning, increased among Christians until it became a fixed habit, and was easily carried over from morals to institutions. Marriage was often regarded as an evil to be avoided, or at the best a necessary form of domestic life in a world of sin whose relations were entanglements to be escaped, or, when this was impossible, to be reduced to the least amount. Celibacy became common. Even the married refrained from the marital duties of sex, and entire abstinence from them was frequently taught. Some words of Milman are very significant on this point: "It is remarkable," he says, "how rarely if ever (I cannot call to mind a single instance) in the discussions of the comparative merits of marriage and celibacy, the social advantages appear to have occurred to the mind. . . . *It is always argued with relation to the interests and perfection of the individual soul.*" Although this method may not have prevailed so completely as Milman asserts, yet it apparently extended through the whole range of things connected with the Family. It was powerfully instrumental in building the great monastic systems of the centuries that followed. Its one-sided effect contributed to the terrible reaction in morals that made the corruption of some of the Christian centuries scarcely less disgraceful than that of the heathenism of former times.

The influence of the later Roman law contributed much to the same end. We should not overlook the particular stage of social development in the Græco-Roman world at the time of the introduction of Christianity and of the triumph of the latter over the civil power, three or four centuries afterwards. The very early Family had pretty generally disappeared, especially from the cities. So had the tribal, and in good degree the gentile domestic forms which stood next to the simple Family of earlier times. The early city or municipality had passed from its tribal basis of kinship through religion and ties of blood into a political form resting far more on the theory of a collection of individuals. Above all, the absorption of the individual by his Family was pretty much done away. Status had loosened its grip upon

him and contract was put in its place. By the aid of conquest and commerce, property had almost ceased to be in the main the corporate possession of the household and was largely held in individual ownership. The office of the House Father was no longer a sacred trust. Woman had acquired great personal independence, both in respect of property and marriage. And these radical changes in society had found their natural incorporation into law. When, therefore, Christianity came into a position where it could practically influence the laws of the empire, these were in a shape that gave pretty loose rein to individualism in the Family. Its own history made it comparatively easy for Christianity to yield to the current that flowed around it on all sides. If it did much to mould law, it is also true that existing laws had a good deal to do with the Christian rules of the domestic relations. There was a great deal that kept Christianity from helping raise the popular thought above the individual to the Family as the point of view. In this way the state of the civil law and of most social institutions gave a peculiar set to the course which the Christianity of this period took with the Family.

This appears in what is known as the canon law. The canon law may be regarded, if I may so express the thought, as having a sort of mongrel origin. Certainly at the outset, it was the result of that kind of a union which a weak and partially corrupt Christian faith would naturally make with the peculiar civil legal system of the times. Coming in its ethical view of the family from debased stock on either side, it could hardly rise to the dignity of those great organic principles on which the vigorous domestic institutions of early Rome and Greece rested, or which a purer faith might have drawn from a direct and more exclusive contact with the Sacred Scriptures as its supreme authority. But perhaps nothing has done more to determine the doctrine of the Family in the modern Church than the canon law. For it has crystalized and transmitted those principles and rules which have been dominant in the Latin Church, and which have powerfully impressed themselves upon all Protestant peoples as well. Even England and other countries which have never adopted the canon law, have not escaped its strong influence.

Now one has only to have his attention turned to the subject in order to see that the canon law does not make its way through the domestic relations on the line of the Family as its clear and controlling idea, but that the individualistic point of view is oftenest taken. The title of the latest and probably best digest of the canon law on this subject makes the book treat of the laws of marriage and its dissolution, and this phrase without doubt correctly describes its task. Most of the Christian and legal discussions of the subject have similar titles, indicative of an inherited method of the same general character. And this method shows the usual point of observation taken by the canon law. It is true that the idea of unity is by no means wanting. But like Blackstone's unity of the common law, which he declared made two one, and that one the husband, the oneness of the Family in the canon law is still very nearly individual; and it is measured chiefly by the single being in which the wife is swallowed up. Rarely does the conception rise to the idea of a corporate unity larger than either of its members and something more than all of them.

The influence of Protestantism is too recent and too apparent to need many words here. Its very beginning in the protesting movement that gave to it its name, tended to make it at first individualistic and divisive, whatever may have been true of it later. The egoistic starting-point in treating all social relations is its easy assumption. The principle of the self-determination of all other duties and relations is readily carried over into the Family. Its return to primitive sources of authority and its disposition to a reaction from catholic methods have also helped towards the general drift now under consideration. In the form of evangelicalism and its ultra-sectarianism, the movement away from the conceptions represented by the Family and towards those taking their rise in the Individual has been very marked. For, however much we may say in behalf of those evangelical principles and forms of Protestantism which have been the strength of American Christianity, it seems impossible for any one who reflects carefully upon their social operation to escape the conviction that they have unconsciously had great influence on the popular mind in its solution of practical questions con-

cerning the Family. A Christianity that has taught individual responsibility with untiring persistence, and that has concentrated its force upon the individual as almost the entire beginning, middle and end of its efforts, has had small inducement to look upon the affairs and relations within the household from any other than its accustomed point of view. The modern Church makes a great deal of the congregation and its separate members, but relatively it suppresses the Family as a factor in religious work. A study of the social causes that gave the early churches their peculiar bent in this use of the congregation and of the means by which this inclination has been repeated and carried down in the work of American churches will, I am confident, throw much light upon the peculiar weakness of the Family in their work, but I cannot do more than refer to it now.* Recent methods in Sunday-schools, Christian Associations, Women's societies, and other rapidly multiplying devices for doing Christian work, are further instances of the tendencies of this kind. The principle underlying them is that of substituting more or less artificial collections of individuals in place of the natural Family; and their incidental, if not their direct, effect has been to turn thought and effort away from this great natural instrument of religion. But it is aside from the proper course of this lecture to do more than make allusion to them.

III. Let us now turn to *some practical bearings of this study*, which I have tried to show is necessary to a better understanding of the historic relations of the Family and Christianity to one another. We shall thus feel more deeply its importance. For it concerns practical issues far more than we may at first be disposed to think.

In the first place, the ascertainment of the true historical relation of Christianity and the Family to each other will prepare us to meet certain scientific difficulties successfully. All intelligent readers are aware that there are serious objections made to the commonly accepted scriptural account of the Family on the ground that recent studies of social institutions have compelled many to entirely new conclusions about them. Whatever

* I have, however, attempted this study in an article printed in the *Andover Review* for September, 1885.

may be our caution in respect to these claims in behalf of evolutionary theories of society, we must all admit that the subject is fairly before us and demands candid attention. And if it should become evident from this class of studies—and I do not, let it be understood, mean to say here that it will or will not—but if it should become evident that the Bible does not contain an infallible history and doctrine of social institutions, but only comes to us making use of them as it found them and giving us received accounts of their origin, yet dropping into them—especially in the New Testament—its great principles and allowing these to germinate and develop in the soil where they fell and under the climate where they were sown, the course of Christian apology will be very different from what it otherwise would be. If the Sacred Scriptures simply contain the history of a partial revelation of the Divine thought in domestic or other social institutions, together with such authoritative principles as the exigencies of that revelation require, no prudent man will throw away his Bible because it falls below his scientific knowledge on this subject, and no Christian need distrust social science because it asks him to accept more than his Bible has revealed on it.

But secondly, and more to our practical need. The study for which this paper is a plea would seem necessary *to put Christianity in a true attitude towards some practical questions intimately connected with the Family*. The apologetic difficulties are, after all, of less concern than the problems which actual life presents. And it would be well for us if we could bring Christians to a perception of the place the Family really holds in the solution of some of the most important questions of the day. For these are too serious to permit Christianity to approach them while loaded down with needless burdens—or restrained from her greatest freedom of action. Let me, then, enforce my general position by referring to some of them. For convenience, they may be divided into two classes.

The first includes several practical problems now before our country awaiting solution, and which, when pushed to their ultimate supports, will turn on the answer we give to the question: What is the essential constitution of the Family? Take the subject of Divorce, or as it is commonly thought of, the dissolution

of the marriage relation, for one cause or another, prior to the death of one of the parties to it. Now all good thinking on this subject soon comes to the inquiry into the nature of what is before us which we propose to dissolve. That inquiry leads us to ask—What is marriage that brought about the original condition with which Divorce is to deal? Is marriage a contract and nothing more? Is it simply a contract of a peculiar kind and order? Is it a *status*? And if so, what sort of a *status*? Who control its origin and being, and how far? Has it unity? If so, what is this unity? Does this unity absorb one of the parties to it in the person of the other, so that the personality of the latter stands for the old personalities of the two? And further, is there an organic unity at all? And if this be admitted, does it or does it not constitute a something more than either one of the two parties—something more than the sum of the two? And once more, may this unity growing out of marriage be regarded as a moral person and treated politically as such, having duties and rights to be discovered and maintained and becoming the subject of rewards and penalties which shall be bestowed according as it shall be true or false to its own being and its own moral consciousness? No one thinks long on the subject of Divorce without perceiving that it is inseparably connected with that of marriage; and no one long continues reflection upon the two without coming to see that the fundamental inquiry of all is into the nature of the Family. The most serious part also of the hotly disputed English question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister derives its chief importance from its bearing upon the problem of the Family.*

Mormon Polygamy is another example. For when we go beyond the popular statements on this subject, which have been made as if they were mere truisms, and try to show just wherein the polygamous family is constitutionally wrong and claim that monogamy only is to be tolerated in a free Republic based on natural institutions and rights, we shall find ourselves confronting this one great question concerning the real nature of the

* The able and suggestive little book of the Rev. Dr. Geo. Z. Gray, Dean of the Episcopal Divinity School in Cambridge, Mass., entitled "Husband and Wife," illustrates what I have said above.

Family. And, indeed, this essential question meets us all the way from Maine to California; and, I may add, from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. We must have a doctrine of the Family that will stand in both Utah and Connecticut; in New Hampshire and Indiana; in Salt Lake City, Chicago and Boston. It will prove a blessing in the end if we shall discover that our doctrine of the Family formulated for use in Utah cuts under the loose divorce laws of the States and Territories. And I sometimes think that the jugglery which the Mormons practise with the biblical doctrine of the Family may have closer relations with the cramped ideas of some of the Christian theories of it than we suspect. The Mormon method of interpretation of Scripture is a familiar one. These are of the class of questions that raise directly the theory of the Family.

The other class of problems which I have in mind demands a true Family and a clear consciousness of it in the popular mind for their best solution. In the former class the idea of theory is directly raised as fundamental to the very question at issue. But in the latter, it is only implied that we have a sound theory somewhere ready for practical use, though it lie far back of the actual problem before us at any given time. But here the range of subjects is so large that I must simply point to a few of the leading ones and then take up a single one of them for illustration. Among them may be named that of the extension of the suffrage to woman, of her absolute equality with man in respect to the ownership and disposition of property, of the more strictly industrial problems—such as affect the employment of women and children, and the influence of the competitive system on the home—of the objects, methods and ends of education, of the view that we take of chastity and the evils of licentiousness and our methods in their reform and, most fundamental and far-reaching of all, of the place to be given to the Family in the practical work of the Christian religion. In every one of these directions we need back of all our work, the most thorough and comprehensive understanding of the Family, both in respect of its nature and resources. I will select, however, for our present purpose a single subject, and that shall be the problem of modern property. It can be touched here very lightly.

A recent article,* based on the returns of the census, shows that in the ten years between 1870 and 1880, the number of children receiving wages in the United States had "increased 66 *per cent.*, and that in face of an admittedly defective enumeration." The writer of it says, "In mechanical and manufacturing industries alone the increase was 59 *per cent.*, while the labor of males over 16 years made an advance of only 43 *per cent.*; and that of females over 15 years, 64 *per cent.*" Those of us who are accustomed to regard the wide opening of employments to women as of so great good as to be everywhere and always encouraged do not, it seems to me, reflect sufficiently on its remote causes and their effects. This remarkable increase of labor for wages among women and young children, and that steady movement which, at Lowell and other centres of manufacture, has supplanted the intelligent women of the old New England stock—first with the Irish and then with the French Canadian, and which would, if it could do so to advantage, put the Chinese in the places of the latter, have causes which appear to me to be quite as powerful as those moral agencies which we usually, and sometimes rather boastfully set forth in behalf of the industrial rights of women. The operation of the demands of capital upon industry is powerfully individualistic as respects the Family. Capital wants a laborer at smallest cost to itself where cost is compared simply with the work done. The individual without a family competes with the head of a large family, crowding the latter to the wall. For the tendency is to compel the head of a household to make an industrial unit of each member of his family, or else suffer in the competition; and, indeed, he must often suffer even after this expedient. Mr. Crowell, the writer whom I have just quoted, clearly perceives the character of the evil he sets forth when he calls this "the play of silently working forces which are daily resolving the adverse interests of industrial life more and more into a treacherous struggle of the factory *versus* the Family." For I would say with all the emphasis of long settled conviction that it is the Family that feels the heaviest grinding of the industrial movements of the times. What is called

* In the *Andover Review* for July, 1885.

the socialistic problem is, I am compelled to believe, linked with the domestic problem far more closely than either of the parties to the former have generally acknowledged. The right of the Family to its integrity, both in its being and labor, and to its freest development amid the largest opportunities, must be asserted against all industrial tendencies to the contrary, or society is imperilled at its foundation and labor and capital lose the truest, the most nearly universal and most powerful incentives they have—the motives of the home. Looking, then, at the industrial problem in its present practical aspects simply, a good understanding of the nature of the Family and its rights, respecting both the ends of personality and property, is indispensable to its solution.

But there is another point of view which should be taken before we can claim to fairly understand this economic question. Most accounts of socialism begin with it as a practical fact and make little account of the historic forces that are far behind its expression in concrete form. But on reflection this, I am sure, will seem to many as unsatisfactory as would be the attempt to get at the inner working and true significance of our political institutions without carefully investigating their English, Germanic and Græco-Roman sources—in short, without discovering something of the contributions of both the Aryan and Semitic races to them. For American economic problems are in part an heritage from the earliest times; and nothing short of a study of the mutual relations of Property and the Family from the dawn of history, and of the effect of these relations in bringing about the conditions underlying socialism, and which have done much to make socialism possible, can adequately furnish us for the work its presence brings. The process by which property has passed from being largely the corporate possession of the household to the exclusive ownership of the individual members of it and under which the control of the Father has been transformed from a trust to a personal right, should be understood. The origin and rise of market price and its steady growth into the place custom once held in fixing the basis of exchanges, the growth and social significance of competition historically treated, the rise and early function of the Will and the laws of Inheritance,

and that whole range of influences in the realms of economics and law by which the Family has been changed from a corporate institution, comprehending within itself nearly all the interests of its members, to what seems almost a new association for those ends which are limited by the demands of physical sex alone, and thus to the merest fragments of its early uses and of the life once concentrated within it—these are all to be taken into any complete understanding of modern socialism. Historic socialism is the thin end of the wedge. The long butt of this wedge, the impelling force it communicates and the causes that have opened the seam into which the edge is set, must be counted among the elements of the problem socialism presents to us. Socialism, in other words, is simply one expression in a particular concrete form of the vast question which modern wealth has brought to the surface. And with the larger question it involves immense changes in the mutual relations of Property and the Family which cannot be neglected by the student of modern economic subjects.

Now, two things make the speedy and diligent investigation of the Christian treatment and doctrine of the Family necessary to the solution of this question. One is that we must have a Christian theory of the Family that will meet every scientific and practical test that may be applied to the Family as a working factor in the solution of the economic difficulties that meet us on every hand. The other is the fact that neither economic science nor the practical operation of the forces it treats, nor of socialism in its ordinary methods, have the disposition or the ability to give us that true Family which is the postulate of a successful solution of their problems. For it is only when economic science and the truths that underlie the theories of socialism have learned their own place and have been taught to serve in the ranks of the sciences and arts of living where they have been frequently disposed to rule, that they really come to know anything of the Family and its functions in industrial affairs. The uncontrolled tendency of strict political economy, in the familiar acceptance of the narrowest idea of it, is divisive in respect to the unity of the Family; for it is individualistic both in concept and method. The purely economic corporation of mod-

ern times tends of itself to loosen the bonds of all corporations in which the dominant force is personal rather than material. That commercial spirit which is steadily reducing the national control over a man and making every human being a cosmopolitan in spite of his own exertions to the contrary, is not sparing the Family, which is the embryo of the Nation and continues to make up the primary cells of every highly developed national organism. The truth is that its work on the Family began before a true Nation existed and went far towards making this Nation possible. For it is through the surrender of many of the economic and other functions of the Family to the larger social forms that these latter have grown into the modern State. And it is our great task now to determine the limitations of this movement and readjust relations within it. A social science that comprehends political economy, rightly understood as one of its departments, and which does not surrender to the claims of the latter to be the whole science of living, can and must do the work of giving the people of our country a true Family, which shall be conscious of its own being and duties and rights, and capable of an intelligent maintenance of its own high place in the work which the great coming contest over material wealth will have for a true Family to do. And a Christian philosophy which shall, like its master, be born of God into the Families of the country—itself a Divine incarnation and so bound to grow into all the wisdom of Heaven and Earth, is the best inspiration and the safest guide to the science that shall successfully grapple with this single one of the social problems which I have used to enforce my point.

A similar exposition might be given concerning the other subjects to which reference has been made. But time forbids, and it is hardly necessary to do so. Any one who will distinctly raise in his own thinking the question as to the part the Family must perform in the solution of any one of them, especially if he will look into their historical relations with the Family, cannot fail to come to a conviction of the high place this institution must occupy in the tasks they set before us.

I have said, in substance, that for its great work in these directions Christianity should come forward with a true Family

that has been made conscious of its nature and calling; that should press this Family into the field of its duties prepared to claim its rights in order that it may attain its highest usefulness; and that it should thereby work out its own freedom as well as the deliverance of man from the bondage of sheer individualism. This is one part of the alternative, and it is based on the assumption of the triumph of a Christian civilization. But the other part of the alternative must be recognized. And that part is found in the opinion that the drift of the times hitherto has been wholly in the right direction and needs no fundamental correction. But to accept this as true implies that the Family must yield more and more to the forces that work for its general disintegration. Some of its sincere friends already speak of the Family as being simply a *modus vivendi* in a way that carries with it evidence of their general satisfaction with things as they are. Shall capital and labor, commerce, the movement in the interests of woman, education, politics, practical religion, one and all go on in their present course until the Family shall not be even this for the many, but rather the accident of the few? Is that powerful, continuous movement by which the individual is being differentiated out from the Family in economics, law, ethics and politics and massed in the largest collections possible at the expense of all smaller social groups, entirely a right one? Or on the other hand, is this individuating process a part of, and preliminary to, a better, more harmonious reintegration which is already begun here and there, but which needs to be made general and powerfully increased? And has the time come which, by its very stress, points to the constructive work Society may do after its long encouragement of separative tendencies?

Thus, it seems to me, the most serious thought of the American people vibrates, though it may be more or less unconsciously, back and forth, waiting for more light and stronger assurances before it moves forward to its heartiest and best work. I have accomplished one part of my present purpose if I have done something to show that there is probability that from the earliest days of the Church down to the present time Christianity itself has experienced similar difficulties in its own more distinctive field, difficulties produced partly by its own exigencies and

in part due to the environment in which it has wrought. And the other part of my aim is secured if I have shown that there is presumptive evidence enough in this direction to call for a re-examination of the common account of the historic relations of the Family and Christianity to each other for the sake of learning just how much has been done for the Family and of getting a better idea of what remains to be done. It is the conviction that I have of the great part the Family must necessarily take in the future work of society, together with the equally strong conviction that Christianity must guide the Family to its best work, and the serious question as to whether or not Christianity has yet fully possessed itself of the historical facts concerning the Family and her own relation to it, that have led me to try in this way to raise the question of the need of reinvestigation. It has seemed to me possible that, by taking the Family for our working line and using the light that the historical and comparative methods have put into our hands in recent years, the old field of Christian history may still yield rich treasures. I raise the question. Other and competent minds must be depended upon to give the answer to it. The question undoubtedly has support in the methods of recent historical research, and it cannot long go unanswered.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE first monthly meeting of the Institute for the course of 1885-86 was held in the chapel of the Church of the Strangers, Thursday evening, October 1st, at 8 P.M., the President in the chair. The devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. Dr. F. Bottome, of New York. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved.

The President, Rev. Dr. Deems, called the attention of the Institute to the fact that the Earl of Shaftesbury, the President of the Victoria Institute of Great Britain, had departed this life on the 24th of September. His health had been declining for several years. But for his age and feebleness Lord Shaftesbury would have been present at one of the earlier summer schools of this Institute, in whose welfare he took great interest. The late

nobleman was the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury. His ancestor, the third Earl, was a deist, whose book, entitled "Characteristics," was a covert attack upon Christianity. The late Earl seemed to feel bound to counteract, by the utmost possible Christian activity, the evil done by his ancestor. He was born April 28th, 1801, was a graduate of Oxford, entered Parliament as Lord Ashley in 1826, and was a member of the House of Commons until 1851, when he succeeded to the Peerage on the death of his father. He held a cabinet appointment under Sir Robert Peel's administration in 1834-35. In 1841 Sir Robert Peel, upon taking office the second time, invited the Earl of Shaftesbury to join the administration. He declined this flattering offer because he found that the Premier's views would not permit him to support the Ten Hours Labor Bill. Lord Shaftesbury was devoted to social, industrial, and intellectual reform, and was a great favorite of the laboring classes, for whose good he manifested such honest zeal.

The following Resolution was offered by Vice-Chancellor MacCracken, of the University of the City of New York:

Resolved, That the American Institute of Christian Philosophy receive with profound feeling the announcement of the death of the late Earl of Shaftesbury, whose pure and exalted life of Christian principle and beneficent practice has made him a noble example and a healthy stimulus to the world for half a century.

Resolved, That the Secretary of this Institute be requested to convey to the Victoria Institute our sincere condolence with them in the loss of so wise a counsellor and able a helper as their late President, the good Earl of Shaftesbury, and our earnest hope that the surviving members will so care for the interests of the Victoria Institute, that his labors on the line of the relations of revealed and scientific truth may be productive of an increase in human progress, in useful knowledge, and high morality.

The regular paper of the evening was by Rev. Richard Wheatley, D.D., Pastor of the Lexington Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, New York, on "Christian Socialism." The subject was discussed by Rev. Dr. Howard Henderson, of Jersey

City, and Vice-Chancellor MacCracken, of the University. They were requested by the Institute to write out their remarks, to be published with the lecture in *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT*.

At the monthly meeting held November 5th, 1885, the devotional exercises were led by the President. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved.

The President announced that the Executive Committee at their last meeting had appointed a Special Committee to take means for completing the endowment fund of the Institute. The members appointed were Gen. Clinton B. Fisk, Rev. Henry M. Sanders and Rev. Alex. Mackay-Smith.

The Secretary announced that Prof. A. R. Simpson, of the University of Edinburgh, Scotland, had become a life member by the payment of fifty dollars.

The regular paper of the evening was by Rev. H. A. Dows, whose subject was, "The Conscience a Witness of God." Remarks upon the paper were made by Dr. Andrew H. Smith and Hon. A. B. Conger.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift will probably meet the demands of our readers.]

"*THE CONTINUITY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT*," by Alexander V. G. Allen, Professor in the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, has for its sub-title, "A Study of Modern Theology in the Light of its History." It is a learned, bright book, written in very clear style, and interesting from beginning to end. Its value lies in giving strong emphasis to a portion of truth which has not had sufficient attention; its defect is in its putting other portions of truth into too much shade. The title does not express the *motif* of the book. Our own view of that is given so almost in the words that we would use, that we adopt Dr. Elmendorf's statement (*Church Review*, October, 1885, p. 343), although in that article there are criticisms of the book to which we cannot assent: "Well expressed, the title of Prof. Allen's book would have been the 'Continuity and Development of Stoical Thought among Christians; or, Anticipations of Schleiermacher.' But as, according to the author, the continuity was interrupted by the almost universal prevalence

of radically different principles after the age of S. Athanasius, and only resumed again by Schleiermacher, in whom converged, as if it had been a focus for the preceding ages, the scattered rays of truth [p. 382], the so-called continuity proves to have been a very lamentable discontinuity." Schleiermacher is Prof. Allen's theologian and Hegel his prophet. If the Professor is not a pantheist, his book must misrepresent him. The most remarkable thing about the whole production is that it is written by a clergyman in the Protestant Episcopal Church, a teacher in one of its prominent theological seminaries. That he should pour contempt on ecclesiastical authority, apostolic succession, the sacerdotal character of presbyters, and what is known as "sacramental grace," and yet retain his chair as a professor and his robes as a priest, shows that his Church has endured a great change in the last half century. Fifty years ago no such thing could have occurred. The world moves. Let it. Have not most of us passed the season of scare? Men may come and men may go, but truth flows on forever. Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

"DANIEL THE PROPHET," by Rev. Dr. E. B. Pusey, late Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford, is an 8vo, of 519 pp., published by Funk & Wagnalls (\$3). The fact that Dr. Pusey's name was connected with an unfortunate ecclesiastical movement in England has weakened his influence over many minds. But this book on Daniel lies outside that line, and is a precious contribution to the knowledge of Holy Scripture. It will endear its author's name to thousands. It consists of nine lectures, delivered in the Divinity School of Oxford University. It was the author's "contribution against the tide of scepticism which the publication of the 'Essays and Reviews' let loose upon the young and uninstructed." That book had no strength but in its wickedness. It was a most cowardly publication. A company of clergymen of the Established Church of England, in violation of their ordination vows, published a book in which they exerted their utmost ingenuity to cast doubt upon the fundamental truths of the Christian religion, destroying men's faith while they had not the courage to deny it themselves, lest they should lose their benefices. A more despicable set of authors has not existed in our century. Laid on the background of such miscreants, the outspoken Bob Ingersoll, Tom Paine and Voltaire might look like luminous gentlemen. In his preface Dr. Pusey deals with the "Essays and Reviews" and their authors in a way to do one's heart good. The book has been so long well known among theologians that little more need be said than to call attention to its republication in excellent form.

"CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY" is the title of an 8vo, containing a republication of addresses and articles by Rev. Dr. Schaff, which made an impression at the time of their first publication. They contain Christological Studies, Polemical and Irenical Studies, and Moral and Social Studies. A reperusal of these articles has given us an increased respect for the good sense, fair judgment, and assimilated learning of Prof. Schaff. We might call attention to his papers in this volume on The Sabbath and on Slavery as showing the practical good sense of the author, which even much learning has not been able to disturb. Charles Scribner's Sons, publishers.

"WHY WE BELIEVE THE BIBLE," by Rev. Dr. J. P. T. Ingraham. (New York: D. Appleton & Co.) The sub-title of this neat little volume is, "An Hour's Reading for Busy People." It has no display of learning and is not profound. It may serve to give "busy people" some superficial idea of some of the grounds of Christian belief. We could wish it had been more carefully written.

"THE SABBATH; Its Permanence, Promise and Defence." We hail everything which goes toward leading our people to such an observance of the Sabbath as God intended, being well assured that thereupon depend their physical health, their intellectual progress, their social happiness, their increase in material wealth, their lead of the world in national advancement, and their spiritual elevation. This book, by Rev. Dr. W. W. Everts, will contribute to the intelligent understanding of the question involved in Sabbath observance. We commend it therefore as a book that should be in the libraries of churches, Sunday-schools and Christian homes. E. B. Treat, publisher. \$1 postpaid.

"BIOGEN" is the title of a speculation on the origin and nature of life by Professor Elliott Coues. (Boston: Estes & Lauriat.) We do not wonder that this brilliant *brochure* has reached its third edition. It is an address delivered before the Philosophical Society of Washington, with much misgiving on the part of the author, because he must say what he truly thought, and he could not do that "without introducing strangers to a select body of Washington scientists, such as God, Spirit and soul, as factors in the problem of life." Trusting, however, that at least the names of those strangers might be known, he delivered this address. It deals heavy blows to the materialistic infidelity.

"**APOSTOLIC LIFE**, as revealed in the Acts of the Apostles." The third volume of this work by Rev. Dr. Joseph Parker, Minister of the City Temple in London, is issued by Messrs. Funk & Wagnalls. (\$1.50.) It seems needless to speak of the writings of a man so well known in America and Europe as Dr. Parker. His cutting, stirring, fearless style has wonderful power in fastening a truth to the memory. His books make their own way in the world. The present volume takes up the history of the Apostles where the second laid it down (Acts xx.), and goes to the end of the book. Then there are seven added complementary discourses, making one hundred and fourteen in all. The fertility of Dr. Parker's mind and the industry of his life are marvels.

We have read with pleasure and instruction "**A LAWYER'S READINGS IN THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY**," by Daniel P. Baldwin, LL.D., of Logansport, Ind. A few things would call for questioning or dissent on the part of those accounted rigidly orthodox, but much is very forceful, and we could wish that our young men generally could read its glowing pages.

The Rev. Wm. A. Snively, S.T.D., delivered a timely and well-expressed Baccalaureate Sermon at Lehigh University, June 15th, 1884, on the "Harmony of Science and Religion," from I. Tim. vi., 20—"Opposition of Science, falsely so-called."

Messrs. A. S. Barnes & Co. are giving us excellent editions of school-books. It is pleasant to have a fresh copy of that good old instructor of our childhood, Dr. Watts's treatise on "**THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MIND**" (Price 75 cents), which cost its author twenty years of study and remains unsurpassed in its department. The "**BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES**," brought down to the funeral of General Grant, is the fairest and best school history of our country which we have examined. \$1.25. Their "**SHORTER COURSE OF RHETORIC**," by C. W. Burdeen (\$1.25), and their new re-written edition of Prof. Davies' Legendre (\$1.85) are excellent.

Messrs. Funk & Wagnalls publish (royal 8vo, \$1.50), "**FORTY-EIGHT DISCOURSES**" delivered on as many consecutive Sundays from the pulpit of the Church of the Strangers, New York, by the pastor, Charles F. Deems. We have our own private opinion of their merits and that opinion shall remain private.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1886.

MUSIC AS REVELATION OF GOD AND OF THE FUTURE.

[Delivered before the American Institute of Christian
Philosophy, August 25th, 1885.]

BY T. T. MUNGER, D.D., NEW HAVEN, CONN.

IF so simple yet absurdly general question were raised as this—What is the use or object of creation? an equally simple and general answer might be returned, namely: that it is the path by which God gets to man, and also the path by which man gets to God; that is, creation is the medium of the revelation of God. By calling it a path we somewhat define it, for it thus implies a distance that is overcome and an end that is reached. God may be regarded as starting towards man at the beginning of creation and drawing steadily nearer until He reaches man, when—being present and now fully revealed—He no longer requires the path, but may be known directly. So man may use creation—its laws, processes, forms—as a path to God along which he climbs till he reaches God whom he thus comes to know directly. When God and man have thus gone over this common path, there is, in a certain sense, no further need of it, for each has reached the other. We use creation aright when we use it as a path between God and man. It has of itself no end or use, and so doubtless will pass away, or be left behind like a cloud of dust that rises from the wheels of the traveller. Creation is the true Jacob's ladder on which the angels of heaven and the angels of humanity pass and repass—itself a dream but the basis of an eternal reality.

Creation is interpreted to us by the five senses, all of which act by some kind of impression and form the one bridge between ourselves and the world of matter—one bridge of sensation but dividing, as it were, at the end where it touches man, and becoming sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. If man were considered as made up of mind and heart and an animal nature, sight might be regarded as revealing creation to his mind, hearing to his heart, smell and taste and touch to his animal nature. The distinction is only apparent and is vaguely general, for as the five senses are but one sense of touch, so man is a being who cannot be divided into parts; man is one. But the distinctions are practically valuable, and are necessary to a classification of knowledge. By the eye we discover an immeasurable universe packed with thoughts, or laws and processes that are based on thoughts—chiefly mathematical; for whatever else the universe may be and may express, it is mathematical, and mathematics, as all will confess, touch only the intellectual side of us. It is true that we may see, and *feel* by seeing, but if creation were revealed to us only through the eye, we should know far more than we should feel. So another organ is provided that shall bring creation to us as emotional beings—the ear conveying sound. It is true that the eye can feed the heart and the ear can minister to the mind; they play into each other; still, the distinction is real. Hence, if using the eye we look at creation and find mathematical laws in gravitation and crystallization, and so infer, as we must, that there is a mind behind the laws that speaks to our minds through them, so using the ear and hearing sounds that touch our hearts, we must infer that there is a heart behind the laws of sound that seeks to reveal itself to us through them. We cannot escape this conclusion. For as the mind can get out of creation no more mathematical relations than were put into it, so the heart cannot get from sounds more emotion than was originally lodged in the laws that produce sounds; the effect never exceeds the cause. If the laws of nature seen by the eye reveal an infinite thought or thinker, so these laws heard by the ear and acting on the heart reveal an infinite heart that ordained them. But the laws of sound rest as fully on mathematics as do the laws of gravitation and crystallization,

and so point to the same source—eye and ear, mind and heart, resting on One who is both mind and heart. There are theories that conceive of the source of creation as only thought because they find everywhere thought-relations; other theories which claim that it is force because they find a universal and indestructible energy; but it would be as logical to claim that this original source is feeling or emotion, for there is as much in the universe to awaken emotion as there is to indicate thought or energy. Indeed, as we only come to full consciousness of ourselves in emotions—emotion or feeling being the highest exercise of our nature—so far as we can reason from our nature to its origin, it indicates that we spring from a source of feeling, or an infinite Heart. Hence the highest wisdom has declared that God is Love and that the worlds were made by the Son of God—the eternally begotten manifestation of Love; and the severest science cannot logically assert the contrary.

Leaving the field of metaphysics, let us enter the world of sound that lies about us and see how vast it is—how packed with emotions—how thoroughly attuned it already is to the heart of man—a very voice of God which, if it could utter all its notes at once, would give forth an infinite and eternal harmony.

There is lodged in all created things—so far as we know—a capacity for sound. There is no substance so coarse and unyielding, except perhaps some clays, but has its note which may be brought out under conditions either of concussion or tension. Strike any solid thing, and in addition to the noise caused by the vibrating air you will hear a certain note or key that belongs to the thing itself; or stretch any tensible thing and it will give out a note peculiar to itself when it is sufficiently touched. We do not hear gases when they are gently moved, nor a bubble when it bursts, but only because our ears are dull to their fineness. The pipes in the organ have had no capacity given them, but simply yield up what their original substances contained. Once they were solid woods, gross tin or lead hidden in the heart of the earth, but even there they had this capacity for sound, and their note and quality, as they had color and chemical affinity. Man has only developed what was

within them. By arranging their shape and size and passing a current of air through them, we obtain a sound which the ear pronounces a musical note. And so we speak of a brassy sound—referring it not to a law of vibration nor to the shape of the instrument, but to its substance. Not only a certain kind of wood is required by the violinist, but only a certain quality of that wood will give him the quality of sound he desires. Some substances give forth their notes without rearrangement by simple concussion, or friction, or tension. Water falling from various heights, and reeds of different lengths swept by the wind, and branches of trees bending under the storm utter their notes, sometimes forming almost harmony. And so we may consider the earth as a vast harp strung with innumerable strings, silent yet but full of tuneful sounds and needing only the skill of man to bring them out. This universal capacity for sound or tone is not a bare and unrelated thing but is connected with a law of music which has its seat first in the air and then in the mind of man. We find in the air the musical scale or octave consisting of eight notes formed by quicker or slower vibrations and so having a mathematical basis. All we can say of this law is that it is a law—why and how we cannot tell. Corresponding to this law of the air is a law of hearing within us, so that the musical sense with which we are endowed accords with the musical law of vibration. Thus the scale or octave has two apparent sources or foundations—one in the air, the other in man. The octave does not more truly exist in the mathematical vibration of air than in the mind. We speak vaguely if we say that man has a capacity for hearing the octave in the air; the law of the octave, with its mathematical exactness, is wrought into his nature as thoroughly as it is wrought into the external world. The wonderful thing here is not the adaptation of nature to man, but the absolute identity of the law in nature and the law in man; for if we only silently think the octave, we think it as under the same mathematical law as when we hear it in actual vibration. We behold here a manifestation of God that goes far beyond that of a skilful designer—forcing on us the thought that God is in the laws themselves. And so, at once, we leap to the grand conclusion that it

is because God is so immersed, as it were, in these laws that we can use them for His praise beyond any others revealed to us.

The subject is full of suggestion at this point. Most impressive is the teleological aspect of it. Begin as far back in creation as you will—in the geologic ages when there was no ear to hear, and you find this capacity for sound in all material things—no harmony, no music as yet, but only a note ready to be brought out, and in the forming air a law of vibration ready to turn the notes into harmony, and finally the ear of man ready to catch the harmonies that his skill evokes, and behind the ear the soul ready to praise God in the sounds and harmonies so prepared from the beginning. Here is an orderly sequence of steps and adaptations mounting continually higher—proceeding from God in creation and at last ending in God in the accorded praise of His own conscious image. In a loftier sense than they were written, we may use the words of Dryden :

“ The trembling notes ascend the sky,
And heavenly joys inspire.
The song began from Jove,
Who left his blissful seats above
(Such is the power of mighty love).

So love was crowned, but music won the cause.”

We do not find in nature what may properly be called music, but only its materials and its laws. Man only can create music, for nothing is perfect in creation until, in some way, it touches or passes through man. He is the end and object of creation, and its processes are full and have meaning only when they issue in him. Everything in nature is a puzzle until it finds its solution in man, who solves it by connecting it in some way with God and so completes the circle of creation. Like everything else in nature, music is a *becoming*, and it becomes its full self when its sounds and laws are used by intelligent man for the production of harmony and so made the vehicle of emotion and thought. But sound even before it becomes music may be the occasion of emotion though not of complex emotions, or—we may say—intelligent emotion. It is the peculiarity of the sounds of nature that they awaken but a single emotion; each thing has

its note and some one corresponding feeling. Enter at evening a grove of pines and listen to the wind sighing through the branches; the term by which we spontaneously describe it indicates the one feeling of pensive melancholy it awakens, but an orchestra could not render it more effectively. It lacks, however, the quality of intelligence because it is not combined with other sounds for some end. The song "What are the wild waves saying?" raises a question hard to answer. It is not a hymn to the great Creator until it has passed through the adoring and reflecting mind of man. But even if there is no music in nature—not even in the notes of birds, as the men of science tell us, for the birds but whistle—there are the materials of music, all furnished with their notes set to corresponding emotions; and the gamut is broader than has been compassed. Beyond the reach of the ear of man is a universe of sound—vibrations slower and deeper than those of Niagara, quicker and finer than those of the mosquito's wing, and each is dowered with power to awaken some emotion that now we do not feel because we do not hear the sound. The materialists are much concerned about the possibility of an environment in case of a future life. Where and of what?—they ask. Well, here is an environment of possible emotion transcending present knowledge, and so perhaps awaiting minds to feel it. It is difficult to believe that God has put Himself into creation in the form of emotional sounds and no ear be made to hear them. If a part of creation comes to a realized use in man, why not the whole? If creation is the path between God and man by which they come to each other, must not man journey along the whole of it, even as God has?

But if there is no music in nature there is a prophecy and some hint and even faint articulation of it. In a favoring spot an echo often starts another echo, but an octave above, and in rare places still answering echoes not only on the same key but always in harmony, softer and sweeter. This is almost music and seems a call to man to liberate it from the prison of matter and suffer it to become the harmony it is striving to express—reminding one of that striking passage of Goethe's child correspondent: "When I stand all alone at night in open nature, I feel as though it were a spirit and begged redemption of me.

Often have I had the sensation, as if nature, in wailing sadness, entreated something of me, so that not to understand what she longed cut through my very heart." The child uttered the deepest philosophy and touched the very secret of creation—even this, that God is not above creation as a mechanician, but is in it by indwelling presence, one with its laws, Himself the secret energy of its processes and the soul of the sentiments and thoughts lodged within it, and so coming to man for recognition. There is no fuller revelation of God in nature than is found in these laws of sound by which He comes into the very heart of man, even to its inmost recesses of love and adoration; and it requires only a sensitive, child-like heart to interpret this speechless music locked within nature as the voice of God pleading to be let out into music and praise through the heart of man, for so only can His works praise Him.

I turn abruptly from this world of sound as a revelation of God, to music as a revelation or prophecy of the future. I do not say the future world nor the future of humanity in this world, as I mean both and regard them as one. There is a future of this world in a historical sense, and there is a future world that is above history, but if death is all that divides them, and if death is abolished, they become one. Hence, while the distinction in some ways is to be retained, in moral ways the two worlds are to be regarded as one. Regenerated humanity and heaven are interchangeable terms; they are alike, and one simply passes on and up into the other. It is a central conception of Christianity that death is but an incident in the external history of man. Hence Christ sweeps it out of His path almost as with the scorn of indifference. Hence also in the Apocalypse, with this principle to guide us, we read of heaven and find it refers to this world; the new Jerusalem comes down from God out of heaven, and the tabernacle of God is with men. Is it here or there? We need not answer except to say that it is both, but under a conception of eternity and not of time. This inseparable blending of moral perfection and heavenly existence, so confusing to ordinary thought, is itself a revelation not to be passed by, and one under which we should teach ourselves to think and act. In its struggle with thought and language to unfold the way to future

perfection, the universe itself is taxed for forms of expression. The sun and moon, the stars, the sea, thunders and lightnings, the four winds, the rocks, mountains and islands, fire and earthquake, hail and smoke, trees and green grass, horses and lions and locusts and scorpions, the clouds and the rainbow, dragons and floods, eagles and nameless beasts, the serpent and the lamb, the forces of nature in their mightiest exhibition, the travail of birth, the cities and the nations, all angels and men, temples and altars, kings and queens and wine of wrath, bottomless pits and fiery lakes, death and mourning and famine, merchants with their merchandise of gold and the souls of men—such are the materials of which the drama of human society is composed as it moves on towards perfection. But as the end draws nigh, this tumultuous scenery of the elements and of lower nature passes away, and another order of imagery appears. Now we behold a city lying foursquare, open on all sides, paved with gold, watered by a river of life and fed by a tree of life and lighted by the glory of God. But underneath the whole mighty process of advancing righteousness and continuous judgment is heard the note of praise—harpers harping with their harps—and, at the end, the song of Moses and of the Lamb—the song of deliverance and victory. The underlying or central image of the Apocalypse is song—the voice of harpers mingling with the voice of great thunders and of many waters and of a great multitude—heard throughout and heard at last in the universal ascription—“Hallelujah: for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.”

If we take this central image and ask why it is used to describe heaven or the future of regenerated humanity, the answer would be—because of its fitness. If this final condition were defined in bare words, it would be as follows: Obedience, Sympathy, Feeling or Emotion, and Adoration. These, in a sense, constitute Heaven, or the state of regenerated humanity. By the consent of all ages, heaven has been represented under a conception of music, and will be in all ages to come. It is subjected to many sneers, but the sneer is very shallow. The human mind must have some form under which it can think of its destiny. It is not content to leave it in vagueness. It is a real world we are in, and we are real men and women in it. We

dwell in mystery and within limitations, but over and above the mystery and the limitation is an indestructible sense of reality. I am and I know that I am. Standing on this solid rock, I find reality about me, nor can I be persuaded that other beings and things are dreams or shadows. It is in my very nature to believe in reality, and so I demand definite conceptions, nor can I rest in vagueness or be content with formless visions and their abstractions. Thus the human mind has always worked and thus it always will work—leaving behind it the logicians and plodders in science, in the free exercise of the logic of human nature. I do not absolutely know what sort of a world this will be when it is regenerated, but I must have some conception of it. I do not absolutely know what heaven is like—it will be like only to itself—but if I think of it at all, I must do so under some present definite conception. The highest forms under which we can now think are art-forms—the proportion of statuary and architecture, the color of painting, and music. The former are limited and address a mere sense of beauty, but music addresses the heart and has its vocation amongst the feelings and covers their whole range. Hence music has been chosen to hold and express our conception of moral perfection. Nor is it an arbitrary choice, but is made for the reasons that music is the utterance of the heart; it is an expression of morality, and it is an infinite language. Before the sneer at heaven as a place of endless song can prevail, it must undo all this stout logic of the human heart. We so represent it because when we frame our conception of heaven or moral perfection, we find certain things, and when we look into the nature and operation of music we find the same things, namely: Obedience, Sympathy, Emotion, Adoration. Of this relation we will now speak.

I. Obedience. The idea that is fastest gaining ground in all departments of thought, is that of the reign of law—law always and everywhere and nothing without its range. It does not antagonize a personal God, but requires it; for law is not an abstraction, nor a mere force, but a thing of intelligence and feeling and purpose, and so must be grounded in a being having these characteristics. We cannot say that God is above or under law, nor that He makes laws, nor that He obeys laws. He is Himself

the laws, which are but ways of His acting. This idea does not antagonize liberty, for there is a law of liberty. A free-acting agent is free only because he obeys the law of his own will and obeys it intelligently. He has power to disobey a law but he cannot really break it—it is law still. Nor does the reign of law antagonize grace, for grace has laws as imperative as that of gravitation. Nor does law contradict miracle. The reign of law went on when Christ multiplied the loaves and raised Lazarus from the dead; He simply disclosed laws to which we are unaccustomed, but which may come to view in farther stages of human progress or in another stage of existence. We do all things through laws, and life itself down and up to its widest complexity, is the product of law, so that the exact and absolute correlative of life is obedience. As human life goes on towards perfection and mounts into higher stages here and hereafter, it is simply gaining in obedience. The will grows freer, all the faculties act more spontaneously, the parts of our nature grow more co-ordinate and tend to reinforce each other, until, like some well made engine, the whole fabric of our nature works in swift, silent and frictionless activity, but it is still the action of obedience, and the perfection of the life is but the perfection of the obedience. Heaven is a state of obedience. The kingdom comes in obedience. The New Jerusalem descends out of heaven as the world rises into the obedient order of heaven. But under what art-form shall we express this? for expression we must have. It must be an art that is itself full of obedience and covers—so to speak—its history, and discloses its results. Sculpture and painting have their laws which they must rigidly obey, but they address chiefly the sense of form and proportion and color, and end chiefly in a sense of mere beauty or fitness; they are largely intellectual and yield their results chiefly in the intellect. But music goes farther. While its laws are as exact and fine as those of form and color and even more recondite, any breaking of them begets a deeper sense of disobedience. When we see a distorted form or ill-matched colors, the eye is offended, but there is no such protest as that of the ear when it is assailed by discord. False proportion and crudely joined colors provoke what may be called mental indignation but nothing more; the borders of feeling are

reached but not deeply penetrated. But a discord of sounds lays hold of the nerves and rasps them into positive pain. In fine natures it may even cause extreme physiological disturbance. A statue could not be so ugly nor a painting so ill colored as to produce spasms, but such a result is quite possible through discord. The sensitiveness of musicians is not a matter of sentiment, and is the farthest from affectation, but is a matter of nerves. The protest and the pain are exactly of the same nature as those caused by a fall and concussion. But, reaching the mind along the wounded nerves, it awakens there the same feelings of anger and resentment that we feel when we have been ruthlessly struck. A discord of sounds is unendurable, but we hardly say that of violations of form and color. This shows that we are much more finely related to the laws of sound than to those of form and color, and that the relation covers a wider range of our nature; or, in other words, that music is a better type of obedience. When its laws are broken, the history of disobedience is written out in the protests of our whole being—from quivering nerve to the indignation of the heart.

There is also an exactness in the laws of harmony that makes obedience to them specially fine and so fit to be a type of it. While, as in every art, it can only approximate an ideal—never reaching, perhaps, actual harmony—it is more rigidly under law and comes nearer its ideal than any other. It is able more thoroughly to overcome the grossness of matter and to use it for its ends than is statuary or painting—nature is more pliant to it. There is a latitudinarianism in other arts that admits of defense, but there is none in music. The sculptor may trench on the laws of form for the sake of deepening expression, but the musician seeks higher effects by an increasing adherence to the laws of his art. If he admits a discord it is not as a variation from harmony but as a denial of it, and is used to shock the hearer into a deeper sense of the investing concord. Nor is any other art so fine in the distinctions it makes. Nothing can be more exact and more minute than the laws of light by which form is revealed, but the eye is not so keen to mark slight departures from the law of form as is the ear in noting variations in its realm. A highly trained musician can detect a variation from the pitch of $\frac{1}{4}$ th of

a semitone, but the best mechanical eye could not detect a correspondingly fine variation of a line from the perpendicular, nor could the nicest sense of color perceive a like variation of shade. There is also this peculiar and suggestive difference between the eye and the ear and their action: the eye never transcends the laws of light and form; it always acts within the limits of mathematical laws, and is transcended by them, but the musical ear recognizes laws for which no scientific basis is yet found. In the tuning of any stringed instrument certain requirements of the ear are heeded for which no reasons can be given; the problem is too subtle even for such an one as Helmholtz—suggesting that music is that form of art in which man expresses his transcendence of nature. As man himself reaches beyond nature and its laws, and goes over into another, even a spiritual world, so music is the art that lends itself to this feature of his nature, going along with it and opening the doors as it mounts into the heavens.

This fine obedience in music is best seen, however, in its execution. When voice joins with voice in the harmony of their contrasted parts and instruments add their deeper and higher tones—trumpets and viols and reeds each giving their various sounds—voices as of great multitude it may be and instruments as of the full orchestra—and all, binding themselves down to exact law, conspire to the utterance of manifold harmony, we have not only the most perfect illustration of obedience but the joy of obedience; one is immediately transmuted into the other; we are thus let into the soul of obedience and find it to be joy—that its law is a law of life. The pleasure we feel in music springs from the obedience which is in it, and it is full only as the obedience is entire.

Thus we see how this art becomes prophetic. There is a double yet single goal before humanity—the goal of obedience to the eternal laws and the goal of bliss. The race is long, and slowly are the mile-stones of ages passed, but when the foot of the runner has touched the last bound, his hands also touch either pillar of the goal; he has obeyed and he is blest. But in all the race he has a continual lesson and a constant presage in this divine art of music—its laws glorifying obedience and its joy feeding his tired spirit.

II. Music is, beyond all other arts, the expression and vehicle of sympathy. In the evolution of matter the progress is from simplicity to variety; in the brute world the progress is the same in the form of fierce antagonism that yields the semblance of almost entire selfishness—not selfish because not yet moral. When humanity is reached, this brute inheritance becomes true selfishness because it encounters laws of conscience and welfare that require the contrary. The order of creation is reversed in man. The isolating struggle of self against every other ends, and a law of preservation takes its place. The watchword is no longer destruction but salvation. The line of progress does not run through isolation and antagonism but through union and sympathy. The aspect of creation before and outside of man shows repulsion; in man creation draws together. Before man, destiny lay in a destructive struggle between species; in man the process ends and he achieves his destiny by loving his neighbor. Under whatever burdens of brute inheritance and ignorance and voluntary evil, thither the destiny of man tends. The highest action of man's nature is the free play of sympathy—not agreement of thought nor concurrence of will, but feeling with another. This alone is true unity. If the human race achieves any destiny it will be of this sort; if there be a heaven it will be a heaven of sympathy. The promise and presage of it are not only wrought into our hearts but into the divine art we are considering. No other art, no other mode of impression equals music in its power to awaken a common feeling. The orator approaches it, but he deals chiefly with convictions, and conviction is a slow and hard path to feeling, while music makes a direct appeal. A patriotic hymn does its work far more surely and quickly than does an argument for the Constitution; and the orator is not effective till he borrows from music something of its rhythm and cadence and purity of tone. The most persuasive orator* of the age spoke in as strict accord with the laws of music as a trained singer, and often it was the melody of his voice that "won the cause." Music leaves logic behind in the race towards sympathy and action, and if it were not itself noble and true; if it did not hide and lose its power when yoked to a

* Wendell Phillips. See *Andover Review*, Vol I., p. 309.

bad cause, it would work great mischief in society. It abets reason and only discloses its full power and works its mightiest results when used in the service of truth. Hence there is no music in nations and races that are without nobility of thought, and there is no truer test of the quality of a nation than its music. Bach and Haydn and Beethoven would be impossible in a nation that did not produce a Kant, a Schelling and a Schleiermacher; and the former are as truly exponents of its character as the latter.

The main office of music is to secure sympathy. When a great singer, taking words that are themselves as music, joins them to notes set with a master's skill, and, pouring into perfect tones the passion of a feeling heart, so describes some tragic tale of death, every heart of a thousand hearers beats with a common feeling, and every mind, for the time, runs in the same path of pity and sadness; for the moment there is absolute sympathy. If instead a truth or principle underlie the song, there is also a temporary agreement in thought. The moral and social value of such experiences is great; they lead away from selfishness and point to that harmony of thought and feeling towards which humanity is struggling.

So too in producing music, its highest effects can be gained only when the performers not only read and utter alike, but feel alike. Hence there is in music a moral law of sympathy as imperative as its mathematical laws. Hence also no one who is centrally selfish ever becomes great either as composer or performer; and often—when everything else is perfect—the defect lies at this very point. "If I could make you suffer for two years," said a teacher to a noted singer, "you would be the best contralto in the world." It follows with sure logic that no one can truly sing God's praises who does not adore God. No training of voice or touch can compass the divine secret of praise. The feeling of praise—not as mere feeling but as solid conviction—must enter into the utterance or it lacks the one quality of highest effectiveness. It is said that the undevout astronomer is mad, but the undevout musician is an impossibility. If we fail to distinguish between what may be called *fine* and *genuine* rendering, it is because it is not always easy to distinguish between

reality and unreality. What is the matter with the music? is a question often asked. The technical rendering may be faultless and the defect lie in that inmost centre, whence are all the issues of life and power. In the nature of things there is the same reason for faith, consecration, devout feeling and holy living in the choir as in the pulpit, and there is nothing unbecoming in the conduct and feeling of the preacher that is not equally unbecoming, and for the same reasons, in singers of the divine praises. It is not a matter of appropriateness but of effectiveness—not of the fitness of things but of the nature of things which is always sincere and can yield results only as it is kept true. We are guided in this matter by nature itself. Any musical sound, however produced, immediately seeks to ally itself with other sounds, but it selects only those that are in agreement with it, and passes by all others. Strike a note on any instrument and the sound will start into audible vibration other sounds but only those harmonious with itself. Thus in the very depths of music there is planted this law of sympathy—like seeking like and joining their harmonious forces. Hence it is that those who feel alike, and are keyed as it were in their nature to the same pitch, turn to music for expression, and, on the other hand, voices that blend lead to blended hearts. Love often has this origin and grows through the mingled song of two voices. Households that sing are the most sympathetic and harmonious in all their order. Christian altruism and mutuality find their highest expressions in song and are fostered by it. Upon the whole, men agree in the matter of music better than in anything else. Call a synod of all the churches—orthodox and heterodox, Puritan and Prelatical, Protestant and Catholic, and while they could not put ten words together in which they would agree, they would all unite in singing the *Te Deum*. The Prelatical churches certainly touch a great truth when they sing their creeds, for a creed is in reality for the heart with which we believe unto salvation. Here we come close to the fact that music is a revelation of future perfection. That ultimate condition will be one in which the separating power of evil is ended, and men have attained to the wisdom of love. They are no longer developed by antagonism and isolation but under a law of mutuality. Then each

life shares in the power and volume of every other, and the peculiar value and quality of each is wrought into a total of perfect unity. We search in vain for any expression or type of this destiny until we enter the higher fields of music where it is written out with alphabetic plainness in the eternal characters and laws of nature. The united action of the full chorus and orchestra is a perfect transcript down to the last and finest particular, of perfected human society. The relation of voices to instruments and of instruments to each other, the variety in harmony, the obedience to law drawing its power from sympathetic feeling, the inspiration of a noble theme, the conspiring together to enforce a mighty feeling which is also a thought—we thus have an exact symbol of the destiny of humanity. If it is never reached, then indeed prophecy will have failed and love also; then the noblest art we know will have turned into a delusion—a nourisher of sickly dreams—the chiefest vanity of a vain and meaningless world.

III. Music as an expression of *feeling* is a prophecy of that grander exercise of our nature for which we hope.

It is the nature of feeling to express itself. Thought may stay behind silent lips, but when it becomes feeling it runs to expression. So far as we can reason from ourselves, we cannot believe that the universe sprang out of thought. Thought would not have made this mighty expression that we call creation; it is an expression of feeling—some infinite emotion that must find vent or the infinite heart will burst with its suppression. Music is an illustration of this law of our emotions, and is the natural expression of great and deep feeling. When great crises fall upon nations and oratory fails to give full vent to the heroic purpose of their hearts, some poet links hands with some composer, and so a battle-hymn sweeps the armies on to victory—the fiery clangor of the Marseillaise, or the sad, stately rhythm of the John Brown Hymn. History all along culminates in song. The summits of Jewish history from Miriam to David are vocal with psalms. There is nothing grand in thought, deep in feeling, splendid in action, but runs directly to song for expression. When feeling reaches a certain point, it drops the slow processes of thought and speech and mounts the wings of song and so

flies forward to its hope. "O that I had wings as a dove;" the feet are too slow to bear us away from our sorrow to our rest. In the simplest life there is always this tendency of feeling, whether of joy or sadness, to voice itself in melody. When night draws its curtain gloomily around us and all the weariness of the day and the sadness of past years are gathered into one hour, forcing tears, idle but real, to our eyelids, deepening and swelling into a burden of despair, how naturally we turn to music for utterance and relief. Some gentle strain is sung by tender lips, or perchance some chord of harmony is wafted from the distance, and the sad spell is broken. Goethe makes a chance strain of an Easter hymn defeat the purpose of a suicide—a thought that Chopin has wrought into one of his Nocturnes. As in nature there is a resolution of forces by which heat becomes light, so emotion, of whatever sort, if entrusted to music, turns into joy. What a fact! Here is the world of humanity tossing with emotions—love, sorrow, hope—driving men hither and thither—and here is music ready to take these emotions up into itself where it purifies and sublimates them and gives them back as joy and peace. What alchemy is like this? how heavenly, how divine! If, in the better ages to come, there still be weariness, sorrow, disappointment, delayed hope, may we not expect that this transmutation of them into joy which goes on here, will continue to act there? We are moving on towards an age and a world of sympathy, and sympathy is the solvent of trouble. If so, there must be some medium or actualized form of sympathy, for there will never come a time when mind can act upon mind without some medium, and the art-idea is probably eternal. In some supernal sense then, music will be the vocation of humanity when its full redemption is come. The summit of existence is feeling; the summit of character is sympathy, and music is the art-form that links them together.

IV. Music is the truest and most nearly adequate expression of the *religious* emotions and so becomes prophetic of the destiny of man as a religious being. "The soul of the Christian religion," says Goethe, "is reverence." It is also the great, inclusive act or condition of man as he comes into perfection. Goethe adds, with profound suggestions, that it must be taught. The

highest conception of the use of creation is as a tuition in reverence. Whatever else it may teach, it teaches this, or, if it fails in this, it teaches nothing. There is no severer condemnation nor surer refutation of the agnostic and mechanical theories of creation than that they rob it of this special function. There can be no reverence for an unknowable cause of creation, nor for a universe whose processes are only mechanical, nor for humanity if it is the automaton of unconscious forces. The whole tendency and operation of physical science at present—if men would but see it—is towards a world not of mere mystery but of wonder, where the only proper feeling is adoration. Materialism is breaking up and disappearing under the discovery of laws and processes and causes for which it has no explanation, and all things are resolving into mere symbols of will and mind and feeling. Already matter has eluded the touch of our senses, and our recognition of it as a thing in itself is a mere conventionality of speech. The resolution of it into force or motion, and of its processes into forms of thought is a drawing out of more than every alternate thread from the veil that hangs between creation and its Source: the veil may never be wholly put aside but it grows continually thinner, letting through revealing rays of truth and glory. When this process gets full recognition—as it surely will—and men become tired of the senseless play of agnostic phrases and catch-words, and philosophy triumphs as it always has triumphed and always will, there will be but one voice issuing from creation—the voice of praise, and but one feeling issuing from the heart of man—the feeling of reverence before the revealed Creator. Then the heart of man will require some form of expression for its mighty and universal conviction. We have already a great oratorio of the Creation but we shall have a greater still—profounder in its harmonies and more majestic in its ascriptions.

We have in music the art-form that is not only fitted to express our religious feelings but is wholly fitted for nothing else. I mean that music is creatively designed for religion and not directly for anything else. Like all great arts it has a large pliancy through which it may be adapted to many uses. Music may be made degrading and a minister of sensuality or trivial pleasure, but never by its

own consent nor with a full use of its powers. When music is used to pave the way to vice certain instruments are rigidly excluded and the nobler tones are exchanged for "soft Lydian airs." This exclusion and perversion every true musician detects as a lack in the music itself, and the spirit of music—like a fettered Sampson—pleads with him for a better use and fuller exercise of its nature. Such use of music is like the look of scorn in the face of beauty; no other face could express the scorn so well, but the beauty is still a protest against its use for such an end—it is made for something better. So music lends itself to almost every human feeling down to the vilest, but always with suppression of its power. It is not till it is used for the expression of that wide range of feeling which we call religious that it discloses its full powers. Then it is on its native heath; it gathers its full orchestra from the organ to the drum, from softest viols and flutes to tinkling cymbals, from instruments that are all passion to instruments of almost passionless dignity; then it covers the whole scale of its vast compass, from one pure note of voice or instrument to its highest possible combinations, from a slumber song to a Hallelujah chorus. It is not a matter of fancy but a fact of science that music never seems to be satisfied with itself except when it is used in a religious way; it is always seeking to escape into this higher form, even as man is himself. We hardly leave scientific ground when we say that music itself is a holy thing and is always seeking to create holiness by some inherent law. It always strives to destroy and overcome its opposite—not by absolute destruction but by conversion. Strike all the keys of a piano and some strong, righteous notes will gather up the agreeing notes, silence the others and create a harmony out of the discord. When a rough, loud noise is made—like an explosion—the harmonious notes sift out and drop the discordant ones so that the final vibration in the distance is no longer jarring noise but soft and pleasing harmony. An over-refinement of thought this may seem, but it is no finer than the laws of nature. It is, at least, an illustration of what it does in man, silencing the discord of his tossed life and refining every sentiment and purpose into sweet agreement.

Beethoven put this process into musical form. In one of his

symphonies, he opens with four full, strong chords from the entire orchestra ; then the separate instruments begin to war upon them, strive to overpower them with the blare of trumpets, to drown them in the complexities of the violins, to silence them under the rattle of the drums ; but the primal chords, yielding at times, still hold their own, gather force, reassert themselves, and at last overpower their antagonists by patient persistence and all-conquering sweetness, rise into full possession of the theme and sweep on into harmonies divine in their power and beauty.

The truth that music is for religion is equally evident in the fact that nothing calls for it like religion. Men fight better under the stir of music but they can fight well without it. Business does not require it. Pleasure craves it, but the voice and the zest of young life supply its lack. It is not needed in the enacting of laws, nor in the pleadings of courts. It might be left out in every department of life save one, and nothing would be radically altered ; there would be lack, but not loss of function. But religion as an organized thing and as worship could not exist without it. When song dies out where men assemble for worship, the doors are soon closed. When praise is repressed and crowded aside for the sermon, the service sinks into a hard intellectual process for which men do not long care. Eloquence and logic will not take its place—why, it is difficult to say until it is recognized that music is the main factor of worship—a fact capable of philosophical statement, namely : worship being a moral act or expression, it depends upon the rhythm and harmony of art for its materials ; they are the substances—so to speak—ordained by God and provided in nature out of which worship is made. And so the Church in all ages has flowered into song. It takes for itself the noblest instrument and refuses none. It draws to itself the great composers whom it first attunes to its temper and then sets to its tasks which invariably prove to be their greatest works. In no other field do they work so willingly and with so full exercise of genius. There is a freedom, a fulness and perfection in sacred composition to be found in no other field. In all other music there is a call for more or for something different, but the music of adoration

leaves the spirit in restful satisfaction. Dryden, the most tuneful of poets, divided the crown between old Timotheus and the divine Cecilia, but surely it is greater to "draw an angel down" than "lift a mortal to the skies."

The fact that all religious conviction and feeling universally run to music for their full and final expression certainly must have some philosophical explanation. In rough and crude form it may be stated thus; music is the art-path to God in whom we live and move and have our being. We may get to God by many ways—by the silent communion of spirit with Spirit, by aspiration, by fidelity of service, but there is no path of *expression* so open and direct as that of music. The common remark that music takes us away from ourselves, is philosophically true. When under its spell we transcend our ordinary thought and feeling and are carried—as it were—into another world; and if it be sacred music, that world is the world of the Spirit. When the spell ends and we come back to this present world, we do not cease to believe in that into which we were lifted. While there, lapped in its harmonies and soaring in its adorations, we felt how real that world is and how surely it must at last be eternally realized. Towards that age of adoring harmony humanity is struggling, and into that upper world where the discords of time and earth are resolved into tune, every earnest soul is steadily pressing.

Meanwhile we have some foretaste of

" That undisturbed song of pure concent
Aye sung before the sapphire-color'd throne
To Him that sits thereon,
With saintly shout and solemn jubilee;
Where the bright seraphim, in burning row,
Their loud up-lifted angel-trumpets blow;
And the cherubic host, in thousand quires,
Touch their immortal harps of golden wires,
With those just spirits that wear victorious palms,
Hymns devout and holy psalms
Singing everlastingly."

POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ITS RELATION TO ETHICS.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, Asbury Park, N. J., July 25th, 1885.]

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IT is proposed in this paper to discuss the inter-relations and interactions of economical and ethical facts and ideas with reference, first and practically, to the principles and methods on which certain problems of the economic social order are to be dealt with; second, with reference to questions of scope and method in Political Economy and the relations of economic to ethical theory.

In the department of practice there is frequent conflict, or appearance of conflict, between economic and moral impulses and maxims. In the department of theory the philosophy on the one hand of material comfort and value, on the other of moral perfection and worth, evince, each in turn, a tendency to invasion or absorption of the other's sphere. This "conflict" is, in part, the outcome of fundamental differences of bias or belief; differences in the conception of life, whether held from practical or from speculative points of view. But, aside from this, there is abundant occasion for collision between economics and ethics in the fact, that while their spheres are distinct they have much in common and deeply inter-penetrate each other. They are distinct; for the economic and the moral ends are wide apart in their nature, and the measures of value and means of production which apply in the one sphere have no direct significance in the other. Yet because the moral and the economic life of man have their distinct aims and methods, it is too easily inferred that they may be separated in practice; a conclusion expressed in the commercial maxim that "Business is business," when interpreted by an underlying idea that "there is a special department of

life for pursuing one's own interests and again another for the practice of virtue."

On the other hand, economics and ethics do coincide as to ends and co-operate by their respective methods, in a great measure. The economic end supports the moral in so far as society needs capital for its moral as well as for its material progress. The strife of economic competition fosters the prudential virtues. Again, moral development carries with it economic advance. The pursuit of the good, in the long run at least, favors the production of the useful. Order, efficiency and credit have their roots in moral faith and feeling. Virtue goes out of man into matter to make a more habitable world.

This constant and necessary interplay of the two spheres explains in part the tendency to encroachment in theory and practice of the one upon the other. Thus on the one hand, the moralist is much inclined to regulate business affairs by purely ethical methods, while on the other extreme the thorough-going representatives of the "let alone" theory in politico-moral speculation would leave little, if any, distinct occupation to the moralist. Proceeding to consider for purposes both practical and speculative some aspects of the "conflict" pending along the lines above indicated, we wish first to discuss that invasion of ethics by the ideas and methods of economics which is involved in the claims of the extreme advocates of the *laissez faire* principle.

The development of this doctrine has gone along with the development of the modern industrial system; the triumphs of which in the increase of wealth and diffusion of comfort appear to have been largely due to the acceptance of the *laissez faire* principle by governments, and this has encouraged efforts toward a wide and unqualified application of the principle in social affairs.

It will be useful for the purposes of our discussion to recall here some facts in the history of economic progress, showing how essentially and necessarily modern is the conception that economic matters "regulate themselves," and by what steps of thought a social philosophy of *laissez faire* has naturally grown out of this. Mr. W. Bagehot, in his "Economic Studies," has well elucidated the inapplicability to primitive or barbarous

society of the fundamental postulates of English economic science. It has been said, indeed, that Adam Smith thought there was "a Scotchman inside of every man." But of the Zulu as the missionary first knew him and of the primitive man generally, it is fallacious to assert the existence in his nature of an unlimited desire of gain, which will lead him, under favoring circumstances, to work and save. The master passion of the Zulu was rather one which Dr. Martineau in his scale of motives places three steps lower than Love of Gain, viz.: Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure. Neither could the desire for wealth, when it appeared, become an important social force until a society had passed through the strife which attends the era of "nation making" and which is requisite to secure the political and legal conditions of a social organism. Social coherence and some degree of institutional order must precede the organization of any industrial co-operation. The "natural liberty" and the "arrangements of nature" of which Adam Smith speaks, presume for their beneficent operation an artificial and complex civilization in which wealth has come to be sought as an end and the pursuit of it made practicable by an elaborate system which determines and protects the rights of person and property, including contract. Ancient Greece and Rome exhibit a partial economic development, yet their civilization is not guided principally by the commercial spirit, and the main postulate of English political economy does not hold of the course of their economic affairs. A state which in its ideal was "opposed to every form of individual independence and to all minor social combinations," a society for which slavery was the great productive source of wealth and in which militancy was the predominant type of social activity, offered little room for the reality and even less hospitality for the conception of a self-regulating industrialism, in which the "mechanics of interest" should work out the highest material welfare of all. By their most cherished habits of thought as well as by social circumstances, the ancients, as Cossa expresses it, were "prevented from attaining the idea of the existence of natural laws governing the phenomena of social wealth."

The impersonal economic forces of the modern time, the

powers of automatic and instinctive operation in the industrial system, are not clearly recognized till the era of scientific political economy, because they do not much before that distinctly and vigorously manifest their existence. Christianity sowed a seed of individualism in its doctrine of the priceless worth of man as man, and it favored the eventual development of an industrial civilization in so far as it discouraged militancy and inculcated the sentiment of human brotherhood. Even feudalism, while obstructing industry by the political and civil anarchy it caused, gave a better standing and prospect to labor by substituting for slavery the permanent attachment of the tiller to the soil. The instincts of the new time, however prepared, slumbered until set in motion by the new knowledge of the luxuries and arts of life diffused over Europe in the wake of the Crusades. This impulse did not cease in the main to gather force from one and another quarter until the millions of Europe were moving on a new career which, if less blest with dull content than that which Church and State had marked out for them and strove to hold them to, was at least their own. The upward movement of Europe from this time, in the line of a higher ideal of social well-being, involves increasing transition from the *regime* of status to that of contract and, as fundamental to this, the continuous elaboration in law of the rights of person and property. The love of a larger and more varied human life, one less poor in the elements of dignity and enjoyment, fastens on wealth as a means to this, open to the people at large, and this stimulates enterprise and saving, industry and commerce, both in extension and intension, as no state-policy could begin to do. Indeed, the political economy of European statesmen in the period preceding the development of economic science, had in view not so much the enrichment of general society as the provision of revenue for the state and the overseeing the trades in the interest of good workmanship and reasonable prices. Neither State nor Church encouraged the growth of luxury nor the development of that new ambition which was to prove destructive to distinctions of birth. The force of the new tendencies was not recognized before the aristocracy found a plutocracy treading on their heels. How the sudden growth of commercial wealth

affected the ruling class is strikingly illustrated by the incident recorded of a queen of France who, invited to a public banquet at commercial Bruges, is said to have wept on finding herself surrounded by six hundred merchants' wives more richly attired than herself.

The growth of industrial and commercial wealth as it goes on apace, makes more and more unmistakable demonstrations that this movement is governed by laws of its own which must eventually render futile attempts at systematic guidance or restraint of it from without ; though trade suffers from multifarious restrictions—from the guilds on the one side, from the governments on the other. Thus Venice sought to keep the secret of her wealth-producing arts by decreeing death to any Venetian workman or artist who should transport his art to a foreign country. Of so wise and so late a statesman as Sully a historian writes that "All consumption of foreign products seemed to him a larceny committed against France and an attack aimed at her morals ; every exportation of money a calamity which it was necessary to prevent by energetic measures." But though growth may be distorted and hindered it cannot be prevented by chains. And not only does the growing industrialism vanquish restrictions, it grows more averse to all interference, even such as aims to assist its development. Experience teaches it such faith in the hidden wisdom of the natural currents of trade, as the woodsman has in the capacity of the mountain-brook to find the shortest way down hill. It answers the statesman's offers of assistance by indicating the maintenance of order as his proper line of duty. It was the great Colbert's friendly inquiry of a group of French merchants summoned to advise him what the government could do for the advantage of trade, which elicited from them what was later adopted as the universal maxim of practical economics : "*Laissez faire*," "*laissez passer*." "Let us alone and keep the ways open." The French merchants had but bluntly expressed the instinctive feeling or the judgment of experience of their class: the French Economists and Adam Smith, but the latter especially, gave to their conviction the force of a reasoned conclusion. The prevalence of individualism in the philosophic thought of

the eighteenth century, the universal practice of deducing the good of the whole from the co-operation of all egoistic efforts, favored but does not largely account for the instant and wide welcome given to the "Wealth of Nations." In such theses of this book as "that private interest naturally points to that employment most advantageous to the society, but without intending it or knowing it," Adam Smith seemed to be simply reporting that which was transpiring in the new order of things and making the spirit of the age clearly conscious of and rationally complacent with itself. It seems the spirit of the industrial era which finds a voice in his pages, proclaiming the enfranchisement of the desires and ambitions which ancient philosophy and middle-age piety alike had condemned, showing the reality and rightwiseness of the laws of trade and declaring the new order of things to be that which nature has pointed out and which it was "the statesman's duty simply to maintain, by allowing every man, so long as he observes the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in his own way and to bring forth his industry and capital into the freest competition with those of his fellow-citizens."

The unprecedented development of industrialism and of material prosperity in England during the quarter of a century following the publication of the "Wealth of Nations" seemed to illustrate and more than confirm the doctrines of a book which, appearing in the year of our American Independence, Prof. Perry has well characterized as "itself a sort of declaration of independence of the false principles and foolish policy of the mercantile system." Mr. Green in his "Short History of the English People," recounts with enthusiasm the wonderful progress of the nation during this period. "The loss of America only increased the commerce with that country. Industry began that great career which was to make England the workshop of the world;" and "Pitt had hardly become Minister before he took the principles of the 'Wealth of Nations' as the groundwork of his policy." Comparative freedom of competition and the mechanically operating force of interest had effected so much for material welfare that it was not wonderful if the teleological forces, formerly overestimated in their influence upon the

social well-being, should be in turn undervalued and that by philosopher and moralist even as well as statesman. To Adam Smith indeed, as F. A. Lange ("Hist. Materialism") has observed, "the market of interests was not the whole of life but only an important side of it"; but Lange asserts, not without some reason, that Smith's successors "forgot the other side and confounded the rules of the market with the rules of life; nay, even with the elementary laws of human nature." At any rate, when new problems arose in connection with the immense massing of labor by manufactures and the new and hard conditions of life in the industrial centres, political economists argued that these difficulties were to be settled only by the same laws which decided the price of corn and bacon.

Organized industrialism showed its dark side early in the nineteenth century; humanity, "always an end, never a means" in a moral view, seemed to have become a mere "means" in the process of manufacture; the poor but safe living on the soil had been exchanged by thousands for the precarious and sordid existence of operatives hived in strange cities; population increased more rapidly as machinery utilized the labors of children; cries of distress went up at each vicissitude of trade as work was wanting or the slender wage was further narrowed. With an enormous increase of wealth the condition of labor seemed to grow relatively more depressed under the free play of competition. The political economy of the period, however, confident in its logic, maintained the wholesomeness of unmitigated competition. And however logically necessary its conclusions might seem, economic science certainly wore a less benign aspect than in her conflict with kings for the industrial enfranchisement of the toiling millions, when now, for their consolation in suffering, she could evolve from her philosophic quiet only the inexorable maxim that "these things regulate themselves." The uselessness and danger of public charity may be conclusively evidenced; the "iron law of wages" demonstrated; Political Economy no less naturally wears the appellation of the "dismal science;" and if she bear indeed the gospel of civilization, it can hardly be called a glad tidings for the poor. Rigid logicians set themselves to show that everything was very good under a reign of

free competition, or at least as good as the arrangements of nature would allow ; though by some it was later recognized that the laborer in England was at an unnatural disadvantage, owing to political inequities dating back to the feudal period which denied him his natural free recourse to the soil. The radical ideas which spread in the wake of the French revolution had awakened an alarm in England which increased the natural disposition of her thinkers to justify at all points the existing order of things. A conservative instinct of this sort appears to have impelled Mr. Malthus about the beginning of the century to the development of his theory of the necessary relation of population to subsistence, a theory which throws the blame of economic distress on unbounteous nature and individual improvidence, and which in effect anticipates Darwinism in sociology. "Malthus, a most excellent and benevolent person, was so convinced that the limitation of what produces wealth should be effected in the interests of wealth, that he proposed to do away with all relief to destitution."

The course of the present century has presented new social problems; new phases in the operation of the competition system which have elicited and justified social action at certain points, in restraint of competition and which have not contributed to an increase of confidence in the well-worn economic maxim that "these things regulate themselves." "*Laissez faire*" as a fundamental principle is now more profoundly questioned and searchingly criticised; while on the other hand it is just now perhaps more strictly held to by men of affairs, and certainly more broadly and vigorously enunciated in speculation, than ever before.

The English Factory Acts and the beneficial results of their enforcement testified to the necessity of some limitation of freedom of contract in the fierce pursuit of gain. Again, the tendency to concentration of industrial power in the hands of monopolies resulting from combination, with attendant evils in the disturbance of free competition and the destruction of personal relations between employers and employed, has diffused inquietude and has disposed many to consider whether combination and organization are not a better way of procuring desired

results than the system now in vogue; has prompted movements toward co-operation in production or even for an extension of the industrial functions of government. Further, the socialistic cry that under the modern industrial system, the "rich grow richer while the poor grow poorer" has not ceased to be heard, and while in its literal sense this complaint is not supported by comparative statistics yet competent students of economic history find a relative truth underlying it. Thus Mr. Rogers ("Six Centuries of Work and Wages"), while he does not doubt that the ordinary hardships of human life in England were greater and more general six centuries ago than now, finds that the extremes of wealth and poverty were less widely separated. The relative condition of the laboring class is what is in question, in view of the steady development in the volume of human wants and the appliances for satisfying them; and the continuous rise in the standard of decent living.

The newer school in Political Economy, which received from Germany its original and strongest impulse, emphasizes the defects and weaknesses of the competition system and of a civilization dominated by the commercial spirit; combats the optimistic views of the old economy and regards the production but especially the distribution of wealth as offering many problems which may be solved by wisely concerted social action; which at any rate cannot be satisfactorily solved simply by a "let alone policy."

Yet the *laissez faire* theory has not ceased to formulate the practical convictions of the mercantile classes in general, while in speculation it reasserts itself with a new and broader sweep in the social philosophy of Mr. Spencer, in which evolutionary sociology of a mechanical type dictates the social aim and the individualism of the old political economy supplies the means of effecting the social welfare. In the increasing disposition to invoke the aid of the state for the amelioration of human conditions, Mr. Spencer sees but perverse and dangerous interferences with the natural and wholesome order of things, and interruption of the course of history in its normal advance toward an industrial *regime* of free contract. Views inculcated in Mr. Spencer's previous writings are elaborated in his latest

volume, "The Man *versus* the State," in which he sounds as it were an alarm to civilization concerning the perils threatening it from over-legislation, increasing the evils it aims to cure and foreboding a coming slavery. This impending slavery is the bondage of the individual who, as well by a democracy as ever by an autocracy or oligarchy, may be enslaved if the free direction of his activity is to be taken from him and he is to be despoiled by vote of the produce of his labor. Reward and benefit should be, as by nature, bestowed in proportion to ability to fulfil all the requirements of life. If this order be artificially altered, the multiplication of the inferior is furthered and that of the superior hindered and progressive degradation of the species results. And, in Mr. Spencer's words, "the poverty of the incapable, the distress that comes upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle and the shouldering aside of the weak by the strong which leave so many in shallows and in miseries, are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence." Mr. Spencer indeed, in reply to criticisms, declares himself not opposed to individual or social effort, not extending to state interference, to assist weakness in the struggle for existence; but the principle on which all state interference is opposed would seem to be of broad application. An able American economist and uncompromising advocate of *laissez faire* teaches, in the vein of Mr. Spencer, that "nature gives full operation to all superiorities," and that "the state in establishing justice does not aim to correct Nature in the least but to leave her laws undisturbed." And in a widely-read essay entitled "What Social Classes owe to Each Other," the same American writer enforces in vigorous fashion the supreme importance to society of the economic commandment, "Mind thy own business," and discourses of "the danger of minding other people's business" in a way which seems not calculated to encourage either social or individual effort for the general good much outside the lines of interested action.

Instead of a mere working rule in economics, subordinated when need requires to the higher ends and laws of social action, we have in the recent version of *laissez faire* a principle of wide application and broadly defended as tending to secure the "survival of the fittest"; an end which competes and conflicts with

the ethical end as commonly understood. Here we have indeed an invasion of ethics by economic ideas and methods and a transformation of the rules of the market into rules of life ; a philosophic justification in fact of the current tendency in practice to carry the commercial spirit into all the affairs of life.

Let us grant that the "hard doctrine" of the new prophets has a great deal of "hard sense" in it and that such teaching may be needed to keep the human race up to its work and to counteract the influence of *doctrinaires* disposed to magnify unduly the efficiency of the teleologic as compared with the mechanically-acting forces of social progress. It is by encouraging the individual initiative and developing individual responsibility that modern society has been able to produce modern civilization, and business experience and economic history alike condemn any experiments at social reform which may tend to relax the tension of this great nerve of social progress. It is true that the great chance of usefulness offered to each one is the care of his own business and that by no one can this duty be so ably attended to as by the one closest to the facts and most immediately concerned in the result. It is even true that the much-deplored inequalities in the distribution of wealth and the tragic vicissitudes of fortune have, within certain limits, a compensatory action in the powerful stimulus of alternate hope and fear which they exert upon human energy and invention, so that, be aspirations not too hopeless or fears fairly unnerving, they stir society healthfully, "as the sea is kept alive by the trouble of its tides." And there are multitudes in our time, as in every time, with reference to whose needs these truths can hardly be overstated. There are hosts of semi-awake, shiftless, ineffective people, complaining of their luck and nursing grievance against the arrangements of society ; there are idle sentimentalists delighting to dispense superfluous sympathy or weakening help ; there are sciolistic world-menders and wrong-headed dabsters at philanthropy—all of whom need nothing so much as a cleansing and tonic dose of the bitterest kind of British political economy with a dash in it, may be, of the new doctrine of the rightwiseness of natural selection and the survival of the fittest.

But, all this fully recognized, it remains true that the good service which economic individualism has done and has yet to do for humanity furnishes no real ground for the assumption that to "let alone" is the golden rule within the economic order, the solvent for all economic difficulties. Still less does it justify the position of those recent theorists who find in the free working of intelligent self-interest quite the "standing or falling principle" of the life of modern society. This latter position indeed involves assumptions, as to fact, which are at variance with economic history, and, as to the social ends, which are at variance with the moral instincts of mankind.

Dealing first with the later theories ; it is a gratuitous assumption that the operation of economic individualism in economic history illustrates the selective play of natural forces toward the ends of an evolutionary sociology.

The "survival of the fittest" is not by any means the result of a struggle for existence which is wrought out under the highly complex conditions of an organized political society embodying those restraints of law and morality which are found requisite to encourage and maintain economic effort. "The animal kingdom and the social organism are such essentially different domains that the same law applied to each would produce wholly opposite effects." The magic of property which "turns sand into gold," which stimulates to such high strains of effort and self-denial, is created by law and thus ultimately by the moral instinct which regards Humanity as an end in itself ; and property in its turn subserves an anti-natural, a moral purpose, as it cherishes the existence and protects the comfort and dignity of the feeble and sets up in certain directions barriers to the mere brute advance of the strong. Dr. Mitchell in his "Past in the Present" has abundantly illustrated the thesis that "Civilization is nothing more than a complicated outcome of a war waged with Nature, by man in society, to prevent her from putting into operation in every case her law of Natural Selection." This is effected in the first place, by means of institutions grounded in reason and conscience in the shelter of which industry is encouraged to extend and diversify itself and, resultantly, by the development of co-operation and the division of

labor which provides even for the most insignificant or the defectively constituted, a place of usefulness in which they may both draw strength from and give strength to the social organism. In short the modern economic order is in various aspects in conflict with the biological law of Natural Selection, while as a whole it is made possible by a political and legal order the existence and force of which cannot be accounted for by the mere mechanical collision of the social atoms, but which draw their life from the insight of the social reason and the power of the moral will.

Not, therefore, by the free working of individualism toward the "survival of the fittest" as a social end could the existing social economy be produced or maintained. But, further than this, experience has shown that even within the bounds set by the prevailing legal order, *laissez faire* is not a principle by any means of unqualified application, either in view of the economic or other social ends.

First, as regards the adequacy of a such a policy to the economic end. The economic good, viz., the increase of the social wealth, has in fact two phases which might be described as the immediate and the ultimate increase. These may be regarded as two different and distinct ends when we consider who are the individuals benefited by them, and consequently the laws under which they are attained. The increase, in any form, of the social wealth largely means direct, immediate benefit to those engaged in producing it, and so far the intelligent self-interest of individuals is a sufficient means and the best means of economic good. But there are material benefits of the utmost importance to the permanent welfare of society, which, either because they inure to the future rather than the present generation or because they diffuse themselves through the whole without reference to the special efficiency of the individuals producing them, individual interest cannot safely be trusted, perhaps not reasonably be expected, to supply. As regards, for instance, the preservation and adequate development of the material resources of a country, the provision and maintenance of a sound standard of values and medium of exchange, the fitting of the young for productive vocations—the issues are of so vast and far-reaching a character

as not to touch individual interest in any effective way. This phase of the economic good can be provided for only by the insight of the social reason and the effort of the social will.

A striking example has recently been furnished in the danger to which the permanent interests of New York State in her great Adirondack wilderness have been exposed from the operations of money-making interests, those, to-wit, of the lumbermen and mining companies. Only let these interests alone and within a generation a thousand mountain streams would run dry, a thousand hill-sides be left bleak and bare, even soilless; devastating spring torrents must take the place of fertilizing summer showers; even climates alter and the channel be choked of a great artery of navigation—to say nothing of an irreparable loss to all lovers of Nature's original wildness and beauty. But whose direct interest is it to interfere? Individual interest does not look after the future generation but rather mutters in answer to all suggestions that way tending, "*Après nous le déluge*," or as the Greek poet had it, "When I am gone let earth be mingled with fire." Here, evidently, the State, as the organ of the impersonal reason and conscience of the society concerned, is called upon to step in and say to private interest, "Hands off! I am the trustee of the Future. I think and act for the economic good not of the individual but of the whole, not of the generation alone but of the humanity that is to come out of it and after it." And the example is not by any means an isolated one. There is therefore an important phase of the economic good which cannot at all be obtained by the competition of interests. And even as regards what we have styled the "immediate" form of the economic end it is now held by many that combination in the form of co-operative undertakings in production and exchange is destined in the future to do much of the work which has hitherto been best effected by pure competition, with better results in the increase as well as in the distribution of wealth.

But second, there are other and higher ends which are affected by economic action, and recent experience has demonstrated the necessity of interference at times with the natural course of economic affairs in the interest of these higher ends. It is a peculiarity of the mechanism by which modern wealth is pro-

duced that living men constitute a great part of its system of cogs and levers. If this machine then be driven at the full pace of a passion which seeks the greatest returns for the least investment, there are certain to result forms of human misery and degradation which are inconsistent with the political ends of the state, while they are repugnant to that moral sentiment of mankind which Kant voiced in declaring that "Humanity is always to be treated as an end, never as a means merely." Thus for example have resulted those abuses of the English factory system as regards the age and sex of the employed, the length of hours and other considerations dangerous to life, health or morals, which enforced, against the vigorous protests of the Manchester economists, the passage of the English Factory Acts. The state found itself in these cases forced to interfere with the right of free contract, as the description of an Act of Parliament for regulating work-shops expresses it, "to prevent the utter degradation of the laborer and to protect the honest employer against unprincipled competitors who owed their success to brutal sacrifice of human life." And this and similar legislation such as that safe-guarding the lives of miners against the cupidity of employers, has been abundantly justified by the results attained. In this country, the easier conditions of life and comparatively abundant employment have made competition less fierce and cruel in its dealing with human well-being, yet the condition of the poor in the crowded tenement-houses of great cities, the degradations especially connected with the union of home and workshop in the manufacture of cigars in tenement-houses, the employment of young children in factories, are but a sample of the illustrations which might be offered of the tendency, which the fever-heat of competition generates even in our favored country, to regard and treat humanity as the mere fuel which drives the money-making machinery.

Summing up what has been said as to the rise of economic individualism and the development of *laissez faire* theories, it appears that economists since Adam Smith have been encouraged by the triumphs of the principle of unchecked competition of interests to assert it not merely as a defensive maxim against misgovernment but as a rule of general application to all eco-

conomic social problems—a rule logically derived from the dogma that “The sum of all interests is best cared for when each individual cares for self.” And the social derangements incident to energetic competition, with the departures from the accepted method, which have been found necessary for their correction, have worked in its defence a new theory of the social end, viz.: that of the survival of the fittest with a more unqualified application of the principle. In the view of the new philosophy of society, social good is attained by substituting the evolutionary end and the mechanical action of impulses closely connected with sense for the properly ethical end and impulse, and this while ignoring the fact that the economic history from which the theory draws its arguments is a history which only the ethical development of Society has made possible. But the plausibility of the newer philosophy is perhaps less due to its logic than to the fact that its conclusions are in harmony with methods and maxims naturally in vogue in a period when the commercial spirit everywhere predominates and more or less colors all conceptions.

No mechanically operating agencies can do the work which has been and is being done for society by the ethical idea and impulse, such as we have defined them. Yet within the economic sphere, we find blindly-acting forces which within certain limits prove to have a self-regulating power, and effect for economic purposes what could not be effected by methods purely ethical. And moralists and social reformers are only too prone to ignore what the “mechanics of interest” has done and is capable of doing for civilization; too prone to exaggerate the efficiency of the teleologic as compared with the automatically acting agencies in working out the material side of the social welfare. Hence what was described in the beginning of this paper as a tendency to the invasion of economics by ethics. The socialist proposes to substitute for the automatic methods of the market, an equitable adjustment of rewards by Society based upon the natural or absolute worth of services and talents. The moralist, of a very different school, when oppressed by such problems as the combination of high rents and low wages offer in great centres, is no less too apt to forget the truth expressed

by Baudrillart in his observation that "*Le sentiment prenant les noms de charité et de fraternité ne saurait servir de base à l'économie politique.*" Good Bishop Latimer, denouncing in his Lent sermons with bitter invective the "rent-enhauncing" landlords of his time, battled, as he imagined, with the sin of covetousness, but in reality with the laws of industrial progress. Like error may easily in our day be committed by the pulpit moralist who may dash into the fray of current economic controversy and with no guidance but such as generous instincts and human sympathy may afford him, attempt to settle the vexed questions by his own immediate intuition of what ought to be. "Sympathy may lead to wrong as well as egoism." The questions at issue are complex and hard ones and certainly not to be settled by "apostolic blows and knocks." Yet public teachers of morals are bound to discuss these themes and therefore are bound to investigate economic phenomena and study the range of economic laws.

The eagerness of the social reformer, the abstract dogmatic method of the professional moralist is apt to give too little place to the truth which underlies the overworked commercial maxim that "Business is business." The truth is that there has come to be somehow an economic world which has its distinct order of phenomena, its peculiar methods and, in a certain sense, its necessary laws. Within modern society there has grown up a vast and complex industrial organism which is automatic and instinctive in its operation. As in the physical organism of the civilized adult man, habit and heredity have created a capacity of reflex action which multiplies power by minimizing the occasions for deliberate and calculated effort, so, in the industrial organism, by the growing habitude of unconscious co-operation in its parts, there has been developed a capacity as it were of social reflex action, which effects far more for the supply of the common wants and, up to a certain point at least, effects it better, than could ever be done by a deliberate social concert for the same purposes. The individual instinct of gain, eager and strong as the hunger of animals, comes converging from a thousand points to the common end of producing and dividing the economic goods. Speculation working at myriad points uncon-

scious of each other has networked the world with highways, organized the complicated apparatus of business, extended and consolidated credit, made fraud more uncommon. Market competition has regulated prices with the rapidity and accuracy of a calculating machine, by a standard as just as any general rule which could be devised and operated, for, as Mr. Sidgwick well says, "The one price which competition tends to fix as the market price of any kind of services has been taken to represent the universal or social and therefore morally valid estimate of the 'real worth' of such services."

There is a wisdom in the general current of commercial instincts which cannot be surpassed or superseded by any thought-taking of society. Prices cannot be fixed by the wisest and best men's moral intuition as to "what things are really worth"; it is vain to calculate on abstract principles the due reward of different kinds of labor. Economic history shows that "these things regulate themselves."

Yet all this may be fully recognized without admitting the encroachment before noted of *laissez faire* upon wise state policy and sound morals; without conceding to the practical heresy so apt to obtain in commercial circles that "There is a special department of life for pursuing one's interests and yet another for the practice of morals"; without at all segregating moralist, reformer and statesman from influence upon economic affairs.

For, first, the economic end is ever subordinate to higher social ends, notably the ethical end, and wherever the pursuit of the former prevents the attainment of the latter and superior ends, the social conscience and will may and does interfere, as in the case of the "Factory Acts." Second, the rules of the market, while accepted in general as working rules for economic practice, may be and constantly are qualified in individual applications by moral sentiment and human sympathy. Third, the political and moral good involved in the economic well-being of the weaker social classes may be, though indirectly and gradually, most powerfully promoted by moral and political effort in the line of the economic laws; by action for the common good proceeding upon and supported by an increased and more diffused acquaintance with economic phenomena and the operations of the forces manifested in them.

The third of these points should briefly be discussed, with reference to the opportunity and duties in this direction of our public moral teachers, whether their especial function be ecclesiastical or pedagogical.

The public moralist familiar with the moral evils which attend the enforced idleness of the unemployed, and the condition of those who find it hard to make a "decent living," is not likely to ignore the intimate connection which subsists between economic and moral good. But he cannot adequately deal with the evils referred to by purely moral methods. The means of economics are here needed to effect the ends of ethics.

Economic aims in the education of the young are of vital importance as tending to increase the general efficiency both in the production and the management of economic goods. To train men capable of productive efficiency, who will be fitted to fill some place in that vast industrial mechanism which, crowded as it is, has always room for the competent, is almost to raise recruits for virtue. The Rabbinic condemnation of the parent who did not bring his son up to some useful trade, had in it a hint for our moral teachers. Public education, while the materialistic side should not predominate in it, should certainly be shaped with reference to making the child able to earn a good living. The admirable trade schools now established in some of the larger cities are not everywhere practicable, nor do such schools meet the wants most widely felt. What is most needed is that type of education, fortunately a growing one, which seeks to lead children through books to things, which would educate in affairs as well as in phrases and abstractions. The early and close training in the use of the senses, some rudimentary acquaintance with the use of tools if possible, as bringing ideas into action, but above and through all, the constant aim to develop a really independent, agile and adaptable instead of a merely imitative and formal intelligence—such is the type of education which we would describe as economic. And as the management as well as the production of economic goods is in question, the topic connects itself with another now often debated, viz.: the proper manner of teaching morals in public schools. There is a difficulty as to systematic and effective

teaching of practical ethics in schools, which seems owing in part to the generality and triteness of the truths obtained by abstracting the moral relations from the diversified and easily apprehensible ones with which they are involved in the complexity of actual conduct. Children seem to need something like a systematic instruction in the art of living in society, which shall blend in one elementary treatment the traditional Aristotelic divisions of Ethics, Economics and Politics. The Greek sophists, in fact, according to Zeiler, were accustomed to include under duty all that according to Greek ideas constituted the capable man—on the one side all practical and useful arts including bodily activity, but especially all that is of value in domestic or civil life ; on the other side ability and uprightness of character.

The Greek blending of the moral and material elements in one conception of the Good, while defective and misleading for the purposes of moral science, might furnish a point of view for practical instruction of the young at once in economics and ethics which would not be without its advantages. The idea of self-control and self-direction to an end, first and most easily learned in connection with the material side of life, could be the more readily carried forward from the natural to the spiritual realm.

Not less important however than the training of a new generation in the capacity of self-help and self-care, is the education of the mass of the active generation in comprehension of the nature and workings of that industrial economy or organism in which it is itself embraced. This is requisite for intelligent political and other social action ever liable to be taken in ignorance or misconception of economic facts and laws. To diffuse information and intelligence in regard to such matters as the nature and effects of good and bad Money, the incidence of Taxation in its different forms, the nature and services of Capital, the comparative condition of Labor in our own and other periods and countries, is to promote intelligent action for the social good and therefore is fit and eminently desirable work for the teacher of public morals. We hold it then a part of the Christian minister's privilege and duty, with due reference to proportion and

limit, to use the various opportunities of his office in diffusing correct and needed information and aiding in the formation of sound judgments on questions deeply affecting the material well-being of the people among whom he lives, but especially that of the more burdened and less fortunate classes. But, as was before intimated, it is only as a student of economic history and economic science that he can engage in the discussion of these questions to advantage. Warrant and text for such teaching cannot be wanting so long as in Solomon's pages "wisdom dwells with prudence." If indeed the Sermon on the Mount seems at times almost anti-economic, it is to be remembered that the Old Testament is all the time in the background and taken for granted, and that the immediate matter in hand was a polemic against Rabbinitism with its selfish and materialistic interpretations of a sublime spiritual law.

The moralist will also wisely lend his earnest aid to whatever efforts or institutions propose by fair means to increase the average rewards of labor or to economize its expenditures.

In the foregoing discussion, largely concerned with practice, various thoughts have been suggested in regard to the scope and mutual relations of economic and ethical science which may now be brought together and stated in order, as, in the main, conclusions in view of what has been advanced.

(a) Political Economy, as a science distinct from Ethics or Politics, has grown up with the development of the system of modern industrialism and with recognition of automatic properties and a certain instinctive wisdom possessed by this complicated mechanism. Political economy therefore as a philosophy, finds its special business in analyzing and seeking to formulate these "natural" movements of the industrial organism: the *calculable* operations of human nature in the pursuit of wealth.

(b) The "laws" of political economy are, for the most part, generalizations based upon the reflexes which human societies tend to establish in developing a capacity of complex co-operation in industry and commerce. They are not therefore "laws of nature" but laws of the nature of a certain highly artificial condition of human affairs, in civilized countries, which has grown

to what it is and has growth and change before it. The safe method in political economy cannot be that of hypothetical reasoning from universal abstract premises; the generalizations of political economy are of service rather as working hypotheses to be tested in the study of economic history and the interpretation of statistics. The fashion, less in favor now than formerly, of arguing in economics from *a priori* grounds to unqualified and often startling conclusions, seems to have promoted controversy more than knowledge.

(c) As up to a certain point, the economic good is instrumentally essential to the ethical good, there is an extensive sphere within which the ends of ethics are to be sought by the means of economics; within which, therefore, economic investigation must furnish to morals a utilitarian interpretation of what is right. Such questions as, Is speculation an evil; What is a just standard of values; belong to a realm which impersonal forces dominate and within which the "ought to be" is identical with the "must be." It is in the investigation of such questions that economic science supplements the work of moral. But neither in the market nor anywhere else does ethics allow a place in which the "economic man" is to supplant man in the exercise of his integral humanity.

(d) There are forms of even the economic social good of such generality and remoteness as to be beyond the reach of the automatically acting forces of self-interest, and, as before noticed, these can be attained only upon grounds and by means which fall within the sphere of ethics.

(e) In the long run and in the main, the virtues are economically productive, yet true virtues, while finding a large utilitarian justification in economics, are not a proper part of its subject-matter. For, being, as virtues, essentially ends in themselves, they cannot be successfully cultivated as the means to a lower end. The demonstrated value of integrity to credit may confirm integrity but cannot produce it. "Seek first the kingdom of God" and the rest follows, but the kingdom cannot be attained if sought first for its economic advantages. What might be described as the "economics of ethics" may be studied to the greatest advantage, but the utilitarian advantages of the

virtues are not such as to make them the product or means of an economy of interest.

On the other hand, ethical science stands as the perpetual critic and moderator of the economic world, in respect of its conceptions of utility or advantage, as well as of the means used to realize them. To economics, utility is the desired, to ethics, it is what ought to be desired. The dictates of a sound ethical philosophy would to-day materially reduce the tension of the wealth-producing energies, by directing attention from visible to spiritual goods, by rebuking excessive *pleonexia*, ostentation and luxurious sensuality. For example, "The want to surpass others is capable of being increased *ad infinitum* without anything gained for the well-being of anyone concerned that is not lost to the others." Again, more is wasted in absolutely hurtful indulgences, such as spirituous beverages, than would be needed to provide for the working millions a fair average of comfort. Thus the treatment of economic consumption from an ethical point of view appears an important means for the correction of serious derangements in the social organism.

(f) There are economic social questions which will hardly be resolved without reference to the belief or bias of the economist with regard to the theory of morals: thus economic theory cannot escape the influence of ethical speculation. As M. Baudrillart has well said, "*La morale précède et domine l'économie politique comme elle précède et domine la politique et le droit.*" But to dominate our economic system is not in a philosophy founded upon an atomistic conception of society; and a philosophy which evolves altruism from egoism by social experience of pleasures and pains can naturally but advise the reformer to stand and wait upon nature and let the Titanic forces of industrial civilization work out what salvation is in them. Thus economic evils may even be transformed into moral necessities, a view not unsupported by the bias of a commercial age, since, as Goethe says, "We delight to clothe our errors in the garb of universal laws." But, on the other hand, the extreme demands of those who arraign the existing economic order, in view of inadequate results in human happiness, also betray the influence of materialistic conceptions of the individual's wants

and requirements—the ascription to economic good of the “categorical imperative” which belongs to the moral; and the social aim of such is in the nature of things as impracticable as their philosophy of human nature is inadequate. A moral philosophy which recognizes the Christian conception of the inherent worth and perfectibility of human nature will, as Channing did, desire for the workers not so much an outward and showy as an inward and real change. Yet from the same standpoint it cannot but condemn any tendency in the economic system to treat man as a means merely—an instrument to wealth in the same sense that matter is. And it must also we think cherish such economic ideals as that of Channing, that “In proportion as Christianity shall spread the spirit of brotherhood, there will and must be a more equal distribution of toils and means of improvement.” In brief, a profound estimate of man’s moral nature is prerequisite to an art of living which shall meet the requirements of a being at once mortal and immortal, who is at once one and many in that his individual development is inseparable from the development of the social whole.

DR. J. M. BUCKLEY: “I have a legal mind,” said a young man to his mother, who had earned the money to educate him, “and therefore cannot believe in Christianity.” So? Sir Matthew Hale and Lord Bacon and Sir William Blackstone found no difficulty. Several of the greatest lawyers in this and neighboring States are among the most devout believers. On the 8th of this month the Hon. Luther Day, LL.D., ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, died at his residence at Ravenna, Ohio, aged 72 years. His funeral took place at the Methodist church, of which he was a member, on the 11th inst. His last words were: “I am not afraid to die; yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil.” This was the passage in which Daniel Webster sought for comfort when the splendor of his career passed under the shadow of the grave. Young man, *have* you a legal mind? If you have, and cannot believe the Gospel, the trouble is not with your mind, but with your *heart*.

THE RELEASE OF FAITH.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Richfield Springs, N. Y., August 22d, 1885.]

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MY aim in this Lecture is to show,
First, That Natural Government, or government of things, is by purpose;

Second, That Moral Government, or government of persons, is by proposal, with alternative sanctions according as the proposal is accepted or rejected: or to state the two propositions more briefly, that things are held, while persons are held to account;

Third, The twofold account to which men are held for their rejection of the Divine proposal; and

Fourth, How through the Gospel men may be honorably released from answering personally for such rejection.

I. *Held.*—In nature everything is held by absolute divine purpose. Each atom is held to be what it is and each force is held to act as it does. These natural obligations or bonds underlie and guarantee natural order. Nature is a cosmos because it is a constitution. Things stand because they stand together, and they stand together because they are held together. The banns were proclaimed in the beginning and what God hath joined together only God can put asunder.

But while the purposes of God in nature are absolute, they are not arbitrary but constitutional purposes. Some of the American Colonies were known as the royal provinces, others were charter provinces. The difference (and it was immense) was that in the royal provinces the king's will was arbitrary so that nothing could with certainty be counted on. The colonists were without guarantee of consistent action on the part of the king, who was at liberty to say one thing to-day and its oppo-

site to-morrow. To the latter-named provinces the king had granted charters in which he had defined and limited his own powers. He had bound himself by the charter and the colonists held him to what he had himself written. Nature is a constitution. It is God's unwritten *Magna Charta* freely bestowed. Under it results are calculable, giving intelligence to endeavor and stability to expectation.

Under a natural constitution natural *oughts* follow natural obligations. We know what ought to be when we have discovered what it is bound to be. It is because the sun and the earth are bound together by gravitation that we can tell to the fraction of a second when the earth ought to be at her vernal equinox.* Tell us how strongly potassium is allied to oxygen, and we will tell what ought to take place when potassium touches water, and how carefully it must be kept lest it be consumed by the fervor of its own passion. Just when and where cyclones and earthquakes ought to come, and of what pace and force, we shall perhaps know, one of these days, as surely as we now know where the trade winds ought to blow. Till we do know, however, cyclones, tornadoes and earthquakes may be safely trusted to do their exact and whole duty. When we have ascertained what that is we shall have what we have not as yet, a seismic and a cyclonic science.

Only infrangible obligation as expression of absolute purpose makes any science possible, since the aim of all science is to trace the bonds by which things are held, rather than to make full enumeration of the things which are so held. Hence the sciences are truly progressive only as they make progress towards science, while science itself is an end to progress. When the ligament or law by which isolated facts are bound and held together has been once found, we are done. The chain of truths which constitute the laws of the planetary system was completed and completed forever when Newton discovered the identity of gravitation with the force which carries the heavenly bodies in their orbits. That is the end. We may go over the same ground, may re-survey the roads now that the great engineers of the heavens have staked them out; we may apply the formu-

* See Hopkin's "Law of Love," p. 121.

las and verify the calculations, but we can go no further. The science of astronomy is a circular railway and, go forever, you go and come by the self-same routes and by the self-same time-tables which Kepler and Newton surveyed and recorded. You may add a new car to the already made up train, provided you are fortunate enough to stumble on one in any of your telescopic rambles, or, better still, provided that like Adams and Le Verrier you have computed where one ought to be found and so where to look for it. When the deer-stalker has once found the radius of the circle which the hunted stag is taking through the forest, he can tell pretty accurately at what time the stag will pass a given point. And so Le Verrier, that mighty Nimrod of the heavens, having computed what course his unseen but suspected game must be taking through his safe and secret far-off ranges of the sky, flings his nimble lasso at a venture three hundred millions of miles into those vast outer depths of space, and there his friend Galle, who was by request watching the throw with his spy-glass in Berlin, sees the flying fugitive and sees how barely he escapes being ringed by the falling noose.

And as the inorganic so the organic world is a constitution. Humboldt can tell us where the different flora and fauna ought to be found because wedded to their natural homes. From a single scale of a truant fish Agassiz tells in what distant waters the fish ought to have been taken. A distinguished botanist once said that the high-latitude *Sedum Rhodiola* ought to be found in the refrigeratory which nature has made for herself in the deep, sunless gorges of the Nockamixon hills. And there to his satisfaction though not to his surprise he found it. The demonstrator of anatomy fears no loss of professional standing by saying beforehand just what bones, muscles, nerves and glands ought to be found in the subject before him. The physiologist asserts what function each organ of the body ought to perform and that hygiene, therefore, is a science and pharmacy an art. The physician tells his patient who will not eat because he has no appetite, that if he has no appetite he ought to have one and that something is wrong. It is to be said of every man that he ought to have all the appetites and all the sensations of which the body is the appointed and proper seat. He is bound to see,

hear, smell, taste and feel things to be what they are; to see blue to be blue, to taste sugar to be sweet, to feel velvet to be soft.

Going higher to the intellect we find that the intellect, too, is held. The stern Vulcan of logic binds and leads captive with unbreakable chains. We are compelled to believe that to be true which is proven to be true, and there are kinds of proof which we are forced to accept as valid. With justifiable ferocity the logician says to however great or however defiant an audience, "I am going to hold every man of you to admit the truth of my proposition." No mind of all the generations since Pythagoras but is held irresistibly to the conclusion that the hypotenuse squared equals the sum of the squared sides.

And as of the intellect and the appetites, so of the desires. Every man is under natural obligation to desire knowledge, esteem, property and power. Every man ought to desire these in much the same way that a vine ought to send its roots out into the soil and its limbs and leaves out into the air in quest of that nutriment through which the vine is bound to cluster in due time its branches with fruit.

The sensibilities are constituted. In virtue of this constitution we are held to honor our parents and to care for our children, to pity the distressed, to be thankful to benefactors, to see beauty in what is beautiful, to admire what is admirable, to adore what is adorable, to worship what is worshipful. It is as much a part of our primeval constitution to love God and our neighbor as it is to love parent and child, to see the force of proof, to see beauty in a rose or a rainbow, to see a red target to be red, to be charmed with melody. The profoundest of philosophers and truest of teachers says even more; for it is He who affirms that it is as natural for the soul to hunger for God as it is for the body to hunger for bread.*

Thus far (that is, till we reach moral choice) the world appears to be, as Boyle has called it, "a great and admirable automaton," or as I would rather call it, a great and admirable *theomaton*; a system all whose members are held together and all whose movements are directed and determined by corresponden-

* Matt. vii., 9-11.

cies of parts and powers wisely and immovably established by the Creator.

God's dominion over nature, then, is by absolute, unquestioned purpose. What the governing obligations should be it was for Him and Him alone to determine: "There is but One Law-giver." Properties and powers, provisions and adaptations are not made to depend on our consent; they come to us as fixed purposes claiming our implicit and full *assent*. In nature obligation is the sole element; so that what ought to be will be, and what ought to go will go, and will go as it ought. Here, "whatever is is right." Consequent is married to antecedent. Results are calculable. Occurrence becomes recurrence. That which has been is, and that which is is that which shall be.

This gives to science its realms and its limitations. Science discovers; it cannot originate. A scientist may suspect. That is legitimate enough, and is often very useful. But the man who, for the sake of being talked about as an advanced thinker, is too quick both to suspect and to proclaim as a discovery what is as yet only a suspicion, is a suspicious and in proportion to his influence a mischievous character. To trumpet speculation for fact, whether in science or theology, in advance of indubitable proof, is as if Columbus, after having sailed from Palos in search of a new world, had gone no further than to the Canaries, had there drawn on his invention for a map of a new continent, had called the continent after his own name, and had then claimed the glory of having discovered something. The only thing he would have discovered would have been his own map, and that would not have been a discovery but a fraudulent though possibly an ingenious invention—a paper continent not worth the paper on which it would have been engrossed.

And as science begins so it ends with discovery. When the discoverer has discovered, discovery ceases. Columbus could discover America but once. So with invention, which is but applied discovery, and so with art, which is but applied invention. The best inventor, like the best discoverer, is the least original. He invents best who listens best. Sitting by his quiet hearth-fire James Watt hears again what he and thousands of others had heard a thousand times before, but with

inattentive and therefore with indifferent ears. Watt now for the first time gives heed, and giving heed he begins to question with himself whether this low musical sound may not have in it a divine message of good. How eagerly does he con the phrases of this message and pry into their hidden benevolence of divine intent, till at length he is able to make to industry "the most magnificent gift it has ever received." Our wisdom lies, not in attempting to alter the terms of the message but in candidly interpreting the message and in conforming to it our plans and our endeavors. "God is not mocked." Steam will work for us, but in God's appointed way only. The valves wrong, the vapory giant will fume and fret in his iron harness but he will not draw. The valves right and he will. To him who asks how he may inherit the present life nature answers, "What is written in the law? how readest thou?" "He that hath ears to hear let him hear;" "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them."

But thus far we have found no choice and no freedom. Gravitation has no choice but to pull as it does, nor cohesion but to stick fast as it does, nor chemical affinity but to tie fast as it does by invariable formulas. Plants have no choice. The orchid is pre-determined to be an orchid and the oak an oak. Nor have brutes choice. They do not devote themselves to courses of their own choosing, but are held to what they do by their respective instincts. The appetites and the desires in man have no choice but to impel as they do. The intellect has no choice but to conclude as it does. Nor *primarily* is it because man chooses so to do that he loves his offspring, his neighbor, or his God. And knowing the wise construction out of which all these results flow, we know what ought to follow and what, therefore, it would be right to expect. We expect gold to resist oxidation and we expect iron to rust. We expect food to nourish and prussic acid to kill. Rarely can tame and train any horse. The farmer and the florist call and crops and flowers come. Doll-makers count on their trade being good to the end of time. Managers of charity-boards assume financial responsibilities on the strength of expected incomes; they know the force of sympathetic appeal. There is a philosophy of rhetoric and an art of persuasion. The proverbs of Solomon are as true and as serviceable now as they

were three thousand years ago. There is a human nature and it may be studied and known.

And it is a part of this nature that the relative superiority of its parts, powers and products is self-indicated. So that let a man yield himself to the incitement of these powers according to their relative and naturally-indicated rank and worth, let him allow nature to have its own way with him, and he will be convinced by all that is valid in proof, will feel the beauty of all that is beautiful, will be awed by all that is sublime, will be saddened by all that is pitiful, will love all that is lovely. He will weep when he ought to weep and will laugh when he ought to laugh, will mourn when he ought to mourn and dance when he ought to dance, will love when he ought to love and hate when he ought to hate; he will live as and as long as he ought to live and will die when and as he ought to die.

II. *Held to Account.*—But when we say, "If a man will let nature have its course," it is implied that he may, if he will, decline to do that. And this reveals to us another part of our constitution with an obligation and an *ought* of a very different kind. Let there be nature only and man would be an automaton; an automaton of a very noble sort, but yet an automaton. Wherever there is calculable product there must be somewhat of a mechanical or compelling element in the producing power; something of routine and monotony. And so while the result may be good, it is yet a lower form of good. It is natural and not moral good. There is no morality and no virtue in any machine, however perfect its construction and however noble or beautiful the product. Morality implies moral obligation, and moral obligation necessitates moral choice, and choice in its very nature is free. And this is an entirely different thing from natural obligation; or rather it is another form of natural obligation or holding having a moral element in it; an obligation, that is, the feeling of which arises naturally in us; which because natural we must feel; but yet an obligation which we may respect or disregard, a bond which we may let ourselves be held by or may break away from, as we shall choose. All the merely natural obligations, those arising from the constitution, are before us; as many of them at least as we have in any way come

to understand, and it is then for each man to say for himself whether or not he will heed these arrangements of the Great Arranger, these provisions of the Great Provider, these ordinations of the Great Ordainer.

And now the peculiarity and grand distinction of moral government is, that such government is not by absolute purpose but by contingent proposal. It is the high dignity of man that God makes proposals to him, giving to him the liberty either of accepting, adopting and carrying out freely what God proposes or of setting these proposals at nought; the choice whether he will respect and keep the divine order or disregarding it make disorder in its place. But is there not a contradiction here? To say that a man is under obligation, is bound, is held, and yet is free? Is that an honest, a genuine proposal which a man is bound beforehand to accept? Is it not a contradiction, is it not a sarcasm and a mockery, to say to any man with regard to any proposed action, "Voluntary on your part but compulsory on mine"?

An apparent contradiction certainly but not a real one. For that is the only kind of obligation, holding or government that is possible with beings having freedom of choice. The fulfilment of God's precepts is necessarily contingent on the choice of those to whom the precepts are given. Has God, then, put Himself in a position to be thwarted and mocked? No, because it is a proposal with alternatives in case of acceptance or rejection. To compel acceptance, however, by depriving man of the power of refusal would be to demoralize, or rather to *un*moralize him; to reduce him, not to an immoral but to an unmoral being. But so sacredly does God hold this divine prerogative of freedom that rather than destroy it He will see a man or even an angel become a devil. It was carrying self-abnegation quite too far when a charming Christian lady once said to me, "I am perfectly willing to be a machine if God will turn the crank"! so heartily did she rejoice in the divine sovereignty. But God does not make His moral world go by means of any crank. No human law-maker ever took upon him to say, "No theft, robbery, incendiarism or murder shall ever be committed by any man under this government." Nor is it at all in that sense that God says,

"Thou shalt," and "Thou shalt not." Were *that* its meaning the Decalogue would be but the declaration of an absolute purpose; a purpose, however, which could be carried out only by destruction of moral freedom. Yet is God not mocked. A man is mocked when he undertakes what he cannot carry out. But God does carry out all that He undertakes to carry out. What God says is not, "You shall never steal;" but, "If you steal I shall hold you to account." *All below man is held; only man is held to account.* The moon is held to revolve and the sparrow to build its nest and to rear its young. But should they fail, neither moon nor sparrow could be held to account. Only one morally free can be morally held. Only the guilty can be held to answer, and only the free can be guilty. Rewarding right-choosing and holding wrong-choosing to account are the two great principles and methods of all moral government.

III. *The Account.*—But what does holding to answer, or holding to account, mean? It means two things; that is, there is a double holding. The man who violates any part of his constitution is held to account, first of all, by the constitution itself. A man abuses his body. He can do that. But his abused body holds him to answer for the abuse. Abuses of the body are fearful debts which the body is faithful to collect; and neuralgia and gout, dyspepsia and insomnia, delirium and paralysis are a few of its thousand agents to present the bills. A man abuses his intellect; but his intellect holds him to answer by impaired attention, corrupt association of ideas, mental one-sidedness, or imbecility. Searing or perverting of the affections follows abuse of the affections. These evil things follow even though the man may have intended no wrong. Physically a man would be a daily drunkard were alcohol put in his food unwittingly to himself, as surely as if he were to drink the poison at the bar of the vilest saloon.

And so if a man violates moral obligation (which he does when he does voluntarily that which he either knows or believes to be wrong), he is held to answer for that by the moral penalties of self-rebuke, shame and remorse. These come of themselves and there is no escape. The "conscienceless" criminal, as he is called, has a conscience still and some day that conscience will

do its work. "How different," moaned the murderer of Parkman when after he had been convicted and sentenced he was being led away to his cell, "How different a man's sin looks to him after it has been committed from what it did before." The fuse may be a long one and it may burn slowly, but in due time the fatal spark will reach the magazine where conscience has stored her materials of torment, and the ruin and the wreck will come. The "mills of the gods" which are said to "grind so slow but so exceeding small," do not grind at all save as some responsible gate-keeper opens the gates in wantonness and lets the water on the relentless wheels.

But there is another holding. The law-breaker is held to account by the law-giver directly and in person; a person holding a person to answer for a personal offence. The murderer may suffer the pangs of remorse in what he imagines is his safe hiding-place. But it is a different pang he feels when the detective comes suddenly and lays a strong hand on him and says, "Come with me; you are my prisoner." And when the indictment is drawn and a true bill is found and the offender is told that he is held to answer before the court, and then when sentence has been passed and he is taken to answer by loss of his freedom behind prison-bars or on the scaffold with his life—then to the penalty of remorse is added punishment by the judge. And then it is that the shame and the remorse are intensified by the open rebuke of deserved exclusion from companionship with the good. This exclusion is that "outer darkness" which makes the remorse and the shame break out in "weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth." We stand not in the presence of our own "spiritual worthiness" only; we stand also in the presence of our Judge.

Thus law is authority as well as guide. It commands as well as informs. "This is the way" is the information, the direction; "Walk ye in it" is the command. This makes the proposal to be also a statute. Such has God made it by linking comfort to obedience and torment to disobedience. And what He has joined together neither nature nor man can by any means put asunder.

IV. *The Release.*—Here is a serious exigency, and in order

fully to meet it two things are clearly requisite. We need, first, to have our sentence remitted so that we be no longer held to answer personally for our sin. How can that be? Not by an act of simple clemency. Not by surrender of righteousness through some strenuously-attempted but impossible catalysis of statute and judgment. Not by sacriligious mutilation of the statute; cutting it in twain and keeping the informing "This is the way," and casting aside the authoritative "Walk ye in it." "To say and straight unsay" would bring both law and law-giver into deserved contempt. When the Law-giver says, "Thou shalt surely die," it can be no other than an enemy, though professing to be a better friend, who will say, "Thou shalt not surely die." No earthly magistrate dare say that. Human law makes no provision for pardon as such. "If it commutes the sentence or grants a respite it is only because the penalty has been found to be too severe under the circumstances, so that so-called mercy is not mercy but is only equity correcting the inequalities of law." Let juries refuse to convict, judges to sentence or magistrates to punish and they would "speed their own extinction and dissolve the bonds of society." Simply to forgive may evidence goodness. Only profoundest wisdom is equal to the task of upholding righteousness while acquitting the guilty. And the Gospel is wisdom. It is the "wisdom of God" no less than the love and mercy of God. And the wisdom is this, that while the Gospel is a release from the law, it is a release which honors the law by more firmly establishing it.

This principle of honoring the law by release from the consequences of its violation is well represented in cases of physical deliverance. A man is sent to sea in a staunch, sea-worthy vessel. But what is that which makes any vessel worthy of the sea? It is the regard had in its construction to all the known laws of hydro and of *anemo*-dynamics. Rightly managed the ship makes a sure and safe voyage. But the voyager carelessly runs his ship on a rock or wantonly scuttles her in mid-ocean. He thus challenges the sea to overwhelm him with his whelmed vessel. He can be rescued only by a life-boat sent from either the shore or from another ship. But what is a life-boat? A life-boat is a boat that is made as a ship is made, but with this differ-

ence, that the life-boat is made with a far stricter regard to the laws which govern the motion and action of water and of wind. And when (supposing him to accept the offered deliverance) when the sinking suicide steps into the life-boat, by that simple act of trust he pays a new and profounder homage to that very law of the elements, by disregard or defiance of which he had invited his destruction.

And the Gospel is our life-boat. When Christ took our place, He took it by saying, "I will answer for you to the law." That answer He made. It was a straightforward, manly, honest answer. It was no evasive response, no eloquent but false pleading, no twisting or hiding of the evidence against us, no ingenious, self-sparing subterfuge. If there is any business which Christ utterly abhors, I think it must be that of the dishonest criminal lawyer who by shielding crime encourages and emboldens it to make a laughing-stock of justice. Christ is indeed our "advocate," but He is no such advocate as that. Having assumed the peril of our indictment He sought neither to quash the indictment nor to have it softened down by so much as one iota. He took on Him all our sin. And having taken it, when the question came whether He would go forwards and make true answer by bearing our curse, no wonder that, understanding perfectly all the elements of that fearful account, no wonder that He was for a time in an agony of spirit. No wonder that He prayed, and that He prayed again, and yet again, "Father, let this cup pass from Me." No wonder that added to His own He needed an angel's strength to enable Him to say, "Nevertheless not My will but Thine be done."

And this is the Gospel, that though the guilty are acquitted and released, their acceptance of the substitution and sacrifice of Jesus, so far from making the law an idle word, "establishes the law" by the new and most powerful of all conceivable sanctions, the expiatory death of the Son of God.

But along with the discharge of our account through the answering death of Christ, there comes through His transforming Spirit the no less needed deliverance from the torment of an estranged and hostile will. For though the trusting offender is no longer held to punishment, he is still held to the obedience of

love. Never can any man cease to owe supreme love to God and equal love to his neighbor. But "owe" and "own," it is well to remember, are correlative words from the same root and originally of the same meaning. And there is manhood in the etymology. No man should owe his neighbor more than he owns, while every man owes all that he owns to God.

And it is pleasant to owe provided we can pay. But it is slavery, it is torture to owe if we cannot pay; to lie under any just obligation which we cannot meet. Owe more money than you can pay, and you are no longer a free man. You are bound by a miserable chain and your creditor grasps the other end of it. And that is a chain which no bankrupt law can ever break. You may abolish the debtor's prison, you cannot dissolve the debtor's chain.

A grateful heart finds its debt of gratitude only a pleasure, for a grateful heart means a solvent, a paying heart. Sir Joshua Reynolds (I think it was) once spoke sorrowfully to Goldsmith of the recent death of a man by whom Reynolds was once greatly befriended. "Be content," replied Goldsmith; "you will no longer be under the painful necessity of being grateful to him"! *Painful* necessity! surely something is miserably out of joint when a man is bound to do and ought to do and is therefore properly expected to do what he finds that it is not in his heart to do. Hearts are not made for fetters. "Owe no man anything" is an inspired man's manly motto. His "except to love one another" is no real exception to a rightly loving man. We may be held to do or held not to do, but we shall not *feel* that we are held provided we are free in doing or in abstaining. Given a perfectly true and straight track and a perfect wheel, and without a flange the wheel would keep the rail. Love going freely and without external restraint is a flangeless wheel. It is the errant wheel only that grates and jars and binds. And if that be a false and unnatural condition where there is a just claim for love but no love, most tormenting and pitiable of all must it be where there is no love and a just claim for the strongest—marriage without marriage-love. Our divorce leagues and literature, our codes and our courts, our magazines and the daily papers witness to what desperate means estranged wives and

husbands will resort, to escape, if possible, this bitterest, this most galling misery. What freedom could the chain be honorably broken! What happiness if a perversely-alienated wife be reconciled to her blameless and injured husband and there be a re-marriage with penitent and abiding love!

And this is no other than a divinely-drawn picture of the wretched servitude of sin and of the joyous freedom of Christian trust—the true “freedom of faith.”* Between the unrenewed soul and the law to which by God’s ordinance it is sacredly wedded there is no congeniality, no sympathy. The estranged mind is utterly averse to the union and is not, will not be, cannot be reconciled to it.† Obedience if rendered at all is yielded only through fear and is but the obedience of a slave.

Such unwilling subjection is sufficiently dreadful even in the family or in the state, but is there made endurable by the certainty that it will sometime be at an end. The hated husband and the hated monarch must die, or at the worst the enslaved will themselves soon find deliverance in the grave. But for a mind embittered against the law there is not even that consolation. The law has dominion over it as long as it lives, and it is immortal. The law goes with it beyond the grave and from the law’s just claim it can never escape. This it was which made our state so dark and hopeless; this which moved the pity of Jesus to seek our rescue. By the willing answer which for our causeless enmity He made upon the cross Christ obtained for us an honorable and just release from the law which we were bound to obey but could not love. And the change which comes to him who through Christ applies for and obtains this release is great and joyous. His heart is now free. If he serve now it will be from no feeling of compulsion but only from choice. All legal restraint having been removed from his affections he is at full liberty to bestow them on whatever new object he will. Yet who in all the wide universe so worthy to receive them as He who with His own blood bought for him this great deliverance, this priceless freedom? To Jesus, therefore, he surrenders himself with all the devotion of a new and loving bride, to serve no

* Rom. vii., 4.

† Rom. viii., 7.

longer as before "in the oldness of the letter," but in the newness and freshness of a willing spirit.

And it is here and here only that we have solved for us the one great problem which through the ages had baffled the best human wisdom—the liberation of the affections from the overmastering dread of punitive disaster for inexcusable transgression. There have been self-demanded and self-imposed sacrifices to this end without limit. But neither heathen nor Jew has ever been quite able to certify himself of the answering completeness of even his most lavish surrenders. The costliest sacrifices have come back only to the confusion of the offerer. The priceless ring which Polycrates had cast into the sea as an expiation for his crimes the tyrant to his dismay finds in the fish which the cook sets before him at his next banquet. Not for an instant does the stress of any "self-invoked adversity" stay the step of the Nemesis of judgment.

Neither have forms sufficed. The "what-shall-I-do-more" Pharisee never knows when he has done enough. The "what-lack-I-yet" young ruler goes away sorrowing because he gets not the expected answer to his inquiry for the last term in his series of good deeds, and so cannot sum the series and make an end. Nor has changing the form of merely outward doing sufficed. Clad in this seemly cloak of outward reformation many a worshipper has gone to God as Hercules is said to have prepared himself for sacrificing by putting on the robe tinged with the poisoned philter of Nessus. At first the hero felt no effect from it, but when the garment became warm the venom began to consume his flesh till at length he put an end to his agony by a voluntary death. So men may wear with comfort the mantle of outward estimableness and in this decent guise may pass respectably among their fellows; yet when thus attired they approach that pure altar where the conscience is quickened by the apprehended presence of a heart-searching and holy God, then the venom of self-righteousness with which every thread of that fatal robe is steeped begins its work. Then the unhumiliated worshipper has the painfully disappointing conviction that his offering is not accepted. Then dissatisfied with himself he becomes dissatisfied with God; he is "wroth and his countenance falls,"

and he ends, it may be, with bitter though perhaps unexpressed hatred of a free salvation which can come only by the cross of Jesus.

From all this enslavement of fear, of form and of unhumiliated hate that cross saves us. No sooner do we surrender ourselves to Christ in penitent and full trust than we are done and done forever with the stress and strain of trying to avert from ourselves punitive and deserved disaster. From all possible overthrow of shame and sorrow we are saved at once and saved forever. Fear is henceforth groundless and is a dishonor to Christ. The sorrowful answerer to law now becomes, instead, the joyful receiver of gifts. We are dealt with no longer on the ground of law but on the footing of grace. In His treatment of us Christ is governed no more by the strict exactitudes of justice but wholly by the unhindered promptings of love. Where before we saw with trembling only a stern form sitting blindfold and bearing aloft in one hand the unswerving scales and in the other the unsparing sword, we see now a face of wondrously-blended human and divine beauty and eyes beaming on us with tenderest love and hands full of blessings stretched out towards us. And our Christ, when He comes, brings with Him no nicely-poised balances with which to weigh our alms and our prayers and our dole of Christian work, to see whether we have earned enough wherewith to buy His offered good. Himself unconstrained in His affection, He ties us to no strict calendar of tithes or of times, to no hard arithmetic of sacrifices, of sufferings or of self-denials. What need? since He has won for Himself a love which scorns to give less than all.

“Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law through the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another, even to Him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God.” (Rom. vii., 4.)

THE WITNESS OF THE CONSCIENCE TO GOD.

[A paper read before the Institute at its Meeting,
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THE one final, all-sufficient proof of the existence of God is to be found in the witness of the conscience in man. This truth is to be deduced, not from the study of the material world taken by itself, but from the study of man as a being moral and spiritual, as well as intellectual and physical, and of this world as the home of man. It is in the realization, on the part of man, of the difference between right and wrong, in the response of the heart to the call from above, that we find the ultimate proof of the existence of God; and although there are other lines of argument which lead up to that one great truth, and all valuable as confirmatory of that truth, still this one is entirely satisfactory, and absolutely conclusive.

All the works of nature bear marks of design, and we find ourselves utterly unable to think of an orderly world as made by chance. The mind exerts itself in vain in the effort to reach a final cause in nature. In the study of history there are seen the workings of a power greater than man, carrying out the purposes of the almighty ruler of the universe—a power none the less divine because it works in ways traceable by human understanding, as in the dispersion of the Jews, the chosen people having been scattered over every part of the earth, and still kept distinct from other nations. These considerations, and others like them, are useful and excellent in their place as corroborative of ultimate truth: but the final proof of the existence of God lies in the fact that there exists, imbedded in the constitution of man, the capacity of distinguishing between right and wrong. That capacity may be dull and weak, from lack of proper training; and still it has a real existence among all men, that “true light” spoken of by St. John, “which lighteth every man that

cometh into the world." It is through the conscience that we know that there is a being not only pure and good and loving, but also Himself the essence and fountain-head of all purity, goodness and love.

I. It is to be noted, in the first place, that it is impossible to arrive at ultimate truth without viewing things spiritually, as well as materially. Underlying all created things there is something fundamental, essential, something which eludes all examination and reasoning, so long as men persist in attempting to bring the matter to a test rigidly material. The true notion of the essential nature of material things is to be reached by one process alone—that of rising, in the course of healthful and rational inquiry, from the material up to the spiritual; and when once the spiritual is taken into account, the way is made plain which leads up to God, the maker and preserver of the universe.

Space—what is it? Something beyond material expression, since it extends far beyond the limits of human knowledge. With the telescope we pierce the heavens, and discover far-distant stars; but there must always be something beyond the range of vision, and we can never know the nature of boundless space. Again, what is time? We are all familiar with time, as it passes from day to day; and still we cannot fully grasp the truth that time existed in the remote past, far beyond the earliest remains of pre-historic days; nor can we, by our own unaided powers, form any adequate conception of the continuous existence of time in the future.

Once more, force, in its various phases of manifestation as heat, light, electricity, magnetism and chemical affinity, has been proved, of late years, to be essentially one and the same, capable of transformation under various forms, and maintaining equivalence throughout such transformation. But at the same time the essential nature of force is a thing not to be set forth in terms of material science. The doctrine of the persistence of force is an abstruse mental conception, in this the material finding expression in terms of the immaterial alone.

The relation of cause and effect is one with which every one is practically familiar in daily life; but it is one which, as to its essential nature, cannot be materially explained. Causation is

not invariable sequence, for the reason that the effect is often produced simultaneously with the operation of the cause, as when wood burns because it is lying on a fire, or when iron is drawn by a magnet—the heat and the magnetic force being at work at the very instant that the effects are produced. In many cases also the causes are so complicated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to follow them out to their respective results. The true conception of cause and effect can be reached only by believing in an all-powerful being, from whom alone all energy flows, and through whose workings all results are accomplished.

We see a remarkable uniformity in the working of natural forces, and expect, with reason, that given results will follow given causes; but we cannot be absolutely certain that such results will surely follow in the future. It is only through our belief in the almighty ruler of the world that we can have any rational dependence upon the orderly succession of natural phenomena; and any man who declares that such order in nature is a necessity, and who nevertheless denies the existence of that superintending being (that is, of God), is simply involving himself in contradiction. George Grove, in his work on “The Correlation of Physical Forces,” remarks that, “In all phenomena, the more closely they are investigated, the more are we convinced that, humanly speaking, neither matter nor force can be created or annihilated, and that an essential cause is unattainable. Causation is the will, creation the act, of God” (p. 199).

The science of meteorology is far better understood now than it was at the time of our Saviour’s earthly ministry; but at the same time we must continue to say, in one sense as to the wind, that we cannot tell whence it comes and whither it goes. In other words, we cannot get at the essential principle of force.

Herbert Spencer, in his “First Principles,” says, “Regarding Science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may say that every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience” (p. 16). And we may add that it is only by the exercise of faith (most reasonable, because necessary in dealing with things of the spirit-world), that we rise into the region of true knowledge, realizing that there is one in whom alone there is perfect knowledge, that is, God.

The attempt to measure all mental phenomena by physical tests must, from the nature of the case, be vain and profitless. It is highly probable that the workings of the mind are accompanied by corresponding action in the brain; but it by no means follows that the mind is material. The nature of the connection between the material brain and the immaterial mind is a thing essentially mysterious, and permeating all this are the workings of the will, itself a fountain of energy not reducible to terms of bodily sense, though circumscribed in action by those limits of capacity which the Creator has established.

Responsibility is possible only where there is freedom; and freedom would be unattainable if man were governed by laws absolutely immutable, rendering it impossible for him to control his own actions. Unless the will is able, within the limits which God Himself has established, to exercise control over the body, man cannot be called to account for anything which he may have done; and the will acts, not only in obedience to natural laws, but also as controlling and adjusting those laws. For instance, I move my arm, and in doing that simple thing I show the power of mind over matter, and also perform an act which is, in its essence, of unfathomable meaning, since no one can declare the nature of the impression made by the mind, through the brain and nerves, upon the muscles.

It is often said, and with truth, that we can see in nature the workings of an all-wise and loving being. But nature teaches us another, and a very sad lesson. We are surrounded by many things that are unpleasant, even annoying, and also by things that are dangerous and destructive. The mosquito, the gnat, the wasp, the hornet, the rattlesnake, and the adder—by whom, and for what end, were all these creatures made? The poppy, the stramonium, the strychnine lurking in peach-pits and almond-pits—why were these things given to us? There is evidence of the most ingenious adaptation of means to the end in the structure of poisonous plants and animals, and the question demands, and must receive, an answer, by whom, and for what ends, were these things made? The answer can be found only in the firm belief in a being who is working all things for the good of His people, one who permits these evil things to exist in order that

His children may be quickened in mind, and placed upon their guard against these and still greater evils. It is only as we take this spiritual view of the matter that we fully realize with the Psalmist that, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork."

II. Studying the constitution of man, we see that it is thoroughly unreasonable for him to attempt to measure truth by the standard of the bodily senses alone. Man is a complex being, largely physical, but with mind and soul constituting an essential part of his nature. The mind has been placed by God in the body; and we know nothing of the mind except as dwelling in the body. The connection between mind and body is most intimate. The mind cannot work with entire freedom unless the brain is duly supplied with oxygenated blood, and the greatest care must be taken of the body as an essential part of the human being, the object of loving attention on the part of the Creator.

It must be borne in mind, however, that there is something in man which is supersensuous, to be described in terms moral and spiritual alone. The actions of men cannot be rightly understood, and the true beauty and nobleness realized, unless we take into account the higher part of man's nature. The soldier, for instance, fights for the flag of his country. What is the flag? Materially considered, it is nothing but a piece of bunting made according to a fixed pattern. But the men who, during four long years, fought for the Union and freedom, fought for something far better than the material flag. They fought for that principle, now firmly imbedded in the constitution of our country, which gave meaning to the flag, and rendered every sacrifice reasonable and precious.

When any man turns his attention in on himself, and sees that self-consciousness is a reality, then his thoughts are necessarily turned upward to the one in whom alone is the source of life, to the one from whom alone all created things have sprung, and by whom alone all things are sustained. As soon as man knows himself at all, he knows himself as a being not standing alone, but depending upon some being above himself; in other words, as soon as man knows himself at all, he knows God also.

Man finds in himself not merely the capacity for sensuous perception of material things, but also the capacity for reflection, for analysis and synthesis, the capacity for ratiocination and almost boundless self-improvement. In all this man continually reaches up to the one who is always above him, though always with him—to his Father, his God.

Man knows himself as a being not only intellectual, but also moral and spiritual, as a being capable not only of thinking and reasoning, but also of distinguishing right from wrong. Man certainly knows himself as a being capable of controlling himself, as one who can do right if he will try, will seek from above the needed help. Making full allowance for inherited predisposition and peculiarities, as well as for the influence of surrounding circumstances unfavorable to the development of moral character, there still remains the fact of man's responsibility, within reasonable limits, for his actions. The sense of right and wrong may be crude and imperfect, as in the case of the primitive inhabitants of our own country, committing acts of cruelty upon prisoners taken in war, and in the case of the long list of persecutions visited, in the name of the Christian faith, alternately upon Protestants and Roman Catholics; but nevertheless there exists some recognition, however weak and imperfect, of the law of right, and that capacity is capable of vast development, necessarily turning the thoughts upwards to the one who alone has given the law of uprightness.

Man has, again, the desire to worship some being above himself. The vague belief in a great spirit entertained by our American Indians, the fetichism of the savage tribes of Africa, the searching after God of the Chinese, and of the Brahmins and Buddhists of India, the polytheistic speculation of the Greek poets, and the monotheistic inquirers of the philosophers of the Socratic school—all these things are simply proofs of the truth that a feeling of dependence upon God is a radical part of man's nature. Granted that there have been found tribes of men in various parts of the world, as in California, in Africa, and Polynesia, who were unable to give an account of the possession of a belief in a being above this world, we must nevertheless bear in mind first, that it is extremely difficult to get at the

views of savages on a subject so thoroughly ideal as religion, and secondly, that, in view of the many proofs gathered from the pages of history, that men have fallen from a state of comparative intelligence into one of utter ignorance and gross defilement, it is not safe to say that any savage tribe whatever has always existed in a state of absolute indifference to the voice of God, however low that tribe may have sunk in modern times.

The existence of this religious instinct is not to be accounted for by the theory that man has gradually evolved it for himself. Religion is essentially a revelation, an unfolding of the truth granted by some being wiser and stronger than men. It is only through belief in God that the whole man is harmoniously developed. Belief in God is true education, the drawing out of the whole of man's faculties, above reason, but in no way contrary to reason, since it is most reasonable, most satisfactory to the mind, to look up to the one in whom alone is perfect wisdom, to the one in whom alone the heart finds rest and peace.

The law of God is not only a thing from without, but also a thing from within, not an arbitrary rule laid down by a tyrant, but the natural expression of the will of one who finds His temple in the heart and soul of man, of one whose law is the law of love, a law none the less loving because it involves (as everything coming from a perfect being must involve) uncompromising hatred of sin. As Dr. Mulford says, in his "Republic of God," "The assertion and recognition of righteousness is in and through the conscience. The conscience is not alone the expression of an external and formal law, although the affirmation of the conscience may be in an external and formal law; it is in a law which is involved in the being and freedom of personality—I, I ought" (p. 142).

Turning to the field of art, we see in George Frederick Watt's picture of Paolo and Francesca an illustration of the power of conscience. The wretched man and woman are seen in sad embrace, an expression of hopeless, unmitigated agony on their pallid faces; their anguish finding but poor alleviation in that companionship which to them, when in life, was the source of guilty pleasure. They are suffering a living death, remorse without alleviation, without respite, without hope; the painter

embodying on the canvas the fearful word-picture of the poet Dante.

The power of conscience is not always felt in this terrible manner. He who hears the voice of God, and turns to Him, may become altogether godlike through that restorative power (the gift of God Himself) whose workings are seen in the world natural, as well as in the world spiritual. That divine power not only brings pardon to the soul, but also gives health to the diseased body, because life is stronger than death: just as the skilful surgeon cures a sore by grafting healthful skin upon the part affected.

It is possible even to rise to greater heights of goodness upon the abandonment of sin, since the man who has come back to the Father, and has tasted the bitter cup of repentance, realizes the depths of God's loving mercy, and gives himself up wholly to the divine guidance. When men sin, they produce discord for the whole nature, physical as well as moral and spiritual, and array themselves in enmity against God; when they turn and repent, they touch the chord of divine harmony, and the whole man responds to the heavenly music, the law of God accepted as the law of love, neglect and disobedience simply put out of the question. Man may look forward with enthusiasm to the day when—in the glorified, spiritual body, and in the clear light shed on every side by the heavenly Father—he shall find himself brought face to face with the blessed Saviour.

It is far better, no doubt, not to sin at all, than to sin and afterwards turn to the Saviour and find forgiveness; but there is nothing else which brings us so near to God, and enables us so clearly to see that He is with us even now, in this life, as the fact that the soul responds to His assurances of pardon, and the heart finds rest in Him.

III. Pass we next to the great, crowning truth of revelation, that in which the conscience finds full satisfaction—the Incarnation. Man is a being made in the image of God, having a certain innate consciousness of God, an instinctive longing after God; and although man has been degraded by sin, still he is capable of elevation to a state of communion with God. The one great link between God and man is the Lord Jesus Christ, Himself

one with the Father from all eternity, and partaking, in time, of man's nature in its original purity—one of ourselves, except as to His freedom from sin. Around the manger in the stable in Bethlehem cluster all our hopes of salvation, and the truth of the Incarnation is not only a truth which meets all the wants of man's spiritual nature, but also a truth which fully satisfies all the requirements of reason, bridging over the gulf between this life and the next.

There is nothing in the Incarnation which is contrary to reason, although much that is above and beyond reason. This belief does not consist in the bare acceptance of certain abstract propositions, but in communion with the Word made flesh, God incarnate; and through the working of the Holy Spirit the blessed Saviour becomes part of our daily life among men.

This truth of the Incarnation is, from the highest necessity, miraculous. Reason sees that miracles are most reasonable, although incomprehensible. That the maker and sustainer of the universe, boundless in wisdom and power, should work in an orderly manner in the government of the world, is a matter of necessity, since God is the source and essence of all order, material or immaterial. And it is likewise clearly reasonable that God should, at times, rise above the ordinary course of nature, introducing into the natural world the higher order of the spiritual world. The Incarnation stands as a miracle, incomprehensible but most satisfactory, the son of a virgin known, in the consciousness enlightened by the Holy Spirit, as the Saviour of the world.

This departure from the ordinary course of nature is a simple necessity in the emergency, the presence of sin as a disturbing element in the world rendering necessary the indwelling among men of the Son of God. And further, the miracles wrought by the blessed Saviour during His ministry were works of goodness and love, bound up with the teachings of the Lord, and going out from Him as freely and naturally as light pours forth from the sun upon the planets of our solar system; and it is only through a careful study of the mighty works of our Lord that the full, deep meaning of His words can be taken into the heart and life.

We must also bear in mind the fact—a matter of history, and

also a truth of the deepest meaning and value to the Christian—that our Lord came into the world not suddenly, but through the preparation of type and the higher preparation of prophecy. From the days of Adam onward God spoke, from time to time, of one who should bring salvation to men. David spoke clearly of the coming Saviour, depicting His sufferings, death, resurrection, and ascension. Isaiah set forth, with the minuteness of a contemporary historian, the sufferings and death of the Saviour, and the vast benefits which should accrue to all men. Daniel, in spirit, saw the Lord coming to judgment; and the prophets in general joined in the chorus of praise to the Messiah. This prophetic preparation is simply a corollary of the truth that God knows all things, a truth most precious to man, since he himself, in his ignorance, finds rest, and also the opportunity for growth, in the bosom of the all-wise one.

The infinite wisdom and power of God are shown, once more, in the shaping of the course of events, so that the Saviour came into the world “in the fulness of time,” peace reigning everywhere, every facility being offered to men to spread the good news to the utmost bounds of the world, as then known.

The great truth of the Incarnation is set forth in the Holy Scriptures—that book in which God speaks directly to men. In the course of ages, through the workings of the Holy Spirit, that book was brought into its present complete form, and it now stands as a divinely wrought mosaic, wonderfully varied, bearing in every part the marks of the divine artist, its unity of plan and fitness to meet all the wants of men to be realized by prayerful study, and by constant use in daily life.

To conclude, as we look over the whole subject of the witness of the conscience to God, we see that upon this one truth are built up the hopes, and the assurance, of the Christian. Human reason, standing by itself, must find difficulties in the simplest things of sense; but reason, when turned up to the being boundless in love, in wisdom, and in power, at once finds everything made plain; and the answer of the conscience to the call of God is simply the witness of the whole man to the presence of the one in whom alone he lives, and moves, and has his being.

From the nature of the case, it is impossible to know spiritual things thoroughly now, in this life. As Shakespeare says, in "The Merchant of Venice":

" There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-ey'd cherubins :
Such harmony is in immortal souls ;
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it."

All descriptions of the other world, even those given in the Word of God itself, must fall far short of the truth. The painter can not show it, the poet can not utter it; even the voice of inspiration can not tell us what shall be, only that all shall be well. The descriptions of heaven given in the Holy Scriptures are simply the distant echoes of the celestial harmony, all that can reach our ears now.

But though we can not know spiritual things fully now, still the moment that we rise at all above the material we are brought face to face with the spiritual, ushered into the presence of the Lord of all. And each earnest Christian, as he finds the light of God shining in his heart, may exclaim, in the trustful spirit of Tennyson :

—" Falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs
That slope thro' darkness up to God."

Remarks by ANDREW H. SMITH, M.D. Dr. Smith said in substance :

While I fully agree with the author of the paper that the highest evidence of the truth of revelation is that derived from the believer's consciousness, I think this is not immediately available for all. There are successive grades in the development of religious belief, the first step being the assent of the intellect to the fact of the existence of God; the second, the acceptance of revelation; and the third and last, that which the paper of the evening describes.

Evidence sufficient to convince any candid mind of the ex-

istence of God is to be found in the study of nature. On every side are the proofs of intelligent design, an intelligent adaptation of means to ends. Men apply the most painstaking research to the discovery of a principle in science only to find that it had been discovered and applied before the life of man began. The laws governing the reflection and refraction of light, the radiation and conduction of heat; the diffusion of gases; the movement of fluids of different densities when separated by membranous tissue, all of which are modern discoveries, at once are seen to have been utilized in the construction of the higher organisms since the first living creature was made. There was thus an intelligence vastly superior to man's intelligence which existed before the dawning of the human mind; an intelligence wise enough to plan the creation and powerful enough to carry out the plan; an intelligence in which nature had its being and by which it continues to exist. Such an intelligence supplies the conception of God.

The speaker adverted to the instinct of animals as something not evolved by themselves, since it is developed at once in its fullest capacity (the first dam built by a beaver being as perfect as any of his later efforts), but as something supplied by a source of intelligence from without. What is that intelligence? Surely it is not chance or "natural law" that teaches the bird to build its nest or the bee to construct the comb and to lay by its store of honey!

God has thus provided in nature an irresistible proof of His own existence. From the same source we derive some idea of His attributes. Especially does the care for His creatures speak for His attribute of benevolence. This, together with the pre-eminent position of man in the scale of creation, prepares us for revelation. Revelation, with the internal evidence of its truthfulness and its historical attestation, presents an incontestable claim to acceptance by the candid mind that believes in God. Revelation once accepted frankly and fully brings the believer into that relation with God which gives play to that inner consciousness which is the strongest as it is the final proof of the claims of the Gospel.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE Institute met in its rooms, No. 4 Winthrop Place, Thursday, December 3d, at 8 P.M., the President in the chair. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. Dr. Daniel Curry, of New York. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved.

The Secretary announced that Mr. Wm. O. McDowell had resigned the office of Treasurer, and that the Executive Committee had appointed Mr. Wm. Harman Brown, of New York, as treasurer in his place.

Rev. James G. Roberts, D.D., of Brooklyn, read a paper entitled "The Reason why Some Men of Culture and Honesty Reject Christianity." The paper and subject were discussed by Rev. Dr. Curry, of New York, Rev. Mr. Ingersoll, of Brooklyn, Mr. Phœbus W. Lyon, of Summit, N. J., and Rev. Henry A. Dows, of New York.

At the meeting held January 7th, 1886, with the President in the chair, the devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. Dr. A. H. Lewis, of Plainfield, N. J. The minutes of the previous meeting were read and approved.

The President announced that a Summer School would be held at Key-East, N. J., during the month of August.

Rev. Thomas A. Hoyt, D.D., of Philadelphia, read a paper entitled "The Fulness of Time." Remarks were made by Rev. Dr. A. H. Harris, of Plainfield, Gouverneur M. Smith, M.D., of New York, and the President.

The Secretary announced that there were 458 members of the Institute, 51 of whom have been received since July 1st, 1885.

IN MEMORIAM.

The following are the names of those members of the Institute who have passed away during the year 1885 :

Samuel S. Constant, New York; Prof. Wm. A. Scott, D.D., LL.D., San Francisco; Wm. H. Seat, D.D., Goliad, Texas; Rev.

Edward W. Breckenridge, Binghamton, N. Y.; Theodore F. Pierson, East Orange, N. J.; Prof. Washington C. Kerr, Asheville, N. C.; Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, London; Samuel Gilman Brown, D.D., Utica, N. Y.; Charles Hawley, D.D., Auburn, N. Y.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift will probably meet the demands of our readers.]

Most of the readers of *CHRISTIAN THOUGHT* are glad whenever a Christian man takes up some theme of philosophical or social science, and so handles it that his work deserves attention. They will therefore be pleased with the work of Edmund Woodward Brown, just published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, entitled "*THE LIFE OF SOCIETY*." It is a general view of the static and dynamic elements which enter into human society. It is a book on sociology displaying wide and ripe thought, extensive reading, skill in discrimination, and literary gift; and is free from cant, either religious or irreligious. As a whole, it must be read to be appreciated. As to details of execution, it may be judged by a few sentences gathered from its pages.

Mr. Brown divides the forces at work in society into two classes; those which we can classify as under law, and those which seem to us mere matters of chance. He insists upon the reality of the latter, in such words as the following :

"I am not saying that chance has the main sway, that chance produced the universe, that under chance it has gone aimlessly on and is still going aimlessly on. I am only saying that in the nature of things, both in the universe and in man, what we call chance has had play in great matters and small" (page 9).

Of the human body as a social force he says :

"The body enables us visibly to enter the outward world. The body seems to awaken us to life, our own and much life about us. If the body cease among men, then of course the

human race perishes out of the world. If the body even gets tired, as it does by every evening, then the human race must go to bed and sleep, leaving the earth at rest and unenlivened. It is because of the body that we need food, clothing, shelter, fire and conveyance; that we study soil and air and water, climate and season. The feeding of the world is the first question for its settlement, is a necessity which must be complied with before anything else can be done. The world, be it army or church or farmer or artisan or professional man, must first have its breakfast, its dinner, and its supper; no fighting, no working, no playing, no talking, on an empty stomach" (page 15).

Most of us have not been much in the habit of thinking of disease as one of the powers by which society is kept in motion. But we recognize instantly the truth of these sentences :

"Sickness is an influence in society : it has created a very prominent calling among men; it has modified character; it has affected property; it has affected some especially leading person in society; it has shaped the thought or cut short the career of many a man of power; it has increased to pestilence, and all these effects have been correspondingly increased " (page 17).

Of a man who has given himself up to some evil habit, till he is hardly a free agent, so far as that habit is concerned, he says:

" The sin is in the fact that the person dropped the reins upon the dashboard and allowed the horses to run at their will " (page 35).

His views as to the supernatural in society are expressed in the following sentences :

" Even if chemistry and astronomy have thrown out a supernatural world it does not follow that social science can throw it out. There are in society other than physical, other than psychological phenomena; there are moral and religious phenomena. In acknowledging religion and piety to be forces which act upon society we are brought face to face with a supernatural world " (page 85).

" In view of these facts, faith in the supernatural as a cause in society is not essentially weak, is not childish, but is sensible. There is evidence that power exists above the physical world, above the human being, above human society; power belonging

to another world, yet at work in this world. Its influence seems to be a part of the influence by which things go on " (page 88).

In the section on supernatural influence and purpose in society, Mr. Brown thus states and refutes a familiar form of error :

"Some philosophy and some science have recognized in the world an order so directed by unerring thought, so full of harmony in the processes, that no interference occurs in it; a sovereignty that has done all things so well that no interference is needed, and none is allowed or gets in. . . . God may be the original source of nature, may even be its immediate support, but He never acts from outside in addition. He leaves His machine to its work. He has no further interest, no surplus power, no additional will. He retains no liberty of this sort. He has tied Himself up. What was meant simply to be a bond of order for His works is made also to bind Him."

"But the question is not, could He do so, but has He done so. . . . Maybe He has not chosen to construct a world and then never interfere. He may desire to exert a direct influence, as one does upon another, as a parent does upon his family. Does it follow that, because the discoveries of natural science have tended to obliterate many apparent exceptions from the reign of material law, there are none left? The universality of law without any personal intervention is not yet established" (page 87).
—*Willis T. Beecher.*

When Dr. Valentine was president of Pennsylvania College he delivered a course of lectures on the "EVIDENCES OF THEISM AND THEODICY." No new weapons seem to have been formed, but Dr. Valentine, who is now professor of theology at Gettysburg, has certainly adapted the old to the demands of modern polemics. It is a good book to circulate where unreasonable skepticism begins to show itself. The style is good. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago. \$1.25.

"THE PEOPLE'S BIBLE," by Joseph Parker, D.D., is a great undertaking, to be completed in twenty-five volumes, if the life of its author be spared. Two volumes have been published. Seven are promised for the next year. It is not an ordinary

Bible commentary, not a scholarly and critical examination of philological questions, not a collection of other men's opinions. It is more teloscopic than microscopic. It strives to find the governing idea in each book and each section thereof. Genesis is treated as a book of beginnings; Exodus, of providence; Leviticus, of religious mechanics, and so on. It is a book for both people and pastors. Matthew Henry's Commentary is such a book, unapproached in value for spiritual edification until this work of Dr. Parker's came. If he can carry it forward as he has begun perhaps there will be no need for another of its character until the middle of the twentieth century. This book on Genesis is exceedingly rich, strong and bright. We have not found a stupid page in it. Funk & Wagnalls. \$2.50.

"THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF PHILOSOPHY," by Josiah Boyce, Ph.D., Instructor in Philosophy in Harvard College, does not seem to us to be of any help to either philosophy or religion, except as an example of how one bright, acute mind, looking through the medium of Hegelianism, regards religion. It seems rather to deserve the title of "The Philosophical Aspect of Religion." The author certainly is not a religious person seeking a philosophy, but rather a philosopher seeking a religion. He is evidently earnest as well as sincere, and often acute and eloquent. But he does not find either a religion that is truly philosophical or a philosophy that is soundly religious. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Count Leo Tolstoi's "MY RELIGION," a very excellent translation of which Messrs. T. Y. Crowell & Co. have just ready (\$1.25), has made something of a sensation in Europe, where it has passed through several editions in France and Germany. Count Tolstoi made great reputation as author of "War and Peace," an historical novel by many regarded as one of the finest productions of Russian literature. In his "Religion" he makes a plea for a direct application of the literal teachings of Jesus as expressed in Matt. v., vi. and vii., to the regulation of human life. He condemns society, as now maintained, as a system of organized violence, and, interpreting the commandments of

Jesus in a radically strict way, he foretells universal fraternity, the abolition of war and of the death penalty, the indissolubility of marriage, and, in particular, a life of simplicity under natural conditions, which are vividly contrasted with the filth and crime of cities, and the sufferings endured by the countless "martyrs to the doctrine of the world." To those who cannot accept its extreme views the reading of the book will be wholesome as pointing out how many and how injurious are the parasitical doctrines and institutions that have overgrown Christianity and largely hidden it from human gaze.

"SWEET CICELY" is the title of a story by the lady who wrote "Josiah Allen's Wife." It is in the quaint language of a woman who, with great natural strength of mind, has had no cultivation. These characteristics are not always kept in the same proportions, so that as a work of art the book is sometimes out of proportion, but it is very entertaining, is full of great good sense, often eloquent, pathetic and touching. It is a book that should be entered on the lists of text-books for examination in the civil service department of the Government. It strikes hard blows at certain classes of our legislators, blows well directed and richly deserved. It is a beautifully-made book, good for presentation. Funk & Wagnalls.

"THE FINAL SCIENCE ; OR, SPIRITUAL MATERIALISM," is the title of an anonymous book (from the press of Funk & Wagnalls) which bears the sub-title of "Being a Strict Application of the most Approved Modern Scientific Principles to the Solution of the Deepest Problems of the Age." We have been amused to see that some of our contemporaries have failed to perceive that this book is a satire and have seriously declared that in their opinion the author has failed to establish the claims of materialism ! No doubt he thinks he has, and no doubt he trusts that he has made all his readers believe that that science which is materialistic is no science at all. We wish the book a wide reading and believe that it will aid the cause of truth.

"THE INSUPPRESSIBLE BOOK," is the title given to a volume (published by S. E. Cassino & Company, Boston) containing

the articles which appeared in the controversy between Mr. H. Spencer and Mr. F. Harrison last year in the *Nineteenth Century* and *Pall Mall Gazette*. It is satisfactory to have these well-known papers collected into so well printed a book. The controversy between the agnostic and the positivist seems to have been serviceable to Christian truth. When the forces in the Philistines' camp rise up to slay one another, Israel naturally rejoices. Gail Hamilton has added "Comments," which are after the manner of her brightness and are very enjoyable, but we trust that brilliant lady will not think ill of us if she has failed to convince us that Herbert Spencer is a saint and his writings a gospel. We do not see that he has laid any one under a debt of gratitude except the enemies of the truth as it is in Jesus, and to seekers after philosophic truth. He has added nothing to human knowledge. The puzzle of the next century will be that a writer so full of mistakes and assumptions had any admirers in this century.

The late Lord O'Neil was a conscientious, hard-working clergyman when he came to the title and estate which he enjoyed up to his death in 1883. His accession to the peerage did not diminish his zeal, but his life was spent in the work of his Master. He was a man of great ability as was shown by his article published in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT last year, which first introduced him to hundreds of American readers. He was one of the most useful members of the Victoria Institute, his contributions to its proceedings winning for him much respect as a Christian philosopher of unusual culture. Messrs. Kegan, Paul, Trench & Co., London, have issued a volume of his sermons, under the editorship of the Ven. Archdeacon of Derry, Dr. Hamilton, who has furnished a charming short memoir of the noble clergyman. It can be procured from Mr. T. Whittaker, Bible House.

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

MARCH-APRIL, 1886



THE RELATIONS OF ART AND MORALITY.

[A Lecture delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Key-East, N. J., August 1st, 1885.]

BY WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D.D., COLUMBUS, OHIO.

IN the discussion of this theme I shall use the word Art in its popular signification, as including the fine arts, and as excluding the practical and mechanical arts. Art, as thus defined, is that portion of man's work which is inspired by the love of beauty. Not all the beautiful actions of men can be called artistic; the natural eloquence of an Indian brave is beautiful, but it is wholly devoid of art; there are unaffected graces of manner and movement that are beautiful—such as the postures and gestures of a little child, which we rightly describe as artless. Actions that are spontaneous and unreflecting may be beautiful but are not artistic. It is only those actions which are prompted by a love of the beautiful, and by a desire to give expression to that love in beautiful forms, that are properly included within the realm of art.

That this love of the beautiful is common to mankind I shall assume; and I shall not undertake any inquiry into the metaphysics of beauty. I take it as an undisputed fact that the great majority of the human beings known to us find pleasure in certain sights and sounds, in certain forms and colors, which they call beautiful; that they are stimulated by these sights and sounds to express, in ways of their own choosing, the beauty

which they have thus discerned, and that this expression of theirs is what is known to us as art. The philosophy of beauty and of the love of the beautiful presents to us some difficult problems; but the facts which the philosophers try to explain are facts of every day experience.

Morality is that portion of man's work which is inspired by the love of righteousness. The right is a notion as simple and as universal as the notion of beauty. Every rational human being says: "I enjoy that which is beautiful;" and with equal clearness affirms, "I ought to do that which is right." The feeling that right is obligatory is just as natural and immediate as the feeling that beauty is enjoyable. I may disagree with others in judging what objects are beautiful, as I may disagree with others in judging what actions are right; but all except a few philosophers are perfectly sure that beauty is to be desired and that right is to be chosen.

The love of beauty and the love of righteousness both belong in the constitution of man. The ideal man craves the beautiful and hungers and thirsts for righteousness. But it is not certain that in the ideal man these desires will be equal in rank or authority. In the ideal man there is a hierarchy of the affections and the active powers; some are nobler and diviner than others, and it is evident that there will be some one faculty that claims supremacy, and gives the law to all the rest. The crucial question for every human being is, Which of these powers does bear the sceptre? Human depravity is disorder and insurrection among the natural powers; the usurpation by the lower of the places that belong to the higher; the thrusting down of those that ought to rule, and the lifting up of those that ought to be subordinate. When appetite takes the throne and gives the law to a man's life it is evident that the order of his nature is inverted. Appetite has its place among his faculties, but its place is not on the throne. The same is true of the desire of property, or the desire of fame. Both are constitutional and lawful desires, but neither is the legitimate ruler of the human soul.

It is easy to see that some of these natural faculties of the soul are inferior and ought to be subordinate; but when we rise into the superior realms of human activity some questions arise

respecting the hierarchy of the powers, and it is one of these questions that we are to discuss to-day. It will hardly be disputed that the love of the beautiful and the love of righteousness are both higher and nobler faculties than the desire of wealth or fame, or the natural cravings of the body. But what shall we say of the relative rank of these two faculties? Are they equal and co-ordinate, or is one superior to the other?

This is by no means a new question. In one form or another it has been debated for many centuries. Some forms of civilization there have been in which beauty was queen, and other forms of which the standard was righteousness. And in many societies there have been sharp disputes between the devotees of the one and those of the other as to which ought to rule. The Greeks after Pericles enthroned beauty and despised righteousness; the Puritans after Cromwell uplifted righteousness, and trampled beauty under foot. We are heirs of the Puritans, and for this reason the question of the relation between art and morality has not, until recent times, greatly disquieted us. Our fathers settled it for us, by banning beauty and exterminating art. There was no more conflict between art and morality in our earlier history than there was between the Israelites and the Canaanites in the days of Solomon; no more than there is between the United States and the American Indians to-day. But of late those indestructible elements of human nature, so long suppressed, have begun to reassert themselves; the love of beauty has risen up to claim its place in the life of men; and the question of its rights and of its rank has become once more a burning question.

In this dispute there are some who assert, and more who assume, that beauty outranks right; that art is above morality. The Greek conception is by many in these days regarded as the true conception; the later Greek civilization as the highest type of civilization the world has seen. This is not often openly asserted, but a study of modern art reveals the fact that this is the central impulse of much of it; and not a little modern criticism proceeds from this as its fundamental canon.

I think it will be found that the philosophy which subordinates morality to art practically denies morality. The judgment, if I do not mistake, is not really a result of comparison,

for one member of the comparison is cancelled. This theory is the progeny of materialism, and thorough-going materialism dismisses with a sneer the moral imperative. When a man can say, with Carl Vogt, that "free-will does not exist, neither does any amenability or responsibility such as morals and penal justice and heaven knows what would impose upon us," or, with Moleschott, that "man is the sum of his parents and his wet nurse, of time and place, of wind and weather, of sound and light, of food and clothing," that "his will is the necessary consequence of all these causes, governed by the laws of nature, just as the planet in its orbit and the vegetable in its soil," he has evidently got rid of all his difficulties, theoretical and practical, respecting morality. That this materialistic doctrine, or something like it, lies at the foundation of most of the criticism which exalts beauty above righteousness is my belief; but the evidence on which it rests can hardly be exhibited at this time; I only leave the suggestion with you as one that may be worth following out. Nevertheless it seems to me that the doctrine which overturns morality undermines the very foundations of art. If there is no ideal righteousness which men may freely choose, what ground is there for believing that there are ideals of beauty which they may freely follow? The creative power of the artist is by this theory denied; art is reduced to the mechanical copying of nature; the painter gives place to the photographer, the poet to the reporter; and the musician is nothing but an æolian harp on which the vagrant winds make meaningless melodies. That this is the present tendency in some art-circles is obvious enough; the invasion of realism in art, so-called, has kept even pace with the inroads of materialism. But the kind of realism with which we are now much afflicted is not art at all. Mere imitation is not art. The monkey is not an artist. The muddy pool reflects the sky, but the picture you see in it is not a work of art. The mere copying of nature in all her phases, the accurate and exhaustive cataloguing of phenomena does not deserve the name of art. I know that people sometimes talk of unideal art, but the phrase seems to me a misnomer. It is not the law in the members but the law in the mind to which art as well as morality owes allegiance. No worthy work is done in either

realm except by those who keep their eyes fixed on the things that are unseen and eternal. The materialism that renounces morality but hopes to exalt art has proposed an impossible task.

Let us try to put into a concrete statement the theory that the beautiful and not the right should rule in character and in society. It means, if it means anything, that manners are higher than morals ; that clothes are more than character ; that a handsome face is rather to be desired than a clean heart, and a graceful deportment than a conscience void of offence toward God and men. It means that a city in which the architecture is shapely and the homes elegant, and the streets comely and the parks and gardens beautiful, but in which the citizens are dishonest and treacherous and lustful and cruel—in which the beautiful homes are beautiful hells, and the stately public edifices are sinks of corruption, and the splendid avenues are so many easy roads to Avernus—that such a city is a better product of civilization than the city whose homes are plain, and whose streets and public edifices are devoid of ornament, but whose denizens are honest, true, brave, steadfast, generous, ruling their own lives wisely, and dispensing to the poor a beautiful charity ; in short that Pompeii, at the beginning of the first century, presented a nobler type of society than Boston or Philadelphia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. I will not argue this question—it is enough to state it. Doubtless there are those among us who would quickly pronounce for the artistic rather than the virtuous society, to whom the Pompeii of Augustus would be a more desirable residence than the Boston of John Adams or the Philadelphia of Benjamin Franklin. But with such as these no argument is possible ; a great gulf that no logic can cross is fixed between their fundamental conceptions and those on which this discussion proceeds.

It is enough to say that the wellnigh universal testimony of humanity places righteousness above art ; that while the love of beauty has almost always been recognized as a lawful love, yet the love of truth and integrity and goodness have been esteemed by the great majority of mankind as nobler affections ; that while the devotees of beauty have won well-deserved applause and lasting fame, the champions of truth, the defenders of right, the

friends of humanity have kindled in the hearts of mankind the warmest enthusiasm, and gained for themselves the widest and most enduring honor. When Whittier said that he felt it a greater honor to see his signature at the foot of the first Declaration of Principles made by the Anti-Slavery Society than to read his name on the title-page of any volume of his poems, he expressed the universal sentiment of humanity, that the humblest act of heroic and unselfish devotion to the right is loftier, worthier, more grandly human, more nearly divine, than the most successful expression of the love of beauty. We may not approve his illustration, but we understand and justify this principle. The people who are undertaking to lift art into the throne and make morality her humble servitor will find the verdict of the race solidly against their project.

The periods when art has become the supreme interest in human life have always been periods of national decadence. "All [great] nations," says Ruskin, "first manifest themselves as a pure and beautiful animal race, with intense energy and imagination. They live lives of hardship by choice, and by grand instinct of manly discipline; they become fierce and irresistible soldiers; the nation is always its own army, and their king, or chief head of government, is always their first soldier. . . . Then, after their great military period, comes the domestic period; in which, without betraying the discipline of war, they add to their great soldier-ship the delights and possessions of a delicate and tender home-life; and then, for all nations, is the time of their perfect art, which is the fruit, the evidence, the reward of their national idea of character, developed by the finished care of the occupations of peace. That is the history of all true art that ever was or can be: palpably the history of it, unmistakably—written on the forehead of it in letters of light, in tongues of fire, by which the seal of virtue is branded as deep as ever iron burnt into a convict's flesh the seal of crime. But always, hitherto, after the great period, has followed the day of luxury and pursuit of the arts for pleasure only. And all has so ended."* That "all lovely art is rooted in virtue"; that "the foundation of art is moral character"; that "great art is the expression of the mind

* The Queen of the Air, § 105.

of a great man"—these are laid down as commonplaces of criticism by the greatest art critic of this century; and they are in deadly conflict with the notion that art is superior to morality.

But it is often claimed that the realm of art and the realm of morality are distinct; that if art is not superior to morality, it is at any rate independent of morality; that it has its own standards and canons, with which morality has nothing to do; that a picture or a statue or a poem may be good as a work of art, though it teaches or suggests bad principles of conduct; that the artist must give himself no concern whatever about the moral tendencies of his work, and that in doing so he is false to his art.

With reference to this theory, it must be said that the tendency to divide up life into separate and exclusive departments is in itself suspicious. When a man begins to fence off his own specialty, and to claim for it exemption from the ordinary rules of human conduct; to make of his particular calling or his peculiar interest an *imperium in imperio*, it is evident that he and his work will bear looking after. This theory has been too common. There was a time when we used to hear it said that politics was politics and religion religion; that religious people should never bring their religion into politics because the two realms were wholly distinct. What was meant by religion in this familiar formula was exactly what is meant by morality in the present contention; it was the principles of Christian ethics drawn from the New Testament. "You must not attempt to apply your New Testament ideas of right and wrong to politics"—that was exactly what they meant. That theory has been vigorously and successfully contested. The right and the duty of applying the New Testament ideas of morality to the affairs of state has been vindicated. That a state as well as a man ought to abhor that which is evil and cleave to that which is good, and that when the state ceases to be a terror to evil-doers and begins to harbor and foster iniquity, it ought to be rebuked by all who love righteousness, are propositions that will not need to be reargued. The old doctrine of the pit, that politics should be wholly divorced from Christian ethics, is not likely soon to be defended by intelligent men.

Another maxim of the same sort is equally familiar to us,

and not yet, I fear, so thoroughly discredited as the other. "Business is business," we often hear men say; and sometimes, when they say it, they mean that business is exempt from moral laws; that justice, truth, honor, kindness have nothing to do with commercial transactions; that the only rights to be regarded in the world of trade and industry are the rights of the shrewdest and the strongest, and that the only law to be obeyed is the unmoral law of supply and demand.

Here is one of the battle-grounds of practical ethics; and there is need enough of sturdy fighting all along the line. Certainly there is no present purpose of surrendering this field to the champions of conscienceless greed, and admitting that moral laws have no control within the domain of commerce.

When now we hear the critics setting up the same exclusive claim for art, we are naturally inclined to be skeptical. Is not the notion that "art is art" quite akin to the notion that "politics is politics," or that "business is business"?

In discussing the question whether the domain of art can be separated from the domain of morality, the first consideration that occurs to us is the close connection of art with human life. Painting, sculpture, poetry all deal largely with the life of man.

The painter gives us landscapes, animals, fruits, flowers, and other natural objects; but the highest art of the painter, as all admit, is that which shows us human life in some of its aspects. Figure painting, including portrait painting, and historical painting, is superior to landscape and still-life painting. The great paintings of the world are those which represent the characters and actions of men.

Sculpture is almost confined to the human form. Animals and simple natural objects are sometimes brought into sculptured groups, but the conditions of plastic art are such that the choice of subjects is greatly limited. "Sculpture," says Dr. Bascom, "from the costliness of the art, is found to choose the nobler themes. It will find these in man. Man is its chief, wellnigh its exclusive subject. This also arises from the only symbol at its disposal, form. The vegetable form cannot meet the mechanical conditions of sculpture, cannot sustain itself in stone, and is too little expressive to become an object of this art.

Animal life is of so feeble a character, is so little on the surface, is so overlaid with shell and hair and hide as to make no considerable figure in sculpture, aside from immediate connection with man. On the other hand the smooth, uncovered skin of man, undulatory and minutely expressive, with the soul on the surface, makes him a fit subject for an art dealing only with the single symbol, form." Sculpture has indeed created for us many gods and goddesses, but it has invested them all with the human form divine.

The poet, like the painter, may give us, with words for colors, pictures of natural scenery and natural objects. That, indeed, is a large part of his high calling. Yet one great secret of his art as the priest of unconscious nature, is to clothe the objects that she shows him with human qualities. The most accurate description of the moon in a cloudless sky will give us little pleasure; but when we hear the poet singing,

" The moon doth with delight
Look round her when the heavens are bare,"

the skies bow down to greet us; and when, instead of trying to represent or imitate the sound of the waterfall, he bids us listen as

" The cataracts blow their trumpets from the steep,"

and when he beckons to the darkness, crying,

" Swiftly walk o'er the western wave,
Spirit of night."

bidding her also,

" Wrap thy form in a mantle gray,
Star inwrought."

and when he shows us the approach of the season of frost and snow in such a picture as this:

" For winter came; the wind was his whip;
One choppy finger was on his lip;
He had torn the cataracts from the hills,
And they clanked at his girdle like manacles,"

we are kindled by his imagery, because he has touched the things without with the traits of our own nature and made the whole world kindred to us. Even when he describes natural objects, the poet is constantly, by his imagination, suffusing

them with human sympathies and interests. But his best work is done when man is his *thème*; the great poems, like the great pictures, are those which deal with the life of man—his hopes, his fears, his passions, his aspirations, his struggles and his triumphs.

Of the five greater arts, then—architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry, and music—three, sculpture, painting and poetry, are immediately and in their highest products chiefly concerned with the life of man, not only in ministering to his pleasure, but in representing his thoughts and feelings and actions; in interpreting his life. Man is the beneficiary of all the arts, but of the three that I have named he is the principal subject. Play-acting and novel-writing are also, in a looser sense, described as fine arts; the novelist and the actor both claim to be artists, and demand that their work should be criticised from an artistic standpoint. Mixed rather than pure arts they undoubtedly are; but I see no reason why the name of art should be denied to their work. So far as these lesser arts are concerned, it needs not to be said that their whole concern is with human life. If they are called lesser arts, it is upon the scale of dignity or purity that we are judging; their activity is as great as any of the others, and the demand for their product as constant.

If now, these arts, greater and lesser, are mainly concerned with human life, it is difficult to understand how they can ignore morality. For "conduct," as Matthew Arnold has made us all understand, "is three-fourths of human life." By conduct Mr. Arnold means *moral* conduct; conduct that is under moral law; that is either right or wrong, either good or evil. I am sure that we shall not think his estimate too high. An elder, and perhaps a better, philosopher has told us that "to fear God and keep His commandments is the whole of man," not the whole duty of man, as in the old version, but the whole of man—four-fourths instead of three-fourths of life. So our essayist told us yesterday, that everything we do has an ethical significance. Certainly those parts of life that do not spring from moral motives, and are not in some way related to moral principles, or directed toward moral ends, or affected by moral considerations, are very few, and comparatively unimportant.

But let us admit for argument's sake that there is some small section of life which is not ethical.* It follows that if art and morality are wholly distinct, the art which concerns itself with human life must confine itself to the smallest and poorest fraction of the life of man. But it is the highest art, as we have seen, which concerns itself with human life. Is it true that the highest work of art is busy with the lowest interests of men? The theory which divides art from morality must therefore degrade art. The artist who forswears and ignores moral problems shuts himself out from the largest and best part of life. His field is narrow and his materials cheap and crude. Perhaps the poverty of the modern art which seeks to espouse the philosophy we are considering is the best answer that can be made to its theories.

It is not true, however, that art ever has confined itself to that part of man's life from which moral motives are excluded. The sculpture of the later Greeks, which aimed almost wholly at symmetry of form, at the realization of mere physical beauty, came nearer to this than any other kind of art has ever done; and it is for this reason that the unmoral art of the present day adopts these Greek models and seeks to lead back art into the sensuous worship of that fading day. But the enterprise is impossible. Theories are cobwebs; the art-instinct quickly demolishes them. In every age the world's great art has concerned itself, not only with human life, but with the best part of human life; in the marble, on the canvas, in the poem and in the story the great artists of the world have shown us not only men, but men thinking, speaking, acting under the stress of moral motives; men dealing with moral questions; solving problems of conscience; heroic in their choice of the ideal right or scourged for their infidelity to duty. From Homer to Howells, from Sophocles to Browning the art of the ages has found its favorite themes in those three-fourths of life which Mr. Arnold describes as conduct. Hear M. Taine in his comment on the father of the English novel:

"He who through anxiety of conscience busies himself in drawing out the good and evil motives of his manifest actions; who sees vices and virtues at their birth; who follows the insen-

sible progress of culpable thoughts and the secret confirmation of good resolves, who can mark the force, nature and moment of temptations and resistances, holds in his hand almost all the moving strings of humanity, and has only to make them vibrate regularly to draw from them the most powerful harmonies. In this consists the art of Richardson; he combines while he observes; his meditation develops the ideas of the moralist."*

There has been, indeed, much art of a high order that did not enter thus profoundly and analytically into moral motives. Walter Scott was a great artist, both as poet and story-teller, but his method was not at all introspective. Nevertheless his people are moral beings, and it is with their moral life that we are chiefly concerned; not only in the conduct of his stories, as Ruskin says, but also in the occasional reflections with which he guides our thought, we perceive how profound is his interest in this supreme concern of human life. So it has been with most of the great artists, more especially with the great poets and the great novelists, and in a scarcely inferior degree with the great painters; subtract from their works all those portions which deal with ethical or spiritual interests and you would have but a paltry remainder.

But this, some one will answer, is a superfluous demonstration. No one, it will be said, claims that the artist must stay outside the moral realm; this he cannot do if he is to interpret human life at all; it is only urged that the artist must not be the advocate and partisan of morality. He must report what he sees with colorless impartiality, neither supporting the good nor opposing the evil. This is, perhaps, the prevalent dictum of modern criticism. I have given you M. Taine's judgment concerning the legitimacy of the treatment by artists of moral problems; let me give you now his theory of the way in which they should be treated.

"What is a novelist? In my opinion he is a psychologist who naturally and involuntarily sets psychology at work: he is nothing else nor more. He loves to picture feelings, to perceive their connections, their precedents, their consequences; and he indulges in this pleasure. In his eye they are forces, having various

* History of English Literature, II., 160.

directions and magnitudes. About their justice or injustice he troubles himself little. He introduces them in characters, conserves their dominant quality, perceives the traces which this leaves on the others, marks the contrary or harmonious influences of the temperament, of education, of occupation and labors, to manifest the invisible world of inward inclinations and dispositions by the visible world of outward words and actions. To this is his labor reduced. Whatever these bents are he cares little. A genuine painter sees with pleasure a well-drawn arm and genuine muscles, even if they be employed in slaying a man. A genuine novelist enjoys the contemplation of the greatness of a harmful sentiment, or the organized mechanism of a pernicious character. He has sympathy with talent, because it is the only faculty which exactly copies nature; occupied in experiencing the motives of his personages, he only dreams of marking their vigor, kind and mutual action. He represents them to us as they are, whole, not blaming, not punishing, not mutilating; he transfers them to us intact and separate, and leaves to us the right of judging if we desire it.”*

This is a clear and frank statement of a theory of art which is, I am sorry to say, altogether too popular in these days. I believe it to be a false and mischievous theory. The idea that the artist is to stand impartial and unmoved amid the characters he shows us; that he is to have no sympathy with the good and no repugnance for the evil; that it is to be with him a supremely indifferent matter whether the leprosy of moral corruption is steadily invading the characters he is painting, or whether they are working themselves free from its defilement—all this seems to me utterly abominable. The novelist can no more be neutral in art than in life. To see one standing in the midst of living men and women, witnessing their struggles with fates and foes and inbred sins, and coolly watching their conduct and anatomizing their characters, with no care whether it went well or ill with them, would fill us with indignation. We might not demand that such an observer should interfere in behalf of these struggling souls; but he could not be indifferent to their fate unless he were an egoistic monster. We have the same reason

* *History of English Literature*, II., 390.

for expecting to see the novelist taking the side of justice and nobility as the fortunes of his characters are wrought out under his hand.

It is not necessary that the artist, whether he be painter or poet or story-teller, should preach or baldly moralize; he need not draw out the lesson for us in didactic form; we do not wish to have him tell us when to laugh and when to cry—when to applaud and when to hiss; but we do demand that the artist who deals with human life shall not divest himself of his humanity; and that he shall not conceal his sympathy with goodness and purity and honor.

Professor Richardson of Dartmouth College, in a recent admirable essay, published in the *Andover Review*, discusses the moral purpose of our own recent fiction. The constant presence in American fiction of the moral element he indicates and praises; and his analysis of the fiction that wants this motive is keen and true. In speaking, for example, of the work of Mr. Henry James, who seems to have followed, all too closely, Taine's method, he finds entire purity, and no open encouragement to evil-doing. "The moral defect, however," he justly adds, "is apparent. It lies in the lack of a large, true, helpful purpose—that shown by every master in every art. . . . Literary finish, art of any sort, is not genuine unless it answers the question, What for? It is because Mr. James so often leaves the question unanswered; so often seems to care naught for it; so often forgets that man has been and will always be a creature of ambition, hope, love, enthusiasm and the idea of duty—it is because of this that he and his school must wield but a temporary power, unless the whole intellectual history of man has been at fault."

We will trust that Professor Richardson's predictions concerning the temporary influence of this kind of fiction will come true; but while it is in vogue it has the power of doing vast mischief. No subtler or more dangerous foe of civilization is now abroad than that moral indifferentism which infests so much of our art; and which accustoms us to look coolly and curiously on the plastic forces of human character, caring little, as Taine says, whether they are good or evil; which is amused with

tracing the "bent" of human dispositions, and equally pleased whether it is upward or downward. When the artist adopts this theory his work begins to be the work of a malefactor, and he himself is preparing to be fit company for fiends.

It is often asserted that it is the business of the artist to represent nature as it is, and life as it is. But this is only partly true. It is not the business of the artist to represent everything in nature as it is. It may be his duty to give us a true picture of that which he does undertake to show us; but there are multitudes of things in nature that he has no business with at all; he prostitutes his art and degrades himself if he touches them. Will any artist pretend that it is good art to paint a pile of offal or of carrion? He selects the subjects that he will represent; his right to make such selection is unquestioned; and his duty is to select such subjects as are worthy of representation. It is no more the painter's business to paint everything he sees; or the novelist's to depict in his tales all that he knows of human nature, than it is your duty to tell your neighbors everything you know. There are plenty of things that you know, that are true, that you have no business to tell anybody. Propriety and decency and modesty and every other virtue join to forbid you. It is really no imputation on your truthfulness to say that you do not tell everything you know. Certainly as much discretion as is required of you in your common conversation, is demanded of an artist in his work. Not only may he refrain from showing us that which is vile and disgusting, he is bound to do it. There is plenty of moral carrion that he has no right to paint. And the discretion that belongs to him in the choice of his subjects and in his manner of treating them, must be used in such a way that his work shall not have a tendency to strengthen the lower and baser tendencies of men and to weaken their higher faculties. In the selection of his themes, as well as in the use of his materials, the artist must be judged. "The habitual choice of sacred subjects," says Ruskin, "such as the Nativity, Transfiguration, Crucifixion (if the choice be sincere), implies that the painter has a natural disposition to dwell on the highest thoughts of which humanity is capable; it constitutes him so far forth a painter of the highest order, as, for instance, Leonardo, in his

painting of the Last Supper; he who delights in representing the acts or meditations of great men, as, for instance, Rafael painting the School of Athens, is, so far forth, a painter of the second order; he who represents the passions and events of ordinary life, of the third. And in this ordinary life, he who represents deep thoughts and sorrows, as, for instance, Hunt, in his *Claudio and Isabella*, and such other works, is of the highest rank in his sphere; and he who represents the slight malignities and passions of the drawing-room, as, for instance, Leslie, of the second rank; he who represents the sports of boys or the simplicities of clowns, as Webster or Teniers, of the third rank; and he who represents brutalities and vices (for delight in them and not for rebuke of them), of no rank at all, or rather of a negative rank, holding a certain order in the abyss."*

It is the function of art to represent life, we are told. But "What is life?" demands Professor Richardson. "Animal existence, says Walt Whitman. Conventional existence, declare its tame and bloodless, though artistically elegant, chroniclers. The career of upward-moving souls, answers the chorus of the world's greatest authors, in fiction as in every other department of literature. It is the ideal in the real, not the real without the ideal. And a finer and truer art is needed for the description of the first than for that of the second."†

I think that a true art may depict for us the career of downward-moving as well as upward-moving souls. The fact that he who sows to the flesh reaps corruption, is a great fact of human life with which the highest art must sometimes deal. The history of a life like that of Tito Melema or Becky Sharp, or—let me venture to say—Bartley Hubbard, is a legitimate subject of art. Such a story as that of Tito is a most vivid realization to us of one of the great facts of human life, the fact of retribution; it gives us the real fact, not the symbolic story which we often hear in vision and hymn. This is the awful judgment itself, of which Michel Angelo's flaming frescos are but the feeble sign. To show us this fact is one of the offices of great art. But not to show it, as Taine advises, neatly, jauntily, heartlessly, with no

* *Modern Painters*, III., Pt. iv., ch. iii.

† *Andover Review*, III., 320.

pity for the doom of the sinking soul! That was not George Eliot's way; no, nor Thackeray's, mocking though his tone might sometimes be; nor is it any more the habit of our own Howells; for though he never preaches, it needs no second sight to see how strong is his manly sympathy with all things pure and honest, how deep his silent scorn for all things base, and how genuine his pity for the wretch who works out his own damnation. George Eliot tells us that she began *Romola* a young woman and finished it an old one, so intense had been her sympathy with the mournful career of her chief characters. The great fact of sin with ruin following hard after is not outside the field of the artist; but he must make sin abhorrent, and retribution—the spiritual facts of retribution—certain; else he is a liar and the truth is not in him. His art cannot be good art, because it misinterprets human life.

But the function of art is not homiletical; it is æsthetical, some will say. Its business is not to preach, but to please. Grant that for a moment. How, then, shall it please us? There are pleasures and pleasures. There is the pleasure of the beast in the gratification of his appetites, and the pleasure of the astronomer in the music of the spheres. These are pleasures that degrade us and pleasures that ennoble us. Must not the artist choose which kind he will provide for us? And is he not bound to choose the higher instead of the lower?

But it is a low view of art which represents it simply as the vehicle of pleasure. That is part of its function, but the lowest part. It is the interpreter of nature and life. And when it interprets life it must tell the truth about life; and this it cannot tell unless it clearly sees and firmly traces the deepest laws of life, which are moral laws. Art there may be that embodies no high moral purpose, that only gives expression to some form of beauty. Music there is, and good music, that is neither sensual nor spiritual—but simply and purely and innocently sensuous—the delight with which articulate nature charms our ears. Landscape and still-life and *genre* painting may be good art without any other purpose than to please. A poem that describes some object or phase of nature, like Longfellow's "Flower-de-Luce," or Shelley's "Cloud," is not distinctly moral, but it is legitimate

art. This argument by no means claims that all art must have a moral purpose; sometimes its mission is simply to please, but the highest art is that which rises into the realm of human conduct, and here it is confronted by the great moral and spiritual laws; it cannot ignore these; it must understand them and clearly affirm them; nor can it be neutral or indifferent when it deals with them; it must be on the side of these laws, not didactically, but sympathetically and openly.

What Professor Richardson says of the work of one of our latest and best writers illustrates the principle for which I am contending:

"Mr. Cable, the wholesomest of later American novelists of the higher class, is a moralist in a genuine sense. The 'art for art's sake' dogma gets no encouragement from his short stories and novels. Through New Orleans life he sees the good and bad threads running, but the warp and woof which he weaves therefrom into his books are presented to us as a beautiful and helpful result. He knows what life is, and what it is for, and the life he describes is real and complete, not imaginary and partial." *

This is exactly what the highest art always knows—"what life is, and what it is for." It discovers the end to which its movements should be tending; it discovers "the ideal in the real." No man knows what life is who does not know what it ought to be; "the promise and potency" which it contains are its essential elements. And no man has any right to lay his hands upon it, in the name of art or in any other name, who does not wish that it may become what it ought to be, and who is not ready to help, with such power as he possesses, to make it what it ought to be.

All this implies that the function of art is service. Its end is not in itself. It is the minister of life. It may please us with pure delights, but it must not debauch our imagination; it must scrupulously guard against all degrading pleasures. In its criticism of life, it must never lose sight of what life is for, and must shape all its offerings toward the attainment of that end. Do you think that a narrow and Puritanic notion? Read, then,

* *Andover Review*, III., 324.

Tennyson's "Palace of Art" and find the clear witness of that great artist that art for art's sake is simply art for the devil's sake.

This makes room for saying that the highest art must always be the product of high character. Even as a vehicle for conveying the natural beauty of the world to the thoughts of men, art must always be inadequate unless the life of the artist be pure and sweet. Nature does not reveal her best secrets, does not show her fairest aspects to any but clean and upright men. That fountain of delight which springs from the heart of nature sings "its song of undying love" always and only to the pure in heart. "And yet," cries Tennyson, in one of his early poems, addressing "the man of hollow smile, and frozen sneer,"

"And yet, though its voice be so clear and full,
You never would hear it, your ears are so dull;
So keep where you are; you are foul with sin;
It would shrink to the ground if you came in."

I do not believe that we have had many great poets—great in the highest sense, who were not good men. But we have had many who might have been great if they had not been debauched by their vices. On this most vital question you must listen once more to Mr. Ruskin:

"The art-gift itself is only the result of the moral character of generations. A bad woman may have a sweet voice; but that sweetness of voice comes of the past morality of her race. That she can sing with it at all she owes to the determination of laws of music by the morality of the past. Every act, every impulse of virtue and vice, affects in any creature face, voice, nervous power, and vigor and harmony of invention at once. Perseverance in rightness of human conduct renders, after a certain number of generations, human art possible; every sin clouds it, be it ever so little a one; and persistent vicious living and following of pleasure render, after a certain number of generations, all art impossible." What a testimony is that from a great art-critic to the majesty and supremacy of the moral laws. But listen again:

"As I myself look at it, there is no fault or folly of my life—and both have been many and great—that does not rise up against me, and take away my joy, and shorten my power of

possession, of sight, of understanding. And every past effort of my life, every gleam of rightness or good in it, is with me now to help me in my grasp of this art, and its vision. So far as I can rejoice in or interpret either, my power is owing to what of right there is in me. I dare to say it, that because through all my life I have desired good and not evil; because I have been kind to many; have wished to be kind to all; have wilfully injured none; and because I have loved much, and not selfishly; therefore the morning light is yet visible to me on those hills, and you, who read, may trust my thought and word in such work as I have to do for you; and you will be glad afterward that you have trusted them."*

Dear teacher and master whose face we never saw, but whose living words have been to us so many years a guide and inspiration, we are glad already for what you have shown us; and we pray that the morning light may yet for many a day be visible to you on the green English hills, or ever you open your eyes upon the glories of the land that needs no sun!

This truth of the close connection between character and art is a vital truth—for artists surely: does it concern the rest of us? We are sometimes told, rather sharply, that it does not. We have no business, we are admonished, with the personal character of the artist. It is with his work that we are concerned, and not with the man.

If it is meant by this that we must not assume that an artist's character is bad—if it is meant that he has as much right as any man to the presumption of integrity—I heartily agree. There has been quite too much of this prejudgment of artists, especially in one or two professions. It is not for us to insist on investigating the private character of a novelist before we will buy his books, nor to catechise a painter before we purchase his pictures. We are bound to assume that they are decent men, and to believe and hope all things good concerning them until we are convinced to the contrary.

Furthermore, there are some departments of art in which the moral character of the artist cannot clearly manifest itself. It may not always be easy, for example, to discern in the

* The Queen of the Air, §§ 107, 111.

symphony or the sonata the moral qualities of the man who wrote it. No doubt there is a dignity and purity in the music of Beethoven and Mendelssohn that would not be likely to appear in the work of a low-lived man; and to a delicate spiritual appreciation something of the character of the musician may be revealed in his music, but this influence is so subtle that we do not readily trace it. So, too, in landscape painting, and in architecture, the moral qualities conveyed, or suggested, must be difficult to seize upon. But when an artist undertakes in any way to interpret to us human life, we have an interest in knowing that he is a good man. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary we are bound, as I said, to assume that he is a good man. If his work proves to be impure, we reject the artist and his work together. By his fruits we know him.

But suppose we have learned beforehand that the artist who undertakes to interpret human life is a man of vile character. We have not gone about to spy out his weakness; but certain facts, palpable and undisputed, show him to be a corrupt and degraded man. What then? Shall we accept his representations of human nature? Shall we ask him to divert us by giving us his ideas of human life? If you knew that a painter had a lascivious mind, would you commission him to paint you a figure-piece for your parlor? If you knew a poet or a novelist to be a rake, would you wish to buy his songs or his stories? You will not, I think, be over-nice if you say: "I do not want the products of such a mind in this kind of art. I do not wish to be familiar with the ideas of life entertained by corrupt men. I prefer not to know their sentiments or their theories or their imaginings. They shall not be my masters in this great field of study. The presumption is that a bad character will express itself. Can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit?"

If what I have said is true of the novelist and the poet, much more is it true of the actor. The drama deals exclusively with human life, and we have a right to demand that the pictures of life that it shows us shall be pure and elevating. To this no exception will be taken. Nobody will arise among us to defend a play that suggests impurity, or that tends to lower our ideas of the sacredness of virtue or the obligations of honor. Every-

body thinks that the drama should be morally sound—that the prevailing sentiment of every play should be sweet and wholesome and bracing. It is certain that this kind of diversion will continue to be resorted to for a long time to come. The theatre is here; it has been here for many centuries; it has come to stay, much as we may dislike it; we are not going to abolish it; we are all interested, even though we may have nothing to do with it ourselves, in having its character steadily improved. "Society will not drop the stage," says Mr. Munger, "but will demand that it shall rise to its own standards and be as pure as itself; decent people will have a decent stage."

Decent plays? "Certainly: everybody agrees to that." But decent actors? "Well—not so much matter about that." So some people say. "We have nothing to do with the man or the woman; the art is our sole concern." Let us see about this.

Doubtless actors, like other people, are entitled to the presumption of decency. At any rate I am ready to judge them as I wish to be judged. To demand incontestable proof of their integrity before you consented to witness their performances would be unjust and Quixotic. But when their vileness is matter of public notoriety—when it is neither concealed nor excused—we have ample reason for keeping out of their company; we dishonor ourselves by asking them to interpret life to us.

The bad actor cannot well help putting his character into his art. The play in which he assists is a delineation of human character. It deals principally with three great sentiments of the human soul—love, honor and duty. The writer of the drama has given us his conceptions of these great elements of human life, but the actor always does and always must infuse into the words of the writer his own individuality. Shakespeare's Hamlet is one thing; Booth's or Fechter's or Barrett's Hamlet is quite another thing; the three differ widely one from another; two of them must, and probably all of them do differ considerably from the Hamlet that was in Shakespeare's mind. Each actor puts a great deal of his own personality into the character. And not only in representing character, but in delineating particular emotions, passions, sentiments, the actor must give us his own conceptions. If his notion of purity is that there is no such thing,

the fact is liable to leak out somewhere in the performance. If his conception of love is that it is simply, or at any rate chiefly, an animal appetite, you are pretty likely to get some intimation of the fact in the course of the play. If you know beforehand that these are his sentiments, and that such is his character, you have reason to expect that his moral personality will disclose itself, more or less, in his art, and you will not often be disappointed. If you like such sentiments, and are pleased to witness the manifestations of such a character, you will, of course, have no scruple about attending the entertainment to which he invites you; if not, you will probably stay away. Certainly I cannot understand how intelligent men and women can fool themselves with the plea that the art of a notoriously immoral actor has nothing to do with his character. "The trail of the serpent is over it all."

"Of all facts concerning art," says John Ruskin, "this is the one most necessary to be known, that while manufacture is the work of hands only, art is the work of the whole spirit of man; and as that spirit is, so is the deed of it; and by whatever power of vice or virtue any art is produced, the same vice or virtue it reproduces and teaches. That which is born of evil begets evil; and that which is born of valor and honor begets valor and honor. Art is either infection or education. It must be one or other of these."*

Which of these it is in the civilization of the present day, it behooves us all carefully to consider. Infection it must be when it becomes the uppermost concern of human life. The doom of all the nations that have fallen has been wrought by luxury leading in art and placing her on the throne from which righteousness had been banished. The same fate threatens us; but we have allies and defences, if we will only trust them, which none of the dead kingdoms knew. We have the lesson of their decay with its clear causes set before us for our admonition; we have, in the four Evangelists, a nobler and completer ethics than they had ever conceived; and we have in the Gospel of Jesus Christ a sovereign cure for those disorders of the human heart out of which the mischiefs of society all spring. If Christ's

* The Queen of the Air, § 104.

Church will but understand, and obey, and enforce His law, and will diligently preach His Gospel, none of the evils that we sometimes dread will ever befall us. Luxury, greedy and cruel, will give place to sweet charity, with gifts for the needy and light for the blind; art, no longer seeking to rule, shall stoop with smiles and songs to serve and bless mankind, and He whose sceptre is a right sceptre, to whom belong kingdoms and thrones and dominions, shall reign forever and ever.

“Two thousand years of scientific ignorance, of ignorance, like Narcissus, admiring its own features, doted on a mere invention which led Alphonso of Castile to scoff at the Creator and to impeach the divine wisdom. ‘If I had been present at the creation,’ said he, ‘I could have given the Almighty some hints how to improve His work.’ All those ages the sun and moon shone on in their sweet reflections of the divine ‘foolishness’ that is wiser than man’s wit. We owe to ‘Science’ the enslavement of the human mind, and its scorn of the Pythagorean theory, for twenty centuries. To Copernicus, a *theologian and an ecclesiastic* be it remembered, we owe true science; and to Christians, like Kepler and Newton, we owe the demonstrations which have emancipated the human intellect from the scientific fetters of ages. ‘Ah! but Galileo and the Inquisition,’ say they. What of that? To make the papal blunder a reproach to Christianity and the Christian Church, you must assume, as sophists always do, that the papacy is part of the Christian religion. The author of Christianity has made His Church and Gospel responsible for nothing that He did not authorize. ‘Whence, then, hath it tares?’ *Answer*: ‘An enemy hath done this!’ The Gospel is not to be charged with what its enemies have wrought in its name.”—*Bishop Coxe*.

THE REASON WHY SOME HONEST AND THOUGHTFUL MEN REJECT CHRISTIANITY.

[A Paper read before the Institute of Christian
Philosophy, December 3d, 1885.]

BY JAMES G. ROBERTS, D.D., BROOKLYN.

NO one can look with any degree of earnestness upon the field of thought without seeing strange and confusing contradictions. Hypothesis is pitted against hypothesis, theory against theory, science against philosophy, and philosophy against religion. The combatants on all sides seem to be equally earnest and equally honest. All use weapons of the finest steel, and wield them with precision and effect. Now this one is victorious and now that one. The champion of yesterday, who carried away the palm amid universal applause, to-day lies biting the dust.

At the present time Natural Science, armed from head to foot, rides rough-shod over all opposition, crushes its enemies by its own weight, hews down things sacred and profane, tears to shreds time-honored faiths, and leaves the arena strewn with the wrecks of those things which were once dear to the human heart. Tomorrow some Red-cross knight may arise who shall lay this ponderous giant low.

Amid such confusions is it at all surprising that honest and thoughtful men are bewildered, and are ready to cry out in bitter sarcasm, "What is truth? Where is it to be found amid this Babel of human opinions? On all sides there is conflict and nowhere harmony. Men of power and of learning take opposite sides in respect to the same question. One class of thinkers accounts for the existence of the world by the law of evolution; another class holds that it is the immediate creation of God. One party looks upon the Bible as little else than a collection of myths and fables, of histories and biographies; another declares it to be the true revelation of God. One school of philosophers asserts that God is unknown and unknowable; another that He is the Father, the Redeemer, and the Comforter. When men

of the highest culture and honesty are so divided, how is it possible to arrive at any certainty in regard to the truth? Is truth opposed to truth? Is there one God of nature, another of mind, and another of Revelation?" To this I answer, it cannot be. God is one, and truth must be one. There can be no more conflict between different truths than between different rays of light proceeding from the same sun. True science, true philosophy and true religion are three streams, which have their origin in the same Great Fountain, and though they may diverge for a time, again they flow into one, and their waters blend together in perfect harmony.

Again it is asked, "If there is harmony, why this conflict? How can able and honest men contend with each other as if life and death were in the issue, when there is nothing to contend about?" To answer these questions, and to suggest some means by which this conflict may fairly be brought to an end, is the purpose of this address.

The great cause of these differences is that thinking men do not realize that different departments of knowledge require different means and different faculties for the discovery of their specific truths. Means that are all-important for the discovery of truth in one department are useless in another. The telescope, which is indispensable for the proper study of the motions, orbits and laws of the heavenly bodies, is useless for the study of things beneath our feet. Turn it upward and let it sweep a belt of sky, and there is a vision of beauty and glory unveiled before you surpassing the sublimest dreams of the imagination. Turn it earthward and it conceals instead of reveals. All is darkness and confusion.

Now take the microscope and you may see a world of beauty in a drop of water. Living beings which are invisible to the unassisted eye appear decked in all the colors of the rainbow. In what seems nothing more than shapeless specks, you behold exquisite order and symmetry. Turn it heavenward and it conceals instead of reveals. You perceive nothing but a confused glare. In that department to which each of these instruments belongs, it is an invaluable means for discovery of truth; outside that, it becomes useless. To what strange confusion would it

lead, if the astronomer insisted upon studying insects by means of the telescope, and the entomologist insisted upon studying the stars with his microscope?

As the telescope is fitted for the discovery of truth in one department and the microscope in another, so is it with the different faculties of man. In acquiring a knowledge of the beautiful in color and form the eye is all-important. The blind man can never attain this knowledge. No one whose eye has not been refined by long discipline can know the chastely beautiful. On the other hand, to acquire a knowledge of harmony the ear is the principal thing. The sweetest and most seraphic strains of music may strike upon the ear of the deaf man, but they awaken no response within him. He is as ignorant of harmony as he was before. And yet his eye may repose with pleasure on the serene outline of a beautiful form. He may even become a painter, but he can never become a musician—the faculty of music is wanting to him. On the contrary the blind man may become a world-renowned musician, but he can never become a painter. The one organ which is indispensable for acquisition of the beautiful is lacking to him. What sad confusion would there be if the blind should insist upon judging of colors by his ear, and the deaf man should insist upon deciding by his eye upon the merits of a sonata.

The knowledge of the external world comes to us by means of the senses—of color, by the sight; of sound, by the hearing; of fragrance, by the sense of smell; of things sweet and bitter, by the sense of taste; of things hard and soft, rough and smooth, by the sense of touch. The knowledge which we gain through one sense we can gain by no other, nor by all others. If a man is deprived of one sense, he must be deprived of the knowledge that comes to him through that sense. Hence you see that a man may be very highly skilled in one department of knowledge and totally ignorant in another.

To acquire a knowledge of the natural sciences, the first thing is to observe the facts. In order to do this you must use all your senses, of sight, touch, taste, smell, and hearing. All these are necessary to acquire an adequate knowledge of the facts of nature. After you have gathered your facts you must

analyze them, in order to learn their likeness and their difference. From your facts carefully sorted, by induction you build up your science. The chemist collects his facts, experiments upon them, analyzes them, and then by putting them together he establishes a principle in chemistry. If his facts are well chosen, if his analysis is thorough, if his induction is complete, it is not for you or anyone else to dispute his principle. It is established on the incontrovertible basis of fact and reason. But you will see that in this process of observation and analysis and induction the moral nature does not come into play. You could easily conceive of a man being a thoroughly scientific man without any moral faculty. The natural sciences do not necessarily awaken the conscience into activity. A man without a conscience could observe, analyze, and induct. Hence a man may attain to the height of excellence in science, and yet not believe in God, nor in the human soul, nor in good nor evil. Those means which are so powerful in the discovery of truth in the world of sense are powerless in the moral world. If therefore scientists come to you and say that they can find no trace of God in the laws of affinity, nor in the deposits of past ages, nor in the structure of the human frame, you should be no more surprised than if a blind man should say to you that in all his musical studies he had found not the least trace of color; or the deaf man should say that in all his observation of nature he had found no trace of sound. Before the scientific man, or any other man, can arrive at spiritual knowledge, he must use the means by which that knowledge is attained. Until he does that, his judgment in regard to moral truth is worth no more than the blind man's in regard to colors.

If we turn from the study of the world of nature to that of the world of mind, we shall find that the means and faculties used for obtaining a knowledge of mind and its laws are altogether different from those used in acquiring a knowledge of the physical world. For the latter the senses are indispensable, and without them man would be forever cut off from a knowledge of external things. They are useless in the immediate study of mind. Here we must close the avenues of sense, and turn the mind in upon itself in order to learn its processes and

laws. The eye cannot see them, nor can the ear hear them, nor the touch feel them, nor the taste taste them, nor the nose smell them. Mind alone can observe the activities of mind. It is only as mind shuts to the doors of sense, and concentrates its whole attention upon self-consciousness, that we can ever arrive at a knowledge of the facts and laws of mind.

Now, if we pass from the mental to the moral world, we shall find that the means and faculties by which we acquire a knowledge of moral and spiritual truths are different from those by which we gain a knowledge of physical and mental truth.

The conscience is the imperative faculty. Its language is, thou shalt, and thou shalt not. Here we must obey before we can know; we must act before we can understand. Coleridge said, "If you wish to know the truth of Christianity, try it." And a Greater than Coleridge has said, If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine. It is by acting upon its principles that we become assured of the truth of Christianity. We cannot acquire this truth by the senses, nor by turning the mind in upon itself, but simply by testing its truth in experience. Act and you shall know—know not formally, nor rationally, but really. Your own experience of the truth will be the most self-sufficing evidence.

Let me illustrate. Here is a cold, hard-natured, selfish man. He has been brought up coldly, sternly, and without affection. Love, which people talk so much about, is an enigma to him. The more he thinks about it, the more perplexed he is. He sees two young persons who love each other dearly and tenderly. But sight cannot give him an idea of love. He calls their affection sentimental nonsense—the most silly thing that rational beings could be guilty of. He reads about love, and what he reads he calls sickening trash. He tries to think love out of his moral consciousness, but the more he thinks, the more absurd does it appear. But let some one come along who has the magical power of kindling love in his cold heart, so that it shall haunt his waking and his sleeping hours. Now he knows what love is, for he feels it burning within his breast. Neither sight, nor hear-say, nor thought could give to him an idea of love; but the moment he *did love*, he knew love.

You may talk for hours to the vicious man on the pleasures of virtue. It is a waste of words. All his pleasures are in vice. Virtue to him is a dreary waste with a low and leaden sky. But let him begin to practice virtue; let him once hear the sweet voice of an approving conscience; let him feel within him the true glory of self-respect; then he will know what virtue is, and what its pleasures are.

Try to persuade the miser of the blessedness of benevolence; that, if he wants to be a happy man, he must give away his money, and he will look upon you as beside yourself. He will ask, "What happiness can there be in simply giving that away for which I have toiled, and sweat, and sacrificed ease and comfort, joy and pleasure, and for which I have lived a life of hopelessness? Give that away? *It is absurd.*" But let him begin to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to comfort the distressed, to lift up humanity, and he will know the joy of giving, the blessedness of benevolence. George Peabody said the hardest thing that ever he did was to give away the first ten thousand dollars; afterward giving became the passion of his life.

It is very interesting to note how quickly man frames for himself a religion of some kind, when once the affectional side of his nature is called into exercise by its appropriate stimulus. Auguste Comte at first scouted all religion, and remanded it to the region of myths and fables. He describes the development of human intelligence as passing through three conditions—the theological, or fictitious, the metaphysical, or abstract, and the scientific, or positive. In its final positive state the mind has given over its vain search for God and absolute truth, and is content with the study of phenomena and their laws. And yet this cold, inflexible sceptic, with a power of thought unsurpassed in this century, felt the need of a religion when once the fountains of his heart were unsealed by woman's love. Under its inspirations he elaborated a religious system more ornate in ritual and more complex in its hierarchy than Romanism itself, and placed it as the climax of the Positive Philosophy.

If ever there was a youth from whom all religious influences were systematically excluded, that youth was John Stuart Mill. His father did all that was possible to crush out of his soul every

spiritual aspiration. The one end of his education was to make him an intellectual machine of the greatest force. If his writings had only been touched with emotion, he would have been a writer of unsurpassed influence. In his later years the great depths of his nature were stirred by woman's love, his asperities were softened, and longings and aspirations for a higher love were awakened within him. His "Essays on Religion" were looked for by the enemies of Christianity as the instrument which would give a death-blow to that religion. They disappointed every one. In them we find a most beautiful tribute to the Divine Founder of Christianity. He says, "The most valuable effect of Christianity on the character has been produced by holding up in a Divine Person a standard of excellence and a model for imitation . . . and whatever else may be taken from us by rational criticism, Christ is still left, a unique figure not more unlike all His precursors than His followers, even those who had the direct benefit of His personal teaching. . . . Nor would it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve his life."

Had John Stuart Mill given the same attention to the culture of his spiritual nature as he did to his intellectual, had he been willing to have tested Christianity by putting it into practice, he would have become one of the grandest and most heroic Christian philosophers.

In Michael Faraday we find a perfect reconciliation between the highest scientific attainments and the simplest and most devout Christian faith. In the scientific spirit, in the search into the meaning of nature and in unravelling her mysterious web, he is without a peer in this century. But no less remarkable was he in the sweetness, trustfulness and unselfishness of his disposition. In him could be seen a living example of how a man may unite nobility and strength of character with perfect gentleness and love, how he may be a sincere believer in Christ and at the same time one of the princes in the world of science.

How are we to account for this combination of scientific greatness and Christian faith? The answer is that Michael Faraday developed his intellect by his earnest search for truth in

obedience to the laws of truth. He developed his spiritual nature in his prayerful search after spiritual things in obedience to the law of Christ. He learned by experience the truth of those words, "If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine."

If any one wishes to know what justice is, let him be just; or purity, let him be pure; or truthfulness, let him be truthful; or what the Christian religion is, let him practice it. Do the will of God and you shall know the truth of the doctrine. Your conscience will be alive and active and tone up your whole being.

But do not imagine, because you have gained an insight into moral and spiritual truth, that therefore you are qualified to decide upon the facts of nature. Here is the grave mistake of many religious men. They have assumed to judge of scientific truth when they knew nothing about it. They take it for granted that, because they have acquired an insight into truth in one department, they have an equal insight into truth in all departments. One of the saddest pages in ecclesiastical history has been the ignorant opposition of the Church to science. This has done much to alienate scientific men from Christianity, and to intensify the warfare on the field of truth. Men of science have turned away in disgust from a system which seemed to beget such ignorance and bigotry; while at the same time the Church has turned away from science as from a poisoned fountain.

But many scientific men have fallen into the same blunder as the Church. They imagine that, because they have gained an insight into science, therefore they are qualified to judge of all truth; that the same means and faculties which enabled them to understand matter will enable them to understand spirit. They put God and the human soul into their retorts, as if they were bits of metal, and because they cannot separate them into their elements as they do material things, they reject them as unknowable, and hence conclude that it is useless to waste time on such majestic nothings. But it would be as reasonable to undertake to weigh the light in scales and to measure the force of gravity by putting it into an alembic, as to attempt to know God and the human soul by means of chemistries and physiologies. Natural things are naturally discerned and spiritual things are spiritually discerned. Not until men on both sides recog-

size this principle can the conflict in the realm of truth be brought to an end. So long as they culture one class of faculties to the neglect of others, so long will their judgments in regard to truth be partial and one-sided. Not only so, but they incapacitate themselves for right judgment. Every one knows that the exclusive use of the arms in great muscular effort develops them to an immense size, and the neglect to use the legs makes them weak, muscleless, powerless. The same is true of the faculties of the mind. Culture and use develop them; neglect and disuse shrivel them. Truths which address themselves to that side of the mind which is developed, will stand out clear, distinct and bold as a mountain; while those truths which appeal to that side of the mind which is undeveloped, will be dim, misty and unreal. The Idealist has dwelt so long in the realm of mind and pondered so much upon it, that he sees nothing in all the universe but mind. Cold and heat, the rough and the smooth, earth and sea, air and sky are to him only conditions, modes and states of mind. Mind is all and in all to him. On the other hand, the materialist has thought so long and so persistently upon matter, that everything that cannot be submitted to material tests appears unreal and unsubstantial. To him there is nothing in all the universe but matter. Thought, volition and affection are only modes and conditions of matter. Matter is all, and in all to him. To the spiritualist who has pondered over and dwelt in the spiritual world, there is nothing so real as the things of the Spirit; all else is a passing show. Bring these three men together and do you think they would agree? They would all be intensely dogmatic, intensely positive, and intensely in earnest. It would be easier to mingle oil and water than to bring them into harmony. They would die rather than yield their positions. They can see one side of the question but no other.

When such a man as Prof. Huxley sneers at poetry, philosophy, literature and religion, he honestly means what he says. He has devoted his strong mind so exclusively to the study of material things that it has come to pass that those things, which he cannot submit to the tests of the senses, appear to him false and unreal and, as an honest man, he denounced them as such. When

Pope Pius the Ninth issued his encyclical letter against modern science, he honestly believed all he wrote. He had devoted all his thoughts exclusively to the Catholic faith; he believed that it is from heaven, and that all that militates against it is from hell; and, as an honest man, he denounced it as such. Whenever and wherever this one-sided culture prevails, such perversions will occur; and wherever these exist there must be conflict. Do you think that Prof. Huxley and Pope Pius the Ninth could live in the same world and not be in conflict? It is impossible.

The only thing which can ever bring these differences to an end is the larger and more harmonious culture of all the faculties of the whole man. All sides of his being must be developed. In this age, when the praises of science are in all mouths, I hardly need say that the scientific side of the man should be cultured by the severe study of science—its facts, its methods and its laws. Fact is supreme in science. To modify facts under the pretext of explaining them is to undermine the very foundations of science. The only science that is worthy of the name is one that embraces all the facts, honestly interpreted. This is the demand which Christians should make upon scientific men. There is a strong tendency to leave the solid fact and to fly off into the realms of speculation. In that mysterious land it is easy to mistake the flashes of the imagination for the true light. I do not believe that Christian thinkers can render a higher service to science than to insist upon the duty of scientists to keep close to facts. When Prof. Tyndall tells us that matter has a spiritual side, instead of launching forth into a highly metaphysical argument upon the properties of matter, as I heard Joseph Cook do, let us say, "All right, professor; please show to us the spiritual side of this stone." The burden of proof is not with us, but with the man that makes the assertion.

Again, the mind should be studied. Mind is more to itself than all the things the mind contemplates. Atoms, molecules, fossils, stars and nebulae are good things because they furnish food, and stimulate the activities of mind.

Here too, if we would find the truth, we must hold to the facts and all the facts. Words are the fossils of the thought of ages past, and they are the living representatives of the thought of

to-day. If it be interesting to study the fossil remains of beasts and birds and fishes, how much more interesting to study the fossil remains of the human mind! If it be worth while to ransack the zones in search of butterflies, moths, caterpillars, beetles and bugs, because we may therewith feed our minds, how much more important is it to search into the meaning of words that we may thereby learn the nature and character of the human soul. I am persuaded that by no legerdemain can we ever deduce the necessary from the contingent, the universal from the particular, the infinite from the finite, free-will from necessity, nor duty and self-sacrifice from selfishness. We may rest assured that the more deeply these representatives of the human mind are searched into, the more wonderful will that Being appear in which they originate. If knowledge is power, that power will be the greatest when it pertains to mind. Search this earthly sphere from centre to circumference, and you can find nothing so grand, nothing so beautiful, as that central, luminous and self-luminous, that conscious and self-conscious thing—the human soul.

Again, the religious nature must be cultured. This allies us to the Infinite and the Eternal. The laws of the spiritual knowledge are as clearly defined as those of science. Obey God and He will manifest Himself unto you. Be humble, and God will dwell with you. Hunger and thirst after righteousness, and you shall be filled with righteousness. Be pure in heart, and you shall see God. Do His will and you shall know of the doctrine. Comply with these conditions, and you shall have within you the certitude of divine truth.

Each man lives in a tower with three windows. If he looks through the first, he sees this beautiful world with its mountains, plains and many-sounding seas. If he look through the second, he sees the more beautiful world of the human soul with its thoughts and purposes, its loves and hopes, its longings and aspirations for immortality. If he look through the third, he sees the All-Beautiful, the All-True and the All-Good, our Father and our God.

Gaze through each of these windows, gaze earnestly, gaze reverently, gaze lovingly, and you shall know the truth in its majesty, its beauty and its harmony.

THE FULNESS OF TIME.

[A paper read before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, in New York City, January 7th, 1886.]

BY THOMAS A. HOYT, D.D., PHILADELPHIA, PA

SAYS Froude, "Julius Cæsar came into the world at a special time and for a special object." "A new life," he explains, "was about to dawn for mankind. Poetry and faith and devotion were to spring again out of the seeds which were sleeping in the heart of humanity. But the life which is to endure grows slowly; and the soil must be prepared before the wheat can be sown; so, before the kingdom of God could throw up its shoots, there was needed a kingdom of this world, where the nations were neither torn in pieces by violence, nor were rushing after false ideals and spurious ambitions. Such a kingdom was the empire of the Cæsars—a kingdom where peaceful men could work and think and speak as they pleased, and travel freely among provinces, ruled for the most part by Gallios, who protected life and property, and forbade fanatics to tear each other in pieces for their religious opinions."

He argues that, "had Europe and Asia been covered with independent nations, each with a local religion represented in its ruling powers, Christianity must have been stifled in its cradle." Again, he says, "this" (Roman) "spirit which confined government to its simplest duties, while it left opinion unfettered, was especially present in Julius Cæsar himself." . . . "He respected the religion of the Roman state as an institution established by the laws. He encouraged, or left unmolested the creeds and practices of uncounted sects and tribes who were gathered under the eagles. But his own writings contain nothing to indicate that he himself had any religious belief at all." . . . "He fought his battles to establish some tolerable degree of justice in this world; and he succeeded, although he was murdered for doing so."

Mr. Froude concludes his book by drawing what he styles "a strange and startling" (but we think fanciful and fallacious) "resemblance between the founder of the kingdom of this world, and the Founder of the Kingdom not of this world, for which the first was a preparation."

The completeness of this preparation is indicated by an event recorded by one of the Evangelists: "And it came to pass in those days, that a decree went out from Cæsar Augustus that all the world should be taxed." The word *οἰκουμένην* signifies the whole habitable world then known to geography or history, and singularly illustrates the sublime and solitary position of the Emperor as the master of the world. Through his gradual absorption of all the great offices—Consul, Tribune, Censor, President of the Senate, Imperator of the Legions, Pontifex Maximus—Augustus acquired a mysterious and awful character, which seemed the exponent to mankind of Divine Providence—all-seeing, all-powerful. Gibbon has noticed the extraordinary situation of a subject in the Roman Empire, who should attempt to fly from the wrath of the crown: escape was impossible; no nation could shelter the fugitive, or oppose the Imperial vengeance.

From this exalted throne issued the decree, above recited, which fixed the time and determined the locality of Christ's birth.

That event was the goal of preparation, and the induction of the new Era. Precisely at this moment coincided the celestial and terrestrial forces which had been so long at work. As we have seen, the secular historian rises from his studies with the emphatic declaration that the Empire of Cæsar was a preparation for the Empire of Christ.

But all the previous history of the world contributed to the production of the Roman Empire: hence all the former ages were a preparation for the coming of Christ. With this conclusion agrees the utterance of the inspired Word: "When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth His Son."

Did space permit, it could be shown by a collation of facts that the general course of events during the four thousand years which intervened between the creation and the Incarnation

points to the same result. We might, indeed, go further and maintain that these forty centuries are quite inexplicable on any other hypothesis. Here we reach the great Basin of humanity, into which all its streams have hitherto poured their affluence, and from which they henceforth flow in other directions to water the earth. Here begins the new division of time, which will no longer be reckoned from the creation of the world, nor from the building of Rome, nor from Greek Olympiads, nor from Egyptian Dynasties, nor from Chaldean Cycles, but from the Nativity of Jesus Christ. The Imperial decree had, as we have seen, an important influence in determining the place and period of the miraculous birth which was thus to divide time into two great portions, to be ever afterwards marked—B.C. and A.D.

The former world is old and ready to vanish away: a new world opens to our view. The first volume of the divine purposes and of human history is closed: the second is begun to be written. The mighty procession of past centuries hoary with age and laden with treasures is arrested: the more august march of future ages is inaugurated. Divine Providence and Revelation, human history and destiny, under the old *regime*, have reached their acme and culmination: a fresh Revelation which shall illuminate Providence; a higher destiny which shall impregnate history—become the starting-point of a more glorious career. The old was the seed-plot of the new; the new was the fruit of the old; but only when we combine the divine and human in our view can this be seen.

The powerful factor in the world now introduced was not the product of man's efforts, nor the logical result of his thoughts, but it was the fulfilment of the eternal purpose, the gift of God to a race which had exhausted its energies, and lay panting and dying before the eye of the Divine pity. Yet all the past was the education of mankind under severe tutors and governors that it might be fitted for "the liberty of the sons of God." This is the true key to the vicissitudes and struggles of the old world.

A rapid glance will suffice to set before us these tentative movements of the human race. We will not however ascend the stream of time to its source, but will pause half-way, since from this point the action becomes more rapid and distinct. About

the middle of the period, which we significantly style "Ancient History," a remarkable event occurred. It was the call and migration of Abraham, and the segregation of the Hebrews from the mass of mankind. It is evident that henceforth human history separates into two parts—the history of the world at large and the history of one peculiar people. Two diverse experiments are in progress—the experiment of the Gentile and the experiment of the Jew. In his work on the Pentateuch, Graves estimates their results and shows that both experiments signally failed to vindicate the virtue and capacity of man. The mass of mankind fell into heathenism, and that heathenism became more and more corrupt. We can trace the successive steps of its deterioration. We can in the distant past find "traces of a primeval religion which acknowledged the existence and inculcated the worship of the true God." We can discover the time when "no mortals had been exalted to divinities, when there were no impure and cruel rites." It is asserted that, "the period in which, and the sects of philosophers by whom, was first broached a dispute on morals" can be ascertained.

"Philosophy, plunging into vain disputations, wandered from the truth, or shrinking from the terrors of persecution did not dare to avow it." Although the human mind displayed lofty powers and a teeming fecundity; and the gorgeous civilization of the "East with richest hand showered on her kings barbaric pearls and gold"; and the classic culture of Greece adorned the realms of thought, the cities of earth, and the temples of the gods with immortal forms of beauty, still the follies and crimes of idolatry continued to increase. "Because that when they knew God they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations and their foolish heart was darkened."

This was the result of the trial on the one hand. The Jewish nation, after a succession of idolatrous rebellions, was sent captive to Babylon. Upon their restoration they avoided the commission of open idolatry, but they eviscerated their religion of its spirituality, and reduced it to a mere outward and ceremonial observance without power to correct the life, or to purify the heart. This was the result of the experiment on the other hand. In both was evinced the necessity of a further manifestation

of God, if mankind should ever be recovered from its degeneracy. But besides this, as the same writer shows, we can discern amid the deepening gloom, "special preparations for the inauguration of the new era. Literature, philosophy and the fine arts were rapidly diffused over Greece, and cultivated with an ardor unequalled in any age or country." Its people were the most ingenious and animated, its language copious, expressive and harmonious. Here were produced noble works in poetry, eloquence and philosophy, which rendered Greek the language of the polite and learned both in the East and the West, and thus prepared it to become the medium through which the records of Christianity might be conveyed to succeeding ages. By the mutual wars and invasions of the Greeks and Asiatics; by the settlements of Grecian colonies in Asia; by the extended commerce of the Greeks and Phœnicians, the connection of the European world with the East, the residence of the chosen people, and the fountain of religious knowledge, became daily more close and constant. This knowledge of the true religion, though it had in a measure died out in the hearts and lives of the Jews, was still preserved by them in their Scriptures, and was accessible to all inquirers.

The conquests of Alexander cemented the two continents and diffused the Grecian language still more widely.

The immense expansion of the Roman Empire united the whole civilized world under one government and rendered the means of communication and the interchange of ideas perfectly open and easy.

The mighty mass was moved and quickened by the transcendent genius of Julius Cæsar, and then moulded into form by the inimitable patience and skill of Augustus.

We now find the Jews placed in a position unlike that of any former period of their history. From having been the most local and exclusive of all people, they began to spread through the world in a movement which continues to this day. They became involved in the Imperial politics; they espoused the cause of Cæsar, from whom they received special privileges, which were confirmed by the edicts of Augustus, who styled them, "the friends of our father, Caius Julius."

A large body of the nation retired into Egypt, built a temple at Alexandria, publicly observed their religion, and flourished in numbers, wealth and influence. They adopted the Greek language so generally, that it became necessary to translate the Scriptures for their benefit. By this means the Old Testament, which had been previously locked up in the comparatively unknown tongue of the Hebrews, became available to the learned of every country. To show how much at variance such an occurrence was with the exclusive temper of the Jews, and how necessary was such an extraordinary adjustment of events, in order to secure it, we are told that this translation, which was indispensable to the religious wants of the Jewish colonies, was the subject of national mourning in Judea.

About the time when this famous Septuagint version was made at Alexandria, the Ptolemies collected in the same city the celebrated library which was the centre of attraction to scholars of every nation; thus bringing the most cultivated minds of the world into contact with the largest colony of the Jews in Egypt, and with this noble and classic version of their sacred writings.

And finally, "the same providential system of preparation for the introduction of a pure and universal religion was equally conspicuous in other movements concurring to the same end. The inquisitive and vainglorious turn of the Grecian character multiplied philosophic sects, which by their perpetual disputations directed the attention of mankind to religious and moral speculations, and gradually undermined the influence by exposing the absurdities of Paganism. Though these sects did not substitute any perfect system of natural religion, yet in their controversies many of its great truths were occasionally debated with spirit and subtlety, and thus became objects of general interest. The want of further information, and above all of such divine instruction as should remove men's doubts on these most awful subjects, was felt and acknowledged by the most sagacious minds."

Some of their philosophers declared in express terms that they could push their inquirers no further, and that unless God should send them a Teacher, they must still remain in doubt on the great problems of humanity. There was a general expecta-

tion, diffused by the Jews, that such a Teacher would shortly appear. This is a brief recital of events which culminated in the great historic period that must next engage our attention; the period which witnessed the marvellous conjunction of Jesus and Cæsar, of Christianity and the Roman Empire.

II. Milman observes that, "The reign of Augustus Cæsar was the most remarkable epoch in the history of mankind." It solicits our earnest scrutiny, for it was the epoch of Christianity. The period derives its chief glory from this advent. But on the other hand Christianity challenges a more profound study by reason of its appearance on so illustrious a stage. It did not hide itself in the dark ages and obscure parts of the earth. It leaped into the amphitheatre at Rome; it stood before the Emperor; it spoke on the Areopagus at Athens; it disputed in the schools at Alexandria; it emerged from the Temple at Jerusalem. It threw down the gauntlet in the face of the world; it drew its sword against all comers; yet it proclaimed itself the champion of the human race, asserting with unbroken constancy that it came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them, and declaring war against the evil powers which had so long trampled on humanity. The interesting inquiry arises, What was the peculiar fitness of this period for the great event which thus marked and adorned it?

When we survey this majestic epoch in the annals of the race, the object which first arrests the eye is the Roman Empire, It was unlike any that had preceded it. This difference had been the subject of prophecy. The ancient seer who had the coming ages unfolded to his gaze, beheld the Assyrian Empire under the form of a lion, yet a lion clothed with the wings of an eagle.

Next, he saw the Persian, "like to a bear, raising itself on one side, and having three ribs in its mouth." Again he beheld and lo, the rapid conquests of Alexander were pictured before him in the guise of a leopard, that with its four wings, seemed to fly rather than to run.

After this, he "saw in the night visions, and behold a fourth beast, dreadful and terrible and strong exceedingly. It had great iron teeth. It devoured and brake in pieces and stamped the residue with the feet of it. And it was diverse from all the

beasts that went before it." This was the Empire of Rome. It was so unlike all the former kingdoms that he did not describe it, and no beast on earth could be selected as its symbol.

The Roman Empire differed from its predecessors in several particulars. For one thing, it was more nearly universal than any other. It extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, and from the borders of the German forests and the shores of Britain, to the sands of the African desert. It stretched its vast bulk over large portions of three continents. The whole civilized world and many barbarous nations were embraced by it. The Mediterranean Sea, with its classic shores, its fertile islands, and its teeming populations, lay enfolded in its bosom. Taking that sea as a centre, it spread a thousand miles in every direction. The Greek and the Barbarian, the Roman and the Jew were all held under its imperious sway. "Parthians, Medes and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, in Egypt and in parts of Lybia about Cyrene, and Cretes and Arabians," were either citizens or subjects of Rome. Over all these numerous and diverse populations the Imperial city held, with some exceptions, undisputed rule.

Next, her methods of subjugation differed. Fiercer than the bear, swifter than the leopard, more terrible than the lion, her legions brake in pieces and trampled upon her enemies. But she absorbed and assimilated the conquered nations. She extended not only her arms, but her arts, her laws, her language over all. The Roman colonies in every part of the world were centres of power and civilization. Her wars of conquest were marked by relentless cruelty, by the destruction of armies, by the sack of cities, by the slaughter of the people; but when her resistless power was acknowledged, Rome threw the ægis of her protection over the prostrate foe, and admitted it as an ally. Although much oppression was endured in the provinces at the hands of the pro-consuls, the effort of the supreme government was to extend just laws throughout its wide dominions. The police arrangements were co-extensive with the Empire. Great roads radiated from Rome, as the common centre, and stretching to the farthest limits of her domain, united to her in constant intercourse the

capitals of every province. Along these noble viaducts rolled the life and wealth and power of the world. Along them thundered the legions, their eagles glittering in a Syrian sky, or gleaming amid the leaves of a German forest. Here travels a pro-consul to his province; and there goes a victorious general to seek the honors of a triumph. Couriers hurry past, bearing to remotest regions the mandates of their mistress. Yonder come crowds of captives, destined to feed the gladiatorial shows. There an illustrious exile bends his solitary way, to seek the consolations of philosophy at Athens, or Antioch, or Alexandria. The ministers and messengers of trade, of news, of letters, of power, civil and military, throng the course and maintain the connection of the Imperial city with her subject populations.

Another important result of the Roman dominion was the wide diffusion of the Latin and Greek languages. The conquests of Alexander had distributed the Grecian tongue and literature over a large portion of the known world. The kingdoms of the Seleucidæ and the Ptolemies had perpetuated them in Asia and Africa. But Rome gave them greater permanence and authority. The Latin was the language of government and war; it was preserved and improved by a noble literature of its own. Yet Greece subdued by her arts the ruder conquerors whose arms she could not resist. Cicero urged his son to follow his example and combine Greek with Latin both in philosophy and the practice of speaking. He yields to Greece the palm of eloquence, and attributes to Athens in particular the glory of philosophy and the honor of having invented and perfected the loftiest powers of speech. We have already seen the ancient Scriptures translated from Hebrew into Greek for the use of the Jews scattered through the Empire. Now when the New Testament is to be written for the instruction of all mankind, it was not the accidental choice of its writers, but the direction of Supreme Wisdom, that led to its being done in the same language.

The manner in which Rome treated the religions of conquered nations was another difference. The preceding empires made war upon the religions as well as upon the political autonomy of foreign nations. Xerxes made a fatal mistake in assailing the gods of Greece. Alexander pursued a more generous policy, and

permitted each people to retain its own deities. But what was in him the instinct of genius, and failed to inspire his successors, became the settled policy of Roman statesmanship. It not only allowed, but adopted the gods of subject provinces. They were worshipped at Rome as well as in their native temples. The Pantheon enshrined a vast concourse of deities, thirty thousand in number. Votaries from every land could find there, each the image and altar of his country's god. It was at once the shrine and museum of paganism.

Thus the sublime effort of Rome was to bind the world together and to itself, by the powerful bonds of arms, of law, of language, of religion. It was the most skilful scheme ever devised by man to form the nations of the earth into one political body. The attempt was made on a scale of surpassing grandeur, by one of the noblest of the dominant races; and the result was among the greatest achievements of mankind. Upon a stage thus prepared for it, Christianity appeared. It availed itself of these facilities. Its ambassadors travelled upon these highways, employed these languages, appealed to this law, were for a time sheltered by these arms. The iron hand of Rome had broken down the barriers, and thrown open the nations of the world to the messengers of the Gospel.

The Religions of the Roman Empire at the epoch of Christianity next attract our notice. The convocation of all their gods in the Celestial Senate Chamber of the Pantheon indicated an amiable toleration, but the number and variety of divinities perplexed their votaries and destroyed faith in all. The subject nations lost confidence in their gods, since they were unable to guard their worshippers from the all-conquering arms of Rome. Their priests and princes had been dragged in chains to adorn a Roman triumph. The presence of their sacred effigies in the great temple of all religions, where they were herded and undistinguished amid the countless multitude, was, after all, a badge of degradation.

Nor had the gods of Rome been able, as St. Augustine elaborately argues, to protect the Empire from the most frightful calamities. Neither Jupiter, nor Mars, nor the tutelary deity of the Imperial city, whose name was an awful secret, could prevent

the march of Hannibal, the invasion of the Goths, or the devastation of the civil wars. They were powerless against the fury of Marius and Scylla, the ambition of Julius, the vacillation of Pompey, the dagger of Brutus, the lust of Anthony, the arts of Augustus. Although Cicero declared that the immortal gods had aided him to defeat the conspiracy of Catal ne, yet vanity so far got the better of piety, that he claimed to be the savior of Rome.

Thus the gods of every nation were dishonored. They were regarded as indifferent to human suffering or as unable to relieve it. No confidence could be placed in deities whose hearts were so cold, or whose arms were so weak.

It may be asked why a similar reasoning does not destroy faith in the Christian religion. Throughout Christendom, and in every age, there have been wars, famines, pestilences, yet Christians do not renounce their faith in God. Why then should the Romans have done so? The answer to this question reveals the distinction between false religions and the true. Ignorant of the One, Personal God, of the nature of His moral government, and of a future life, with its rewards and punishments, the Pagans limited the power of their gods to this life, and had no hopes except of temporal benefits. Disappointed of these, in an age of unparalleled misfortunes, they cast religion to the winds, and renounced the worship of divinities who could not or would not help them. The inability of the gods to contribute to the happiness of the future life vested the whole issue of piety on their power to benefit men in this world. Their failure to do this was proclaimed by the accumulating miseries of the Empire. Hence in its hopeless agony the human heart despised and rejected them.

But these external calamities were not the only cause at work to overthrow the ancient devotion. The progress of speculative thought had convinced the educated classes of the absurdity of the popular beliefs. The priests themselves became tinctured with the prevailing scepticism. No surer evidence can be found of the decay of religion than that its ministers have lost faith in it. "Actors," says Milman, "will perform ill who do not feel their parts."

“‘It is marvellous,’ says the Epicurean in Cicero, ‘that one haruspice can look another in the face without laughing.’ And when the Epicurean himself stood before the altar, in the remarkable language of Plutarch, ‘he hypocritically enacted prayer and adoration from fear of the many; he uttered words directly opposite to his philosophy.’ While he sacrifices, the ministering priest seems to him no more than a cook, and he departs, uttering the line of Menander, ‘I have sacrificed to gods in whom I have no concern.’”

Thus among the Romans, in spite of the frantic efforts of the common people to maintain the ancient faith, it slipped away from them, and left them to struggle with the anguish of despair. Man was left without religion, and the lack of this great boon became his greatest misfortune. He was deprived of the noblest thoughts, the deepest aspirations, the loftiest hopes, the richest consolations.

Such was the religious condition of the Empire at the epoch of Christianity. Mankind had lost the faith of its ancestors and had no substitute for it. Christianity came to fill the mighty void.

But a rival disputed its claims. Philosophy strove to supply the wants of humanity. What then were the merits of philosophy in this respect? This is a pertinent inquiry, since these two, Religion and Philosophy, are ever closely allied. Indeed religion is the fountain of philosophy. Cousin says, “All truths are primitively given us; philosophy does not invent any.” Again, he says, “I hope I have established this important truth, that religion is the cradle of philosophy. In every epoch of the world, religion is the foundation of that epoch; it is religion which makes the general faith of an epoch, and for this reason its manners, and again for this reason, up to a certain point, its institutions.” Sir Wm. Hamilton affirms that identical problems arise in philosophy and theology. Theology is the result of the application of philosophy to religion; it is the last and highest expression of philosophy. Hence the force of the dictum which he utters with the confidence of genius and learning, that, “No problem has arisen in theology which has not first arisen in philosophy.”

Philosophy, then, from its relations to religion, might, if anything could, aspire to become its substitute. Was it competent to do so?

Out of the materials furnished by speculation, Greek and Roman thought formed two great systems of practical philosophy—Epicureanism, and Stoicism. Was either of these able to meet the wants of man, and guide him safely in the paths of virtue and happiness? None will pretend that a gross and sensual Epicureanism was adequate to the task. On the contrary, by the common consent of mankind it is branded with infamy; its very name is a reproach. It degraded the soul to the level of the body; it placed the purest and the coarsest pleasures on the same footing; it denied the dignity and refinement of moral, intellectual and spiritual gratifications; it held that he who tickled his palate with a sauce, enjoyed as noble satisfaction as he whose "mind moved in charity and turned upon the poles of truth."

Epicureanism, then, could not elevate or console man; it could only sap the virtues of the heroic age, and reduce its votaries to the condition of a beast or a butterfly.

But the Stoical Philosophy appeared in a fairer and nobler form. What shall be said of its ability to benefit mankind? Stoicism was a recoil from Epicureanism—the indignant protest of the soul against its baseness. It taught that to live virtuously is not to live in pleasure, but to live according to the highest wisdom. It seemed to anticipate the inspired utterance—"she who liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth." It enjoined a severe self-denial, repressed the natural sentiments of fear, surprise and love, and inculcated a lofty but impossible egoism. By adopting the aphorism, "The wise man is sufficient unto himself," the Stoic cut himself off not only from human sympathy, but also from the fountain of his being, the supreme object of affection, and was left a lonely and sullen orphan in the world. His philosophy gave many just precepts, but it did not reveal the source of duty. It was cold and hard, having no fellow-feeling for suffering, no pity for weakness, no charity for those who erred. We have preserved to us the lives of three illustrious philosophers of this school—Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

The morality they taught was on its own confession insufficient; it was dim and partial; it was inadequate to arouse the sluggishness of mankind; it gave only a rule, where men required a principle of action. As Farrar says, "They were among the truest and loftiest of Pagan moralists; yet Seneca ignored the Christians, Epictetus despised them, and Aurelius persecuted them." Most of the Stoics allowed suicide, many of them glorified it, some of them committed it—and why? Because the doctrine of the future life was hidden from their eyes. Shakespeare shows in the soliloquy of Hamlet how one reasons on this subject who is conscious of immortality. But the ancient philosophers had no materials for such an answer, much less for the confident assertions of Scripture.

Even Socrates had no certain hope. He closed his "Apology" with these doubtful and pathetic words. Addressing his judges, he said: "But it is now time to depart—for me to die, for you to live. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God." It is true, Socrates employed his last day on earth, while awaiting the hemlock's fatal hour, in framing an elaborate argument for the immortality of the soul, which is recorded in the "Phædo." It displays wonderful penetration, but it does not reach greater certainty than Bishop Butler's first chapter of the "Analogy," which professes only to show the *probability* of a future life. Socrates first endeavors to prove the previous existence of the soul, and makes this the basis of his argument for immortality. Now the falseness of the one conclusion casts suspicion on the other as a logical inference. It is curious also to notice that the friends to whom he directed his discourse, were more ready to admit that he had proved the previous existence, than that he had demonstrated immortality.

Seneca, in his "Consolation to his Mother Helvia," written during his exile at Corsica, speaks of his mind thus: "mindful of its own eternity" (it) "passes into all that hath been, and all that shall be throughout all ages." Yet this was merely a rhetorical flourish: he had no real convictions. This is evident, for he glorified suicide as the "be-all and end-all" of existence; the escape from "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."

With him, as with Cato and Brutus, to die was to sleep:

“ No more:—and by a sleep to say we end
The heartache, and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to.”

Seneca died by the painless death of opening the veins; yet while his life thus slowly ebbed away, he made no reference to the existence before him. He perished by the command of Nero, his former pupil and friend: and this suggests, in marked contrast with his hopeless death, the exultation of another illustrious victim of Nero's cruelty, who spoke thus: “ I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which God the righteous Judge will give me at that day.”

Epictetus nowhere alludes to immortality, or the life to come; hence it is probable that, either he did not believe in it at all, or put it aside as one of those things which are out of our power. Even the nobler and sweeter Aurelius lacked this buoyant hope. All he aimed at was to preserve his integrity to the end. He exclaimed thus—“ Come quickly, O death, for fear that at the last I should forget myself.” Although an emperor, he surpassed the other two in modesty and virtue; yet no clear vision cheered his sadness amid the deep calamities in which during his whole reign the Empire was involved.

Here is his advice in view of death: “ Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou hast come to shore: step out ! If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there. But, if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures.” In the only allusion Marcus makes to the Christians, he complains of their indifference to death, which appeared to him, as it did also to Epictetus, to arise not from any superior motives, but from a perverse obstinacy.

Thus the Stoical philosophy revealed its inability to supply the place of religion; it could not support man under the burdens of life, nor could it unveil his future destiny.

Such then was the abject state to which both religion and philosophy were reduced at the dawn of Christianity.

These two great fountains of truth and devotion had become corrupt, and the streams which flowed from them could no

longer gladden, but only devastate the land. This conclusion is confirmed by a scrutiny of the actual moral and social condition of the age. We have seen it to be an age of remarkable development in the arts of government and civilization. But how did it fare with virtue, public and private?

Was the happiness of individuals and nations advanced? Did virtue and happiness flow from these fountains? "The heathen system," says Thornwell, "in its richer developments was evidently the offspring of imagination, requiring no piety, but taste. Fables were its scripture, poets its divines, and the fine arts its altars. In its practical applications it was an affair of the state. Princes were its priests, magistrates its guardians, obedience to its precepts a branch of the duties of a citizen."

The Emperor was the Pontifex Maximus. His statue was placed in the Pantheon, and divine honors were decreed him. When we recall Tiberius, Caligula and Nero, we appreciate the force of the startling language of Gibbon, that the Emperor "was at once a priest, an atheist and a god." The worshipper cannot rise higher than his god. A system which allowed such an apotheosis, "was of course destitute of moral power; and from the intimate connection which subsists between the imagination and emotions, its appeals to the fancy must have served to inflame the passions, and to augment the corruption which it is the office of religion to repress. The understanding was left without instruction, and the heart without discipline, while loose rein was given to the imagination and the appetites. Hence was formed a species of character, in which sensibility to beauty, and refinement of taste were strangely blended with the grossness of vice and the obscenity of lust."

History confirms all this and tells us that it was an age in which the twin monsters, atheism and superstition, stalked hand in hand. Men, who denied a god, were afraid of a ghost and trembled at a shadow. He who rejected Jupiter grovelled before a frog of the Nile. It was an age of great crimes; of cruelty to the weak; of vice, licensed by religion and justified by philosophy. It was an age of deep sadness; virtue and truth were gone, and even hope no longer remained in the box of Pandora. "Judgment had fled to brutish beasts; men had lost their

reason." The world was worn out with doubt and lust and fury. The bitter cry of despair went up from the heart of humanity.

This was the aspect of the world at the epoch under view. It was at this juncture in its affairs that Christ came. It was when the Jews were scattered through the world as harbingers of the coming era; when Greek language was at once the tongue of the world and the vehicle of the sacred Scriptures; when the conquests of Alexander had thrown Europe upon Asia; when the Roman dominion had moulded the two continents together; when the wars of Cæsar and Pompey, of Brutus and Anthony were ended; when Augustus sat upon a peaceful throne; when the doors of the temple of Janus were shut; when the gloomy visage of Tiberius was about to appall the Empire; when the bloody and fantastic footsteps of Nero echoed in the distance; when philosophy had become untrue and religion had become corrupt; when the Schools were deserted, and the temples were despised; when doubt and dismay brooded over every heart; when darkness covered the earth and thick darkness the people. It was then that the great clock of the world struck the morning hour, the day began to dawn, and the shadows to flee away; it was then the Star of Bethlehem beamed, the Sun of Righteousness arose; it was then that God sent forth His Son, that Jesus of Nazareth appeared on earth—for the Fulness of Time had come.

DR. LYMAN ABBOTT, in a sermon at Cornell University, gives a parody of the Lord's Prayer in his closing sentences as "The Prayer of Modern Positivists": "Our brethren which are on the earth, hallowed be our name; our kingdom come; our will be done on earth, for there is no heaven. We will get us this day our daily bread. We will forgive no trespasses for there is no forgiveness. We will fear no temptation, for we can deliver ourselves from evil, and ours is the kingdom, and ours is the power, and there is no glory, and no forever. Amen." The Doctor then invited the audience to unite with him in the Lord's Prayer, thus impressing the fine contrast upon the heart of each hearer.

THE BIBLE FOR MOHAMMEDANS.

[A Paper read before the Institute of Christian Philosophy,
at Asbury Park, N. J., July 22d, 1885.]

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THE supreme work of the Church is to evangelize the world. All subordinate questions are questions of method. The plan pursued by Jonah, when he began his remarkable work in Nineveh, would speedily cause the imprisonment of a preacher in a modern Asiatic city, as the smallest charge brought against him would be that of inciting riot.

A missionary campaign may be planned in many ways which differ widely, and varieties of ecclesiastical artillery are now in use. In any given case, as the Church looks over the field, many ways suggest themselves with a view to opening the country to the Gospel, and bringing the native mind under evangelical influence. Each of these ways will doubtless afford some advantages, and each has its representative men, its noted and successful champions, to whom we are referred, as to any well-known type. Men are too quick to draw broad inferences, and striking personal success in a particular case, does not warrant comprehensive rules and sweeping generalizations based thereupon. No two missionary fields are opened to the Gospel in precisely the same way, and a system which proved a conspicuous success in one place may fail as signally in another.

There is the dashing method, and this has been blessed of God in many cases. The great African exploring missionary, David Livingstone, may be taken as the representative man under this head. But it is foolish to confound the work of such a man with the work of those who come after and take up his mantle.

Another group may be called the Preaching Missionaries, and William C. Burns, who went to China in 1847, may be cited as a typical example. He lived among the Chinese people,

dressing in native costume, and so seeking by conciliatory methods and by constant preaching to emancipate their souls from bondage. But his method is not always practicable.

Another method still is the educational, the system which proposes to expend effort mainly for the young, hoping in this way to reach and hold generations that shall follow. This system has grown in favor decidedly of late, and claims many distinguished names as fully committed to it. Dr. Alexander Duff, of Calcutta, and Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, of Constantinople, may be named in illustration.

But over against all specific opinions as to method in opening up new territory, and over against a varied experience of success and failure in the past, stands the self-evident proposition that the Word of God must be given to all men in their vernacular tongue and that as speedily as possible.

Martin Luther said well, "By the Word the world has been conquered: by the Word the Church has been saved: by the Word, too, she will be restored."

The Church of this nineteenth century has an earnest faith in that proposition, and we are chiefly zealous for this—to bring the mind of man everywhere into an intelligent relation to that precious Word.

When the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions began their work in Southwestern Asia, there were no accepted formulas of missionary science, or rules of procedure, nor was there any specific choice, comparing the different methods just named; but the evangelical instincts of the workers led them in the right direction, and the result was the adoption of what may be termed the Biblical Method—not any particular method taught in the Bible, but that method which requires the use of the Bible. There must be preaching of the Word indeed, but also reading and study of the same, in a permanent form so translated as to stand with an enduring literary character. This is now a bare truism, but in the days when Dr. Joseph Wolff went to Tartary, in the days of the Danish Protestant missions in the East India islands, to say nothing of earlier times, it was by no means a truism, and if it has become so now, the change is due to a prodigious uprising in the Church.

Friends of the cause half a century ago were not agreed as to the question of founding schools, of sending converted youth to America, or of editing a weekly religious press, but they were agreed about the Bible. It was not the feeble agreement of men who nod before a truism, but it was the agreement of the men who marched to Marathon! The missionaries did not adopt a uniform policy, even in the matter of personal habits, residence, clothing and the like, but they stood absolutely together on the supreme importance of giving each separate race in the Ottoman Empire a faithful rendering of God's Word. This was the ground-plan of all the work undertaken, and it was a war of the giants! Looking back now over the history of that grand effort, and reviewing the many difficulties which must be met and vanquished even in case the nature of the translation is the simplest, we are astonished at the course mapped out for themselves by those pioneers of the work in Turkey. It is surprising that they foresaw so many of the difficulties that must be met, and it is also surprising that when they did see them, they still pushed forward with a courage so simple, and a patience so steady. Our theme is one not readily stated, because the difficulties encountered in the work are so many. The translation of the Bible into the language of the Ottoman Turks may be considered as an example or type of the difficulties met by all who seek to set forth the Scriptures in the language of any Mohammedan people.

It must not be supposed that the modern missionary translations were new in the absolute sense, or that any one laboring at this cause now is compelled to break up virgin soil. Work has been done from time to time, throughout the ages gone by, and the work of the past has its own value, just as the same thing may be said of Germany before Luther, and of England before Tyndale. A brief statement may serve to indicate the course of events in this line, before the great work began in this century.

The eighth and ninth centuries saw the Eastern world overwhelmed with the new doctrine, and literally overrun by the disciples of the False Prophet. But long before this the Arabic language had been highly developed by the native authors who were very numerous and very ingenious.

A Jewish school was maintained during the tenth century at

a place called Sura, in Babylonia, and from the year 928 to 942 that school was conducted by a learned man named Saadia Ben Joseph. He was accustomed to write in the Arabic language, and in addition to his own writings, he translated a large part of the Old Testament, if not the whole, into that noble tongue. Very little use, however, was made of such rare manuscript treasures as that of Saadia, and so far as popular influence in Syria was concerned, it might as well not have been written. In Europe it was more highly prized, but on another ground.

After a like fashion in other places efforts have been made, and we would gladly do justice to all such did time permit. But for various reasons none of these former drafts were in any thing like a satisfactory shape, and when the great missionary effort of this century began, it was quickly seen that the whole ground must be carefully gone over again.

I gather the following dates and specifications from the published records of the American Board. Previous to 1842 only brief portions of Scripture in the spoken Arabic were sent forth from the Beyrout press, such as the Sermon on the Mount, Ephesians, Psalms, Proverbs, etc. After 1845 came the book of Genesis, and other selections, but at last, in March, 1860, the New Testament, complete with references, was issued in an admirable edition of 5,000 copies. Five years later the Bible was published entire, March, 1865. Dr. Eli Smith had begun the work, and after his death it was carried forward by Dr. Van Dyck. There are now several different editions available, in electrotyped plates.

In the Armeno-Turkish, *i. e.*, the Turkish language written in the Armenian alphabet and used by Armenians, there had been much earlier progress. The last sheet of the first edition was corrected in January, 1831, in the island of Malta, where the mission press was then held for fear of violence in the large Mohammedan cities. It was printed many times after that date.

In the Arabo-Turkish, *i. e.*, the Turkish as used by the Turks, printed in Arabic characters, the first edition of the entire New Testament was issued in 1862. Subsequently the book of Psalms appeared, and at last, in 1878, the entire Bible, revised by a large committee and approved (?) by the Mohammedan censor of the

press, was printed and offered for sale in Constantinople. This was the Lord's doing, and it may well be counted marvellous, when we call to mind the current of hostility that the Gospel must encounter in such a city. A large part of the life of Dr. William Goodell was given to the Armeno-Turkish version, and Dr. William G. Schauffler labored for many years on the Arabo-Turkish.

The committee responsible for the issue of 1878 comprised six persons, viz.: Dr. Elias Riggs, D.D., LL.D., Chairman; Rev. George F. Herrick; Dr. Weakly (Church of England missionary); one native Protestant Armenian secretary; two Osmanli Mohammedan secretaries.

The writer had the privilege of sitting in the committee-room while some discussions of this subject were in progress, in 1872 and 1873. In the present discussion, the speech of the Ottoman Turks is in the foreground, though some remarks will be made about the Arabic, which is vitally connected with the Turkish.

What is the problem which an American missionary must face, when he proposes to lay open God's Word before Mohammedans? The barriers to be surmounted are of no ordinary kind. The Bible for Germans was translated by Germans; the Bible for Englishmen was translated by Englishmen; and in such a case the workmen employed were presumably familiar with their mother tongue. But the missionary, at work on a new version, for Turks, or for Arabs, or for Persians, or for the Mohammedans of the Ganges valley, must possess not only the qualifications of Luther and Erasmus, but those of Lane and De Sacy also. I do not know of anything in the range of literature more difficult!

It is not an easy thing to write a book that shall prove of permanent literary value. It is not easy for an author, working in his own mother tongue with every thing in his favor, to produce a book that shall rise to a commanding position, that will fit into one of the niches of immortality. How many can follow in the steps of Gibbon or Macaulay? and there never was but one Homer, but one Milton! And yet our translator is expected to work miracles in the way of expression in a tongue which he did not learn from infancy! Juno said, "I walk a queen," but

there was only one Olympus for her to walk. Yonder in Beyrout is a poor perplexed mortal, who must soar at once with Moses, David and Isaiah in Hebrew, and with Hariri, Ibn Arab Shah and Mohammed himself in Arabic.

A writer has only his own thoughts to deal with under one set of laws for expression, but the translator must deal with the thoughts of God, and that under two or more entirely different sets of laws both of grammar and of taste. IT IS NOT EASY TO TRANSLATE THE BIBLE. Few persons even in cultivated society realize how difficult is the work of a conscientious translator, and few know how rare a thing a really good translation is in any language. A school-boy toils along over his "*Arma virumque*," and by main force of his verbal catalogue, called by courtesy a dictionary, he makes some kind of an English sentence and calls it translating, but what he makes is a caricature of the original. Even grown-up men, using good dictionaries, make very poor work of their authors in many cases. We have here a good example of the tax levied by the Muses, in the three degrees, positive, comparative, superlative:

It is difficult to write well in mother tongue.

It is more difficult to translate well from the foreign speech into our own.

It is most difficult to translate well from our own tongue into a speech which is foreign.

There are also many specific obstacles standing in the way among the Mohammedans, which add to those hindrances that are essential.

One point of vital consequence may be stated in the line of a broad distinction. The labor of past centuries, embalmed in the form which we call a dictionary, is available for use among those who confine themselves to the beaten track, who are content to write on topics that are familiar, and to work veins that have been worked before. Thus, a man writing in Turkish on historical themes, could rely on the native lexicographers, because history has been written in Turkish before, and the terms have been worked up in many shapes. The same is true of a man writing on Mohammedan theology, for that is a fruitful theme among the dervishes. But a man writing on Christian theology is

suddenly confronted with a new barrier, in the poor quality of his lexicons.*

No matter how excellent the dictionary may be, it must be used with caution. There are men who are the bond-slaves of dictionaries all their lives, and their work shows the consequence. Dictionaries are like other books, and must be used with a vigilant eye, for the translator who would do GREAT work must at least be abreast of the lexicographer. By dint of long pruning and trimming a book of this kind may (possibly) become perfect, but no such labor as the European lexicons display has yet been expended on the languages of Asia.

In working between the German and French, accuracy of verbal information may be assumed, and the writer who is criticised may shelter himself behind the recognized authority. When work of this sort is compared with that of a missionary translator, it is readily seen that there is a difference not only of degree but of kind. To use a yardstick is one thing; to compute by elaborate mathematical processes what the length of the yardstick ought to be is quite another. You intend to translate the *Divine Comedy*; you will employ your trusty verbal yardstick; but if you propose to translate the book of Job into the Amharic, you may be compelled to work out your verbal yardstick for yourself.

In short, a literary workman in a European office is like the traveller who proceeds by rail to his destination, and gathers from his time-card just how long he will be about it. But the missionary is like the pioneer, cutting his way through jungles, and slowly paddling across rivers, tormented at every stream by the want of a foot-bridge.

Another broad line of distinction is seen in the moral aspect of human speech. When we range two or three languages side by side, the question is pertinent, Is there, or is there not, a moral parallelism between them? What sort of moral forces have blended themselves with the terms and the syntax of this tongue? Here is a word for righteousness, but what do Arabs and Turks apprehend from such a word? What

* This remark applies to the time when the work of translation began; since then the difficulty has been remedied to a great degree.

does righteousness signify in their souls? The Mohammedan talks much of the divine mercy, but what he really means is the partiality of God, the favor which God shows to the Muslim, because he is a Muslim. These things must be understood by the translator, on penalty of saying things he does not wish to say, so making dreadful work of his rendering.

Again, there is a great difference between work done in languages that belong to the same family, and in those that are separated by a deep chasm.

The Indo-European languages are not indeed exactly alike in structure or in vocabulary, but they do sustain a well-defined mutual relation, and they constitute a group, the outcome of parallel historic action.

A man's thumb is not exactly like his forefinger, yet thumb and fingers together constitute but one set, to be studied all at once as a complete whole. But the most exhaustive study of the phalanges would not throw much light on the formation of the sutures of the cranial bones. So it is in these marvellous groups of diverse tongues. The noteworthy languages of Europe, Italian, Spanish, French, German and English, are like the phalanges of a man's hand, while the Russian may be compared to the thumb, set over against them all. They form a system, a set, and they are what they are by reason of great forces, mighty agencies, not local and narrow, but continental and far-reaching. Hence, these are in some particulars alike. Lines of thought run in close intellectual harmony; modes of illustration are kindred; the very same blow-pipe of national vanity has been felt in all sections; and the result of this process in Russia and in Spain, in England and in Hungary, has been a set of masterly forgings, all of them hammered on the same colossal anvil.

It is presumable that any man who assumes to be a translator in these European forms of speech, is possessor of the general qualifications; that he knows what great historic forces have combined to make modern literature what it is. It is presumable that he has a distinct apprehension of the mode of thought out of which his very tools have come into existence; but when a man passes over from the Aryan group or system of groups into a Turanian, or a Semitic tongue, he has to study not only a new language,

but a new set of historical associations and of social types. Ideas which are germane to all sections of European literature are foreign to the Arab horseman, or the Nile farmer.

If the object were to render Gibbon's "Decline and Fall" into Russian, the translator would find in that language lines of thought already marked, and veins of historical inquiry already worked, to an extent sufficient to warrant the hope of success. But let him cross the Bosphorus and seek to give the great history to any Mohammedan race, and he would find lines of thought that would mislead him, and veins of inquiry by which he would be greatly perplexed. He must then begin his education over again, and study roots, etymologies, side lights, and especially the types of thought and expression which are normal in the language he examines.

Mohammedan civilization in south-western Asia is not really so uncouth as it seems to the stranger, but it has certain peculiarities that must be recognized. These affect in a special degree the duty of a translator. One point of special importance in Turkish is the order of words and of clauses, and this we shall examine presently. But some of the peculiarities are to the advantage of the missionary, because they constitute a definite link between the Orient of the nineteenth century and Bible times. Eastern immobility is a suggestive theme for declamatory criticism, and yet the same thing is a stepping-stone by which the missionary is much the gainer. Western civilization is like a ship navigating a dangerous archipelago, hourly encountering new perils; but Oriental civilization is like a ship at anchor in the Bosphorus; there is no headway made, but risks are small, the anchorage is good, and the current hurries past to-day sparkling in the sun, exactly as it did when the war-galleys of the great Constantine dropped their kedges in the same channel.

If contrasted with the Occident, the Orient is changeless, and we find that two millenniums have affected the East less in respect to its intellectual anchorage than a single century has affected the West.

There is a genuine sympathy between the modern Turk and the Mosaic age, which is a real gain; and it is easier for him to think

along the lines of Old Testament discussion than it is for a man reared in a London billiard-room or on a farm in Kansas.

It is easier to travel around a mountain by rail than it is to go over it by a common road, even though the common road be very much the shorter. So, we can sometimes reach a fuller sympathy with the characters of Scripture by going round through modern Syria, and we arrive at a more satisfactory sense of the inner meaning by learning to think as he thinks, who was born in Bagdad or Damascus. It is refreshing to the Christian to learn that the Mohammedans call Jerusalem El-Kuds—The Holy. And when the phrase is used, "The hour of prayer," there is a feeling in the mind of the Gentile pilgrim that he is now on ground that is unmistakably Mosaic and biblical, if not apostolic.

Some of these points of contact between the present and the remote past are subtle, and to define them in a short compass would be impossible; but there are also some which may be made clear by a brief statement of the case.

The literary debt which is due to the past is far more obvious in the East than it is with us. This is one result of the tendency to copy, in mere questions of method, the usages of past days. There is no such systematic radicalism in methods as we of the West are fostering. The most primitive mechanical device, such as a reed pen, will hold its own for three thousand years, one scribe imitating exactly the tricks of the scribe who taught him. So, the numerical values of the letters of the alphabet are determined by their arrangement in Hebrew, without any reference to the order followed in Turkish or Arabic.

Thus the letter named "He" has the value of 5, both in Arabic and Turkish, because it stands fifth in the Hebrew alphabet, although it stands thirtieth in the Turkish, and twenty-eighth in the Arabic.

So, "Ayn" stands for 70, because it had that power in Hebrew, but it stands number twenty-one in Turkish, and number eighteen in Arabic. This curious adherence to the usages of the remote past, gives rise to a deliberate rearrangement of the letters (an afterthought), so as to make them appear to follow the Hebrew order. In this order they are called the Ebjed alphabet. For the first four letters, Aleph, Beth, Gimel, Daleth, or as the Turks

pronounce the names, Elif, Be, Jim, Dal, put together spell the word Ebjed. Ebjed-hewwaz-hutti-kelemen-sa'fass-karashat-sakhaz-dazagha.

This is just such trifling as if we were to arrange our alphabet in the order which Cadmus observed with his sixteen, when he passed them into Attica, duty free. If we should follow the Hebrew, as the Arabs do, we should have—instead of our familiar a, b, c, d, e, f, g—a, b, g, d, h, v, z, ch, t, i, k, l, m, n, s, etc.

The language men employ is largely determined by their calling in life, and the East has always been to a very great degree agricultural, so that a set of thoughts decidedly rustic in their bias will enable the missionary to establish a lively connection with Gospel teachings. One instance is now recalled in which a missionary produced a profound impression on the mind of a simple shepherd on the mountains of Bithynia, by reading to him in the tenth chapter of St. John, of the Good Shepherd and His sheep. The poor man was charmed, and said that he never knew before that the Bible was a "sheep-book."

Intellectual friction modifies ideas, and they gradually assume new forms, but where that friction is wanting, the same types of thought and feeling flow on without rapids or cataracts, like the sluggish current of the Euphrates. And the result of this is in one way an aid to the native and to his foreign instructor, inasmuch as it has allowed Mohammedanism to retain in such marked relief the features of Judaism. The express declaration of Mohammed himself was that he came to reform and to bring men back to what they had dishonored, and not to construct a fresh and original fabric of his own. In this he was certainly correct, for the Koran contains less that is original in proportion to its size than any other book of like pretensions ever written. If we take a broad view of the whole case, we may say that Mohammedanism is a modified form of Judaism.

Both declare unqualified war to extermination on idolatry; both practice the rite of circumcision; both attach an extravagant value to pilgrimage, and to certain particular sacred places; both have rules about canonical prayers; both require certain canonical ablutions; both tolerate polygamy; and both

are devoted to their own sacred books with a zeal which is fervent indeed, but not according to knowledge.

There are also curious coincidences in point of specific doctrine, incident, superstition, etc., on which we cannot dwell, as there are also striking divergences in all these varying aspects. One example may serve to indicate the class.

About the time of Christ the Jews were divided into Pharisees and Sadducees, or to employ a modern term, into a church-party, and a world-party. The Pharisees scrutinized closely the concessions they were compelled to make to the Romans, while the Sadducees made concessions freely, and looked upon worldly aid as of vital importance to their system. There is a like split among the Ottoman Turks in this present age, and the causes are very similar. There are Turks who can make no terms with infidels, and another party who are glad to make the best terms they can with any race or nation.

In the history of south-western Asia this wonderful power of Mohammedan faith has been at work more than twelve centuries, and it is yet mighty, but our present purpose is not to recount the events which have shaped life and manners, but to state the problem that must be met by the translator.

The wildest flight of fancy never could have predicted things so strange as those which have been crowded together in the parts of Asia which adjoin Europe and Africa. The natural stratification of historic causes and of national life has been deranged so often and with such violence, that the actual condition in which society is left will prove a life-long enigma to any who is content with surface inquiry.

The action of fire alone could never have made the Alps what they are; nor could water alone, or the force of contraction alone have wrought out such results. The Alps must be viewed in the light of a long train of events, and with a recognition of conflicting forces. So, the language spoken to-day by cultivated people in Constantinople is not like the sedimentary deposit of the Nile valley, but like the granite and sandstone of a mountain chain. Curious anomalies in geological structure are found where different agents have been at work; so, grammatical symmetry will be set at nought on the scene of race-conflicts, where language itself has been fused and cast anew.

The Turkish language is well worth study for its own sake, apart from any question of utilizing it in aggressive labor, just as a man may study with delight a Titian, or a Murillo, whether he be an artist, or a lay admirer. The Turkish language will be found a great curiosity, in respect to its vocabulary, verbal inflection, syntax and rhetorical structure.

It is a remarkable example (the most striking example that I have met) of that species in philology that may be compared to a bridge. A bridge has two abutments, two piers, and each of them is in a sense independent; each stands by itself, on this side, and on that, of a chasm, or river. That is precisely the case with this Osmanli Turkish. It is a magnificent bridge, connecting the Turanian and the Semitic families, having also a spur (through the Persian), establishing a relation less vital yet real with the Aryan family.

If an intelligent boy, born and reared on a wide prairie, yet taught to observe facts and draw inferences, were to be left without special geological instruction in a mountainous country, he would soon begin to feel a curious interest in the phenomena there exhibited. He would notice how one element crowds upon another in the orderly disorder of broken strata. He would see evidence of a process, yet he would soon feel that this process somehow had been arrested. Sandstone overlaps granite, and limestone overlaps sandstone, rubbish covers up the limestone, and water washes down the rubbish to new deposits.

So, a student who is not a professed devotee of philology will be delighted at what he finds in the language spoken among the Turks, diverse materials being woven together in a most extraordinary manner. The tourist is interested to see, in Rome and Athens, the modern, mediæval, ancient and pre-historic standing side by side in silent eloquence, and in Turkish we are witnesses of a like spectacle; we see a substantial structure built of bricks which vary greatly in their hardness and value, but are plainly of diverse origin, being Aryan, Semitic and Turanian.

History-fossils, found in words, are common enough, but what is remarkable in this case is the prodigious separation of the sources from which the materials came at first. It is not a

mere accidental combination that will fall to pieces forthwith, but a true language with a real literature, yet constructed as if one should build a house out of porcelain brought from China, ivory imported from Africa, coral from the South Seas, and granite from Scotland.

In our college song books we find an extraordinary effusion of a comic character beginning,

" Felis sedit by a hole, intenta she cum omni soul
Prendere rats:
Mice cucurrunt over the floor, in numero duo, tres or more,
Obliti cats."

The gifted person who wrote that gem intended to be funny, but in Turkish we find the whole mass of the literature composed in that style, not at all from an idea of being funny, but because that is the Turkish language. The component elements are mainly (ignoring for the present the Persian) Tartar, or pure Turkish, and Arabic. But these elements are not melted together and fused into a new substance, run into a fresh mold, but the Tartar remains Tartar, and Arabic remains Arabic. In this respect the case is totally different from our own English speech in which such a mass of Latin material is found. But we see each Latin word under a thin disguise, provided with a termination which is not Latin at all, but is a proof that there has been a process of adoption, and that the result may fairly be called English. This distinction is not a fanciful one, but may be seen in a moment by employing an illustration:

"*The specified alterations being made.*" Pure English, although the word "specified" and the word "alterations" are alike in their substance Latin words. Such phrases are in constant use in English, while it is only on rare occasions that we hear a phrase that is pure Latin, as *mutatis mutandis*, which is nearly equivalent to the English expression just used. But we prefer to speak our own language, even while we make the fullest acknowledgment of our indebtedness to the noble Romans. But in the Turkish, Arabic is used in its pure form, as such, an entire clause being employed as an adverbial expression, or compounded with Turkish verbs, to do, to make, to be, as if the

whole were a true verb. And this is not viewed as literary affectation, but as a correct style.

A few examples may suffice:

Fi'l hal, instantly;

Fi'l hakika, truly;

Haba' ilu-sh-Sheytan, snares of Satan;

Al'et-tertib, in orderly fashion;

Kemal-i-dikkat, with scrupulous care;

Kemal-i-mertebe, in supreme degree;

Sahib-i-kiran, Lord of the age;

Der-i-saadet, gate of felicity (Constantinople).

These expressions are pure Arabic, and hence not like the Latin intermixture that we use so freely in all modern European languages, for the latter has passed through a process of naturalization.

On the other hand the Turkish proper has not been greatly changed in its features, or in its use. The language is identified at once with the Turanian family, having that monosyllabic agglutinative structure which is unmistakable. In its original home it had no relation to the Semitic groups, yet it showed such a power to absorb Arabic idioms, and to appropriate Arabic words, that it has come to be a sort of bridge, as already noted. Nor was the Tartar stock connected with Aryan tongues, yet by a very curious historical process it has come under the influence of the Persian, and so cannot be wholly separated from the Indo-European philology.

Hence the language in its present state, as written by cultivated men in Constantinople, is a singularly interesting subject of study. It is like a railroad turn-table, facing about at will, and the student can glide off easily on lines of syntax or of vocabulary which lead to Semitic, Aryan, and Turanian fountains.

In the study of English we can do something like this, especially in etymology, following up lines of study which lead us to the Greek, Latin and Saxon. But there is a radical difference in the two cases. The Greek, Latin and Saxon do indeed differ widely, yet they are after all parts of one whole. They are all Indo-European, and the resemblance is clear in many ways. But the

Turkish, Arabic and Persian are not twins, but representatives of groups that stand so far apart that the question of the final unity of speech in the outset of human history is the despair of the grammarians and the lexicographers alike. I have no doubt whatever that the key to this problem will yet be found, so that the relation of Hebrew and Latin will be one day as patent as is the relation of the Italian and Spanish to us to-day.

But this wealth of lexical matter in the Turkish language is a source of very serious embarrassment to the translator, on account of a wilderness of questions that arise regarding choice, taste.

In English very little difficulty of this sort is felt, because we have in English so few words that are really synonyms. In the vast majority of cases we have only one name for a thing. When we mean the moon we say the moon; occasionally a writer will go out of his way to say the lunar orb, but most writers are fastidious in the use of simple terms. But in Turkish there are three words for moon, all of them recognized as allowable and in constant use—*ay*, Turkish; *mah*, Persian; *kamer*, Arabic.

This curious state of things runs through the language and gives rise to the same question at every point. In some cases there is a technical use made of one of the terms, by which it is shut out from the competition, but this is the exception, not the rule. The numerals afford a case in point. Those in daily use in the bazaars are the true Turkish words, *bir*, *iki*, *uch*, etc. But when a Turk wishes to name certain months, First Rebi, Second Rebi, First Jemazi, Second Jemazi, he never uses the Turkish words first and second, but always the Arabic, *Rebi-ul-evvel*, etc., so that the word first has practically come to be a part of the name of the month. On the other hand the Persian numerals are used in playing backgammon, *yek*, *du*, *seh*, etc. *Yek-yek*, double one.

Occasionally a pure Persian phrase is met with in Turkish, but this is by no means so common as the like adoption from the Arabic. "*Char-u-na-char*," remedy or no remedy, pure Persian.

Borrowed idioms complicate structure in language just as elaborate patterns complicate the duty of a carpet-weaver. No single system can be so complicated as this combination, in

which three distinct strands are braided together into a fabric the like of which is to be seen nowhere else. The translator is called upon to decide questions of taste involving many elements and in regard to which native critics are by no means agreed. Let us look at one case.

Turkish verbs are agglutinative in their inflection. Each syllabic addition to the stem involves a new idea. A multitude of these stems are monosyllabic, but the word when built up is a formidable polysyllable.

Sev, love, an original Turkish root;

Sevmek, to love;

Sevmemek, not to love;

Sevememek, not to be able to love;

Sevdirmek, to cause (another) to love.

Sevinmek, the reflexive form of the verb, has a secondary idea attached, to love one's self, *i. e.*, to rejoice. So a host of formations exist, which we express by the use of auxiliary verbs, or by another word distinct in every sense.

The Latin grammars give two infinitive forms to each conjugation, as, *Amare* and *Amari*. But the Turkish grammars (see Redhouse, pages 70, 71) give thirty-six infinitives to the same verb. Each of these has a train of its own, a full set of moods and tenses. The result is that as far as form goes Turkish is the most elaborate language in the world in verbal forms. If I wish to say in Turkish, I was not able to make him come, it is a single word, *Gel-dir-e-me-dim*. That is not at all an extravagant example, but a very commonplace one, selected for that reason. We must be constantly dealing with what is commonplace in any such work of translation.

But over against this mode of expression, there is the temptation to make use of attractive Arabic idioms which express the thought and do not cumber the page by a perpetual recurrence of long words.

In countless cases a distinct choice is allowable, and the native secretaries do not always show good and safe taste, so that much really depends on the keenness of the foreigner, although every translator is supposed to have the best native advice obtainable.

The simple process of laying these diverse idioms side by side will astonish a man whose ideas of grammar were acquired from Pelasgic sources only. We shall presently look at a fair example of Turkish syntax in detail, but first a few minor examples of variety in expression may be given.

The English word, jackal, is a Turkish word that we have borrowed, and it is in use to-day. But the jackal may also be spoken of as *Ibn-ava*, son of howling (I am not sure that this term is as common in Turkish as it is in Arabic, but it may serve as an illustration of the principle), and so the translator is from line to line in doubt as to a form of expression touching abstract themes which afford a like variety.

The use of the plural in Turkish is entirely different from our custom. A Turk looks upon the sign of plurality just as we look upon the sign of the negative; we do not put the negative in connection with every word in a sentence, but we put it in once and that is sufficient; it throws the whole statement into the negative form. So, the Turk does not waste his plurals as we do, but puts in a single word at some point and this carries the idea throughout.

Besh serche iki pulla satulmaz-mi ?

Five sparrow two farthing is it not sold for ? (Luke xii., 6.)

What is the use of saying sparrows (pl.) when you have already said that five of them are meant, and why should we take the trouble to say farthings when we specify two of them. So, in a long sentence comprising many words that we should make plural, the Turk is satisfied with indicating the idea of number once, and resting the case there.

But the Arabic is more like English, rejoicing in abundant plurals, lavishing them, and forming the same in a great variety of ways. Hence the choice is free where the word has a common plural and an Arabic plural both in use, and the writer can say, *Melekler*, angels, or *Mela'ik*. Advantage is taken constantly of this liberty, both by Mohammedan writers and by the Christian translator.

In Matthew xxvi., 53, Christ speaks of "More than twelve legions of angels." In that passage our usage requires that both words following the number must be plural—legions, of angels.

But in Turkish the phrase is, *On iki alayden ziyade melai' ke*. Legion (*alay*) is singular, while the word *angels* is given in the Arabic plural.

This is somewhat analogous to our liberty of saying *memorandums*, or *memoranda*, as the plural of *memorandum*.

The most scrupulous care is needed, because the usage which exists may have a tendency which ought to be avoided. Thus the expression *Ruh-El-Kuds*, which means the Holy Spirit with us, is in use among the Mohammedans to signify the angel Gabriel. Sometimes it is impossible to obviate the ambiguity, but in all cases vigilance must be maintained of the highest order.

A particular word may be in use in one sense only in the one language and may have several uses in the other. Thus, according to Redhouse, the word *Ajuz* has ninety-six meanings in Arabic, but it is in use in only one among the Turks, signifying an old woman.

The Turkish has no article, either definite or indefinite, but they make an ingenious use of the pronominal suffixes as a substitute; but the Arabic article is used with some limitations, and all the refinements of arthrous and anarthrous sentences may be introduced into discourse by resorting to these various combinations.

So, too, the Arabic allows a much more free use of Hebrew stems in translating than would be advisable in Turkish, so that in names of animals, trees and the like, the difficulties felt by Constantinople editors are greater than those encountered in Beyrout. Also, the inflection of the Arabic verb is far more like the Hebrew and the mode of expression is more conformable both in the linking of clauses and in the sequence of words.

It is in this, the sequence of words in Turkish syntax, that we find the crowning curiosity of all. In this respect that language differs from all others, although the influence of the Turkish has been felt by the modern Armenian.

In English we have a very limited range of choice as to order. We can say *five-and-twenty*, or *twenty-five*, and there is no change of meaning. But if we wish to say that *A* deceived *B*, it will not do to turn the clause about, and say *B* deceived *A*.

It was ordered otherwise;
 Otherwise was it ordered;
 Ordered it was otherwise.

Here each is good English, yet the arrangement affects the sense a little. But the absence of inflected nouns, and of a full system of inflection in verbs, cripples the English, in this, compelling us to regulate the sense by the order.

The Latin language is a fine example of the other sort, in which inflection serves nearly every purpose and the order is (compared with English) of small consequence. But Turkish is not like either of them. The succession of ideas is very nearly an inversion of the order in European languages: *Ev*, house; *evde*, in the house; *sungher*, a sponge; *sungher ile*, with a sponge.

So, in longer sentences the subordinate clauses are put first, and the most important verb of all, which is the first with us, is last in Turkish. For example: in giving out a hymn in church we say, Let us sing to God's praise the fifteenth hymn. In Turkish we say,

Terennum ederek on-beshinji ilahi okuyalum.

Melody making the ten-fifth hymn let us sing.

If I wish to make a remark in a book-store about a book for which I inquired there the day before, I say,

Boorada sorduglum kitab hakkunda. (Literally.)

Here inquiring my book regard to in.

The influence of the Arabic on Turkish, great as it has been in some particulars, has not made any impression in this particular, for the two languages are as wide apart as ever.

The first verse of the book of Acts in Arabic exhibits the words in the following order:

"The treatise the former have I made O Theophilus of all which began Jesus to do and to teach."

Here the difference is very slight between the order in Arabic and that in English. But in the Turkish the order is so different that the phrase, "The former treatise I made," comes at the end of the second verse, instead of the beginning of the first.

"And the Lord of hand the Elijah upon was; he also girding himself Jezreel of the gate unto Ahab before ran." (I. Kings xviii., 46.)

It sometimes happens, however, especially where the clauses are short, and have an emotional character rather than narrative or argumentative, that an arrangement somewhat like the English is practicable.

"O that my head water: and my eyes tear-fountain the were: that day night people my daughter of slain the for I might weep." (Jeremiah ix., 1.)

The first clauses of this verse are nearly in the order of our own text; the last clause is quite different.

The first four verses of the Gospel of St. Luke, in Turkish (Roman letters), with a literal rendering—Revision of 1878 :

Ey	faziletloo	Teofilos :		
O	most excellent	Theophilus :		
ibtidaden	gyozleri	ile	gyorenlerin	
from the beginning	eyes their	with	persons seeing	
ve	kelamun	khademesi	olanlarun	
and	the word of	retinue	persons who are	
miyanemizde	yakunan	mussellem	olan	
midst of us in	for certain	incontrovertible	being	
nesneleri	bize	nakl	etmish	olduklaruna
the things	to us	narration	made	to their having
gyore,	nije	kimseler	anlarun	al-et-tertib
with a view	sundry	persons	of those things	in order
teelifine	mubasheret	eylemish	olduklaru	
to the writing	set themselves	having	their	
jihetle	ben	dakhi	en	evvelinden
with reference to	I	also	the very	from the beginning
every				
sheyi	kemal-i-dikkatle	taharri	etdighimden	
thing	with scrupulous care	pursuit	because I made	
sana	ta'lim	oloonan	sheylerin	hakkikatini
to thee	taught	which have been	things of	the truth
bilmeklighin	ichun	sana	jumlesini	
your knowing	in order to	to thee	all of it	
surasulle	yazmak	bana	munasib	gyorundu.
in order	to write	to me	appropriate	appeared.

The difference in syntax and the building up of a sentence between the English and the Turkish languages is here set forth, and it is so remarkable, the sequence of words as given already

is so extraordinary, that it might suggest to some mind the question whether that is really a translation at all.

It is a scrupulous, a most faithful translation, in the legitimate sense of the word. For the real test of a translation is not the arrangement of clauses, nor the identity of the meaning sentence by sentence, but the identity of meaning when the paragraph is complete. In these verses from Luke we find every clause here that is found in the Greek, but the order is changed by reason of the imperative claims of Turkish usage. Thus the expression, "It seemed good to me also," stands at the beginning of the third verse both in Greek and English, but among the Turks good usage requires that it be placed at the end of the fourth verse, that is, at the end of the completed paragraph.

If the reader will turn to the example given, and begin to read at the last word, working backward line by line toward the first, he will perceive that the paragraph makes much better sense; in fact, the sequence of words, as compared with the English, is very nearly inverted. Yet this point does not really affect the fidelity of the translation, because in any intelligent reading we gather the sense from the entire paragraph, and when an educated Turk has read through those four verses, he has gained from them exactly the ideas which an Englishman would get from his authorized version, or a Greek, from the original.

In many shorter sentences the inverted order of the two languages is exact throughout.

In conclusion, this remark is suggested by the history of the century now passing so rapidly to its close. The enemy is disposed to sneer at missions. Let him sneer! He doesn't know anything about it.

The work done in foreign lands by American missionaries in the discharge of their duty, viewed from the standpoint of fine literature, is of the very best quality, of the highest order, and the day is not far distant when Americans will recognize this and be proud of their great missionaries, aside from any technical denominational zeal. There will come a day when the secular annalists who are not supposed to cherish any enthusiasm for the Kingdom of Christ, will take pains to do justice to this

colossal enterprise on its literary side, enrolling the great missionaries, just as they enroll great discoverers, great generals, and great senators. But the true reward is in the work done! THE BIBLE TRANSLATED! Millions of eyes will read; millions of hearts thrill; and millions of feet will seek the way to New Jerusalem!

MEMORABILIA.

AN INSTRUCTIVE STORY.—On p. 64 of this volume of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT was given a paragraph in regard to an infidel colony in Missouri. We are now enabled by the Burlington (Vt.) *Free Press* to furnish a full account of the results of this experiment to live without God. Five years ago there was founded in Barton County, Missouri, by a party of atheists, a town called by the name Liberal. It is said to be the only community of equal size in the United States which does not recognize God or religion. There is not a church within its limits, nor a minister, nor a professing Christian. Christians who come into the town on business are commonly surrounded and assailed for their religious belief in the most abusive manner. The whole atmosphere of the place is densely atheistic. If there could be a community from which God was utterly shut out, this town of Liberal would be such. The founders gave out distinctly that the town was established as an experiment—or rather, as they looked upon it, as a demonstration of what man could do for himself without the so-called “superstitions” of religion. They proposed to show the world that Christianity was nothing but a fable; that people could live and prosper without it; that churches, and ministers, and Sabbath-days, and religious observances of every kind were all a humbug, a kind of fetish-worship that man ought to free himself from, if he would attain to his highest earthly welfare and happiness. What, then, has been the result of the venture? Nineteenths of those now living in the town would leave it if they could sell their property. There is not a store in the town which carries \$10,000 worth of stock; there is not a factory or manufacturing establishment of any kind in the place, and, worst of all, there is not even a school-house. Public schools and infidel meetings

have been held in rented buildings, except those which were held in the "Universal Mental Liberty Hall," the flaming title of a "building," says a correspondent of the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, "about the size of a smoke-house, which it closely resembles." There is not in the town a building that could not be built for \$3,000, not half a dozen that cost \$2,000, and a great majority of them cost less than \$1,000. The two hotels of the place are spoken of as "cheap dens of the lowest character." One of them is vacant, and the other is soon to be closed. Nor have the social features of this infidel paradise been more gratifying than its material features. One of the inducements held forth by the founders was that, with the absence of all religious sects and those quarrels which arise from differences of belief and from the necessary opposition between Christianity and the world, social harmony and good feeling would prevail, and men would live together as brothers in peace and prosperity. But instead of this ideal harmony, the town has known nothing but quarrels and dissensions since the day it was founded. And as to the virtues of society under the removal of all religious restraint, Liberal is a sad example of what unaided human nature is able to do in emancipating itself from the dominion of sin. Liquor is sold without stint, and drunkenness is a prevailing crime. Swearing is the common form of speech. Girls and boys swear in the street, in the playground, and at home. Fully half the women are said to habitually use profane language. Lack of reverence for parents and obedience to them is the rule. Husbands and wives separate whenever they choose, and the most gross forms of social immorality prevail. Slander and vituperation are in everybody's mouths. This town of Liberal has important material advantages. It is situated in the midst of an unusually fertile country, underlaid with rich deposits of coal. A large amount of capital was invested at the start, in developing the resources of the region, and providing facilities for immigration. There is nothing whatever to account for the utter failure of the community except the atheistic principles upon which it was founded. The significance of the experiment is heightened by the bravado with which it was announced to the world. It is a lesson which the socialistic and

free-thinking will do well to ponder. Neither towns nor States can prosper without the restraints of religion and the recognition of Divine Providence, authority and law.

PROF. L. TOWNSEND: There is an Infinite Being; for the evidence in the world without and the evidence from the thinking and personality within us is, in our day, too overwhelming to admit of anything like reasonable doubt. 1. "You will get out of your atoms by evolution," says Martineau, "exactly so much, and no more, as you put into them by your hypothesis." Back of all that has been evolved in the physical universe there is, therefore, something greater than all that has been evolved, and something that has put into the universe all that has been evolved. 2. "I am sure that I am a thinker," says Descartes, "but I cannot be a thinker without being a person. But outside of me there must be a thinker who has made me a thinker; for a thinker cannot come from what does not think." Therefore that which is back of all evolution, giving it whatever of substance and efficiency it has, and that which is the Supreme Thinker, and the author of all other thinkers, certainly fulfil together the conditions of a Supreme Being, and, therefore, prove the existence of a Supreme Being.

BISHOP WHIPPLE: "I once met a thoughtful scholar who told me that for years he had read every book he could which assailed the religion of Jesus Christ, and he said he should have become an infidel but for three things: First. I am a man. I am going somewhere. To-night I am a day nearer the grave than I was last night. I have read all such books can tell me. They shed not one solitary ray of hope or light upon the darkness. They shall not take away the only guide and leave me stone blind. Second. I had a mother. I saw her go down into the dark valley where I am going, and she leaned upon an unseen arm as calmly as a child goes to sleep on the breast of its mother. I know *that* was not a dream. Third. I have three motherless daughters (and he said it with tears in his eyes). They have no protector but myself. I would rather kill them than leave them in this sinful world if you blot out from it all the teachings of the Gospel."

H. H. BATES: The nature of matter is almost as unknown to us in its essence as it was to the ancients, since in its minute structure it lies far below the range of the senses, or of instrumental appliances, and therefore beyond that direct experimental field so necessary in furnishing primary conceptions to the mind.

MONTHLY MEETINGS OF THE INSTITUTE.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE Institute met in its rooms, No. 4 Winthrop Place, Thursday evening, February 4th, the President in the chair. The devotional exercises were led by Rev. Henry A. Dows, Assistant Minister of the Church of the Redeemer, New York. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved.

The President announced that Rev. James R. Day, D.D., of St. Paul's M. E. Church, New York, would preach the Annual Sermon in behalf of the Institute, Sunday evening, February 21st, in the Madison Avenue M. E. Church.

The regular paper of the evening was by Rev. William Tucker, D.D., of Mt. Gilead, Ohio, on "The Will as a Factor in Science." In the absence of the author the paper was read by the Secretary. Rev. Henry A. Dows, Hon. A. B. Conger and Dr. Deems joined in the discussion which followed.

At the meeting held March 4th, in the absence of the President from the city, Vice-President Henry M. MacCracken took the chair. Scripture was read and prayer offered by Rev. Edward M. Deems. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved. The Secretary announced that the program for the Summer School to be held in Key East, in August, was nearly completed.

Andrew H. Smith, M.D., of New York City, read a paper entitled, "Evidences of Design, Especially from Anatomy and Physiology." The subject was discussed by Rev. Edward M. Deems, Gouverneur M. Smith, M.D., and others.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift will probably meet the demands of our readers.]

"OUTLINES OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY; designed as a Text-Book and for Private Reading." This work by Professor George P. Fisher, of Yale College, has made such an impression on us that we must modify the expression of our estimate of it lest we seem extravagant. Prof. Fisher's studies have eminently fitted him for the production of this book. His "History of the Reformation" will go long without finding its superior. He has the historic instinct, quickened by historic researches. The style of the "Outlines" is very pure; it might almost be called classic English. The arrangement of the matter seems to us almost faultless, and the difference in types is used to assist in distributing the facts so as to show their proportionate value. The maps are made after the latest adjustments of boundaries. The index is very full. Take it all in all it is the best book of reference in history known to us, and the very best outline for an enlarged, thorough, continuous devotion to historical study, if any one had a lifetime to devote to it. Prof. Fisher gives the names of books treating of the several periods, so that if the sections marked "Literature" were published in a small separate volume, it would be valuable. To busy men who have not time for research, to students who wish to get quickly at packed information, to those who desire to formulate and give proportion to their historical studies, we most heartily and confidently commend Professor Fisher's "Outlines." (Published by Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Co., New York.)

"DOGMA NO ANTIDOTE FOR DOUBT" is the title of a book by a member of the New York bar. In a work entitled "Catholic Dogma the Antidote of Doubt," Bishop McLaren, of Chicago, makes an argument which he supposes to be a restatement of

the famous canon of St. Vincent, who in the middle of the fifth century laid down the formula that we are to believe *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est*. The New York lawyer shows that this rule is utterly impracticable. As to the *semper*, it seems plain that we cannot learn what it is that has never been doubted; as to the *ubique*, we have the difficulty of settling what the Church approves in all parts of the world—indeed, of settling “the Church” itself, since all heretics have been in the Church; and as to *ab omnibus*, even the author of the Vincentian canon, pressed by the difficulties of the case, says, “we shall follow unanimous consent if we agree with all, or *nearly all*, who have been in the Church.” But the author of this book shows that Bishop McLaren plunges himself into much more serious difficulties than even an adherence to the Vincentian rule would create. He examines Bishop McLaren’s book as a whole, and then chapter by chapter. He shows what he believes to be the Bishop’s grave mistakes, illogical reasoning, and damaging contradictions. While very respectful, the author is rigid in his logic and unsparing in his analysis. It is a very able book. Whoever has read Bishop McLaren’s book owes it to his own intellectual impartiality to read this treatise. While specially designed for readers in Episcopal circles, it will be instructive and helpful to all lovers of the truth as it is in Jesus. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.)

“PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY” is the title given by President Bascom to twelve papers in which he aims to make, in the most direct way, a contribution on the more obscure topics of philosophy. The fourth paper in this volume, “Freedom of Will Empirically Considered,” was delivered before the American Institute of Christian Philosophy (of which Dr. Bascom is one of the Vice-Presidents) and is published in the first volume of CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. Dr. Bascom has a “following” of readers who peruse all his works with interest. This is his eleventh volume. (G. P. Putnam’s Sons. \$1.75.)

[Other notices crowded out of this number.]

CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.

MAY-JUNE, 1886.



WHICH NATURE SURVIVES?

[The Anniversary Discourse in behalf of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, delivered in the Madison Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, New York, Sunday, February 21st, 1886.]

BY REV. JAMES R. DAY, D.D.,

Pastor of St. Paul's Methodist Episcopal Church, New York.

"For what hath man of all his labour, and the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath laboured under the sun?"—ECCLESIASTES ii., 22.

NATURAL science has made a definition of man which is commonly accepted. "Man is a rational animal." It is a true definition so far as it goes. But it is not descriptive of the entire man. The man that you meet in the Bible commended of God is that and more. And the more is the most essential. He is not only dual in that he is material and immaterial, but he is a threefold being.

There is the *animal* nature—its structure and law of development and habit not materially different from that of a beast of prey or burden. All animal forms in which the blood circulates are similar in their structure so far as bone, muscle and nerve are concerned. They are sustained by food and restored by sleep and have aches and sicknesses and die. It is difficult to tell where man has the pre-eminence in mere animal form. Contemplated as such only he is one of the shortest-lived and most feeble. His whole structure is that of a machine to be used by some one, that the clawless hands may overcome the lion, the wingless body capture the eagle and the heavy foot outrun the deer.

There is the *rational* nature. In the physical structure is a curious contrivance, a delicate mechanism intimately related to thought. It does not think. No changes that take place in it make thought. But when the man thinks it is active. It increases and decreases in capacity according to habits of thought. There is a sense in which it is made by thinking. Thought seems to be structural. Not a thought passes through the brain that is not immediate in its effect, as when a hammer strikes a bell causing it to vibrate and send forth music. Only the effect is more than a vibration. It is actually destructive. Particles of the brain, if such a term may be applied to anything so infinitesimal, are broken up and decomposed and float away on the returning currents of the blood. These are always being renewed, and in proportion to the thoughtful habit a healthy organism makes desperate struggle to replace them and to meet the increased demand. The strife is not to furnish thought, but to keep in repair the instrument which thought uses. Man seems to have the monopoly of this nature. The highest forms of instinct hardly admit of comparison with the lowest processes of the purely rational faculty. The one is automatic though often of a very high order. The other is creative, inventive.

There is the *spiritual* nature—the residence of the moral senses and faculties. It is that nature to which the Spirit of God appeals and where that Spirit resides and to which are handed over the spiritual teachings of the New Testament. It is the home of conscience and faith, of hope and patience, of peace and fortitude, and of joy that is “unspeakable and full of glory.” By it is man again differentiated from the animal kingdom by immeasurable distances. In it is seen the image of the Creator. It is taught in the Scriptures as an imperishable nature. It is the deep soil in which the ethical sense has its roots and whence it grows to fruit in holy and useful lives. It is that heart that, when pure, sees God. It perceives the pure and the beautiful and rejoices in them.

Now man is all of these. He is a trinity. And he must appreciate his threefold personality and study each nature, its office and laws. Each is under laws peculiar to itself and developed by processes unlike.

I. Man's physical nature in its vitality and the operation of its functions is under natural law. The chemical elements are from physical sources. The healthy activity of the functions is by physical processes. By neither mental anxiety nor prayer can a man add a cubit to his stature. But by wholesome food and air and exercise he can materially increase his weight and powers. Our physical natures are as much under natural law as are the bodies of the beasts of the field. They are to be fed and clothed and sheltered by physical products and agencies. Somebody must raise wheat, make bricks and weave cloths for them. They are under laws unwritten save in the book of nature, but no amount of piety will annul those laws or exempt us from them. Some have thought that good men are peculiarly related to natural law; that piety might presume upon divine intervention. But the Scriptures teach us that the rain shall "descend upon the just and the unjust," and "He makes His sun to rise on the evil and the good" alike. Obedience to one or ten enactments of a minatory code will not suspend the law of gravitation or change the nature of heat and cold. The barbarian Christian once tried to believe in trial by ordeal, but the fire burned saint and sinner alike. Even the good bishop dare not take the fire which was to reveal the innocence of the accused prince. From this law Christ has not exempted His most intimate followers. The law of the spirit of life does not annul or modify physical law. We may be in perfect harmony with God, integrity the rule of our lives, our hands abounding with good works, but our material relationships and destiny will be according to the physical method. Without prudence pious people will drown as quickly, starve as certainly, freeze as surely, die as inevitably as others. The Bible, human reason, the experiences of the ages confirm this position. Men are not to sustain the body by faith but by works; not to cure it by faith, but by medicine and hygiene. There is no more connection between faith and a broken bone or a blind eye direct and immediate, than there is between faith and a broken tree or a blighted leaf. Since the days of Christ and the apostles, who used miraculous power for an ultimate well-known purpose not now required, "was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind."

Does any one imagine that inflammation due to a compound fracture will be allayed by faith until a physician has restored the bones to their place and applied bandages of antiseptics?

A lady told us of a miraculous cure of inflammation of the foot. The prayer of faith was offered in the morning, the cure was effected before night. A knowledge of some of the causes of inflammation and the natural remedies would have aided this woman to a more intelligent faith and revealed to her the actual cure.

The natural processes are most curious and interesting. The blood corpuscles are little canal boats. They flow along in the channels made for them. A foreign substance falls into the channel or its banks are pressed in by a blow. The little boat cannot get through. It is turned over or canted around and blocks up the channel. The other little boats come crowding down and there is a jam and a flood of blood around the dam; the capillaries overflow; pain, that mystery that nobody can explain, is induced; the member swells. What is the remedy? Plainly to enlarge that channel, or break that boat to pieces and get it out, or help cut a new canal, that the jam may be released. And this is done by physical means. When the obstruction is a small one it is often removed by nature unaided. The force of the current breaks a way through. These curious little happenings are occurring in our bodies every week of our lives, and they depend upon our physical habit; and it were as sensible to ask God to lift a log out of a mountain stream that is flooded as to expect Him to straighten up an overturned blood corpuscle.

Symptoms of disease are similar in the lower and the higher animals. Phthisis, the raging fever and the broken bone yield to the same kind of treatment in all, because the same law runs through the whole animal kingdom, kindred in bone and nerve and function. There is nothing supernatural in the cure of either. Where there *seems* to be some connection between faith and physical ills it will be found that the maladies are under the control of the will, and the pathological chain of cause and effect is purely natural and traceable; and the result might have been secured by strong feelings, awakened by fear

or love or sudden joy. There are many bodily ills that are intimately connected with the consent of the mind, and if by any means you can give the mind a sudden stimulus and undeceive it, the disease disappears.

Upon this fact, that involves not a grain of supernaturalism, blind guides are working and filling the world with false witness.

We are referred to the Scriptures. Arguments constructed upon the misinterpretations commonly used are inconsequential. Paul remained uncured, though he prayed mightily and often. When Timothy was troubled with infirmities, he commended him to a physical cure. Trophimus he "left at Miletum sick." The fact of miraculous cures in apostolic times is without force in an altogether different time and can no more be cited as authority than the fact that the dead were raised and the blind received their sight and the sting of deadly serpents did not kill. Such blindfold deductions would start men out to awake the cemeteries and turn the Hudson back to its sources. The purposes of those miracles were fulfilled in the days of Christ and the apostles, and Christianity was established, and we now live by faith and not by sight. But modern faith-cure attempts to live by signs and wonders.

But is the physical nature not involved in the supernatural? Not so as to change its nature or take it out from under natural law or to raise it up and make it superior to natural forces. How then does that affect Providence and that faith which is taught in the Scriptures? Providence need not deal with rocks and streams and storms to guide and preserve the children of men. It suspends not the falling rock, but the Christian.

His angels "shall bear *thee* up in their hands lest *thou* dash thy foot against a stone." The storm descends, but the man came into port before it. The lightning smites the tree and shatters it into atoms, but the man left that tree ten minutes before the bolt struck it. His providence adjusts us to our surroundings, not by the suspension of natural law, but by kindly guidings of the mind and heart. "I will never leave thee nor forsake thee."

The only place where we can see any room for faith in sickness is, that we pray for wisdom to be imparted to the physician,

that he be guided in seasons and symptoms and remedies, and that the sufferer have hope, fortitude and patience—conditions essential to the best effects of the curatives employed.

Man is sometimes placed in a position where he needs faith as a man that he would not require to secure the same physical end as an animal. And in fact it is found that when a terrified lower animal is led to repose confidence in its master, physical symptoms strikingly like those secured by faith in the higher animal follow. The violent beating of the heart ceases, the temperature due to excitement resumes its normal degree, the respiration becomes natural.

In both man and beast there is a traceable connection between nervous apprehension and some diseases. The lower animal does not know the serious nature of his disease, and the fact is highly favorable. He is undisturbed by fear. Man knows his danger, but counteracts its effect often by courage and faith. There is no divine interposition. Both cause and effect are natural. It can therefore be seen that man's physical nature with its peculiar organism and functions contemplates an active physical life. His place is not in a monastery, but in a field. He is not to look for God to send the ravens, but he must earn "his bread by the sweat of his brow." He must study laws of health and appreciate the claims of a perishable machine. It is very mortal. It must some day break down and become useless.

II. The rational nature is immaterial and under laws peculiar to itself. It is not, as the monists claim, from the same common source as the bodily functions and manifestations. There is no correlation between the mental activities and the physical processes. When you have accounted for a vibration of the brain you have not discovered the source of a thought. Thought is something more than molecular change or a form of that hidden cause called force, the unknown God of the materialist. Thought is more than a tabulation of impressions received through the eye and ear in the cells of the brain. The sources of the phenomena of mind and matter are at opposite poles and separated by an impassable gulf. We see the eye responding only to ethereal matter; the ear is struck by vibrating matter. And so the touch and taste and smell deal with forms of matter. And some one

behind them readjusts the inverted image on the retina, locates the sound and defines the fragrance of the rose. Mere matter could not be refined to the capability of mental processes. Ether is no nearer thinking than granite; star mist is no more immaterial than sea mud. The nerve and the nervous fluid are matter as much as the bony frame they tenant. The brain can no more originate a thought than can the hand. It is an instrument. Take a piece of metal, a common wire of commerce, suitable for mechanical purposes of the common sort. No one has ever thought of anything better for it. But one day this coarse metal is possessed of another self, an impalpable, imponderable somewhat. You cannot discover where it resides, in what atom or molecule. It is different from the steel and yet you do not see it in the steel. Now, astounding fact, that metal articulates your voice a hundred miles away, with every note and passion and cadence plainly expressed. Was it the wire that spoke? The brain, even when vitalized and active, is only a transmitter, as the tongue is an annunciator of thought. And the brain is under physical law and is furnished with its vital elements as are the lungs or the heart. But the rational nature is under other laws and grows after quite a different fashion. It does not depend upon the wheat crop or the condition of the money market, or upon the bulk or temperament of physical structure. It depends upon its new discoveries in science and philosophy and mathematics. And it grows by study and reflection, and is fed and clothed by schools of literature and art and the classics and by contemplation of knowable things.

The physical instrument may be of like weight and material, and the cranial capacity may not differ. All of the conditions to physical capability may be alike favorable. But the capacity of the rational nature will depend upon arduous study and persistent thought. There is an increased ratio of mental activity and an ease and readiness of solution of problems by the habit of thinking. A large vital temperament does not multiply the brain-loops or inspire the thinking habit. The vital principle that clothes itself with a flower never produces a thought. The laborious study of mathematics, the languages, political and domestic economy and the exercise of the inventive genius are

the processes that make great thinkers. Whatever may be the exciting causes, the force of ambition, patriotism, the love of gain, thought grows by thinkings, by inquiry and reflection.

Nothing is more common and well-known than the manner of making thinkers. Long years of discipline are required and the elements of growth are not light or heat or electricity. But the animal nature is restrained and time is taken out of "bread-winning" and amusements and the toil is to account for things and the cultivation is of mental perception. This growth is even at the expense of the body—expense by neglect. Not a pugilist, but a scholar; not a stadium, but a curriculum.

This nature is imparted to enable us to adapt ourselves to our surroundings and to work out the problems of manhood. Within the rational faculties are possibilities of all useful mechanics and the professions, all literature and the polite arts, all philosophy and discovery, all forms of progress.

And men must cultivate this nature. They must seek strength of intellect and well-stored minds. They are to deal with vast problems and increasingly so as the years roll on, and they must "study to show themselves approved unto God, workmen that need not to be ashamed."

They must sit at the feet of Christ, in nature, in revelation, in philosophy, gleaning "here a little and there a little, precept upon precept, line upon line," that they may go forth every morning "living epistles known and read of all men." It may be that Christian philosophers have sometimes underestimated the comparative place of the rational nature and faculty. And true it is that the Scriptures tell us that among the disciples there were "not many wise, not many mighty, not many noble." But the apostle that was learned founded more churches and secured more permanent results than all the rest put together, and it is to his epistles that we turn for the fullest and clearest exposition of the plan of salvation. The intellect has its place at the front of the Christian economy.

III. The spiritual nature unfolds under laws and yields to influences peculiar to itself. It sips no nectar of flower. It is measured by no golden reed. It eludes the most searching analysis of chemistry. No ear has been tuned so delicately as

to hear it. No eye has ever caught its shadow. It is never materialized. It is incapable of representation by any figure or activity. "For what man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of a man which is in him?" It yields to will and passion, to conscience and love and hate. Its processes are not rational, but intuitional.

By that nature we are related to God and spiritual truth. Without it there could be no desire for, or sense of right. It is the only eye that can see God. That sense does not reside in the body, whatever its beauty and graces. It is not resident in the intellect. Mathematics with its progressive series opens out no path into spiritual truth. Man has turned his telescope into every quarter of the moral heavens and searched untiringly through all the labyrinthine paths of human thought to find God. He has sometimes said that he has found Him. He has toiled laboriously up the rounds of the geologic ladder, hoping that it might prove another Jacobic approach to the throne. He has driven through the awful depths of the heavens in his star chariots. He has attached his car of inquiry and hope to the uncertain balloon of speculative thought and launched it upon the air of philosophic assumption and drifted out among worlds chaotic.

His ladder has broken off in darkness whether he go up or down. His star chariots have returned as empty as they went. His excursions into domains of speculative philosophy have left him with only first inquiries upon his lips. The trouble is not that there is no God to find. But men have searched for Him with eyes that see not and ears that hear not and with hands that have no nerves in their palms.

Bacon with his "Organon," or Euclid with his "royal geometry" may not know as much of spiritual truth and experience as the man who does not know that twice two are four.

"I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes."

That hiding of truth is in the fact that, "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."

This is the reason that many of the scholarly minds of our

time are ignorant of the essential New Testament doctrines. They attempt to know spiritual things with the understanding. But these faculties cannot enter the realm of the spiritual teachings. The reason travels out toward God only so far as it can collate the works of God and from them construct probabilities. Very quickly it is in need of data that it does not possess, neither can it gather. Its bridge ends with an unfinished pier on the hither side of a vast unknown. That pier is not even in sight of God.

Another sense is needed to discover Him. Our friends who search with the intellect and neglect the spirit are as men who confound their senses and try to see with the ear or to smell the fragrance of a rose with the ends of their fingers. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness." The spirit nature of man alone can appropriate spiritual things and assimilate them and return them back to God in acceptable devotion.

The growth of this nature is by the direct influence of the Spirit of the Most High, promoted by devotion and worship, as well also by the cherishing of those pure impulses and unselfish sympathies taught by our Saviour, also by the practice of acts of beneficence and charity. It is not involved in the growth of intellect or the physical. It is not to be measured by one's ethical discrimination or obedience to ethical rule, since many have the spirit-nature and the heart of Christ-love who have mistaken views of duty and service because of fallible judgments and ignorance, while many others know their Master's will but are "beaten with many stripes" because they have no disposition to do it. Theology is not religion, though a great aid often to a religious life; neither is the spiritual nature increased by a knowledge of it alone. A master in Israel was ignorant of the doctrine and experience of the new birth. A teacher of Christ once admitted that he had not so much as heard of the Holy Ghost. One may "have the gift of prophecy and understand all mysteries and all knowledge" and have not charity. Because charity is a spiritual gift and resides in the spiritual nature. The processes of spiritual development differ from those of the intellect as do the aids of mental culture differ from the elements and law of bodily growth. The body man sees and feels; upon the intellect he daily relies

in the humblest affairs. With these he has a necessary and intimate acquaintance. But if one has never known saving faith, which is a life, and divine love and spirit-consecration, he knows nothing of the noblest passions and powers of the spiritual nature, even if he knows of the fact of such a nature. Here the "wisdom of the world is foolishness." The experience of the humblest disciple of Christ the profoundest scholar's "scanty thought surpasses far," for to him is "given by the spirit the word of wisdom."

If the spiritual nature lies fallow, man may be a thinking machine inside a case of clay solving problems correlated within space and sense, but he will lack the essential and distinguishing nature that constitutes him that immortal being whose homeward flight is through a transparent sky of purity and light to ultimate spirit-dominion and power.

Now Christian philosophy says that when man is a body only, he is an animal; when he has in that body a mind, he is a rational animal. When he has body, mind and sanctified spirit, he is a son of God. Christian philosophy, as no other does, discusses the various economics essential to the development and perfection of the *whole* man. It also appreciates the destiny of each of these great natures.

In the progress and growth of man onward to maturity the animal nature has its place at the bottom. It is a native of this world. It draws its sustenance from it. It could not live out of it and it is restricted to a very narrow limit of the earth. It cannot live in the sea or the sky, and the elements only obey it as it is an instrument of the mind. It is plainly needed as we now have it, only, in a world of matter. Here we cannot get along without it. In a different world we could not get along with it. As it is a vehicle for the time, we treat it as such. It is not the ultimate good. It merits no more attention than is necessary to enable it to perform its functions with efficiency. Its bony frame, its tissue, its eye, its ear and hand demand such attention as do the wheels and springs and jewels of a chronometer. We cause it to serve marvellous purposes, bringing to its aid natural forces. We fit to its ear a mechanism by which it gathers sounds from surprising distances. We fit to the hand a

machine by which its fingers grasp those of the man on the opposite hemisphere, and we aid the eye to pierce the night and discover new worlds. The body is a marvellous instrument.

But it wears out, and because it can be used no longer it is put aside like the telescope. It crumbles to pieces. That whole lower nature disappears before our eyes and we know what becomes of it. "It returns to the earth as it was."

The rational nature is essential to this life—this is its arena. Here it has an ample field. We measure its growth and are amazed at its marvellous powers. No kingdoms of fact or philosophy or fancy that it does not enter. It has called upon Laurentian rock to declare its age. Its conquests are tracked along the pathway of the farthest sun. What magnitudes and distances has it traversed in its morning walks. Its amazing thoughts are responsive in the inventions and progress of the noblest of all ages. What monumental achievings of marble and canvas and poetry! It compels tribute of flower and star and lightning and stormy wind.

Its mighty movements to-day are but the chords of the grand harmonies, the sublime symphonies of all the ages since God said, "Come let us reason together." But whether there be knowledge it shall vanish away! This is the only land in which there will be any need of or employment for the slow processes of the rational faculty. Now "we know in part and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come then that which is in part shall be done away." Now "we see through a glass darkly," by mathematics, by natural science, by experience. "But then face to face." Whatever may be our fancy of another life, it is not that of an angel with a table of logarithms and a theodolite measuring the distance from the throne of God out to Alcyone.

The intellect has been disciplined by the necessities of a partial life. Knowledge is an imperfect and incomplete accumulation of facts upon which we rear conclusions by much labor and care. The structure is an uncertain one and its foundations we must constantly re-examine. All knowledge is now partial and imperfect and mediated by means incomplete and laborious. It shall not be so "when that which is perfect is come." We shall

not wait for facts to be brought up from the four corners of the universe, or to experiment with every substance and thought and emotion before we reach a deduction. But as the clumsy foot of the old-time courier has been left by lightning shall the syllogism be superseded by spiritual intuition.

Now we have seen that that which is physical passes away. For some strange reason the elements that cause our bodies to grow to fulness of power do not sustain them there long. They walk up the mount with "eye undimmed and strength unabated," but it is not long after, that they go to their burial. No man has any hope of immortality in his body. Its natural order is decay and extinction of all bodily form. Its elements are gathered from the earth and air and water, and to them they return again just as soon as vital force ceases. And they have no power of themselves to live again.

That which is merely rational, a factitious intellect, the product of our investigation here, that thought, essential to the mission of a partial life, the accumulations of unspoken languages, of mathematical and experimental science, of exploration and invention, of literature; lumber out of which we were compelled to build a temporary abode and with which we perform a partial work, will be laid aside also.

They have grown as some of the products of this life and are for a temporal purpose. They are being constantly modified by the new conditions of human life and progress, and their necessity inheres in our physical limitations, and they will finally be put off; for we shall take our departure out of these scenes where they were both created and required.

What remains? The *soul* in its spiritual essence and qualities, with spiritual faculties, fundamental among which are faith and hope and love, is to abide. Here is the essential man. The only imperishable man. The only creature that has a nature that predicts a future existence. Mere animals cannot live. The only nature which they have is as perishable as dust. The growth of intellect is not a growth of immortal powers. There is no hint that "of such is the kingdom of heaven."

But there stands the spirit. He is the man that is to live forever. A forgotten man, an abused man. A man much

unknown, because we are searching for our man with the lantern of dim human sense. A man that natural science could never find, for it was searching for an animal only; a man that materialistic philosophy denies the existence of, for it has not yet found the source of a thought. But the man to whom New Testament philosophy has pointed for two thousand years.

The supreme man of this world, speaking out as best he can in prayer and hymn and symbol the great passions and hopes of his immortal nature. Amazing that our brothers have not found this man. They have discovered the seed but not the rose-tree. They have found the egg but not the bird. They have been deceived by appearances. The seed of the rose-tree reveals to the eye none of the beauty of the rose-filled shrub. The egg has no resemblance to the bird—its plumage or its song. And if you search them with most exhaustive analysis it will not appear what they are to be. But out of those limey walls one day comes a song sung by a form of rare beauty. Up from that little dry, hard substance, breaking it apart and escaping from it, there springs a tree radiant, fragrant, the home of that bird.

And there stand the materialists, owl-eyed, around a nest of cast-off shells, so intent upon the origin of the shells that they never hear the singing of the birds in the branches above their heads.

But not only has New Testament philosophy directed our attention to the mighty man immortal, but it has declared the hope of that man.

Materialism groans a hopeless query—"Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" The faith of a soul exclaims, "The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

The materialist, looking out gloomily over the grave, sadly inquires, "For what hath man of all his labor and the vexation of his heart, wherein he hath labored under the sun?" The apostle of spiritual life and hope answers, "Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day, and not to me only but to all them also that love His appearing." That soul-man is not

native here. His food, his light, his native air are spiritual. That man seeks a country.

As a pencil of light leaves yon orb, nor rests its flight until it makes its home in this far-off world, and adds its bright joy to bird and flower, the immortal spirit goes forth from the "house of clay whose foundation is in the dust," nor does his foot abide until far beyond the fiery worlds he finds the unutterable fellowship of the spirits of "just men made perfect," and makes his home in the land where no night is. The man now depends no more upon steam and electricity for communication and upon the cumbersome and slow processes of the intellect for knowledge. But that soul that God for a little tutelage kept a few years on the surface of things, now independent of lame vision and dull sense, with unmingled spirit-consciousness and unfettered spirit-power, escapes out of the darkness of guessing and blundering into light—nightless, fadeless, eternal light. The first morning glance across the entire breadth of ten thousand years of human philosophy. The first spirit-outlook through that universe only the outer gate-lamps of which were ever seen by the telescope of Newton, Herschel and La Place. The estate absolutely without measure, "incorruptible and undefiled and that fadeth not away." Would we know the best habit for this body while it lasts, the soundest and broadest development of the mind, the perfection of our spirit, we must sit at the feet of the only infallible Teacher.

He shall make us to know the immutable principles upon which we may build a perfect manhood.

He shall translate and transfigure our spirits unto divine beauty and holiness that we may forever "behold the glory" which He had with the Father "before the world was."

"I pray God your whole spirit and mind and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." His appearing to any one of us may be to-night.

THEN AND NOW; OR, THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NINETEENTH.

[Delivered before the Summer School of the Institute, at
Asbury Park, N. J., July 24th, 1885.]

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IF "history is philosophy teaching by example," my subject comes quite within the range of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy. No present is wholly dis severed from the past or from the future. There are, however, periods where the lines are more direct and traceable; and, where the lessons are specially sure and serviceable—crises in the life and language and literature and laws and religion of a people; when the past is modified, and merged into a new and nobler future. Germinal periods are these, having the promise and the potency of all the time to come.

Such a period was the fourteenth century in its relation not only to the English people, then; but to the English-speaking millions, now. To-day, the English-speaking population of the globe numbers not less than one hundred millions. In the Eastern and the Western hemispheres they are found on every continent, massed, or moving into every zone from the Equator to the Pole.

"With the swing of conquest," as Gen. Grant aptly remarked, they are pushing their way, perhaps into popular and permanent leadership, under two rival but friendly flags—"The Union Jack" and "The Star-spangled Banner"—both Christian; both Protestant. In the words of Mr. Gladstone's letter, dated Whitehall (London), October 4th, 1884: ". . . Mr. Barnam Zincke, no incompetent calculator, reckons that the English-speaking peoples of the world an hundred years hence will probably count a thousand millions. What a prospect is that of these millions, certainly among the most manful and energetic in the

world, occupying great continents and islands, in contact, by a vast commerce, with all mankind, and perhaps still united with kindly political association with some more hundreds of millions fitted for no mean destiny." Yet, five centuries ago (or, to be exact, at the beginning of the fourteenth century) the English language proper did not exist. At the close of the fourteenth century all England had not more than half the population of the State of New York to-day. Indeed, at the beginning of the fourteenth century there was no English nationality, no English Protestant Christianity, nor constitutional liberty. The life was Norman, Saxon, Danish, Briton—elements not unified, but in conflict. The language was a jargon. Feudalism domineered in society and the state. Romanism domineered in the Church and the State. By the narrowest possible escape, the nationality and language and literature and liberty and religion were rescued from chaos and perversion.

This was the crisis, and this the fundamental question, then: How shall English Nationality together with its great concomitants, which I have mentioned, be wrought out?

The principle upon which they were produced then, is the principle *now*, on which they are to be preserved and perpetuated.

The fourteenth century opened portentously for England. The emergency at home was great, and greater abroad. Factional strife everywhere prevailed. During the preceding century, baronial wars distracted the country. The debris of these wars well-nigh buried society.

At the age of sixteen Edward III. was called to rule over a country almost without a name, certainly without a nationality and without a national language. In the midst of domestic faction and internal chaos, foreign war was precipitated. I need not trace the strife of years, crowned at last by the splendid victories of Crecy and Poitiers. After all, England failed to subjugate France. It was well. For, if France had then been gained, England had been lost—then and now. Far more was gained then, for England and for us. On these foreign battle-fields, Norman and Saxon conquered their own hostility. The Norman nobility of England and the Saxon yeomanry, who had hitherto

been hostile parties at home, but who fought with common purpose, and with common courage, side by side in France, learned henceforth to look upon each other with mutual good feeling and respect. As they withdrew from the foreign wars, it was to recognize at home a Nationality—an English Nationality.

This gain was worth all that it cost. This gain was, indeed, essential to England—to her very life and happiness; essential then and now; essential to her and to us.

The new life of English nationality needed a common language as a means of more thorough unification. The national life intensified by the sympathy of suffering and struggle needed to be developed and trained by the sympathy of success and peace—by the communion of thought and feeling and purpose and hope through a common language—a language transformed and ennobled as a living speech embodying and expressing, and thus expanding the national life.

The demand and the supply were consentaneous. The language, no longer Norman or Saxon, nor Norman and Saxon, coalesced in one—the new—the English language. The soldier and the citizen, the Saxon and the Norman joined even proudly to employ it as the language of victors—the language of the people.

I have not paused to point the lessons. They are evident: a common nationality for our diverse population; a common life born of suffering and struggle, of success and peace; a common language—the English—the American language for all our people, thus to secure a more comprehensive and vigorous unification.

Another important lesson we may note just here. As then, from a lineage fourfold—Briton, Saxon, Dane and Norman—there sprang a composite nationality with a unified life and character, the stronger in proportion to the variety of elements thus combined and unified; so now, our nationality, not merely fourfold but ten times four, is developing a life and character which, by its multiplied elements in union, promises to surpass in vitality and vigor any nationality in the world. The principle, "In union there is strength," is certainly valid. The point to be guarded is, that the multiplied and varied elements, now, be

thoroughly unified. In this way, and in this way alone can they be made to contribute permanently to our national life and vigor.

The language unified into the English about the middle of the fourteenth century was now ready for a unified, an English literature. I have time not to trace but merely to indicate the remarkable development in this direction. The first book of English prose literature appeared in 1356; and yet before the year 1400—the year in which Geoffrey Chaucer died—English literature achieved the brilliant success of “The Canterbury Tales,” fixing at once the fame of Chaucer and of English literature. And to-day Tennyson, in his “Dream of Fair Women,” thus gratefully repeats the praise of

“Chaucer, the first warbler, whose sweet breath
Preluded those melodious bursts, that fill
The spacious times of great Elizabeth
With sounds that echo still.”

But with the lengthening distance of the centuries, Chaucer asserts his affinity not only with the poets of Elizabeth by his gallery of pictures, and with the Reformers by his portrait of “The Good Parson,” but with the thought and culture of our land and our time uniting the day-dawn then with the noonday now, so that a New England poet, whom we doubly love, and lament that he will sing no more on earth (Longfellow), has with kindly cunning limned our poet's likeness, and thus also written lovingly his latest epitaph:

“He is the poet of the dawn, who wrote
The Canterbury Tales; and his old age
Made beautiful with song. And as I read,
I hear the crowing cock; I hear the note
Of lark and linnet; and from every page
Rise odors of ploughed field and flowery mead.”

We have glanced at the dawn of English literature in the fourteenth century, and marked its brightness. *Now*, no longer confined to its island home, its growing light shines on land and sea with brightness as clear and broad on the American Republic as on the British Empire—here as there, a common language and a common literature.

Until the fourteenth century, the two dominant forces for England, as well as for the European continent, were Feudalism

and Romanism. The Feudalism of the continent, introduced by the Norman conquest into England, had been extended and established. The type of continental Christianity had also been introduced by the Norman conquest of England. Seven crusades had come and gone, convulsing the entire world. Knighthood, serving itself first, playing false and fair with the people, loyally or licentiously toward the crown, had grown into colossal proportions. Feudalism held the country by military tenure as the property of the crown, which he leased or mortgaged as he listed. Knighthood had performed its mission for good, if it ever had any. It had entertained contempt for any soldiers but cavaliers. Enlisted in the crusades, it had already sacrificed five millions of people in its fanatical zeal to demonstrate the superiority of feudal civilization, and had learned nothing from the sacrifices and defeats. In the words of a writer in the *North American Review*, 1883, "Feudalism gave to the conqueror or king the ownership of the country, together with the ownership of the service of the people, both in time of peace and time of war. The entire country and the entire service, from the highest officer to the lowest serf, was farmed out or leased by the king upon stipulation of the strictest payment, all of which flowed into the royal exchequer. The Court of Exchequer was the court of supreme jurisdiction throughout the entire realm, in every detail. Nothing in society or the state escaped it."

This ownership had been fully exercised from the time of the Conquest (1066). In the thirteenth century King John had actually mortgaged the whole country to the Pope of Rome as security for his feudal bond or promise to pay the Pope a thousand marks annually, in return for the Pope's sly, personal favor to John in getting him out of a corner in which John had basely caught himself. This mortgage and this annual payment had been fully recognized up to the time of Edward III. (1350), after the French wars. What availed Magna Charta which had been extorted from John at Runnymede? It had been anticipated and annulled by this mortgage on England given by John to the Pope. So the Pope understood it. So John understood it. What could the people do? Edward I., at the opening of the fourteenth century, allowed nothing to the Commons but to petition. To the

bare suggestion of the House of Lords that the king remove a particularly obnoxious chancellor, he haughtily replied that "he would not remove even the meanest scullion of his kitchen at their request"; and this was good feudal logic, as the king very well knew.

Under Feudalism there was but a singleright possible to the people—the right of resistance. This right must have been vigorously exercised during the fourteenth century. Before the close of that century, not only scullions and the highest officers of the feudal tyrant were removed; but the House of Commons was established as co-ordinate with the House of Lords, and before the close of the fourteenth century, these representatives of the people had become the law-makers of the realm. "Twenty times Magna Charta had been confirmed." Two arrogant kings, traitors to liberty and law, had been deposed, according to Magna Charta, and executed. Then Feudalism, which had been deprived of its knightly spurs at Courtrai in 1302; and pierced by a storm of arrows at Crecy in 1346; and shot with crossbow, and with cannon heard in Europe in the fourteenth century—Feudalism was then doomed in England. Although the hydra was long in dying, yet the end was certain.

Three important principles of government were firmly settled: "The illegality of raising money without consent; the necessity that the two Houses should concur for any alterations in the laws; and, the right of Commons to inquire into public abuses and impeach public counsellors."

And further—at the close of this period—the very year that witnessed the brilliant English victory of Agincourt completed the constitutional triumph of the Commons, by this great law: "That henceforth nothing be enacted to be petitions of the Commons that be contrary to their asking, whereby they should be bound without their assent." This committed to the Commons the control of English legislation, which they hold to-day. It has been said that, by no lower hand than its own could Feudalism be overthrown. And old Monteil declared that it was as little capable of change as the castles with which it studded the land; and there were then eleven hundred of these castles in England.

Feudalism suborned knighthood into its service, and by its embrace it depraved the spirit of chivalry till it lapsed well-nigh into brigandage. "The middle ages foundered beneath the feudal vices, and Feudalism itself went down in blood." If Froissart's "Chronicles" are "The Epitaph of Feudalism," as they have been called, it is not because knightly spurs and lances were no match for cannon and gunpowder, for these Feudalism could readily have summoned into its service; but it was because Feudalism was smitten with death by the spirit of English independence. Henceforth monarchy in England was no longer absolute, but limited. No longer dared the king say, as Edward I. implied, and Louis of France asserted, "I am the State." The ablest lawyer in England, Sir John Fortescue, summing up the results secured in the fourteenth century, wrote thus in the early part of the fifteenth century: "In the body politic, the first essential thing is the intention of the people" (precisely as we now style it "the will of the people"). "A king," he says, "cannot at his pleasure make any alterations in the laws of the land; for he is appointed to protect his subjects (people) in their lives, properties and laws. For this very purpose he has the delegation of power from the people." Here are the principles established in the fourteenth century essentially the same with those of John Locke in the seventeenth century, and of Samuel Adams and Thomas Jefferson in the eighteenth century, and of John Quincy Adams and William H. Seward in the nineteenth century. Fortescue then proceeds to contrast the boasted Roman law with the English law—the one, the work of absolute princes and tending altogether to the sacrifice of the individual; the other, the work of the common will, tending altogether to protect the person. He contrasts the Roman procedure, which is satisfied with two witnesses to condemn a man, with the new, English procedure in law, with the jury and the witnesses and the three permitted challenges and the admirable guarantees of justice which surround the sentence of twelve good and true men duly sworn.

So much was then gained for liberty and law that however long the hydra of Absolutism was in dying, government in England and America is not now, we trust shall never be, the

feudal tyrant, but shall be the responsible trustee or representative of the people; in a word, "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." The principles, then inwrought into constitutional and common law, are the very principles asserted by the colonies when they resisted taxation without representation, and threw the tea overboard in Boston harbor; when they formulated the colonial Bill of Rights; and when they wrote the Declaration of American Independence. Though these principles lingered long before fulfilment in our own land, yet they are living principles springing up with the English nationality and life in the fourteenth century, interpenetrating more and more the English language and literature and law till now they have become a great tree, and people under the whole heaven are coming here to rest under the shadow of its branches. Civil progress pursues the course of ethical ideas and moral obligations and personal rights. Thus Magna Charta became effective in the fourteenth century until it has, at length, overthrown English slavery and extended the English franchise; and the Declaration of Independence has become effective in the nineteenth century in establishing American franchise and removing American slavery.

We have traced, in rapid outline, the tyranny of Feudalism. But this was inferior and subordinate to the tyranny of Romanism. This was the other great, dominant, tyrannical force against which the people had to contend.

Feudalism and Romanism were identified in interest and well-nigh in origin. They had been for centuries in mutual alliance interpenetrating society, the Church and the state; professedly protecting the rights of the people, really guarding the claim to their subjection. This league of tyranny confronted every advance of literature and law and worship.

Chaucer, with the Ithuriel spear of his satire, had pierced the high-blown follies of Feudalism and Romanism. But, together with him, in the foreground and foremost, appeared a new champion—Wiclif, the Christian harbinger and promoter of Reformation. Learned, as all admit, he was the foremost man of the foremost university in England. Prominent as he had justly become by the favor of the College, the Church and the State,

he was above all an honest man, loyal to truth, to liberty and to humanity. When English freedom was asserting itself, and English right to life and property and representation was asserting itself, could the right of freedom to worship God and read His Word be ignored or denied? Yet, in this crowning question of the fourteenth century were garnered the living seeds of Reformation. As was fitting, so in fact, "the Morning Star of the Reformation" then arose. It was not for such a man as Wiclif to see the Scriptures proscribed and forbidden by the Romish hierarchy, and offer no protest. And when his protest was first scorned, then condemned, then anathematized, it was not in Wiclif to desist and keep silence. He reminded all of the primitive history of the Church in Britain, when it was not Roman but Christian; and still higher, he pointed to the sacred Scriptures as the rule of faith and life, and thus made his appeal direct to divine authority and to the first principles of our holy religion. At once, in this great conflict, the Bible, hitherto inaccessible to the people and unknown, must be translated and put within the reach of all.

But the Pope, holding the globe in his hand and armed with the two swords of spiritual and temporal sovereignty, would not suffer either priest or layman to offer the insult of impartial investigation, nor, especially, to employ in self-defence the Word of God. Wiclif was summoned before the Romish Convocation, February 19th, 1377. History has vividly sketched the scene.

A vast throng assembled at St. Paul's Cathedral to witness the trial of such a man for such a crime. All eyes were turned upon him, as Wiclif advanced slowly up the aisle until he stood before the tyrannical Bishop Courtenay who sat in the judgment seat. As Wiclif stood erect before them, his whitened locks, his thin tall figure, the sharply cut features, the clear, calm, penetrating eye, the firm-set lips and flowing beard, the thoughtful, earnest, dignified presence challenged the sympathy of many, the admiration of friends and foes. But Lord Henry Percy, Earl Marshal of England, and the Duke of Lancaster, son of the king, who had made way for Wiclif through the multitude of anxious spectators, stood beside him in the presence of the Papal Convocation. They respectfully requested the venerable pris-

oner to be seated. The tyrannical Bishop from his seat of judgment arrogantly ordered Wiclif to stand. The Duke of Lancaster and the Earl Marshal insisted that he should sit during the trial. The tumult spread throughout the vast throng which Courtenay could not quell. The trial was suspended and was never resumed.

But, so far as it dared, the papal power continued its persecution; and, on the other hand, Wiclif renewed his diligence in the work to which God and humanity called him. But the crowning service which he rendered to the English language, to the English literature and to the English welfare was the translation of the Scriptures into the common tongue. To this great service he addressed himself with unfaltering devotion. In the meantime a bill was introduced into the House of Lords prohibiting the perusal of the English Bible by the laity. John of Gaunt, son of the king, rose in Parliament and declared indignantly: "The people of England will not be the dregs of all mankind, seeing all nations besides them have the Scriptures in their own tongues." The bill was defeated. Persecution did, indeed, continue. Wiclif was proscribed; but the Word of God was not bound; and for five succeeding centuries the English people have possessed an English Bible—an open, English Bible. And now, as then, on both sides of the Atlantic, they hold this possession in freedom, together with freedom to worship God. Recently, one of our ablest American lawyers said: "I believe that this act, giving the Bible to laymen, was the germ of the peculiar liberty, civilization and progress which England and America most enjoy and illustrate."

We can the better understand how much of religious liberty was gained during the fourteenth century for England and for us, by knowing how the century opened religiously. Pope Boniface VIII. had, in 1300, decreed the subjection of every human being to the Roman See. Pope Urban V. (1365) demanded "the odious tribute" of a thousand marks (annually) from England (omitted now for several years), together with the due performance of feudal homage by King Edward III. But the conqueror of France, fresh from the victories of Crecy and Poitiers, demurred; and referred "the insolent exactions" to his

Parliament. The Parliament returned a prompt refusal concluding thus: "If, therefore, the Pope shall attempt anything against the King by process or other matters in deed, the king with all his subjects shall, with all their force and power, resist the same." Bold words were these to fling back, then, defiantly to the Roman Pontiff. But Parliament was in earnest. The famous law was passed, called "The Statute of Provisors," designed to check and punish illegal provisions or reservations made by the court of Rome. This was followed by the still more famous "Statute of Præmunire," punishing with forfeiture and perpetual imprisonment all persons bringing papal orders or processes or other instruments against the King of England.

This public spirit reached a still higher expression when the Commons of England before the close of the century made the direct proposal that the king "should seize all the temporalities of the Romish Church and employ them as a fund for the exigencies of the state."

Thus, we have traced in outline this period of transition—of new departure: the *task* to be performed; the *means* employed; the *ends* achieved; the *representative actors*.

The task was, if possible, to unify the various and discordant peoples into one commonwealth, animated by one common life, employing one common speech, adopting one common constitution, acknowledging one rule of faith and life.

The means were various—war and peace, patriotism and piety, law and literature, poetry and theology, devotion to freedom and devotion to faith.

In the end secured, the guiding principles lying far beneath the surface emerged into free constitutional government on the one hand, and free Protestant Christianity on the other.

Of the representative actors, in the fourteenth century, we have caught but a glimpse as they passed in the distance trailing clouds of glory, and disappeared. But the brilliant achievements remained. The living principles established, then, shone on with undiminished lustre filling the whole horizon with an after-glow not of trailing clouds but of "bars and beams and coronals of living light," the glowing promise of the better future. With the brighter morrows the promise has been fulfilling. It is now

fulfilling. The language multiplied is spreading to voice our literature and liberty and religion over every sea to every land. Men die but the truth survives. Leaders fall but the ranks close up, and these living principles with increasing vigor push on the advance, and "Men may come, and men may go; but these go on forever."

We are to emulate the high endeavor of those who have wrought for our good. We are to cherish and extend the national spirit, the living speech, purified literature, enlarged liberty, Protestant Christianity, with an open Bible and freedom to worship God.

Finally, from this study of history we are especially to learn the philosophic lesson both of principle and process—of valid principle, viz.: the Scriptures and the Christ of Scripture; and the valid process of verifying the principle, viz.: by holding the two together—the Scriptures as foretelling, revealing the Christ; and the Christ as fulfilling, demonstrating the Scriptures. That is, we are not to give up, but to hold to the Bible as the rule of faith and life. We are to study it that we may find more and more of truth and life and fulness in it.

"This is the record, that God hath given unto us eternal life, and this life is in His Son." With wonderful significance, Jesus said: "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life." "Search the Scriptures . . . they testify of Me."

"WATER has quenched our thirst in the past; by what assumption do we affirm that the same will happen in the future? Experience does not teach this; experience is only of what has actually been; and, after never so many repetitions of a thing, there still remains the peril of venturing upon the untrodden land of future possibility. The fact, generally expressed as Nature's uniformity, is the guarantee, the ultimate major premise of all induction. 'What has been, will be,' justifies the inference that water will assuage thirst in after-times. We can give no reason, no evidence, for this uniformity; and therefore the course seems to be to adopt this as the finishing postulate."—*Bain's "Logic," I., 273.*

THE WILL AS A FACTOR IN SCIENCE.

[A paper read before the Institute of Christian Philosophy,
February 4th, 1886.]

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THE fact of the existence of Will is given us in consciousness, and verified by experience. It is true we are conscious of action only and not of being; but it is a mental intuition, that there can be no action without being. Every effect must have a cause, and every act must be performed by some actor. These are axioms in philosophy. The cause which can produce effects, and the agent who can perform acts must have an existence. From nothing, nothing can come, is another philosophical axiom that shows that action is impossible without being. Action is the evidence of the existence of substance, and will is the first or primary form of being. Action implies being, as motion implies force. We are conscious of volition as a form of mental action, and of motion as the result of action. This fact reveals not only the existence of *will*, but its nature. It is force directed by reason, and working to an end; or in other words, will is rational and intelligent force. "Force," says an able scientist, "is that which causes motion." The will causes action, and action is motion. This proves that will is a cause. W. Wundt,* in his axioms of physics in their relation to the principles of causality, says, (1) "All causes in nature are causes of motion. (2) Every cause of motion is external to the object moved." This makes *will* the basis or source of all causation. If all causes are causes of motion, and are external to the object moved, the cause of motion is not in matter, for it is external to matter; it must therefore be in mind. It is not material but spiritual. The cause of motion is force, and this proves the spiritual origin of force. "That cause, mould, or type of all constitutions of beings," says

* History of Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 323.

De Remusat in a famous essay on this subject, "that general nature, the original or principle of all natures, that force which fashions, specifies and characterizes all these kinds of being, cannot be conceived of as a constant property of any being; because the diversity of all these beings is what it has to account for." I look upon this as the strongest proof of the presence of will and intelligence exerting their power through all nature. This makes the organizing, directing and building force of nature a manifestation of will.

Natural phenomena reveal the action of a force directed by intelligence, working to an end, and according to a plan. Only will works in this way. "Force," says an eminent writer, "may be conceived but cannot be shaped to fancy. The clearest and truest thing we can say of it is, that it is energy—an energy analogous to that whose constant and undeniable presence we feel dwelling in our deepest selves." "The only force of which we are conscious," says a great scientist, Henry Sainte Claire Deville, "is will."^{*} This eminent savant thus traces all force either to the divine or human will. All physical phenomena, whatever their name, are at bottom manifestations of one and the same primordial agent. The unity of nature can only be found in the unity of the cause of all natural phenomena; and science in its search after unity has failed to find it in matter. Says Faraday, "What do we know of an atom apart from force?"[†]

Matter in its last analysis is reduced to force. Extension is a resultant of force. Inertia, as it is a form of resistance, reveals the presence of force. The substance which matter reveals to sensation is force, and force is a manifestation of will. Force springs from will, and reason from mind, and both unite in God. The manifestation of the divine will in the force and motion of the universe, and the divine reason in the law and order of the universe are the two facts that make all science possible. Science results from the study of force as the cause, and law as the order of all phenomena, and force reveals will, and order reason. It is thus evident that all science results from the action of will as force directed by reason. Will

^{*} *Nature and Life* : By Fernand Papillion, p. 11.

[†] *Nature and Life*, p. 10.

working in Nature is the basis of all science; and will working in man has created all science; science is therefore the result of the united action of the divine and human wills. This reasoning is conclusive, and it shows God as a person in Nature. The divine Being is the first principle of the universe—is the all-comprehending law to which all other laws are subordinate, as that most general cause of which all the physical causes are but manifestations. This universal cause is the will of the omnipresent Deity."* This great savant traces all the forces of nature to the will of God, and all the laws of nature which define the mode of the action of such forces to the divine reason or intelligence. In a final analysis these two are one; for will is force directed by reason. We cannot interpret force without will, nor law—which is order—without reason. These are personal attributes, and as only a person can understand and interpret the universe, so only a person could create the universe. The personality of man who interprets nature and the personality of God who is the author of nature, are both necessary to the existence of science. Science is man's interpretation of nature. It presents the thought-relations of phenomena. It reveals mind in the arrangement of matter, and will as its cause.

It thus results from the manifestations of intelligence and will in all physical, vital and mental phenomena. This is a revelation in nature of the intellect and will of God. To understand this revelation demands the presence and action of intellect and will in man. Science springs from the co-operation of the divine and human factors.

Like religion God and man must work in harmony to make it possible. Science and Religion both result from the effort of the human mind to explain or account for phenomena. They grow from the same mental root. They are streams from the same fountain of thought and emotion. Both build on the same facts and use the same logical methods.

In both, the existence of God and man as personal beings sustaining rational and moral relations to each other are essential facts. Take away either, and you make science and religion impossible. Science and religion reveal the wants and capacities

* Carpenter's *Mental Physiology*, p. 701.

of man's nature. The revelation of God to man in nature and providence, as intellect and will, presents the necessary conditions under which this creative power operates. This revelation constitutes the necessary environment which conditions the action of man's rational, moral, and religious nature, and from this action science and religion result, as effects from the operation of their natural causes.

This makes revelation the necessary condition, but not the efficient and creative cause of religion. It is a part of the environment in which religion in all its forms has originated; but the cause of religion is to be found in man and not in revelation. Revelation conditions the action of the religious faculty, but it does not create this faculty, or cause it to act. In all religious action, the intellect, emotions and will are engaged. Religion is thought, feeling and action. The rational, emotional and voluntary powers of man's nature act under appropriate conditions; and one of these conditions is the revelation of scientific, moral and religious truth.

This presents a rational view of the relation of revelation to religion. It is the condition and not the cause of man's religious devotion and consecration. Man in religion is rational and free. Piety is voluntary. It is a free-will offering. The exercise of will is necessary to religious action, life and character. If man were not free, he could not be religious; and all true religion has in it an element of liberty. Under religious influence, and in a religious life, man attains the free action of all his powers. "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." True philosophy is thus confirmed by the teaching of Christ. Divine influence does not destroy, but perfects man's freedom. If sin is slavery, salvation must be necessary to man's largest liberty of action. The spirit of God operating on the spirit of man, imparts the moral power by which man frees himself from the control of sin, and becomes a free-born son of God. Divine control is in perfect harmony with man's freedom, as it quickens the action of the highest faculties of the human soul. The divine life is in harmony with nature, reason, conscience, God, Christ and duty, and thus becomes free. The spiritual controls the natural; the mental, the material; the moral, the animal; the

heavenly, the earthly; and the divine, the human; and this gives liberty. Freedom has its seat in the higher, and not in the lower nature of man. It is a faculty of the spiritual, and not of the animal nature. The control of the lower by the higher, and the government of the animal by the spiritual, must therefore secure to man the largest moral freedom of which he is capable. We thus find will the basis of both science and religion, and a bond of union between them. But the freedom of the will is as necessary to morality as it is to religion. It is an essential element in all moral action; obligation, duty and responsibility could not exist without it. Power of choice must underlie the obligation of choice. Morality has no place in a system of mechanism. If man is a machine he is not responsible. This is an intuition of the reason, and a necessary moral judgment. We find it revealed in all language and literature. It is an axiom in the philosophy of morals. It is the basis of the sciences of ethics and jurisprudence. Duty and obligation could not rationally be applied to man and his conduct, if the human will was not free in its volitions. This makes the will an important factor in morals.

The practical importance of the doctrine of will is thus clearly evident, as it is a basal fact in physical and moral science. This is apparent, as a rational philosophy of science cannot be constructed without it. Its important relations to science, morals, religion, and the duties and interest of practical life make it one of the most important facts of consciousness, and one of the most sublime doctrines of philosophy.

"THOSE who set up their own conceptions of the orderly sequence which they discern in the phenomena of Nature as fixed and determined laws, by which those phenomena not only *are* (within all human experience), but always *have been*, and always *must be*, invariably governed, are really guilty of the intellectual arrogance which they condemn in the systems of the ancients, and place themselves in diametrical antagonism to those real philosophers by whose comprehensive grasp and penetrating insight that order has been so far disclosed."—*Bixby* (pp. 35-36), quoting from address of Dr. Carpenter, at Brighton, 1872, before Brit. Assoc. for the Advanc. Science.

JESUS CHRIST AS THE REPRESENTATIVE HUMAN REDEEMER, IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE.

[Delivered before the Summer School of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Asbury Park, New Jersey, July 27th, 1885.]

BY REV. SAMUEL W. DUFFIELD, BLOOMFIELD, N. J.

SAID Ernest Renan, "Jesus cannot belong exclusively to those who call themselves His disciples. He is the common honor of all who bear a human heart." Thus the old paradox is renewed, and the world which once cried "Crucify Him!" cries again, as once it cried on that awful morning, "Surely this man was the Son of God."

If it be possible for me in the sphere of a dew-drop to exhibit the form of a world; if I can so reverse the optic glass as to bring what is immensely vast within the vista of the eye; if I can arouse and inspire a zeal for harmony simply by sounding the notes of the diatonic scale—then, and then only, can I hope to set forth the present topic with full success. But it has been chosen not without some confidence that I may offer you the cartoon of a picture grander than I can execute within these limits, and may, by this outline sketch, inspire other thinkers to the same line of investigation.

The one great fact of this world is Sin. It is stamped on all history and upon every life. Disease, loss, sorrow, anxiety, pain, fear, and death are the sevenfold darkness of its spectrum. It is here and we all know it. Each asylum is its interrogation-mark and each prison is its exclamation-point. "There's something in the world amiss," and whether this shall be "unriddled by and by" depends on the religion which gives the answer. And in order to comprehend the relation of Jesus Christ to mankind, it is necessary that we should commence with the origin of the greatest factor in His life.

A good God could never allow Sin to exist if Sin, in some

manner, did not subserve a higher purpose than appears to be its mission. Destruction could not be permitted to intrude upon Creation, unless by means of destruction the grandeur and goodness of the Creator could be enhanced. God does not and cannot subsist selfishly in heaven, wrapped in His own introverted glory, the maelstrom of a universe which pours itself back into His bosom. Plainly and fairly I assert that the Creator is not fed or sustained by His creation. If the reverse of this was true, then we should be driven to admit the existence of a god beyond God, and an outside something-or-other upon which God could sow worlds, as a farmer sows grain, and thus reap His sustenance from a creation which grew outside of Himself. But nowhere in the Bible does this monstrosity appear. On the contrary this Being above all beings, this I Am who is the source and supply of all existence, is shown to us as Father, Guide, Guardian, Friend. He is a "jealous God," because His glory is our best good. He is disclosed to us—however He may otherwise be revealed to other worlds—as the One whose infallible will is behind all Law, and in the doing of whose will we therefore obtain the highest freedom possible under the conditions of our creation.

Science to-day affirms that, back of Matter and Force there is their unity, and this unity is called Law. Before Law, who is her god, Science bows reverently. She cannot see Law—and Law may be moral, mental or physical, and simple or compound—but she believes in Law, as a general name for this body of rules and assurances. She is as confident of its invariable action as the physician is confident of the *vis medicatrix* in the body of his patient.

And Science further affirms that, beyond the known region of Law, there is a realm concerning which she is able to say only "I do not know." At this point the positive man of science abandons his positivism. In reference to the higher grades of study and experiment he replies to your question, "I am an agnostic. I guess and try and theorize—I *know* nothing absolutely."

Now Science admits what we all admit—the presence of Sin. That is to say, she recognizes the presence of a vitiating and per-

verting principle in nature, a disorganizing, inharmonious, unforeseen element in calculations where exactness is essential. Storms in the air and shakings in the earth—the oppression of the weak by the strong—the inexactness of measures and the infelicity of weights—the intrusion of the unexpected into an experiment or calculation—the thousand-fold baffling obstacles which trouble the stream of our thought, these reveal the presence of dark and intricate, and often obstinate and unconquerable, forces. The best we can do is to attain to approximate results. Instances are not lacking to serve as illustrations. All of a sudden Mr. Babbage's calculating machine, which had been going at a steady logarithmic jog-trot, reached a number at which its law inexplicably changed. It worked by vastly greater intervals and on a system utterly unexpected; and Mr. Babbage has dedicated an entire treatise to this singular phenomenon. This is but one case out of many which have disturbed the scientific mind, and shaken the foundations of materialistic or rationalistic dogmatism. Thus the science of our day is in the condition of the best science at the time of the birth of Christ. For, after Plato and Aristotle came Pyrrho of Elis whose philosophy was pure agnosticism—who doubted everything and believed nothing. If it was time *then* for the true Redeemer to appear, it is time now.

Conceding that this fact of Sin has produced this uncertainty and these confusions in exact science, can Science give us a better account of the origin of Sin than that which we find in the Bible? That, or something like that, is a universal tradition. It is as surely tied fast to the idea of disobedience as lightning is tied fast to the idea of a thunder-cloud. You cannot separate them. But *whose* disobedience was the primal cause of Sin? Was this disobedience the act of *Man*? I think not.

Man is not regarded in the Bible as the author of Sin—but only as the one involved in it and suffering by it; and this representation agrees with that given in other religious systems. In those, even more than in our own, we are made aware of a malignant power, hostile to man and alien from God. Familiarly he is known to us as the author of evil. In the Bible he is called "that old serpent the devil and Satan," and he is there described as a "man-murderer from the beginning." The picture presented

to us is that of a lofty but disobedient intelligence, banished from heaven and finding his way to this earth. The Miltonic conception of the fall of Satan is not astray from the truth. Jesus Christ Himself once said, with a strange flash of reminiscence, "I beheld Satan, as lightning, fall from heaven."

The great angel who has not kept his first estate is sent hither, therefore, to become "the god of this world." The effects of his reign are at once apparent. Here, in the ages before man, the saurians and pachyderms riot and roar together. Here death is already busy, tussling its way through creation; and if death comes by reason of Sin, then Sin must have been here in the world before man appeared. Age rolls in upon age. At the end of each age the God of heaven shuts one day of His creation and opens another. Each page is better than the page of the record which precedes it. The god of this world has tried his strength against mollusks and mammals, and death has prevailed in consequence. But each death has been the birth of a higher life—and now it is time for man to be brought upon the stage.

Do not smile at me when I say to you that God will not be unjust even to the devil; and that He never forgets the moral education of His, and our, greatest enemy. Do not think that I deal with thoughts of a sensational levity when I say, that this struggle of humanity on the earth is the "stage-play"—for these are Paul's very words—by which God exhibits the wonders of His grace. "For we are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men." Yes, to the devil's world, and to demons and evil intelligences—and also to heaven and to our human companions—we are made such a divine tragedy, such a Satanic comedy.

As we near the Age of Man we find the earth burdened with terror and fierceness. It needs a master, and Man is made its master. It needs one to tend it, and to dress it, and to keep it, and thus it is more than a mere myth or legend to us when we read that the original Paradise was set off from the rest of the world, and there Man was to be nurtured up as the possible monarch of the sphere. Into the presence of the devastating power of disorder is brought that power which is to name, order and control. With an eye to His divine purpose God calls every

æon of the earth "Good." Every change only furthers His plans. He prospers by reason of apparent defeat.

And who is Man? He is a creature made out of the very dirt beneath the devil's feet; and this is the key to that enigmatical curse, "On thy belly shalt *thou* crawl and dust shalt thou eat." And again we read, "Dust shall be the serpent's meat." For it is to this thing of earth that God has entrusted the unredeemed earth and the unredeemed creatures. It is to Man that we must look for conquest over the forces of evil. I say, then, that this story—so remarkably annotated for us, of late years, by Science of every sort—shows us a clear purpose, on the part of God, to rescue this earth in its entirety from the control of its god, who was, and who now is, the devil.

And I pause to say, just here, that the consequences of this determination are so vast, so fraught with human woe, that I cannot conceive how a good God could undertake them, unless the benefit and blessing were to be infinitely beyond the trouble and care and grief of the process. It is this thought which has so thrilled us all as we read the "In Memoriam." It is this thought which so inspires the greatest of our poets and tragedians, and which lends its mournful longing to the cantos of "Faust." In a word, we all feel and we all have felt the presence of a Being who has ever infused a struggling effort after harmony into nature, and a struggling hope of final victory into the human heart. Poetry, which is our only modern substitute for the chant of the ancient prophet, assures us that these are the "clouds of glory" which we "trail" as we come "from God who is our home"; and that "heaven lies about us in our infancy."

Connected with this fact of Sin, science takes cognizance of another fact, that of Sacrifice. The two go together. Sacrifice, even to the offering of a human victim, is universal in some shape. The first sin of Man gashed too deep a trace upon the disappointed creation for us not to find a throb beneath the scar, though centuries have fled from us with averted faces into the eternity of God.

Once more let us take the testimony to our assertion. *Mental* philosophy is satisfied that the mind of man is somehow awry and inharmonious. *Moral* philosophy confesses that the affec-

tions and passions are in a state of perplexity and disagreement. *Natural* philosophy admits the discordances and discrepancies of the visible world. If I have put my case properly I have then made it plain that all these things are the consequences of disobedience to the true law of our being. Discord is *not* "harmony misunderstood." That was a clever fallacy. Discord is harmony denying itself, resisting its own law of concord. And so it is not a something misunderstood by us because we are not capable of understanding it, but on the other hand it is something whose disloyalty to its own law we *do* understand and we *do* dislike; and which no fallacious reasoning can make us unnatural enough to like. Man's soul sinned; but Man's senses have kept their power to recognize their own law.

It is precisely here that we must smile at the folly of those who say that the "serpent-and-tree tradition" is unphilosophical and imaginative. I do not care to contend for the particulars of it—though if there were space I might even do that—when the great doctrinal backbone of it is so apparent. We see that the tree is called the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil." We see that man, having partaken of the forbidden fruit, is filled with shame, selfishness and remorse. We see that here, for the first time, we obtain an idea of Man's recognition of the difference between good and evil; and that his newly awakened moral consciousness is the factor which we call "conscience"; and which Paul declares to be universal among mankind. It is this which enables us to detect discord, to experience sorrow, to anticipate judgment. The Fall of Man made music possible as an art. Nay, we may summarize it all in that terse sentence of the German satirist, who spoke a truth he did not realize when he said that the Fall of Man was a "vast stride in human progress."

The language of the Scriptures is notable. It tells us that to eat of the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" was not by any means for Man to eat of "the tree of life." Failing to eat of "the tree of life," there would be an unsatisfied hunger in the heart for good, as distinguished from evil. For he who has eaten of that fruit has become as God, knowing good and evil. And now lest an immortality of knowledge like this should be perpetuated on the earth, God withholds the tree of life from Man.

It is of slight consequence to us that the whole story may be classed with the folk-lore of all lands, provided we can show that here is a philosophical statement of the origin of that intense desire for knowledge, that keen discrimination between evil and good, according to the various standards which men have agreed to set up; and that deep instinct towards an immortal existence which led one infidel Frenchman to the pathetic exclamation, "No, no, Robespierre, death is *not* an eternal sleep!"

A fact of moral disobedience is then declared to be the cause of separation between Man and God. In this fact, and in the series of events which conducted us to it, can be found the true reason why there should be a Redeemer for the human race—a new champion who shall rescue what was once lost. I see a struggle which begins with this moment of the Fall. It is the struggle of Osiris and Typhon; of Ormuzd and Ahriman; of Zeus and Dis; of Asgard's Lok and Utgard's Lok. It is the struggle between good and evil—between God and Satan.

I do not wonder then that we find the ignorant and debased nations worshipping the devil in preference to God. Fear is more potent with a low nature than love is, and the idea of God is vague and dim because of the sinful medium through which He is beheld. But it is not of Fetichism that we ask our question. We ask it rather of the book-religions of the world. To each of these there is a central thought, and when we reach that thought we have the philosophic key to the moral conflict out of which the religion grew.

Ask Confucianism what it seeks, and it answers "*Order.*" Ask Taouism, and it answers "*Indifference.*" Ask Buddhism, and it answers "*Calm.*" Ask Mohammedanism, and it answers "*Fate.*" But ask either Judaism or Christianity, and the answers will be "*Mediation.*" Its purpose—for Christianity comes not to destroy Judaism but to fulfil it, and the two are one—is to reconcile earth and heaven; to reconcile man and man; to reduce discord to harmony and to give the "garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness." Old and New Testaments—Sacrifice and Atonement—Law and Gospel—blend together; and the old Adam of sin and the new Adam of salvation join their hands in one common acquiescence to the divine will.

Out of the heart of Sin must then come the Saviour for sinners. If God be God we should expect some sort of hope held out, coincident with the Fall; or else despair would obliterate the race. Down the vista of ages therefore the divine thought runs, and in a single sentence it expresses the divine purpose: "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head."

Supposing our premises to be correct we have then laid out some such scheme as the following statements make plain. For if we find that with the Fall of Man was revealed a definite and supernatural method of restoration to God's favor; if this line of heavenly intention passes through representative phases of human nature in order to culminate in a representative Redeemer; if this Redeemer lives, acts, speaks and dies consistently with the original design; if the mission of atonement, tried by pure tests, proves successful, and it is made evident that only such a Redeemer could be the Saviour of the world—then the argument before us will have been drawn to its legitimate conclusion, and the proposition before us will have been demonstrated.

The first step on the way which we are about to tread is the fact of Conscience. "I was afraid and I went and hid myself": it is the cry wrung from the lips of the convicted sinner, everywhere on earth. It does not belong in Eden alone, but in all the world; and it is familiar to us by ten thousand examples. Mark, then, that it is to this convicted sinner, and to no one else, that hope arises in the midst of despair. The word to Satan is the proper antecedent of the word to Man; the condemnation of Satan is virtually the reprieve of the sinner. Tested by this first case how utterly subversive of moral government it would be if Sin were treated with that toleration which the mere moralist advocates. Let us not forget that man has eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Let us not forget that the devil—the author of sin and of the lie—is the god of this world. For these facts emphasize the necessity for clear distinctions. There is neither truth nor charity in calling evil, good, and good, evil. Sin is not a *disease*, but a disobedience.

On this pivot of disobedience turns the whole problem. Any return to God is signalized by a desire to obey His will. Disobedience is loss of fellowship—the only thing which, in his in-

fantile moral state, man could understand. Restoration to fellowship with God includes the joy of that happier early condition which is best known by its absence, and best explained by the present posture of affairs. It is by comparison, or by deprivation, that we understand our blessings.

Just here it is important that we should avoid an error. A child, let us say, can break a mirror. He may be unrepentant and defiant; or he may be unconscious of the nature of his offence, and so free from all shame. Or else, in view of punishment (that is, *fear*), or in view of conscience (that is, *love of right*), he may be contrite and penitent. Now, he cannot replace the mirror. But when he is truly penitent the mirror is of less value than the child's character; and it is possible for *some one* to replace it, in the child's stead. There is cost in this, and labor in this, and both cost and labor may be very great. One can imagine a case where utter devotion, and even life itself, could not personally atone for the rash or ignorant action of a moment. Therefore the point to be held in view is the uplifting of character, and its restoration to a fellowship with all that is good and true. Three elements are necessary to this result: Conviction, Contrition, Confession.

We are told that the consequences of Sin were death. And the commencement of moral death is seen in the prevarication of our first parents—in their shame—in the dying of hopeful sympathy between them—and in the wasting and wearing of existence which follow the expulsion from Eden, and the presence in their daily life of the thorn, the thistle, the sweat of the brow, and the agony of physical pain. Well might Victor Hugo declare that every noxious beast renews to us the old problem of the existence of evil. If the story in Genesis, then, is anything at all, it is philosophically correct, by the best testing which we can give to it. We may again revert to it in order to examine on what moral foundation the edifice of salvation could be upreared. What did man carry with him, by way of moral salvability, through that Eden-gate? We know that selfishness had been infused into all of his passions and affections. We know that selfishness is the ultimate grave of all that is pure and noble.

I. *With man went woman*—companion, comforter, comple-

ment of his existence. Swedenborg reached towards the real meaning of this fact when he declared man and woman to be portions of a sphere, each incomplete without the other. It is to Christianity that the development of woman's true relation to the world, and to man, is due.

II. Man also had the *original grant of dominion* over the earth. It had never been repealed. This is a profound instinct in the heart of even the lowest savage.

III. It seems evident, too, that man had *language*, and the consciousness that his was a *destiny of tillage and labor*—his old life to be still followed out, though under severer conditions. At this point in our inquiry we derive the greatest assistance from the archæologists and ethnologists. To them we are indebted for the demonstration of the effects of climate, hardship, and the varieties of personal situation and struggle, in their bearing on the primitive forms of culture. And it is noticeable that the Scripture story exactly corroborates their researches.

IV. But chief of all that he brought out of Eden was that double factor in man's life—the *certainly that he had disobeyed* and that disobedience was estrangement; together with the clear apprehension of the *difference between right and wrong* and good and evil. In a word, he carried CONSCIENCE through the Eden-gate, and he has never been able since that time to silence her voice until he has silenced his own moral nature, and destroyed in his soul the last lingering trace of its likeness to the divine Creator in whose image it was made.

“ Man hath still either toyes or care;
 He hath no root, nor to one place is ty'd,
 But ever restless and irregular
 About this earth doth run and ride.
 He knows he hath a home, but scarce knows where;
 He says it is so far,
 That he hath quite forgot how to go there.

“ He knocks at all doors, strays and roams;
 Nay, hath not so much wit as some stones have,
 Which in the darkest nights point to their homes
 By some hid sense their Maker gave;
 Man is the shuttle, to whose winding quest
 And passage through these looms
 God order'd motion, but ordain'd no rest.”

So sings Henry Vaughan concerning this dethroned king. He is anointed and has once held the sceptre. But he is paying a heavy price for that godship of knowledge for which he has exchanged the kingship of innocence. Jehovah-God is supreme; next ranks Satan as the "god of this world"; and now, below Satan in creation and beneath him in power, we find Man—the deceived, banished and ruined Man. If our proposition is correct, we must ever henceforth find enmity between the serpent and man; we must find that he who holds fast to the good does so "at cost of life and limb"; and that the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head is no surer than that the serpent shall strike his fangs into that bruising human heel.

I should ask no further confirmation of this statement than an analysis of the curse pronounced on the woman, did I dare to invoke the help of modern science by way of commentary. I may only say that this curse is the perpetual memorial of the redemption. It both anticipated it, and reflects it when it has come. And if, as Thomas Carlyle says, "a thinking man is the devil's worst enemy," we have a key in this fact to the added sorrows of a high condition of civilization. Motherhood is the perpetual mystery-play—the sacred tragedy—of the noblest women. Each mother has her Gethsemane; and each Gethsemane has its Calvary. And the Saviour Himself lent a deeper charm to the thought when He said, "He that receiveth one such little child in My name, receiveth Me!" For the child is the true citizen of the distant kingdom of righteousness, and with each pure little face of the loving children, Christ comes back to be with us.

Need we stay to disprove that outworn fallacy that a man can somehow be *his own* atonement and *his own* redemption? A single word defeats it. No man can obtain merit for what he is *bound* to perform. "These ought ye to have done, but not to leave the other undone," is a vast philosophic truth, when applied to the case in hand. How can a man, granting the facts which we have been elaborating, get back to God's favor, when Eden is shut, and speech between God and Man is ended; and when the blank memory of disobedience and loss offer no suggestions by way of help? Do you not see that if any personal obedience on the

part of man could now regain the favor of God, God would be placed in the dilemma of pardoning in particular, what He refused to pardon in the mass? In other words, if Man could work out a scheme of restoration irrespective of God, Man would be so much greater than God as to *compel* God to forgive him! It would be anything but an intelligible and practical system. But if you will consider the false religions, it will be apparent that every one of *them* is attempting just this plan of reconciliation. Like the piano-tuner, they content themselves with accommodating the notes to each other, and are satisfied if, by taking from this tone and adding to that, they can reduce discord to a minimum. Perfection is impossible. For, as a result of the Fall, the whole moral nature of Man must have changed. He may be as sorry as he can be; but he cannot be as sorry as he ought to be. An impure being cannot be as sorry for impurity as a pure being sees that he should be sorry. How then shall Man be just with God? It is not for *sins* that one must atone—but for Sin.

And here is another element in the problem, and one of the most essential, also. Not only is Man unable to see as the pure God sees, in this matter of moral obedience and restoration of harmony in the frame of nature, but *each* man is the resultant of many forces. Traits of character, physical excellences or defects, talent or depravity, are transmitted from one generation to another. Literally, we are "heirs of all the ages." Each human being is a mixture, composed of all his past ancestry, *plus* or *minus* his own conduct. Thus, if I were a materialist, I could put a terribly strong case as to moral necessity: that each person, being born to this or that destiny, was morally certain to be happy or to be miserable, in spite of his own volition. The influence of astrology and palmistry and divination had more or less to do with the formulation of the doctrine which Calvin himself called "*decretum horribile*," and which reduces the saved and lost among mankind to a mathematical demonstration, logically predicated on the unconditional election and reprobation of God. I repeat, that we have learned to be something better than materialists, and to look beyond dead logic to the living truth. "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."

As this new sphere of light, which we call "heredity," dawns

now upon our path, we have ground for thinking that it must be carefully estimated. Its mass and motion will affect other spheres in the system.

The perfectibility of human nature has been a favorite thought with many theorists. But, as it happens, the only really scientific attempts at stirpiculture were undertaken by the Oneida Community; and these were so much of a failure that the world has no need to be further informed upon the unpleasant details of that experiment. Those records will, however, be invaluable at some future day, in the hands of a Christian scientist. The fatal difficulty with this or with any effort of a Godless Science is, that a certain free force which, for lack of a better name, we entitle "personality" has oftentimes "put down the mighty from their seats and hath exalted them of low degree." Science is baffled completely by agencies which laugh at her laws. Human nature fights from behind rocks and bushes; and by all sorts of ambushes and attacks, fair and unfair. She disregards the book-learned strategists altogether. And when it comes to the perfectibility of human nature and the *avatar* of the "great God, Humanity" for whom poor Winwood Reade was vainly looking, we must confess that stirpiculture is unsuccessful. The old familiar way of "marrying and giving in marriage" will go on, as it has always gone on, and the prospect of improving the race, as one would improve Jersey cattle or Hambletonian horses, is not such as encourages us to break up the family and cut asunder the unseen bonds of the heart, in order to promote them.

To the moral obtuseness then of which we have spoken, is now joined an *element of uncertainty*, which grows out of the peculiar differentiation of the individuals of the human species. Therefore I dismiss from our consideration any of these efforts to evade, or to cajole, the broken law of God. I turn, instead, to the promise of a Human Redeemer who shall bruise the serpent's head, and by so doing shall reinstate Man in his old condition of fellowship with God.

I see no reason for thinking that there would have been *no* human race had there been no Fall. But it would undoubtedly have been a race most unlike to the present one. We may well wonder if it would have had any knowledge of *childhood* at

all. Adam had no childhood, and Eve had none. "Through all Eternity," Mercein once said, "we can be young but once," and this brilliant expression illuminates another aphorism which lies near it in those forgotten but marvellous pages, namely, that "Redemption placed the first child in its mother's arms." It is plain that a race so formed would have been like the angels of God—without originality or individuality. Without sin there would have been no desire to have one's own will, if that will had been able to stand the crucial test of obedience. But when this wilfulness had begun, then the willing service of such a free being would be more honorable to God than that of a host of angels. And hence it is said that there is "more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine righteous intelligences"—or "beings," for the word "persons" is not in the original—"which need no repentance." Thus the human race affords a spectacle to the world and to angels and to men of a class of created intelligences, sinful and fallen it is true, but of which each rescued soul incites the happiness of that unknown region where God abides in glory.

The question which now intrudes upon our notice is imperative. Will this little seed of hope, this promise of redemption, have power enough to ultimately produce the Redeemer of the race? History tells us that such a seed of hope and possibility may often deteriorate and be lost. How far can this purpose be kept strong and pure, as the children take the place of the fathers, and as this traditionary hope thins and shallows with the widening generations? We must, I think, admit the antecedent necessity that, if there *is* such a divine purpose—such a supernatural hope—there must be a providence to watch over it. We must admit that the assumption that this is the design of Almighty Wisdom carries, inevitably, with it the assurance of a definite principle of selection, which shall work out the *avatar* of the "great God, Humanity" in the due process of time. Into such an inquiry as this come all the cant terms of our current sociology. Here are to be found "environment," "the survival of the fittest," "heredity," "natural selection"—in fact everything and every name which can be noticed in our later discussion of social development and degradation.

I cannot step aside to quote Scripture, but I mark in passing that the language of Scripture is always consistent with our best Science upon these points. "He saith not to *seeds*, as of many, but to *thy* seed, as of *one*, which is Christ." The tendency of natural selection is to run out in one direction or another, guided by superior force or courage or skill. But the singular story we are now tracing rises and falls like the waves of the sea, or like mountain and valley. It advances by that strange law of spiral movement which Hugh MacMillan so wonderfully demonstrates in his sermon on "The Law of Circularity." For this purpose of God presses on when it appears to recede, just like the motion of a planet in the sky. So that Dr. MacMillan's own words are doubly valuable when he says, "Mankind, by the law of natural development, could never have given birth to a character so exceptional as that of Christ."

This is what makes more remarkable to the investigator that thought of a coming Messiah which pervaded all the religions and nations of men. The argument has been fully expanded in De Pressensé's "Religions before Christ"; in Prof. B. F. Cocker's "Christianity and the Greek Philosophy"; and in the unique essays by George Smith on "The Harmony of the Divine Dispensations." We can refer to these monographs for the circumstantial proof that this hope of a coming Redeemer has had a conspicuous place in all human thought, as well as in the Judaic prophecy.

If, now, we employ the ideas previously advanced in this discussion we are inducted into an unnoticed line of investigation. The law of heredity, as we understand it in this nineteenth century, may receive some singular expositions from the pages of the Bible. We have here the genealogy of Jesus Christ, a person whom this Bible claims to be the Redeemer of mankind. We can therefore ask, from the facts given in connection with His history, whether the good and bad of humanity have been properly commingled in His ancestry. To say the least of it, it is strange that such a genealogy should be in existence at all. Socrates has none. The great heroes and sages have none. The best of such records only go a short distance and then cease. But this one is complete from the beginning of beginnings. Here they are,

those long lists of names which have so often annoyed and puzzled the readers of the Bible. We now know, in the light of modern science, the immense value of these genealogies, and especially we know the value of that which conducts us to Christ. We are able, in this mode, to ascertain whether God has carried on through generations His purpose of revealing a Representative Human Redeemer, as no combination of men or wisdom of men could have effected it. The spaces are so wide, the diversity of character and disposition is so great, that these of themselves remove the proposition which we are considering far out of reach of all collusion, chance or contingency. Nowhere else than in such lists of ancestral lineage could the true representative nature of the humanity of Jesus Christ be explored.

This argument is not all to be found in one place, any more than we can expect to find the *flora* and *fauna* of earth all on one continent, or in one zone. But if the argument *is* here we should be capable of discovering it, since it is the clue to itself. It is also its own proof, for when we attain what we seek, we ought to be satisfied. This is as usual a method of scientific procedure as there is. Mr. ImThurn, for example, heard much of Roraima, a strange *mesa* or table-land which stood, isolated from all the surrounding country, at the extremity of Guiana. He announced the proposition that there one could probably find the *flora* and *fauna* of the ancient world, which had been for so many ages cut off from admixture with the regions around and below. After incredible hardships and a delay of several years he scaled its craggy wall, but Roraima has afforded only a new fern or so, and on its wasted and denuded surface there is nothing which supports the theory of its explorer. So would it be with us, if, when we scaled this hitherto unexamined table-land of genealogy, we should see no special features of divine guidance, no unusual forms of character, no unmistakable evidence of design and progress. All these names and incidents ought to fit to each other, like bits of a Roman mosaic. We ought to gaze through these fragments of fact and see their structure as by polarized light.

The ordinary argument for the representative character of Jesus Christ is metaphysical and logical. It consists of inferences

and deductions, and is based on His conduct and teachings. But our present purpose is to abandon that series of reasons and proofs altogether. I am to ask you to remember that in those veins pierced on Calvary ran the blood of covenant-keeping Abraham, of translated Enoch, of praising David and praying Solomon. I ask you to recall the inscription in Greek and Latin and Hebrew, "This is the King of the Jews," and to bear in mind that, by direct heredity, the royal son of David was that Shiloh whose throne was the triangular seat-piece of the cross; whose crown was woven from the thorns of a cursed earth; whose sceptre was a trivial reed; and whose purple robe was the cast-off *toga* of some Roman lord.

More than this. For it must not be forgotten that while this ancestry has in it the patient faith of Noah, and the loving devotion of Ruth, it presents, by the side of the most exalted virtues, the blackest and most abominable vices. I shall offer the Ten Commandments in evidence against this ancestry—each one of them broken by some flagrant sin. Side by side—nothing extenuated—stand the blessing and the curse on these sacred pages. In short, I offer to prove that sainted or sinful humanity with its highest purity and its lowest foulness, contributed men and women to be twisted, like filaments of weak and inconclusive hemp, into the great cable by which the race is to be moored back again to the throne of God.

As we begin our journey we perceive that every book of the Old Testament is a subscriber to the general fund. The Pentateuch tells, historically, the rise and progress of the genealogy; it reveals God's care of His people; and in its types and shadows are prefigured the hope of the Gospel. In the other historical books this same genealogy reappears here and there, as a road is seen on the plain when one gazes from a mountain-side. Now and then it is visible through openings among the trees, or emerging from behind some intervening hill. And this is the way with the story which we are tracing. Individual biographies and incidents enliven it. Contemporaneous events color and lend atmosphere to it. Here, we come to some old hero under his vine and fig-tree. There, perhaps, we see the harlot Rahab, casting her scarlet cord over the Jericho wall. It is a panorama.

Even the book of Esther with its fulfilment of prophecy against Amalek, and Ezra with its renewal of the canon of Scripture, and Nehemiah with its restoration of the wall, are important to the result. Job too—what should we do without Job, and the Psalms, and the Proverbs, and the Song of Songs, and the preaching of Ecclesiastes? For these give us the subjective side of God's providence, by which alone we have been able to expound such a narrative as this story of salvation. Here it is that the Christian scientist finds his key to the otherwise incomprehensible elevations and depressions of sacred history. The prophetic books—from great Isaiah and stately Jeremiah down to complaining Jonah and small Obadiah—have a share in the work. I see before me, as I view the king's highway on the plain below from this mountain-top, that motley company of kings and peasants who form the progenitors and the body-guard of Jesus of Nazareth. They appear and disappear along the road, but, even when I do not see them travelling by the open path, I hear the harp of David and the timbrel of Miriam, the song of Deborah and the chant of Korah's sons. And, at the end of the way, I behold these mighty ones all gathered at an inn and a manger, over which the angels soon shall sing.

But this, it may be said, is rhapsody and not Science. Science would have us exact before we are exultant, and would have us prove our case before we claim it. It is necessary then that we should remember how Satan came anew into power under that tree of the knowledge of good and evil. In his hand is the power of death. Has he not an acquaintance with the design of God in this progress of the generations? Does he not know what to expect as he listens to that promise? And will he not defeat the plan of God if this be possible? Has he not moreover certain formulated rights over this ancestry, in respect to their inheritance of a sinful nature and because of their absence from the fellowship which would keep them in holiness? If he has such rights would not God respect them? I speak reverently, but I speak with real conviction, when I announce that the heavenly law is that which even Buddha comprehended when he said, "Hatred doth not cease by hatred; hatred ceaseth by love. This is an old rule." If evil is to be overcome by good then God must avoid "doing evil that good may come."

What are these devil's rights? I answer:

I. The right to claim that the Redeemer of the race who must obey where Adam disobeyed, *must be born far enough along in point of time for Sin to have subjected His ancestry to its full force.*

By this I mean that the stock must have been acclimated; and that the coming Redeemer must be born under, and within the scope of, the law that was broken. It ought to be possible to show that that law had been broken somewhere, somehow, in every particular, by some one of that ancestry.

II. Satan had the right to hold God to His exact expression that "*the seed of the woman*" *should bruise the serpent's head.* It must then be no archangel, no newly imagined creature, but a child of human parentage made of a woman as well as made under the law.

III. He had the right to demand, further, that this Redeemer should be a *true representative of His kind*, sprung from the people in no casual sense, and so rooted into humanity that the fibres of His life ran below the lowest of the low, as well as above the highest of the high. How could He be "representative" unless He were as much the child of a hovel as of a palace? And do I require to add that this involves every conceivable contradiction? Here are poverty and wealth, health and sickness, pain and happiness, high station and handicraft labor. The physical, mental and moral gamuts must be sounded in every note.

I have said that these were the devil's rights. They were respected.

Our particular information from this point onward would need blackboard, or chart, to make its sources and interlinkings comprehensible by a popular audience. It is only possible for me to say that the matter of reconciliation of names in the genealogy has been carefully considered. We are not taught to rely on one list but upon several. Matthew, Luke, the patriarchal genealogies in Gen. v., and xi.; those in I. Chron. i., and subsequent chapters; the fragment at the end of Ruth; and the various scattered references to the branches and twigs of individual lineage—these all, in curious fashions, sustain and illustrate each other. The apparent omissions and contradictions

are, in several instances, very instructive, but I need not stay to do what Lord Arthur Hervey, and the anonymous author of "Who was Jesus?" together with many famous biblical scholars, have already thoroughly performed. There remains, in spite of every quibble, this striking fact: that the Bible furnishes us with a genealogy for Jesus Christ which is the best established record on earth. No English nobleman can go beyond Battle Abbey with any certainty, but here is a list which anticipates the Flood and contemporizes the Creation.

I. In these names a *distinct principle of selection* has prevailed instead of a mere descent from father to son. Seth was Adam's third son. Shem, though named the first, is, by the list in I. Chronicles, shown to be the third son of Noah. In Jacob's family, Judah was the fourth son of the despised wife, Leah; Reuben, Simeon and Levi were passed by. Of Jesse's long list of sons, David, the youngest, is chosen. In David's family, Nathan, who heads one branch of the ancestry, and Solomon, who heads another, were younger than two, and possibly three, of their brothers. In connection with this take the doctrine of "birthright" as we observe it in the case of Jacob and Esau. It is with a view to the birth of the future Christ that Jacob is loved and Esau is hated—for the character of Esau is certainly the nobler of the two.

At this point, too, the "right to the crown" comes in—a right which Matthew ignores in those who were merely official kings of Judah, and so omits their names from his list. In all other cases than these which we have mentioned, the descent is from the oldest son to the oldest son. This fact, if there were no more, would be sufficient to accentuate the departure from the order in the instances we have noticed.

II. Observe again *how much Gentile and heathen blood there is in this lineage*. Here is Abraham, son of Terah, whose grandfather dwelt in Ur of the Chaldees—the very heart of idolatry. He is compelled to leave his kindred and his father's house in order to follow God. The female ancestry, too, is remarkable, and may serve to emphasize what could be said of the men. Leah was of Gentile stock. Tamar was a fanatic, and yet her illegitimate child, Pharez, is in the ancestry. Ruth was a Moab-

itess. Naamah was from the children of Ammon. Athaliah, the daughter of Ahab and Jezebel, comes from the Baal-worshipping Canaanites. Bathsheba, the granddaughter of the crafty Ahithophel, was the wife of a Hittite and very likely was of that blood herself. She furnishes a fair illustration of the manner in which the Scripture record assists us in such inquiries. For we can trace her father Eliam, or Ammiel, as one of David's mighty men, and it is perhaps her brother who is the "Machir, son of Ammiel, of Lo-debar" who joins with Barzillai in his care of David when he flies before Absalom. She herself is remotely from Giloh, which is a place named among the towns and villages included in the inheritance of the children of Judah, and which is in the country of the Hittites.

But in the case of Rahab we are not left to any conjecture, however ingenious. She is undoubtedly a heathen. So was Maachah, who was an open idolatress and built an obscene and horrible idol which Asa destroyed. It is no wonder then, that good Matthew Henry, remarking upon the four women whom Matthew the Evangelist has named in the genealogy of Jesus Christ, has this pertinent note: "We ought not to upbraid people with the scandals of their ancestors; it is what they cannot help, and has been the lot of the best, even of our Master Himself."

III. Let us also notice *the heights and depths of character in this ancestry*. In Seth's time men "began to call upon the name of the Lord." Enoch "walked with God." Noah was a "preacher of righteousness." In the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Jacob, Rahab and David—all ancestors of our Lord—are commended for their faith. Here too we must take cognizance of David's poetry, Solomon's wisdom, Asa's piety, and Hezekiah's religious zeal. And among the individual examples of earnestness, or goodness, we have Zerubbabel bearing back through the desert the vessels of the sanctuary, and reinstating the service of the house of God.

In other matters, too, we may ask, where is there a deeper love between husband and wife than that example which we commonly employ in the marriage service of the Episcopal Church—the love of Isaac for Rebekah. Where have we any-

where a better type of manly honor than Boaz, or of womanly virtue than Ruth, or Mary? Where is piety in youth more beautifully exhibited than in Josiah? In these, and other persons in the direct line of ancestry, we also have the warrior-spirit, the administrative ability, the patriarchal priestliness. Prophet, or priest, or king—each has his illustrious instance here.

Nor are these ordinary names. By the common consent of the world they are representative characters, and typify some of the sweetest and tenderest phases of our humanity.

Now suffer the other side to appear, and the contrast will be at once discerned when we inquire as to the breaking of God's law by these progenitors of Jesus Christ.

1. Every idolatrous king, not excepting Solomon, broke the *first commandment*.

2. And of course they broke the *second* by making graven and molten images—particularly Manasseh, who put a carved idol in the actual house of God itself. (II. Chron. xxxiii.)

3. Commend us to Jehoram for *taking the name of God in vain*. He utterly forsook God, and caused the people to do likewise.

4. Of the *profanation of the Sabbath*, Jeremiah and Isaiah both speak (Jer. xvii., 20, and Is. lviii., 13), and to this offence on the part of the wicked kings they attribute the future fate of the kingdom of Judah.

5. In examining the second table of the law we find bad children in pious families. Isaac is deceived by Jacob. Ahaz goes contrary to the life and words of good Jotham. This *fifth commandment* has been conspicuously kept—and as conspicuously broken.

6. As for the *sixth commandment*, it is plain that David was too much a man of blood to be allowed to build the Temple. And Manasseh "shed innocent blood very much."

7. The *seventh commandment* had a multiplicity of violators. It is indeed the one command of all the list which has suffered the most—as though, somehow, there were found in it the essence of those fleshly lusts which make the bitterest war upon the soul. I may only mention Judah and Tamar, David and Bathsheba, and the abominations of Jehoram.

8. *Theft* also has its notable exemplars. It would be difficult to disentangle Jacob from the meshes of this portion of the law.

9. And so we may say as to *falsehood*, for Abraham lied to the king of Egypt; and Isaac did the same to Abimelech. And where is there a more horrible woman for all depravity, treachery and lies than Athaliah?

10. David and Jacob evidently broke the *tenth commandment*.

Thus we have detected the ancestors of the sinless Saviour in all manner of transgressions. And not alone in these samples of crime, but in others, too. For Noah was the first drunkard, and Solomon was the greatest of polygamists. All through this line of genealogy we shall observe the traces of the individuality which is produced by Sin—the will of man striving either with, or against, his passions, and so determining his character for ill or good.

And as Satan has many camp-followers, let us not forget that Azariah was a leper, and Asa had the gout. It is a story then which shows how this glacial age of Sin has ground its way, and marked it with ineffaceable striations, across the surface of mankind.

We have arrived at another great feature of this analysis, namely, the evident *guidance and supervision of a supernatural authority*, shaping these diverse elements to one definite end. We have been looking, on scientific principles, for something better and more than erratic, unguided, and eccentric developments of disposition or behavior.

I admit, frankly, that this is the supreme test of the argument. If this cannot be shown, then the list of names is in no wise unique. It is only singular in being so perfect, and extending so far back into remote ages.

But when we face this difficulty it is no difficulty at all, for it is here that the Bible lends us constant and unvarying support. Unless the birth of the future Messiah—the Representative Redeemer—was the real intention of the divine providence, and unless we were to move, page by page, to a result as clear and certain as a mathematical demonstration, why, I ask, should so many things of this nature and so many conclusive facts be interjected into the narrative? The study of the *covenants* receives a

fresh impulse, when it is manifest that these covenants are the renewals of the original promise, and the recalling of its provisions to those who are to be led in a right path. Paul, when he wrote to the Galatians, assuredly understood them in this manner. Noah gives to one of his sons the appellation Shem—as if he were to be the progenitor of an illustrious “name.” The primal covenant is reasserted to Abraham, to Isaac, to Jacob. It is hinted to Boaz in the congratulations of his fellow-townsmen. Of Jesse God said, “I have *provided Me* a king among his sons.”

David, according to the divine promise, was to have a “light always before Me in Jerusalem.” The expression is repeated when Jehoram, who married Athaliah, brought God’s anger on Judah. Haggai and Zechariah identify Christ in type and shadow with Zerubbabel, and the Saviour Himself put this interpretation on David’s word: “The Lord said unto my lord, Sit thou on My right hand until I make thine enemies thy footstool.” (Matt. xxii., 44.) Jewish prophecy had been so well studied that the Magi had no trouble in ascertaining where, in the land of Judea, the Christ should be born. I claim this series of suggestions, promises, covenants, warnings, judgments and blessings as an essential part of the argument, far more fully stated to us in the Scriptures than any other part. The place where we should anticipate barrenness is therefore waving with an abundant harvest, ready for the sickle of the reaper. And I may be allowed to repeat the words I uttered a moment since, and to reaffirm that the doctrine of covenants, seen from this angle, will prove a fruitful study to any devout and earnest questioner. In a single sentence the Scripture has summed up the case, when it declares that the “testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy.” That such a sentence should stand at the latter part of the closing book of the canonical Scriptures, is no less remarkable than that it should appear at all.

Thus, persistent as the precession of the equinoxes, God’s purpose went steadily on. Nations arose and nations fell. Flood and wandering and dispersion; war and peace and theocratic rule; evil and good kings; knowledge and ignorance; degradation and elevation; the brick-kilns of slavery and the profuse treasure

of Solomon's reign—all these wrought upon the chosen people and, equally, upon that chosen line among the chosen people, which ran through the very centre of their social and political life.

Never did this line deviate, even in critical circumstances, from the true course. It came through the twin Pharez, for Zarah was to be the ancestor of Achan who betrayed the children of Israel, at Jericho, for "a wedge of gold, and a goodly Babylonish garment." It came through Isaac and not Ishmael, for Ishmael was a wild man whose "hand was against every man and every man's hand against him"; and it came through Jacob and not his twin-brother Esau, for Esau was a freebooter and an outlaw. Thus the progress of this genealogy was kept within the conservative limits, and on that side of the family where perpetuity and peace would be ultimately found. It was not suffered, according to the natural fate of families, to run out and disappear, or be submerged in some foreign stock. When it sank very low it was raised from slavery to Exodus, from captivity to restoration—as, in the history of the kings, it once leaped upward from Jotham to Josiah.

Like some wonderful stream, hemmed in on either side by granite walls of divine decree, it goes onward down the vale. Now it darts along with arrowy swiftmess. Again it returns almost upon itself. At times it flows with vehemence over a rocky bed. At other times it moves with a sluggish and scarcely discernible current. Anon clear, and then turbid, it passes finally, by a delta of double channels, into the vast and quiet sea. Well may we call that a "wondrous humanity" to whose bosom these troubled waters of human life have been tending for so many years and ages of the past!

It is with this stage of our progress that the real intricacy of the problem begins. By all natural inferences we must look for something new and unheard of in the actual birth of the Human Redeemer.

Before we consider this we may enumerate what things we have now settled upon the side of heredity. I know a person of mingled blood, combining in himself a lineage composed of Scotch-Irish, Scotch, English, Dutch and French. He has the

caution of the Scotchman with the recklessness of the Irishman, and the determination and force of the Scotch-Irish. He has a Dutch love of freedom, and an English touch of pride. He has the versatility of the Frenchman, and at times his frivolity; tempered, however, by the almost Puritan sternness of his covenanting forefathers. In short, he is, and he will continue to be, a contradiction and a puzzle to any one who does not know how he came to be what he is. But, as I have continued to know him, I have found him developing an harmonious character under the influence of a sincere devotion to God. His greatest struggles to-day grow out of what he represents in himself, and in the necessity which is upon him to conform to God's will, instead of his own.

Such an ethnological and psychological fact sets ajar a door into the character of Jesus of Nazareth; and through this crevice we may glance at the question now in hand.

The problem itself lies in this shape:

GIVEN: The purpose of God that there *should be a Human Redeemer* for the human race.

GIVEN: The impossibility that any human being, ordinarily born, could rise above the conditions of his servitude enough to *save himself*, to say nothing of others.

GIVEN: A *marked progress of some sort*, which has for its ultimate intention the birth or development of this Redeemer.

REQUIRED: *The conditions and manner of this birth.*

One who never had seen a cactus in flower could by no means predicate from the dead, dry stalk the possibility of a night-blooming cereus—which would expand when other plants were folded shut, and would then, in so brief a period, perish and be gone. But this concept is no harder to form in advance, than it would be for one to imagine how it will please the Almighty Wisdom to produce the Saviour of mankind. And yet the hints and indications already given to the chosen nation, are enough to have sustained the religious life of the world.

Now if the Redeemer came in any other than the fulness of time; if He was born (for a human being must be humanly born) at any other date, or in any other way, than one in which Sin could have had entire force upon His transmitted physical structure; if He was placed at any point where He would not be

at the centre of history, both of the human mind and of the human race; if a single condition (as of God's sovereignty) interfered with, and overrode any other single condition (as of Man's free agency), then the ruin of mankind was complete, and the salvation promised to it had failed.

The inquiries into history, philosophy, heredity, and every matter of Science which is thus called in evidence, have been conducted for the most part by non-Christian, or even anti-Christian, thinkers and students. It is a source of satisfaction that this argument for which the Church of Christ has been long waiting, is now furnished forth by the kind help of those who knew not what they did. A few names will settle this fact beyond dispute. In heredity, Dalton; in ethics, Sidgwick; in sociology, Tylor and Herbert Spencer; in natural history and physics, Huxley, Tyndall, Darwin and Wallace; in the study of other religions, Max Muller, Samuel Johnson and James Freeman Clarke—not to mention such investigators as Bunsen and Humboldt—have been known to us long enough for their labors to be recognized as independent, faithful and removed from any reproach of special pleading, or unscientific bigotry. I have mainly omitted the later names in all these departments, for the reason that I wish to show how these men first rendered to Christian thought the tribute of the unprejudiced examination of scientific data. By furnishing us with facts they make us able to discard their theories, and to draw conclusions equally well with themselves. "Lord," said the disciples on a certain memorable occasion, "we found one teaching in Thy name and we forbade him because he followed not us." "Forbid him not," said the calm voice, by way of answer, "for he that is not against us is on our part."

It is therefore abundantly established nowadays, that the birth of Christ was central in all particulars. No one authority ever held the mastery of earth like that of Cæsar Augustus. No thinkers have ever stood higher than the Greek philosophers. No religions have been grander than those which, fully five centuries before Christ, bore the names of the great Persian, Chinese, and Indian teachers. Each of these religions, and with them the initial Greek philosophy of Pythagoras, is crystallized about some

Christian idea, some instructor and head who dimly indicated by his presence and virtues the need which men have always felt for a Saviour from their sorrows and sins. Each of them, as I have already given their key-notes, is a sham, a fallacy, a "thing pleasant to the eyes and to be desired to make men wise." There will some day arise a scholar who will show us the propædæutic office of these religions, in such a beautifully lucid way that we shall understand the justice of the Scripture woe pronounced against "the heathen who are at ease." "Humanity," says De Pressensè, "taken as a whole, has never erred in its mode of propounding the religious problem. It has ever held religion to be not a mere communication of ideas concerning the divinity, but a solemn effort to reunite the broken bond between heaven and earth; to re-establish an effectual union between man and God. The religions of the ancient world," he proceeds, "had all presentiments of this union, and strove to realize it. In the East it manifested itself under the form of frequent incarnations; in the West in the apotheoses. In the East it is the divinity that stoops to man; in the West humanity rises to the divinity; but neither in India nor in Greece was the real union between God and man effected."

In this respect, then, the contest has ceased. This nineteenth century after Christ concedes to Jesus of Nazareth the palm of honor as thinker, teacher, philanthropist, religious leader. It lifts Him from His tomb to set Him upon the throne. But He has again eluded this mockery of a superficial homage, and He claims no posthumous glory while He deserves, instead, the higher award of recognition as the living Intercessor of mankind.

Return with me to the problem of His actual birth.

I. He must be *pure and free from sin*, else how could He escape that selfishness which is born within us, which is antecedent to our very existence, and which is the essence of a nature thus tainted and made originally sinful, by the exact principles of the law of heredity? In some manner the Redeemer must be set free from this inheritance.

II. But He must be also *truly human*—born as the "seed of the woman." He must have an earthly mother.

III. Then consider too the *fulness of time*. It should be the

world's best age. *Mentally* it must have touched its highest unaided achievement. *Politically* it should present the greatest possible oneness and security from commotion. *Financially* it should exhibit the extremes of luxury and of poverty, side by side. It should be a time ripe for the development of *philanthropy*. It should be that period of *history* when men most desired the solution of the problem of reconciliation to God.

I beg you to remember that Matthew and Luke tell us of the birth of Christ without the least conforming of their facts to the necessities of our theory. To them Science, such as we possess, had no existence. Their account must stand the scientific testing of to-day, upon its intrinsic truthfulness. They are observers and witnesses—that is all.

In Mary the mother of our Lord they present to us a pure unmarried woman, loving and beloved. Gabriel's mission is in exact accord with the prophecy of Jeremiah (xxxi., 22), where it is said that the Messiah shall have no human father. To Mary's simple-hearted question comes an equally simple-hearted and direct response. Nor is the visit to Elizabeth without its due significance to the story. And now steps forward modern gynæcology—one of the most subtle and tender of all sciences in the hands of the tender and the pure-minded—and even modern gynæcology can ask no better *data* than what Matthew gives. Joseph, Matthew tells us, is a "just man," one who is deeply shocked at his betrothed cousin's condition. He is unwilling to make Mary a public example. He reaches such a height of character that to him, as to one of the patriarchs of old, a word comes from Heaven about the child that is to be born. He is in the profoundest trouble in which a pious Jew could be placed. And when he marries Mary he preserves her reputation at the expense of his own. Nay, this fine Matthew goes further still, and in the 18th and 25th verses of his first chapter he puts on record something which I suppose a good many of us have never understood, and which we have perhaps been inclined to regard as needless, if not improper. There is a class of Bible-tinkers who have appeared of late, who would like nothing better than to purge the Scriptures of what they are pleased to style "indecentencies," and matters offensive to a cultivated taste. But against them

thunders the mighty curse from the open heaven above Patmos: "If any man add, or if any man take away, God shall add woe and take away blessing." It is the old corrective which we find in Deuteronomy (iv., 2): "Ye shall not add, neither shall ye diminish."

Therefore when we read in Luke's account that Mary was only Joseph's "betrothed" wife, we readily assent to the fact which lies in his mind, and which is the corroboration of Matthew's statement.

The problem is solved in a manner hitherto unimagined. The power of original sin is abruptly broken asunder. The seed of the woman is indeed the Redeemer. He comes through shame and misapprehension, and is literally "made under the law." In Him are found the traits of all past ancestry to such an extent that He is truly the microcosm of the human race.

I pause for an instant to drive away a pack of snarling sceptics. They sneer at this device of a woman to escape her shame. But, inasmuch as Mary became the actual wife of Joseph, and had other children, whose descendents—it is a strange thought!—may be among us in the world to-day, why was there any need for Matthew or Luke to write as they did? Does a John the Baptist sacrifice his whole life—do Magi come across the desert—to do honor to an illegitimate nobody? Does Pilate believe that this is a person over whose head ought not to be written the inscription, "This is the King of the Jews"? When the impossibilities are spoken of, then we may properly ask whether this birth is any stranger than the very corner-stone of Christianity, namely, the resurrection. And are either of these unique events any more isolated from comparison than the life of this Man who "spake as never man spake"? Christ is so human and so divine that what God hath joined together man puts asunder at his peril. Modern doubt now prefers to ignore what it cannot explain nor deny. But we have the right to stand by this great banner-principle, as in the Crusades men rallied to that signal-car from which floated Godfrey of Bouillon's standard, with its motto, "God wills it!" Scientists have increased our difficulties by their inquiries. It is time for us to declare to them, "Show us another solution; afford us a better analysis, and we are sat-

ified." For the day of apologies is past, and the day of challenge and courage has come.

Thus was Christ Jesus born into the world. No touch save that of the Holy Spirit was upon the Lily of Nazareth. And while we deny her none of her glory as a spotless and profoundly pious soul, let us not exalt her unduly. She was a woman indeed, but a woman only. As from the man Adam at first came Eve, the woman without earthly mother; so now from the woman Mary came the Man Jesus, without earthly father.

This is a real person. He has a true body and a reasonable soul. He eats, drinks, labors, sleeps, journeys, is weary, sorrows, rejoices and wears the common aspect of a man. He learns Noah's trade, for is He not to build the ark of a new creation and to teach the world how to construct the home for the family? For this cause He was known as the "Carpenter." In point of fact He displays the characteristic features of our physical structure—the flesh and bones of one who is neither an angel nor a spirit.

But the animal nature of the race, that sinful taint impressed on Adam by the Fall and descending through Seth—this never assailed Him except from without. His was a body absolutely pure and holy; hence its capacities and sympathies, its supremacy over nature, its command over man, its conquest over death. Jesus Christ was not narrowed down to the sphere of an individual, and to one country and to one period of time. If we were to remove from history this personality which is known to us by the name of Jesus Christ, we should destroy a veritable ganglion of humanity. If the story were *not* true, the world would insist that it *should* be true!

Suppose the "worm Jacob" should then turn on his insulters. He could thresh down their mountains of theory with these stubborn facts. They would prove a genuine whip of small cords to lash these traders out of the sacred precincts. For if this were not a philosopher beyond philosophers, a teacher beyond teachers, a reformer beyond reformers, and a Redeemer beyond redeemers, then He might have died as a poor carpenter; His reputed origin would have been the vague tradition of His

native village and a parcel of Syrian earth would have held His mouldering bones. By what calculation of chances could the present results of His birth, life, death, resurrection and doctrine have been estimated?

Our thoughts are too familiar with the story of Bethlehem and the manger for me to delay upon that. I only desire you to notice that the extremes of society were there—kings with their gifts and shepherds with their worship. The Redeemer begins His career at the lowest round of the social scale. He must reconstruct the world from its dregs to its diadems. He must begin below in order to uplift this sinking mass. The birth of Jesus Christ is the convulsive throe which heaves the slow-growing coral island at once to the surface of the ocean, and makes it a refuge in the midst of the mighty waters.

Not yet, however, must we end our inquiry. From babyhood to manhood this Redeemer will need to be made perfect for His work by means of sufferings. He has come to a stricken race; and if it was instinctive for Francis Xavier to go into the rotting steerage of the Portuguese galleon and there share the lot of the desperate and ruined adventurers who were on board, it must have been still more instinctive for the Saviour to enter thoroughly into the toil, grief and pain of our mortal lot.

It is not without purpose, therefore, that the sacred historians of the New Testament reveal to us that there was an immense accession of Satanic energy at the coming of Christ. Upon this earth came the commander-in-chief of the hostile forces. Satan was incarnated and his demons got themselves houses of wretched, sinful, human frames wherever they could. The devil, so to say, perceived the coming contest and entrenched himself to direct the campaign in person.

When the devil finds that he has "nothing in Christ" and that this sinless nature must be attacked from without, it does not at all vitiate the truth that the Redeemer of mankind was tempted, actually, in all points, "like as we are, yet without sin." We are now at length in the well-trodden path of theology, and I may safely assume that temptation is only sin when it is indulged or allowed. And I can also claim that we agree upon the uselessness of such a trial as is attempted by the devil

in the wilderness, unless there were some vulnerable spot in the humanity of Jesus Christ. What Archbishop Trench has so elaborately and admirably settled cannot require any pause from us to-day. Yet we are able to recognize here even better than Trench, for we come by another road, the wonderful harmony of this threefold assault with that recorded in the opening pages of Genesis. It is the old conflict renewed. Adapted to its changed conditions the method of the adversary is just the Eden story over again. It was not original with Voltaire and his correspondents to use the signet on which was engraved "Crush the Wretch," for this was the device with which every battle-order of the devil's campaign was sealed.

I. Again we turn to these Evangelists for their help in noting the instances of suffering and struggle through which our Saviour passed. The *flight into Egypt* was the first—a terrible journey for a young child. But in this we perceive how obedience is already beginning to reconstruct the fabric of mankind and how a dutiful free-agency obstructs the design of Satan. Joseph is as notable an illustration of faithful obedience as Abraham was. See too on what a slender thread hangs this infant life, beset by Herod's hate and with all the dangers of wild animals and wilder men around it. That is a lovely thought of the French painter which seats Mary and the child between the outstretched paws of the great Sphinx, while the weary Joseph and the tethered ass are there below. For this woman and this babe gave the answer to the riddle of humanity and this King of men comes, "meek, and riding on an ass"—the most despised of beasts of burden, as He is Himself the most inconspicuous of the myriads of mankind. Not Moses in his bulrush ark was more helpless than this persecuted baby.

II. We notice again that as a poor man's son Jesus *had a poor man's pains*. Labor and fatigue were His. Perhaps there were houses in Palestine on which the very hands of the son of Joseph wrought. We must not etherealize this story. He could only have been an average man—the average man. We hear of Him asleep in the ship, wearied by the well, dropping under the cross which the dark child of Africa, Simon of Cyrene—called "Niger" or the Black—carried in His stead. At the crucifixion

Jesus was dead before the others. In any event John enables us to say that the gush of lymph from the side pierced by the soldier's spear was a proof of dropsy of the pericardium—a fatal disease. And this disease is one which is not due to any inherited weakness or structural lesion, but entirely to mental anguish and to the tormenting anxieties which beset a beleaguered life.

III. *Want*, also, and *homelessness* were the lot of Jesus. He had not where to lay His head and could at last only bow it upon the cross and die. The fox had his little family, the bird his little brood. But marriage and home were forbidden thoughts to the Man of Sorrows. Yet I read no more pathetic idyll in all the lore of all the ages, than the pure, devoted, death-defying affection of Mary of Bethany for Jesus of Nazareth.

IV. And now we must include the *actual temptation* addressed to the body, the soul, and the spirit of the Human Redeemer. He fasted and was driven by the Holy Spirit among the wild beasts—a hungry second Adam, with all the world against Him. His fight was to be fought in the desert, and not in Eden; and the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of the Eyes, and the Pride of Life, which are the Satanic trinity, must there attack Him.

The particulars of this life-and-death grapple between good and evil I shall not attempt to portray. They are, however, a most striking and suggestive confirmation of our argument.

V. From this time onward the devil *seeks to hinder and prevent the work of Christ*. It is because of these perpetual resistances that we have record of those prayers in mountains and deserts. Never once did the Son of Man fail—but sooner or later every disciple “forsook Him and fled.” The Transfiguration could not keep them awake. Even Gethsemane finds them slumbering. The Last Supper itself is polluted by a traitor's hand. He was Satan's own man, that Judas of Kerioth, but when he saw himself as God saw him, the betrayer of innocent blood, he turned to suicide and went to his own place. Thus it was that the Redeemer battled with disappointment, with grief, with ignorance, with treachery, with envy, with malevolence, with stupidity, with arrogance and with bigotry. Thus He kept His purpose—for now it is He who, as God manifest in

the flesh, is working out the problem to its conclusion. Thus He pressed the campaign forward on God's part against the hindrances of formalism and hypocrisy, and under the shadow of the semi-philosophy, semi-idolatry of Rome.

Some one once said to Frederick William Robertson that he was in a sure way to suffer for his bold advocacy of the right. "Madam," he replied, "I don't care." "Do you know, sir, to what Don't Care comes?" "Yes, madam; Don't Care was crucified on Calvary between two thieves." It was such a conviction of what would be the end of it all which led Jesus Christ, partly by divine inspiration and partly by human foresight, to predict so often the nature of His own death. For thirty years He had been preparing for this struggle. Three years would be enough to close it and to complete the task.

VI. Nor would I have you forget that these typical temptations were *forever recurring*. Take the cases where His own courage saved His life. Take the instance where, upon the cross, He refused the anodyne which would have drugged His watchful sense of personal responsibility. It was invariably the same principle on which He acted throughout His ministry. He allowed nothing to turn Him from His Father's work—the work of carrying out the scheme of redemption.

VII. There was, of course, in Him *no trace of devil's desires*, like lust or gluttony. And yet, strange as it may sound, I affirm to you that the gospels give a record of incidents which show that an assault was made upon Him by every one of these base passions. It must be remembered that His standard of morality was intense and lofty. To *think* the evil was as truly to commit sin as if the consenting thought were followed by actual transgression.

VIII. There was besides a more dangerous, because more fallacious, *series of trials* in addition to all the rest. Who can say that love of country is wrong; or that it is wrong to wish to deliver one's people and kindred from a foreign yoke? And this Man truly wept over those who were scattered as sheep without a shepherd, and He lamented over the decay of the capital city of Judea—but He never swerved from His course. Not even when they "came by force to make Him a king"; not even under

the sweet pathos of that reverent love which came to Him in the house at Bethany, which waited at His cross, and which watched beside His tomb!

IX. Greatest scenes of all—best known to us, but in new light now because of this story which we have been tracking down the long files of time—are *the sorrowful Gethsemane and the awful Calvary*. Words may not paint this picture aright. Modern skill in the study of nerve and brain, and the pathology of human agony, tell us much which the four Evangelists recorded but could never have understood. And while in these scenes we behold what many persons consider to be the true atonement, to us they are only the culmination of what has occurred from Adam unto Christ. Listen to the testimony around that cross. Observe the contradictions and representative features in that death. See how hell comes on earth as if for triumph; and how tempest and earthquake and the sheeted ghosts that speed along the public ways, attest the shaking and convulsion of the frame of nature. Once more it is Satan's victory, but that cry, "It is finished," transformed his victory into defeat. The serpent had bruised the heel and wounded unto death the Redeemer of the race—the Representative Human Being who had taken up the old battle in behalf of His mortal kin. But that heel was crushing the serpent's head, and from thenceforth even to this day, "Hell and sin are vanquished foes."

Thus we have traced, often in mere outline, the story of this wondrous plan. We have, I trust, found in it a clue to the intricacy of the Scriptures. In it we have obtained a method of reconciling difficulties, of explaining enigmas. It is the key to prophecy. It is the interpreter of history.

Science tells us that far beneath the carbon of old geologic *strata* the central fires of the globe begin to heave and surge. At last they break, in volcanic flames, through the dead fern-trees and crushed structures of the past. Then, in the glow and terror before which all else must melt and fly, in that intense heat and in that mighty crucible, the diamond is born. Finally after many years, it comes from its rocky matrix. Flawless and perfect it goes into the lapidary's hands. With slow and patient

art he grinds and polishes its priceless beauty until it shines as the gem of gems—a jewel for a crown.

Thus, in the hot heart of man and in the strife of ages, but yet by deliberate purpose and of set resolve, was produced the gem, Christ. Thus was He perfected by suffering. Thus shall all His glory be laid at last at the Father's feet. The new heaven and the new earth, with water of life and tree of life—the restored Eden—shall come back again. The morning stars shall again sing together, and the sons of God shall shout aloud for joy. Satan shall be bound. Death and hell shall be cast into the lake of fire. And He who sitteth on the throne shall announce the opening æon of a new creation, for He saith, "Behold I make all things new."

MEMORABILIA.

A PARODY of the doctrine of evolution which appeared in the papers some years ago was lately printed in the *Boston Herald* and prefaced with the words which precede the "sceptic's prayer," as it is called, as follows :

"Austin Bierbower, a German imposter of this city, constructed parts of a ritual for unbelievers and sceptics which the Free Religious Association and the agnostic congregation of this city might adopt as a satisfactory service. The sceptic's prayer is as follows: 'I believe in the chaotic nebula, self-existent evolver of heaven and earth, and in the differentiation of its original homogeneous mass, its first begotten product, which was self-formed into separate worlds, divided into land and water, self-organized into plants and animals, reproduced in like species, further developed into higher orders, and finally refined, rationalized and perfected in man. He descended from the monkey, ascended to the philosopher, and sitteth down in rites and customs of civilization under the laws of a developing sociology. From thence he shall come again, by the disintegration of the culminated heterogeneousness, back to the original homogeneousness of chaos. I believe in the wholly unknowable absolute, the wholly uncatholic church, the disunion of the saints, the survival of the fittest, the persistence of force, the dispersion of the body, and in death everlasting.'"

GOETHE has been named as a model of healthy scepticism. But hear him, near the close of life, say in his conversations with Eckermann: "Happiness is but a dream; misery only is real." "I have always been looked upon as a favorite of fortune; neither will I bemoan myself or accuse my past course of life as unworthy. But yet, after all, it has been nothing but labor and trouble, and I may well say that in my seventy-fifth year I have not had four weeks during which I could enjoy life." Hear Strauss confess to the awful condition of man, when the existence of God and providence is denied: "The giving up of faith in a divine providence is certainly one of the most sensitive losses that can befall man." Hear Humboldt: "I despise humanity in all its strata. I foresee that our posterity will be far more unhappy than we are. . . . The whole of life is a great insanity." Listen to Schopenhauer, the great German author and pessimist: "This world is the worst possible; the life of man is one of unbounded misery and wretchedness; existence is a blunder and crime, and 'not to be' is infinitely better than 'to be.'"

MONTHLY MEETING OF THE INSTITUTE.

BY THE SECRETARY.

THE Institute met in its rooms, No. 4 Winthrop Place, Thursday, April 1st, at 8 P.M., the President in the chair. The devotional exercises were conducted by Rev. Edward Riggs, Professor in the College at Marsovan, in Asia Minor, Turkey. The minutes of the last meeting were read and approved.

Rev. James F. Riggs, of Bergen Point, New Jersey, read a paper entitled "American Schools in the Turkish Empire."

Professor Edward Riggs, who has had an experience of many years among the people of that empire, described the state of education there and earnestly supported the views presented in the paper.

The next monthly meeting of the Institute will be held in October.

ABOUT BOOKS.

[In this department we shall make mention of recent publications, especially those in the line of our studies. There will not be space for extended review. The name of the book, its publisher, and its price when known, together with a brief statement of its drift will probably meet the demands of our readers. Any book mentioned will be sent post-paid, on receipt of price, by WILBUR B. KETCHAM, 71 Bible House, New York.]

"THE TWO BOOKS OF NATURE AND REVELATION COLLATED," is the title of a work by Dr. George D. Armstrong, former Professor of Chemistry and Geology in Lee University. This book makes another demonstration of the fact that scientific questions can be discussed in such a way as to be intelligible and interesting to men who are not employed in scientific studies. The author has popularized the discussion of the matters he treats of, and has confined himself to the strong points. The second chapter in this book was originally delivered as a lecture at the Summer School of the American Institute of Christian Philosophy, at Key-East, 1885, and subsequently published in CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. In regard to one portion of his work, our own opinion is expressed by Professor Hodge, of Princeton, who says: "His 'Evolution' is admirable. I have read it with great pleasure and profit. It is vastly superior to the great mass of the discussions on either side—of the men of religion who know no science, or of the men of science who know no religion. We want more, much more, from the class to which Dr. Armstrong belongs—those who are theologians as well as Christians, and intelligently acquainted with the fundamental ideas, language and methods of science." (Funk & Wagnalls. Price, \$1.)

"MECHANICS AND FAITH; A Study of Spiritual Truth in Nature," by Charles Talbot Porter, undertakes to show that a proper study of mechanical science, instead of necessarily producing materialistic convictions, will be of great assistance in the discovery of spiritual truth. It contains some excellent passages on the harmony between natural and revealed religion, and the satisfactory confirmations of the Bible to be found in

nature. We cannot go the whole lengths to which his theories lead the author, while we have great respect for the ability with which he has written. The author's basal idea may be found in the following sentence: "In this inquiry matter will be considered to be force itself, manifested in endless diversity of adaptation to our nature and wants. This conception of the identity of matter with force must be regarded as fundamental in true philosophy." (G. P. Putnam's Sons. Price, \$1.50.)

The Rt. Rev. Bishop Bedell, one of the Vice-Presidents of our Institute of Christian Philosophy, was joined by his excellent wife in doing for Kenyon College what we have been hoping and praying some one would do for our Institute. These worthy and distinguished Christians have put \$5,000 into the hands of the trustees of the College, the interest of which shall be used to procure lectures on the Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion or the Relations of Science to Religion. The lecturer in the course for 1885 was Hugh Miller Thompson, Assistant Bishop of Mississippi, whose two lectures on "THE WORLD AND THE LOGOS" are full of force and fire. They are worthy the perusal of all thoughtful people; they pour another broadside into the already battered fashionable science. We could wish that a cheap edition of this little book might be generally circulated. (G. P. Putnam's Sons. Price, \$1.)

A number of essays have been selected from the papers of the late Lewis R. Packard, Professor of Greek in Yale College, and are published under the title of "STUDIES IN GREEK THOUGHT." It is not necessary to say that they are scholarly: Professor Packard's reputation says that. Some portions are very fine. One of the papers, namely, "Plato's Arguments in the *Phædo* for the Immortality of the Soul," is a brief paper which will be most acceptable to those who have heard so many allusions to Plato in connection with immortality and have not had either the time or the scholarship necessary to enable them to go to the original source for information. We know of nothing more fairly done than the Professor's presentation of the ancient philosopher's views. While scholars will greatly enjoy this paper, we believe that even the unlearned who wish to know

what has been the course of thought in the world will have much satisfaction from its perusal. The other papers are: "Religion and Immortality of the Greeks," "Plato's System of Education in the Republic," "The *Œdipus Rex* of Sophokles," "The *Antigone* of Sophokles," "The *Œdipus at Kolonos* of Sophokles," and "The Beginning of Written Literature Among the Greeks." (Ginn & Co. Price, \$1.)

"ATONEMENT AND LAW," by Rev. John M. Armour, has made good its claims to attention by having reached its third edition. It is a vigorous attempt to show that redemption is in harmony with law, as revealed in nature and Providence; that it was no departure from the original divinely-ordained order in the administration of law; and that it was merely the highest exemplification as yet shown of the principle recognized everywhere throughout the divine government. The author maintains his propositions with great force. Those who cannot accept all his views and all his conclusions must be helped by the reverent and able manner in which he handles his high theme. This book requires and will provoke thought wherever properly taken in hand. ("Christian Statesman" Pub. Co. Price, \$1.50.)

We take pleasure always in announcing an addition to "Griggs' Philosophical Classics," the initial volume of which was Dr. George S. Morris's critical exposition of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." We now have before us Kant's "ETHICS," by President Porter of Yale College. Through the whole of the century which has intervened since Kant's first publication, his influence over thinkers seems to have steadily increased. President Porter now gives us Kant's ethics in a volume which is explanatory and critical. The reader is not embarrassed in reaching Kant's idea through his terminology; the critical wisdom of President Porter has enabled him to put the thoughts of the great thinker in such a form that ordinary English readers may understand what he means. In this age, when most men are entirely too pushed to go to the original sources, it is a great help to have the substance of these systems presented in a succinct and comprehensive manner. (S. C. Griggs & Co., Price, \$1.25.)

"EVOLUTION OF TO-DAY" is from the pen of Dr. Conn, of the Faculty of Wesleyan University. He attempts to give a summary of the theory of Evolution, as held by scientists at the present time, and an account of the progress made by the discussions and investigations of a quarter of a century. It is a fair and able book; but we do not think we shall ever come to an understanding until an agreement be entered into among scientific and philosophical writers to draw a marked distinction between evolution and development. When Dr. Conn calls the names of certain well-known Christian men as representing believers in evolution, we think it will be found in all cases that they are only believers in development. The fact is, there are as many sects of Evolutionists as there are of Presbyterians, or Methodists, or Baptists. We certainly admire the spirit in which Dr. Conn's book is written. (G. P. Putnam's Sons. Price, \$1.75.)

To the series of "Stories of the Nations" Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons have added the "STORY OF CHALDEA, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE RISE OF ASSYRIA," by Zénaïde A. Ragozin. A large portion of the book is occupied by a treatment of the ruins, as they appeared in the times of Xenophon, of Alexander, of the Arabs, and of the Turks; then as they were explored in 1820 by Rich, in 1842 by Botta, and in 1845 by Layard. The ruins are described at considerable length, the letter-press descriptions being assisted by pictorial illustrations. The four stages of culture, nomadic, pastoral, agricultural and civic, are treated, after which follows a discussion of Genesis x., which the author calls the oldest and most important document in existence concerning the origin of the race. The legends and stories add to the interest of the book. Amongst the illustrations is that of a Babylonian cylinder, in which two human beings are represented as stretching out their hands toward a fruit-tree, while a serpent stands "behind the woman in, one might say, what was almost a whispering attitude." This valuable book contains two maps and eighty illustrations. It will serve the purposes of many who cannot examine the larger works of Rawlinson, Smith and Layard. (Price, \$1.50.)

"THOUGHTS FOR THOUGHT" is the title of a small book

containing several discourses by William Frederic Faber. It deserves its title. We know not who the author is, but he has presented some thoughts which every thoughtful man in America ought to lay to heart—thoughts which would correct many of our American prejudices. The first discourse is devoted to the "Church and State," and consists of a plea for their complete separation. The author considers our chaplains in army and navy, our Thanksgiving proclamations, our use of the Bible in the public schools, and the legend "In God we Trust," stamped on our coins, as "relics of Protestant state religion, nothing more, nothing less." "They are not parts of the American system, if we are to look for that system in the National and State constitutions." As an example of the embarrassment to which the retaining of this "element of peril in the state" may lead, he instances the struggle in the New York Legislature over the Freedom of Worship Bill, and urges that we should "put away the last vestiges of state religion." (Published by A. E. Rose, Westfield, N. Y. Price, \$1.)

In our last number we mentioned Count Tolstói's "MY RELIGION." This remarkable man is the author also of probably the greatest work of fiction in the Russian tongue, and one of the greatest novels probably ever written. The title of it is "Anna Karénina." The wonderful conscientiousness which appears in "My Religion" pervades this great story. It is valuable as presenting us to Russian society in the highest classes. Great ability is shown as well in the author's insight into character as in those little details in the painting which make it perfectly real. More life-like pictures we have not seen in many a day, but whether the reader is to get good from it or not is in this case, as in the case of "My Religion," to depend upon the reader. It does not seem a very good book for very young readers. The translation, by Mr. Dole, seems quite excellent. (T. Y. Crowell & Co. Price, \$1.75.)

"SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF SOME COMMON THINGS." By W. M. Williams, F.R.S., F.C.S. (J. Fitzgerald. Price, 15 cents.) Every reader will find in this little work something that will interest and instruct him. The subjects treated by the author are

